Traylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Patrick Austin Traylor,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
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No. CV 25-00404-TUC-RM (MAA)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Patrick Austin Traylor, filed this action for review of the final decision of
the Commissioner for Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1, p. 1.
The case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for report and
recommendation pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court. Doc. 10.
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review,
affirm the final decision of the Commissioner. The ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion
of Traylor’s treating provider Dr. Sara Frye. The jobs identified by the vocational expert at step
five of the disability analysis do not require skills that exceed Traylor’s residual functional
capacity (RFC).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Traylor filed an application for disability insurance benefits (Title II) and supplemental
security income (Title XVI) on November 2, 2021. Administrative Record, AR 33. He alleged
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This appears to be the date of his neuropsychological evaluation with Dr. Sara S. Frye.1
AR 505.
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disability beginning on October 12, 2021 due to “intellectual disability, anxiety, skin condition1
ichthosis [sic], [and] thyroid.” AR 369.
Traylor’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 33. He
requested review and appeared with counsel or a representative at a hearing before
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) TinTin Chen on September 14, 2023, February 8, 2024, and
June 13, 2024. AR 33, 46, 55, 72, 99.
The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits on August 23, 2024. AR 46. The Appeals
Council denied Traylor’s request for review on June 27, 2025, making the decision of the ALJ
the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1. Traylor subsequently filed this action appealing
that final decision. Doc. 1.
Hearing Testimony
At the first hearing, on September 14, 2023, Traylor testified that he works at Pizza Hut.
AR 101. In 2017, he earned $13,817 which was just below the significant gainful activity
(SGA) threshold of $14,040. AR 101. Traylor testified that he currently works 14 hours per
week and does not have a job coach. AR 104. He does not believe he could work 30 hours per
week because he gets tired easily. AR 105.
The first supplemental hearing was held on February 8, 2024. AR 70. The ALJ read a
letter written by Larry Lounden, Traylor’s supervisor at Pizza Hut. AR 75. Lounden explained
that Traylor was “hired as a dough prep person . . . a highly repetitive task.” AR 76. Traylor
was successful at his job. AR 76. He was also successfully as a dishwasher, but not as a pizza
cook. AR 76. “The additional skills, speed and variables required [of a pizza cook] were not
within his range.” AR 76.
The ALJ took testimony from medical expert Dr. Jay Toews. AR 41, AR 76 (in the
transcript spelled “Taves”). Toews noted that the medical record showed cognitive limitations
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and contained references to mood-related problems. AR 78. Traylor testified that when he was
at Pizza Hut, he worked between 14 and 15 hours per week. AR 79. Toews opined that nothing
in the record indicated that Traylor could not work full-time. AR 79-80.
The second supplemental hearing was conducted on June 13, 2024. AR 66. The ALJ
took testimony from vocational expert Linda Tolley. AR 66. The ALJ asked Tolley to consider
a hypothetical claimant with Traylor’s age, education and past work, who “is limited to simple
routine and repetitive tasks,” whose “[i]nstructions should be given by demonstration or
verbally, never exclusively in written form,” who “should not be asked to conduct arithmetic
computations,” and who “should only occasionally interact with the public.” AR 67. Tolley
opined that such a person could work as a hand packager, Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(DOT) code 920.587-018; janitor, DOT code 381.687-018; or in the marker retail trade, DOT
code 209.587-034. AR 68. Tolley testified that her testimony was consistent with the DOT.
AR 68.
CLAIM EVALUATION
To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must demonstrate, through medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory standards, an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity
due to a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). “An individual
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in
the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(B).
“To determine whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, and therefore eligible for benefits, an ALJ follows a five-step sequential
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The citation is for a Title II claim (disability insurance benefits). The regulations for2
evaluating a Title XVI (supplemental security income) claim are substantively identical and
appear in the code beginning at 20 C.F.R. § 416.901. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148, n. 1
(9th Cir. 2020).
Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual can still do despite3
his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
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evaluation.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).2
The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If so, then the claimant is not disabled and benefits are
denied. Id.
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ proceeds to step
two, which requires a determination of whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or
combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). In making a determination at step
two, the ALJ uses medical evidence to evaluate whether the claimant has an impairment that
significantly limits or restricts his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
Id. If the ALJ concludes there is no severe impairment, the claim is denied. Id.
Upon a finding of severity, the ALJ proceeds to step three, which requires a
determination of whether the impairment meets or equals one of several listed impairments that
are so limiting as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, evaluation proceeds to the next step.
The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant has sufficient residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If yes,3
then the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant cannot perform any past relevant work, then the
ALJ must move to the fifth step, which requires consideration of the claimant’s RFC to perform
other substantial gainful work in the national economy in view of the claimant’s age, education,
and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
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“To meet this burden, the ALJ may rely on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found at
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 2 or on the testimony of a vocational expert.” Ford v. Saul,
950 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2020). “Given its inherent reliability, a qualified vocational
expert’s testimony as to the number of jobs existing in the national economy that a claimant can
perform is ordinarily sufficient by itself to support an ALJ’s step-five finding.” Id. at 1160.
The ALJ’s Findings
At step one of the disability analysis, the ALJ found that the claimant “has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since October 12, 2021, the alleged onset date . . . .” AR 36. At
step two, she found the claimant “has the following severe impairment: intellectual disability
. . . .” AR 36.
At step three, the ALJ found that the claimant “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 . . . .” AR 37.
The ALJ then analyzed the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). She found that
Traylor had the residual functional capacity to perform “a full range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is limited to simple
routine and repetitive tasks. Instructions should be given to the claimant by demonstration or
verbally, but never exclusively in written form. The claimant should never be asked to conduct
arithmetic computations. He can have only occasional interaction with the public.” AR 39-40.
At step four, the ALJ found that the claimant “has no past relevant work. . . .” AR. 44.
At step five, the ALJ found, relying on testimony from the vocational expert, that “there are jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform”
considering his “age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” such as
hand packager, janitor, or retail trade marker. AR 45. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Traylor
is not disabled. AR 46.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). The court “will disturb the [ALJ’s] denial of benefits only if the decision contains
legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2020) (punctuation modified). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, and
means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Id. “If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is
the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Id. Moreover, the court “may affirm the ALJ’s
decision even if the ALJ made an error, so long as the error was harmless, meaning it was
inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Id.
Discussion
After completing step three of the disability analysis, the ALJ evaluated Traylor’s
residual functional capacity. AR 39. As part of that evaluation, the ALJ considered the medical
opinion of the treating provider Dr. Sara Frye. AR 43. The ALJ found her opinion
“unpersuasive.” AR 44. Traylor argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
decision to discount the medical opinion of the treating provider. Doc. 19, p. 2.
Under the new regulations, “[t]he agency must articulate how persuasive it finds all of
the medical opinions from each doctor or other source, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), and explain
how it considered the supportability and consistency factors in reaching these findings.” Woods
v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9 Cir. 2022) (punctuation modified). “The more relevant theth
objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented and the more consistent with
evidence from other sources, the more persuasive a medical opinion or prior finding.” Machelle
H. v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4342313, at *7 (D. Idaho Sept. 22, 2021) (punctuation modified). “In
sum, the [ALJ] must explain [her] reasoning and specifically address how [she] considered the
supportability and consistency of the opinion, and [her] reasoning must be free from legal error
and supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
The ALJ’s analysis of Frye’s opinion reads in pertinent part as follows:
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Additionally, the undersigned considered the treating source statements by
psychologist Dr. Sara [Frye] . . . . (Exh. 5F; 6F). Dr. [Frye] opined that the
claimant had marked limitations in [his ability to] understand, remember, or apply
information and in [his ability to] adapt or manage oneself, and moderate
limitations in [his ability to] interact with others and concentrate, persist, or
maintain pace. (Exh. 5F/1) [AR 584.] While Dr. [Frye] supported her opinions
with the results of the neuropsychological evaluation she performed with the
claimant, the level of impairment indicated in the treating source statement is
generally inconsistent with the results of the neuropsychological evaluation and
the record as a whole. (Exh. 5F/1, 2). For example, the neuropsychological
evaluation results state that the claimant had mildly impaired processing speed,
mildly impaired auditory working memory, an average/intact visual working
memory, impaired immediate auditory memory, and mildly impaired immediate
visual memory. [AR 508.] The evaluation also states that the claimant’s
performance slightly improved in both auditory memory and visual memory after
a delay. (Exh. 1F/4); [AR 508.] These results do not support Dr. [Frye]’s opinion
that the claimant has a marked limitation in [his ability to] understand,
remember, or apply information as this limitation is more severe than the
evidence supports. Additionally, Dr. [Frye] noted in the statement that the
claimant’s comprehension and learning [are] substantially impacted by his
intellectual disability. However, the claimant performed most tasks during the
consultative examination without issue, and medical expert Dr. Toews testified
that the claimant would have no problems with simple repetitive tasks. (Exh.
3F/7-8; 5F/1; medical expert testimony). Thus, the undersigned finds the treating
source statement unpersuasive.
AR 43-44 (emphasis added). In this passage, the ALJ referenced the “B-Criteria” evaluation
of mental limitations, which considers a claimant’s ability to “understand, remember, or apply
information,” “interact with others,” “concentrate, persist, or maintain pace,” and “adapt or
manage oneself.” AR 38, 584. The ALJ believed that Frye’s opinion that Traylor has a
“marked limitation” in his ability to understand, remember, or apply information is not
supported by the neuropsychological evaluation.
Traylor argues that the ALJ erred “when she equated the language regarding [his] clinical
diagnoses directly to her findings about the B-Criteria, without considering that medical
language does not always correlate directly with the limitation standards defined by SSA.” Doc.
19, p. 7. He notes that the Regulations specifically warn that while “[c]linicians may use these
terms [such as ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’] to characterize your medical condition . . . these terms “will
not always be the same as the degree of your limitation in a paragraph B area of mental
functioning.” Doc. 19 (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)-(3)). And
presumably, if clinicians use the same terms as the B-Criteria, the ALJ might apply those terms
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directly to the B-Criteria analysis even when they indicate different levels of limitation. The
court recognizes that this might be a problem in certain cases, but it is not a problem here.
The neuropsychological evaluation uses terms such as “impaired,” “mildly impaired,”
“low average,” “average,” “high average,” “superior,” and “very superior.” AR 508. The B-
Criteria use terms such as “mild,” “moderate,” and “marked.” AR 584. The language used in
the two evaluations is different, so there is little danger that the ALJ would accidentally equate
the two.
The ALJ explicitly considered the terms used in the neuropsychological evaluation, such
as “mildly impaired” or “impaired,” and compared them with Frye’s analysis of the B-Criteria
to determine whether the former supported the latter. The ALJ concluded they did not. The
ALJ properly considered whether Frey’s own medical treatment notes support her assessment
of Traylor’s functional limitations.
The ALJ also noted that “the claimant’s performance slightly improved in both auditory
memory and visual memory after a delay.” AR 43. This is further evidence that Frye’s
assessment of Traylor’s limitations might be unnecessarily pessimistic. She might be focusing
on his initial performance without giving him the extra time he needs to show his true abilities.
Traylor argues that the ALJ should interpret his need for extra time differently. Doc. 19,
pp. 8-9. He believes that it should be seen as an additional functional limitation. Id. Traylor
proposes a reasonable alternate explanation for his need for extra time. However, “[i]f the
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that
must be upheld.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (punctuation modified).
The ALJ further noted that Frye’s statement that “the claimant’s comprehension and
learning [are] substantially impacted by his intellectual disability” is not supported by the fact
that Traylor “performed most tasks during the consultative examination without issue.” AR 43-
44. Traylor performance on the examination is some evidence that he is able to learn and
understand new tasks.
Traylor asserts that the ALJ’s comment fails to consider the fact that when he was
working, he was able to transition between work tasks only “with repetition of instruction.”
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Doc. 19, p. 9. The court agrees that if Traylor was able to complete the consultative
examination only after repeated instruction, his reported ability to complete most of the tasks
without issue is less impressive. Traylor, however, does not argue that he was able to perform
the examination tasks only after repeated instruction.
Finally, the ALJ noted that Frye’s assessment of Traylor’s functional limitation is
inconsistent with Dr. Toews’s testimony that “the claimant would have no problems with simple
repetitive tasks.” AR 43-44 (citing Exh. 3F/7-8; 5F/1; medical expert testimony). Traylor
does not address this argument specifically in his opening brief. Doc. 19. The court finds that
the ALJ provided substantial evidence for discounting Frye’s medical opinion of Traylor’s
functional limitations.
In his reply brief, Traylor argues that the ALJ confused the term “mildly impaired” that
appears in the evaluation with the term “mild” as it appears in the B-Criteria evaluation. Doc.
24, pp. 2-3. He does not, however, explain why he thinks the ALJ made this mistake. Absent
evidence to the contrary, the court may assume that the ALJ is acquainted with the Regulations
and applied them correctly. See Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1072,
n. 3 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We presume that ALJs know the law and apply it in making their
decisions.”).
Traylor further asserts that his impairments “affect only 8% of the population” and “Frye
was reasonable in her assessment that” those impairments “are within the marked level” as the
term is used in the B-Criteria evaluation. Doc. 24, p. 7. He argues that “[t]he ALJ’s findings
to the contrary are not supported.” Doc. 24, p. 7.
The Regulations explain that “[a] claimant has a ‘marked’ limitation if the claimant’s
functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is
seriously limited.” Norris v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2373351, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025)
(punctuation modified) (citing 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00(F)(2)(d)). Traylor
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The Regulations describing the evaluation of a child for Title XVI benefits explain that4
a “‘[m]arked’ limitation . . . is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to find on
standardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than three, standard deviations
below the mean.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). It is unclear whether these Regulations have
any application to an adult claimant, but if they did, they would not support Traylor’s argument.
See Maxim v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2439706, at *4 (E.D. Wash. May 30, 2014) (When evaluating
a child for Title XVI benefits, a score in the sixth percentile is only 1.60 standard deviations
below the mean and does not result in a “marked limitation.”); Sabala v. Saul, 2020 WL
6946562, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 25, 2020) (“When evaluating children, which does not directly
apply to Mr. Sabala’s claims here, a ‘marked’ limitation constitutes functioning on standardized
testing between two and three standard deviations below the mean (which would be
approximately between the first and third percentiles assuming a normal distribution of scores).”
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provides no authority to support his assertion that an ability that falls below the 8 percentileth 4
proves that one’s functioning is “seriously limited.” The ALJ did not think so, and absent any
evidence to the contrary, the court may assume that the ALJ is an authority on the Regulations.
See Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1072, n. 3 (9th Cir. 2010).
Traylor asserts that Frye’s statement is supported with other evidence in the
Administrative Record such as the 2003 Psychological Evaluation administered by the Arizona
Certified School Psychologist Iris Surette, Ph.D. Doc. 19, p. 8. He maintains that Frye’s
assessment is consistent with his work history and his demonstrated need for “repetition of
instruction” between work related tasks. Doc. 19, p. 9. Traylor’s argument, however, overlooks
this court’s standard of review. It does not matter if the evidence would support a different
result. The court only decides whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and is
supported by substantial evidence. The court concludes that it is. See also Ford v. Saul, 950
F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”) (punctuation modified).
Traylor further argues that the ALJ erred at step five of the disability analysis when she
relied on the vocational expert to identify jobs that he could still do in spite of his mental
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limitations. Doc. 19, p. 9. He asserts that he cannot perform the jobs identified by the expert
because they require job skills that exceed his residual functional capacity (RFC).
At step five of the disability analysis, the ALJ took testimony from a vocational expert
to determine whether there are jobs that the claimant can perform considering his age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. AR 45. The ALJ asked the
expert to consider a hypothetical claimant with Traylor’s age, education and past work, who “is
limited to simple routine and repetitive tasks,” whose “[i]nstructions should be given by
demonstration or verbally, never exclusively in written form,” who “should not be asked to
conduct arithmetic computations,” and who “should only occasionally interact with the public.”
AR 67. The expert opined that such a person could work as a hand packager, Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT) code 920.587-018; janitor, DOT code 381.687-018; or in the marker
retail trade, DOT code 209.587-034. AR 68. The expert testified that her testimony was
consistent with the DOT. AR 68.
Traylor argues first that he cannot perform the jobs identified by the vocational expert
because the DOT states that these jobs require “Level 2 Reasoning” and he does not have that
ability. Traylor explains that a Level 2 Reasoning job “requires a person to apply commonsense
understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions. . . .” Doc. 19,
p. 12 (emphasis in original); see Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), (4 ed.), p. 1011.th
The ALJ, however, stated that Traylor is limited to simple routine and repetitive tasks, whose
instructions should be given “by demonstration or verbally, never exclusively in written form.”
AR 67. And this limitation, he argues, precludes him from performing a Level 2 Reasoning job
because a Level 2 Reasoning job might entail exclusively written instructions and he cannot
receive instructions exclusively in written form. Traylor, however, misinterprets the limitation
that the ALJ included in his RFC.
At the hearing, the ALJ asked the expert to consider a hypothetical claimant who, among
other things, was “limited to simple routine and repetitive tasks,” whose “[i]nstructions should
be give by demonstration or verbally, never exclusively in written form.” AR 67. The expert
then asked the ALJ the following: “Your Honor, just to clarify, when you indicate the individual
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needs to have instructions that are verbally or by demonstration, are you talking about just
during the beginning, you know, when [they’re] training?” AR 67-68. The ALJ answered,
“Yes.” The expert continued, “That’s what I thought, but I just wanted to clarify.” AR 68. She
then concluded, “There would be positions that the individual described could perform,” and
she named the three jobs. AR 68. The expert further stated that her conclusions were
consistent with the DOT. AR 68.
Based on this exchange, the court finds that Traylor’s limitation to receiving instructions
“verbally or by demonstration” applies only during his initial training period, but afterward, he
is not so limited and is able to receive his day-to-day instructions in “written or oral form.” The
court further finds that Traylor can perform the Level 2 Reasoning jobs identified because they
only require an ability to accept instructions in “written or oral form” during the day-to-day
performance of the job, not during the initial training period. The court concludes that these
jobs do not require job skills that Traylor does not have and the ALJ did not err at step five of
the disability analysis.
Traylor further argues that he cannot perform the three jobs identified because they
require “Level 1 Mathematics” and he does not have that ability. Doc. 19, p. 12.
The three jobs identified by the expert are listed in the DOT as “Level 1 Mathematics.”
Doc. 19, p. 12. The term “Level 1 Mathematics” corresponds with the following skills: “adding
and subtracting two digit numbers, multiplying and dividing 10’s and 100’s by 2, 3, 4, 5,
performing the four basic arithmetic operations with coins as part of a dollar, and performing
operations with units such as cup, pint, and quart; inch, foot, and yard; and ounce and pound.”
Doc. 19, p. 12; see Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), (4 ed.), p. 1011. The ALJ,th
however, stated that Traylor “should never be asked to conduct arithmetic computations.” AR
39-40. Traylor therefore argues that he cannot perform these three jobs and the ALJ erred at
step five. The court disagrees with Traylor’s reading of the DOT.
The “Mathematical Development levels are part of the DOT General Educational
Development (GED) scale that embraces those aspects of education (formal and informal)
which are required of the worker for satisfactory job performance.” Woodin v. Colvin, 2015
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WL 3917132, at *4 (D. Or. June 24, 2015) (punctuation modified) (quoting DOT Appx. C, §
III). “This is education of a general nature which does not have a recognized, fairly specific
occupational objective.” Id. “Thus, the GED definition trailers describe the relevant education
levels based on the curricula taught in schools throughout the United States; the GED trailers
may inform but do not necessarily impose job requirements.” Id. (emphasis added). To
determine what mathematical skills are required for a job, one must examine the specific duties
for that job. Id. Not all jobs designated Level 1 Mathematics require all the skills listed under
Level 1. That is simply the lowest mathematical designation that the DOT has. “Notably, there
is no level of Mathematical Development lower than 01.” Id.
The three jobs identified by the vocational expert are designated Level 1 Mathematics
but those jobs do not necessarily require the ability to perform arithmetic computations, contrary
to Traylor’s argument. The DOT’s Level 1 Mathematics designation for these jobs is not
evidence that the vocational expert erred or that the ALJ’s finding at step five was error.
Traylor further argues that he cannot perform these three jobs because they carry a
Numerical Aptitude of 4, which corresponds with the “lower third” percentile. Doc. 19, p. 12.
Traylor’s argument is not entirely clear. He states that a “lower third” percentile job is
“blatantly inconsistent with the RFC provided,” but he does not further explain his reasoning.
Doc. 19, p. 12.
The vocational expert testified that a person who “should never be asked to conduct
arithmetic computations” still had the ability to do the three jobs identified. AR 39-40. She
testified that her testimony was consistent with the DOT. Traylor has not shown that her
testimony is inconsistent with the DOT. The ALJ’s analysis at step five is supported by
substantial evidence.
In his reply brief, Traylor argues that two of the occupations identified by the vocational
expert “require counting and/or arithmetic” that exceed his RFC. Doc. 24, p. 10. For example,
“[t]he job description for hand packager includes: a) weighs containers and adjusts quantity; b)
records information, such as weight, time, and date packaged; [and] c) may stack, separate,
count, pack, wrap, and weigh bakery products.” Doc. 24, p. 10 (punctuation modified). Traylor
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explains that “[n]ot only are counting requirements inconsistent with a restriction to no
arithmetic calculations, but weighing and adjusting weight clearly also requires arithmetic.”
The court does not agree with Traylor’s characterization of the skills required for this job.
The ALJ stated that Traylor “should never be asked to conduct arithmetic computations.”
AR 39-40. But weighing containers, recording information, and counting products do not
require arithmetic computations. They require an ability to record numbers, but they do not
require the ability to add, subtract, multiply, or divide those numbers. Those tasks do not
require functional abilities that Traylor does not have.
The job description for the marker job includes the following: “a) marks selling price by
hand on boxes…or on price tickets; b) may record number and types of articles marked; and
c) may compare printed price tickets with entries on purchase order to verify accuracy.” Doc.
24, p. 10. Traylor argues that “[m]arking prices is not purely clerical . . .[i]t requires handling
and processing of numerical values, including the need for counting and basic arithmetic.” The
court does not agree.
Marking prices, recording numbers, and comparing prices are tasks that require an ability
to recognize numbers. Recording the number of articles marked may require the ability to
count. These tasks do not require an ability to perform arithmetic computations.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after
its independent review, affirm the final decision of the Commissioner.
The ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion of Traylor’s treating provider Dr. Sara
Frye. The jobs identified by the vocational expert at step five of the disability analysis do not
require skills that exceed Traylor’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may file and serve written objections within
14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are
not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. The Local Rules permit
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the filing of a response to an objection. They do not permit the filing of a reply to a response
without leave of the District Court.
DATED this 3 day of February, 2026.rd
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