Eldridge v. Gutierrez

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Clinton T. Eldridge,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden Gutierrez,
Respondent.
No. CV-24-00366-TUC-RCC (LCK)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Clinton Eldridge, incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in
Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to
Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2). Before
this Court are the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondent's Answer (Doc. 25), and Petitioner's Reply
(Doc. 35). The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent
review of the record, deny the Petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1984, in the District of Columbia Superior Court, Petitioner was sentenced to a
38-year and 8-month to 120-year sentence for rape, burglary, assault with intent to commit
rape, attempted rape, attempted burglary, and robbery. (Doc. 25, Ex. A, Attach. 1 at 1.) As
set forth by Petitioner, he had parole hearings before the U.S. Parole Commission in 2010,
2013, 2016, 2018, 2019, and 2022. (Doc. 1 at 4-5.) He challenged the 2010, 2013, 2016,
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2018, and 2019 parole proceedings in previous lawsuits. Eldridge v. Oliver, No. CV-16-
00690-MSK, Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2016); Eldridge
v. U.S. Parole Comm., No. CV-18-00797-LTB, Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus (D.
Colo. Apr. 5, 2018); Eldridge v. Von Blanckensee, No. CV-21-0081-RCC, Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2020).
In the current Petition, Petitioner challenges the 2022 parole hearing and decision.1
(Doc. 1.) At the hearing, Petitioner denied committing the rape offenses. (Doc. 25, Ex. A,
Attach. 22 at 6.) Petitioner was asked if he had any new or pending disciplinary infractions
at that time. The Hearing Examiner was informed that Petitioner had been charged for
using suboxone a few weeks prior to the hearing, but the charges were going to be
expunged due to procedural error. (Id.) Petitioner stated that he had found paper containing
Suboxone by a computer and decided to take it. (Id.) It was equivalent to four doses and
knocked him out. (Id. at 6-7.) After the hearing, the Commission denied Petitioner parole
and scheduled him for a rehearing in 2025, amounting to a 36-month rehearing set-off. (Id.
at 8-9.) The Commission summarized the reasons for its decision:
After consideration of all factors and information presented, at this time, the
Commission is denying your parole and exceeding the normal rehearing
schedule for the following reasons: The Commission finds you remain a
more serious risk to re-offend based on your status as an untreated sexual
predator and based on your admission of drug use only weeks before this
current parole reconsideration hearing. Specifically, the Commission has
previously recommended that you participate and complete a Sex Offender
Treatment Program within the Bureau of Prisons. You have failed to
complete such programming and you now deny committing the rape offenses
you remain convicted for. Additionally, you admitted at this hearing to using
Suboxone only weeks before this parole reconsideration hearing. In addition
to your continued status as an untreated sex offender, the Commission also
finds the recentness and severity of your negative institutional behavior
indicates that you are not ready to remain crime-free in the community at this
time. The Commission finds your continued incarceration, even beyond the
ordinary 12-month rehearing schedule is necessary to protect the public, to
allow sufficient time for you to complete the recommended programming,
and to allow sufficient time for you to demonstrate you can abide by the rules
of the institution over a sustained period of time.
(Id. at 9.)
1 Petitioner submitted an amendment to his reply, providing information about his
September 2025 parole hearing and subsequent decision denying him parole. (Doc. 37.)
The 2025 proceeding was not included in the Petition or briefed by the parties; therefore,
the Court’s decision does not address that hearing and decision.
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In the case currently before the Court, Petitioner named as Defendants Warden
Gutierrez and the United States Parole Commission. (Doc. 1.) The Parole Commission has
been dismissed. (Doc. 36.)
LEGAL STANDARD
"A § 2241 habeas petition challenges the execution of a criminal sentence on
grounds that a prisoner 'is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.'" Benny v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 295 F.3d 977, 988 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). A § 2241 petition may be used to attack decisions by the
Parole Commission. Id. Review of Parole Commission decisions is "very narrow," and is
limited to deciding whether the commission has acted beyond the scope of its statutory
authority or so arbitrarily that it violated the petitioner's due process rights. Coleman v.
Perrill, 845 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539,
1551-54 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc)); Hedin v. Daniels, 387 F. App'x 751, 753 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Benny, 295 F.3d at 981); Eldridge, 2024 WL 2880642, at *2; Fischer v. Von
Blanckensee, No. CV-19-00433-TUC-RCC-DTF, 2020 WL 1067789, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan.
15, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1065879 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2020).
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Under Claim 1, which Petitioner captioned "Petitioner's history of parole hearings,"
he stated that it was "important to present to the [C]ourt the parole hearing that was held
over the years." (Doc. 1 at 4-5.) Petitioner then set forth his summary of the parole hearings
occurring between 2010 and 2022 but did not allege a legal claim. (Id.) For that reason, the
Court finds Petitioner did not intend the information set forth under Claim 1 to require a
ruling, and the Court finds Claim 1 is not a cognizable claim. Additionally, Petitioner has
challenged the parole hearings held prior to 2022 in previous habeas petitions.
Claim 2
Petitioner alleges the Parole Commission wrongfully relied upon an expunged
disciplinary report to deny parole and impose a three-year set-off for his next parole
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hearing. A § 2241 petitioner may challenge the Parole Commission's reliance on inaccurate
information. Elliott v. United States, 572 F.2d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Billiteri v.
U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976)). However, the weight the Parole
Commission gives to various factors is beyond this Court's narrow review. Dunne v. Jusino,
No. 21-55507, 2023 WL 2783259, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2023); Hedin, 387 F. App'x at
753 ("Judgments 'involving a broad range of factors' that the Commission takes into
account in arriving at its decision are committed to the Commission's discretion and are
unreviewable even for abuse of discretion.") (quoting Benny, 295 F.3d at 982).
In denying Petitioner parole, the commission relied, not upon the expunged
disciplinary charge, but upon Petitioner's statement admitting to drug use three weeks prior
to the parole hearing. (Doc. 25, Ex. A, Attach. 23.) The Hearing Examiner stated that
Petitioner's most recent of four DHO infractions occurred in July 2008; he did not list a
2022 disciplinary report. (Id., Attach. 22 at 4, 8.) The examiner also acknowledged that the
2022 charges based on drug use were going to be expunged. (Id. at 6.) When asked if he
wanted 	to 	make 	a 	statement 	about 	the 	incident, 	however, 	Petitioner 	admitted 	to
intentionally ingesting drugs a few weeks prior to the hearing. (Doc. 25, Ex. D at 14-20.)
It was this admission that the Hearing Examiner relied upon. (Id., Ex. A, Attach. 22 at 8-
9; Attach. 23.) One of the non-exclusive factors that may be considered by the Parole
Commission is a prisoner's institutional experience, including his general adjustment and
"behavior responses." 28 U.S.C. § 2.80(p)(4)(v). Therefore, Petitioner's recent drug use
while incarcerated was within the statutory parameters for the Parole Commission's
consideration. Because the commission did not rely upon an expunged incident report in
denying parole, and it was entitled to consider Petitioner's use of illegal drugs, there is no
basis for relief on Claim 2.
Claims 3 and 4
Petitioner alleges the Bureau of Prisons has failed to provide him access to the Sex
Offender Treatment Program (Claim 3) and a residential drug treatment program (Claim
4), and his failure to complete those programs has led to the denial of parole and to a three-
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year set-off between parole hearings. The Court understands Petitioner's frustration with
his assignment to a BOP facility that has not provided him access to the programs the
Parole Commission recommends. However, the fact of a defendant's conviction empowers
the custodial entity to place him in, or transfer him to, any of its prisons without judicial
review. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78,
88 n.9 (1976) (finding due process not implicated by transfer to a prison despite
substantially negative impact on prisoner); Grayson v. Rison, 945 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that prison transfers are at the discretion of prison officials regardless
of the motive); 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any
court."). Similarly, a prisoner's eligibility for programs focused on rehabilitation is fully
within BOP's discretion and does not implicate Petitioner's due process protections. Moody,
429 U.S. at 88 n.9. Further, "[b]ecause Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest
in parole, any complaint arising out of an alleged failure to provide recommended programs
fails to state a due process claim." Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 273-74 (D.D.C.
1995) (finding that D.C. parole statute did not create a liberty interest in parole). Therefore,
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claims 3 and 4.
Additionally, Petitioner's requested relief as to Claims 3 and 4—to be transferred to
a 	different 	BOP 	facility 	that 	provides 	the 	programs 	recommended 	by 	the 	Parole
Commission—is not within the Court's power. 2 As Petitioner asserted, and the Court
highlighted above, BOP has the ability to transfer Petitioner to a different facility where he
could participate in programs not available to him at his current facility. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.)
However, that decision is wholly within the discretion of BOP and the Court does not have
the authority to mandate Petitioner's transfer.
2 Petitioner also requested that the Court direct a parole hearing to be held within 90
days. Petitioner recently had a parole hearing, in September 2025; therefore, he has
received the requested relief of a new parole hearing since he filed his Petition in 2024.
Because this form of relief has been provided, his request is moot. See Eldridge, 2024 WL
2880642, at *3.
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1972 Parole Guidelines
Although not listed as an independent claim, in his Memorandum of Law, Petitioner
challenges the Parole Commission's failure to apply the 1972 D.C. Parole Guidelines. (Doc.
1-1 at 2.) In particular, Petitioner seems to contend that the imposition of a three-year
rehearing set-off indicated that the commission was not using the 1972 guidelines. The
1972 guidelines provide that a prisoner "ordinarily will receive a rehearing one year after
a hearing conducted by the U.S. Parole Commission" but the commission "may establish a
rehearing date at any time it feels such would be proper" up to a five-year period. 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.80(p)(5).
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner announced that he was holding a "1972
guideline hearing." (Doc. 25, Ex. D at 3.) In the hearing summary, the hearing was
classified as "DC Rehearing – 1972 Guidelines." (Id., Ex. A, Attach. 22 at 1.) The examiner
also noted in the summary that the "normal" timeline for rehearing was 12 months. (Id. at
8.) Because a one-year set-off is not mandatory under the 1972 Guidelines, and the Hearing
Examiner stated that he was applying those guidelines, the Court has no basis to conclude
the 2022 hearing was conducted under the wrong guidelines. Further, imposing a three-
year set-off was within the commission's statutory authority.
Additionally, the imposition of a three-year set-off was not so arbitrary as to violate
Petitioner's right to due process. The Parole Commission explained that the extended
period before rehearing was "necessary to protect the public, allow time to complete the
recommended 	Sex 	Offender 	Treatment 	Program, 	and 	to 	allow 	sufficient 	time 	to
demonstrate he can observe the rules of the institution over a sustained period of time." (Id.
at 8-9.). When reviewing the imposition of a three-year set-off in 2019, the Court found it
was rational and did not violate Petitioner's right to due process. Eldridge, 2024 WL
2880642, at *4. The 2019 set-off was based solely on Petitioner's failure to complete
recommended treatment programs. That rationale remained true in 2022, plus, Petitioner
had just violated institutional rules by ingesting drugs. Thus, a three-year set-off remained
a rational decision by the Parole Commission.
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RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent
review of the record, enter an order DENYING the Petition because it is without merit.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file written
objections 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	being 	served 	with 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party's objections within fourteen days.
No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District Court. If
objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the
parties should use the following case number: CV 24-00366-TUC-RCC.
Dated this 6th day of November, 2025.
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