USA v. Koistinen

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jeffrey Allen Koistinen,
Defendant.
No. CR-23-01495-001-TUC-AMM
(EJM)
ORDER
On April 9, 2026, Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending this Court deny Defendant Jeffrey Allen
Koistinen’s Motions to Suppress. (Doc. 113.) On April 21, 2026, Defendant objected to
the R&R, and the Government responded on May 5, 2026. (Docs. 114–115.) For the
reasons discussed herein, the Court will overrule the objections and adopt the R&R.
I. OVERVIEW
The present motions arise from state search warrants issued on August 16 and 17,
2022, wherein local law enforcement investigating a marijuana grow operation executed
multiple search warrants on Defendant Koistinen’s three houses, including his personal
residence located at 4495 West Butterfly Mountain Drive (“Butterfly Mountain”). (Doc.
34 at 1–2.) The Butterfly Mountain search warrant, obtained and executed on August 17,
2022, included authority to search the residence, a motor home on the property, and
Defendant’s person for evidence of money laundering and unlawful marijuana grow
activities. (Doc. 34-1 at 28.) It further authorized law enforcement to seize and search the
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 1 of 9

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
contents of any computers and cellphones for evidence of these crimes because, as the
affiant stated, investigators were looking for records, documents, and proceeds, which are
often stored on electronic devices. (Id. at 21–24.)
During the investigation on August 17, 2022, three vehicles were seen on Butterfly
Mountain Drive and believed to be connected to the operation. Throughout the evening,
these vehicles were stopped, and addenda to the warrant were obtained to search a white
Tesla (with an Arizona license plate “YTesla”) driven by Defendant with Mrs. Koistinen
as a passenger, a white BMW (with a California license plate) driven by Defendant’s son
Brandon, and a white Tesla (with a California license plate) driven by Brandon’s girlfriend.
(Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 33 at 3.)
About a week after the Butterfly Mountain search, Detective Fernando Robles
reviewed the extractions of a blue iPhone that was recovered in the search. (Doc. 104 at
47.) After Detective Robles discovered suspected images of child sexual exploitation on
the blue iPhone, law enforcement obtained another state search warrant to search the blue
iPhone and the other electronic devices for evidence of child pornography.1 (Id. at 47–49.)
Defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of that search warrant. Instead, Defendant
seeks to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of the August 17, 2022 search warrant
and addenda asserting (1) an unlawful search and seizure of an overbroad category of
electronics as well as a lack of specificity and probable cause, and, alternatively, (2) an
unlawful search and seizure of the blue iPhone seized outside the scope of a warrant. (Docs.
33–34.) The Government contends that any search and seizure were done pursuant to a
valid search warrant, search warrant addenda, or an exception to the warrant requirement.
(Docs. 45–46.)
The Magistrate Judge held evidentiary hearings on February 23, 2026, and March
5, 2026. (Docs. 104, 109.) After so doing, the Magistrate Judge found (1) there was
1 Defendant was subsequently charged with (1) Attempted Productions of Child
Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2251(e); (2) Attempted Coercion
and Enticement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); and (3) Receipt of Child Pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). (Doc. 13.)
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 2 of 9

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
probable cause for the Butterfly Mountain search warrant and addenda issued for the search
of Defendant’s residence, his person, the vehicles, and any electronics found in those
locations; (2) even if probable cause did not exist, the good faith exception applies; (3) the
Butterfly Mountain search warrant and addenda were not overbroad and the items seized
were described with sufficient particularity; (4) the blue iPhone was found in Defendant’s
vehicle or a container within that vehicle; and (5) while the blue iPhone was not seized
pursuant to the warrant addendum, it was lawfully seized pursuant to either the automobile
exception or the doctrine of inevitable discovery. (See Doc. 113.)
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the material facts in this matter and do not object to the
Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact.2 As such, the Court will adopt the factual findings in
the R&R with two clarifying points in the record:
First, the Magistrate Judge found that Officer Duarte’s BWC video “shows the rear
hatch of [D]efendant’s vehicle open and then officers close it.” (Doc. 113 at 8 n.7 (citing
Ex. 12 at 11:15).) 3 Upon a de novo review, the Court further finds the video also shows
two officers leaning into the vehicle’s back seat and then trunk at 6:40 p.m. (Ex. 12 at
10:22–11:30.) The two officers appear to cursorily search the vehicle prior to the YTesla
warrant addendum being issued at 7:56 p.m.4 (Ex. 1 at 3.) Second, the Magistrate Judge
found that the BWC video “shows Officer Hengsteler picking up the purse and phone from
the front windshield/hood area of the [D]efendant’s car and handing them to the
[D]efendant’s wife through the passenger window.” (Doc. 113 at 7 n.5 (citing Ex. 11 at
29:00).) Upon a de novo review, the Court finds the BWC video shows law enforcement
escorting Mrs. Koistinen away from the YTesla at 6:35 p.m. and that she is no longer in
the passenger seat when Officer Hengsteler puts the items in the vehicle at 6:52 p.m. (Ex.
2 The Magistrate Judge does not make explicit credibility findings; however, his reasoning
and conclusions rely on implicit findings. No objections have been raised to these implicit
findings.
3 Officers Hengsteler and Duarte’s BWC videos were admitted into evidence as Exhibits
11 and 12, respectively, at the February 23, 2026 evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 104 at 24,
111.)
4 The affidavit for the addendum was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1 at the March 5,
2026 evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 109 at 11.)
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 3 of 9

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11 at 12:28, 29:02; Ex. 12 at 8:52, 22:08.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
a. Objections to the R&R
A party may file “specific written objections to the [R&R’s] proposed findings and
recommendations.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The
Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific
objections are made. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149
(1985); United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by
the magistrate judge. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court
reviews for clear error the unobjected-to portions of the R&R. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp.,
170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204
(D. Or. 1998).
b. Burden of Proof
The standard of review on a motion to suppress is by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) (“[T]he controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.”). “[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden
of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged
search or seizure.” United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978)). When a defendant makes an initial showing that
a search occurred without a warrant, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the
warrantless search or seizure falls within one of the established exceptions. See United
States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 416 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Steinman, 159
F.4th 550, 568 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-7245, 2026 WL 1640844 (U.S. June 8,
2026) (“Because warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, the
government bears the burden of showing that a warrantless search or seizure falls within
an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” (quoting United States v.
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 4 of 9

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012))).
IV. DISCUSSION
a. All Electronics
Defendant renews his argument that the Butterfly Mountain warrant lacked
specificity and was unsupported by probable cause. (Doc. 114 at 5, 10, 12–15.) Having
reviewed and considered the objections, the Court disagrees. For all the reasons well-
articulated by the Magistrate Judge, there was probable cause for the Butterfly Mountain
search warrant and addenda. Similarly, this Court, after a de novo review, agrees that the
good faith exception applies even if there was no probable cause for the search warrant and
addenda.
The Court further finds that the warrant was sufficiently particularized as it limited
the search to evidence of a specific crime and could not be narrowed further (e.g., by a
specified time period) because evidence of a sophisticated marijuana grow conspiracy
could reasonably include an extended swath of time. For these reasons, the Court overrules
the objection and finds probable cause existed for the warrant and that the warrant does not
fail for want of specificity.
b. Blue iPhone
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the blue iPhone was seized
pursuant to a warrant exception, arguing the Government cannot show where or when the
phone was seized. (Id. at 2–3, 6–7.) He further contends that even if the seizure was lawful
pursuant to a warrant exception, a separate, subsequent warrant was still required for the
initial search of the blue iPhone because the Butterfly Mountain warrant and addenda could
not apply to evidence seized outside that warrant and addenda. (Id. at 6–8.) Finally, he
maintains that the Government cannot rely on the doctrine of inevitable discovery because
it cannot show a lawful basis for either the seizure or search of the blue iPhone. (Id. at 7–
8.)
i. YTesla Warrant Addendum
Although not challenged by either party, the Court has considered whether the blue
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 5 of 9

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
iPhone was seized pursuant to a valid warrant. The Court conducted a de novo review of
this finding because the evidence before the Court initially suggested that (1) the officers
on scene expressed a need for a warrant addendum to search the YTesla at 6:35 p.m.,
shortly after stopping Defendant, (2) a four minute period of time, at most, could have
lapsed between Officer Duarte’s BWC video shutting off at 7:52 p.m. and the execution of
the warrant addendum at 7:56 p.m., and (3) it appeared that no search of the YTesla
occurred before the addendum issued. (See Ex. 1 at 3; Ex. 11 at 12:35; Ex. 12 at 1:22:00.)
However, upon a de novo review, the Court finds the evidence shows two officers leaning
into the back seat and trunk of the YTesla, apparently searching, at 6:40 p.m. (Ex. 12 at
10:22–11:30.) This occurred just minutes after Officer Hengsteler said a warrant addendum
was needed to search “that,” and gesturing toward the YTesla, and over an hour before the
7:56 p.m. addendum issued. As such, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s finding
that the blue iPhone was not seized pursuant to a valid warrant.
However, because the Court agrees that the blue iPhone was seized pursuant to a
lawful warrant exception, the Court finds the phone was thereafter searched pursuant to the
valid warrant addendum. While Defendant asserts the Magistrate Judge’s “extension of the
warrant to permit the search of a phone not seized pursuant to the warrant, is deeply
flawed,” the Court finds Defendant’s reliance on Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)
and United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014) is inapposite. (Doc. 114 at 5, 7–
10.) These cases hold that the fact that a cell phone is seized pursuant to a warrant
exception, such as a search incident to arrest or the automobile exception, does not justify
the warrantless search of the cell phone. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; see also Camou, 773
F.3d at 943. Notably, the facts of the present case do not violate that principle. The blue
iPhone was seized pursuant to a warrant exception, but it was not searched until a week
later pursuant to the subsequent warrant addendum. As such, Defendant’s objection is
overruled.
ii. Automobile Exception
Defendant argues that the automobile exception does not apply because officers had
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 6 of 9

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
control of the scene and he was secured in the back of the vehicle. (See Doc. 33 at 6–8
(citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460–63 (1971)).) In response, the
Government argues Defendant waived his objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
the automobile exception applied to the seizure of the blue iPhone. (Doc. 115 at 2.) The
Court finds Defendant sufficiently raised the objection and will consider de novo whether
the blue iPhone was seized pursuant to the automobile exception.
While the Fourth Amendment generally requires evidence be seized pursuant to a
valid search warrant, “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle
without more.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996); see also California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (extending the automobile exception to containers
found in the vehicle). As the Supreme Court first recognized over 100 years ago in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), the “automobile exception” is based on the
“ready mobility” of an automobile, along with the individual’s “reduced expectation of
privacy” due to “pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on public highways.”
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985). No separate exigency finding is
required. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999).
Notably, the automobile exception, “[u]nlike search incident to arrest, . . . is not
rooted in arrest and the . . . rationales of preventing arrestees from harming officers and
destroying evidence.” Camou, 773 F.3d at 941. “Moreover, unlike searches incident to
arrest, searches of vehicles and containers pursuant to the vehicle exception need not be
conducted right away.” Id. at 941–42 (citing United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487–88
(1985)) (noting that the scope of the automobile exception is “broader” than that of a search
incident to arrest); see also Steinman, 159 F.4th at 577 (“[T]he automobile exception may
apply even if the automobile has been towed back to the police station or elsewhere.” (first
citing Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570, then citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52
(1970))).
Here, at the time of the stop, law enforcement had probable cause to believe
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 7 of 9

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
evidence of the marijuana grow operation was in the YTesla for the same reasons
articulated in the Butterfly Mountain warrant. Further, the YTesla was readily mobile
because it was stopped shortly after leaving the Butterfly Mountain residence. And, while
the precise moment when law enforcement seized the blue iPhone is not clear from the
record, sufficient evidence supports the finding that it was seized from the YTesla or a
container within that vehicle, such as Mrs. Koistinen’s purse. This finding is supported by
Defendant’s statement that his phone was in the car or with his wife and the BWC video
showing that the phone was not found on Defendant’s person.5 (Ex. 11 at 13:35; Ex. 12 at
3:26–4:33.) Accordingly, the Court finds the Government has met its burden by a
preponderance of the evidence that the blue iPhone was seized pursuant to the automobile
exception. Defendant’s objection is therefore overruled.
iii. Inevitable Discovery
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the blue iPhone was seized
pursuant to the doctrine of inevitable discovery. (Doc. 114 at 11.) Upon a de novo review,
the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s well-reasoned discussion of the inevitable
discovery doctrine and its application to this case. Accordingly, Defendant’s objection is
overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 113), Defendant’s
objections (Doc. 114), the Government’s response (Doc. 115), as well as the parties’ briefs,
and the record. Accordingly, after an independent review,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED AS
MODIFIED. (Doc. 113.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress Electronics and the
Motion to Suppress Blue iPhone are DENIED. (Docs. 33–34.)
///
///
5 Defendant did not move to suppress any of his statements.
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 8 of 9

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter remains referred to Magistrate
Judge Eric J. Markovich for all pretrial proceedings and Report and Recommendation in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and LRCrim 57.6.
Dated this 26th day of June, 2026.
Case 4:23-cr-01495-AMM-EJM Document 118 Filed 06/29/26 Page 9 of 9