Nina Alley v. County of Pima, et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Louis Taylor, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
County of Pima, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-15-00152-TUC-RM
ORDER
On March 31, 2026, the Court issued an Order resolving various Motions, including
Plaintiff’s Motion re: Equitable Estoppel and Defendants’ Motion in Limine re:
Compensatory Damages. (Doc. 1218.) The Court declined to equitably estop Defendants
from asserting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), concluding that Plaintiff1 had
failed to adequately address the elements of equitable estoppel. (Id. at 3-8.)2 The Court
then held that Plaintiff will be limited to seeking nominal damages at trial because Heck
bars him from seeking incarceration-based damages and he failed to disclose or identify
compensatory damages “that can be disentangled from incarceration-based damages.” (Id.
at 9.) Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s rulings on equitable estoppel and
compensatory damages. (Docs. 1220, 1222.)3
1 Nina Alley, the Guardian and Conservator of former Plaintiff Louis Taylor, has been
substituted as the named plaintiff in this action. (Doc. 624.) The Court uses the term
“Plaintiff” herein to refer interchangeably to Taylor.
2 All record citations refer to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic filing
system.
3 Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Trial and Vacate Deadlines (Docs. 1242) will be resolved
separately.
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For the following reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration re: Equitable Estoppel and partially grant Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration re: Compensatory Damages.
I. Motions for Reconsideration
In his Motion for Reconsideration re: Equitable Estoppel, Plaintiff concedes that his
original Motion re: Equitable Estoppel “probably did fail to adequately prove all elements
of equitable estoppel and in pari delicto,” but he asserts that “it shouldn’t matter” because
the Court may preclude Defendants from asserting Heck under the Court’s inherent
equitable powers. (Doc. 1220.) The Court ordered Defendants to respond to the Motion
for Reconsideration with respect to the issue of whether equitably estopping Defendants
from asserting Heck would be appropriate in this action “if Defendants misrepresented or
concealed the consequences of Louis Taylor’s 2013 no-contest plea on Taylor’s ability to
obtain damages in a future civil lawsuit.” (Doc. 1224.) Defendants filed a Response as to
that issue (Doc. 1229), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 1232).
In his Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration re: Compensatory Damages,
Plaintiff argues that, based on the Ninth Circuit’s interlocutory ruling in this matter,
Plaintiff may claim that he was wrongly convicted and sentenced in 1972, and he may
obtain all damages related to alleged constitutional violations that occurred during his
original criminal proceedings. (Doc. 1222 at 2-6.) Plaintiff further argues that he has
disclosed evidence of non-incarceration-based damages related to his 1972 conviction, and
he did not thwart discovery on the issue during his deposition. (Id. at 7-14.) Plaintiff
argues that limiting him to nominal damages “would work a profound injustice.” (Id. at
19.)
In response to the Motion, the Court clarified that based on the Ninth Circuit’s
interlocutory ruling, Heck poses no bar to Plaintiff challenging the validity of his 1972
conviction and resulting sentence, so long as he does not seek incarceration-based
damages; furthermore, Plaintiff will be free to present to the jury his theory that the alleged
constitutional violations at issue in this case resulted in an invalid jury verdict and an
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invalid life sentence during his original criminal proceedings. (Doc. 1244 at 1-2.) The
Court further clarified that, because Plaintiff’s 2013 conviction was based on a no-contest
plea, the 2013 judgment would not necessarily be undermined by his protestations of
innocence. (Id. at 2.) The Court ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the issue of whether Plaintiff should be limited to seeking
nominal damages. (Id.)
A. Legal Standard
Motions for reconsideration “will ordinarily” be denied “absent a showing of
manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought
to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). Mere
disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Leong
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988). Nevertheless, the Court
“ordinarily has the power to modify or rescind its orders at any point prior to final judgment
in a civil case.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016).
B. Compliance with Local Rules
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration are untimely and
exceed the presumptive page limit without leave of Court. (Doc. 1229 at 2-3; Doc. 1251
at 9-10.) Absent good cause shown, motions for reconsideration are due within fourteen
days after the date of the filing of the subject Order. LRCiv 7.2(g)(2). Furthermore, a party
must obtain leave of Court to file a motion in excess of 17 pages. LRCiv 7.2(e)(1). Plaintiff
filed the pending Motions 15 days after the date of the subject Order,4 and he improperly
filed two Motions addressing the same Order, with the Motions together exceeding 27
4 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration re: Compensatory Damages
seeks reconsideration of a ruling made by the Court in an Order dated April 30, 2024, and
that it therefore is untimely by approximately two years. (Doc. 1251 at 10.) In the April
30, 2024 Order, the Court noted that, “[a]lthough Heck may not bar Plaintiff from seeking
non-incarceration-based compensatory damages, Plaintiff has failed to disclose or identify
any emotional distress damages that can be disentangled from incarceration-based
damages.” (Doc. 1136 at 43.) However, the Court did not rule at that time on Defendants’
Motion in Limine re: Compensatory Damages, instead taking the Motion under advisement
pending its resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion re: Equitable Estoppel. (Id.) Given that the
April 30, 2024 Order took the Motion in Limine re: Compensatory Damages under
advisement, the Court finds it reasonable that Plaintiff waited until the Court had resolved
the Motion in Limine before moving for reconsideration.
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pages, and with the Motion for Reconsideration re: Compensatory Damages alone
exceeding 17 pages.
Plaintiff is warned that he must strictly comply with the Local Rules of Civil
Procedure and he must obtain leave of Court for any divergence from the Local Rules.
Given the importance of the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Motions, however, the Court will
address the substance of the Motions despite Plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the
Local Rules.
C. Equitable Estoppel
As this Court noted in its March 31, 2026 Order (Doc. 1218 at 6), the Ninth Circuit
has held that “Heck is an affirmative defense that may be waived or forfeited.” Hebrard v.
Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024). Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be used to bar a party from raising an affirmative defense. Jablon v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981). Equitable estoppel may be applied against the
government “where justice and fair play require it.” Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699,
706 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff seeking to equitably estop a government defendant must
show: (1) the defendant’s “knowledge of the true facts”; (2) the defendant’s intent to induce
reliance”; (3) the plaintiff’s “ignorance of the true facts”; (4) the plaintiff’s detrimental
reliance”; and (5) “affirmative misconduct . . . and a serious injustice outweighing the
damage to the public interest of estopping the government.” Est. of Amaro v. City of
Oakland, 653 F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 2011).
In their Response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has waived and forfeited any
equitable estoppel claim, because he has never alleged in this action that Defendants
misrepresented or concealed the consequences of his 2013 plea on his ability to obtain
damages in a future civil lawsuit, and he conceded in his Motion for Reconsideration that
he could not establish the elements of equitable estoppel. (Doc. 1229 at 4-5.) Defendants
argue that “[i]t is incredibly prejudicial and unfair to inject this theory now . . . when Taylor
has never pursued it and Defendants have not had an opportunity to defend against it.” (Id.
at 5.)
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Defendants further argue that Plaintiff cannot prove the elements of equitable
estoppel. (Id. at 5-14.) They argue that there is no evidence showing misrepresentation or
concealment by Defendants, and that Defendants could not have engaged in any such
conduct because neither the City of Tucson nor Pima County were involved in procuring
Taylor’s 2013 plea, and the consequences of that plea on Plaintiff’s ability to obtain
damages is not a “fact” but a legal conclusion—one that Plaintiff has repeatedly asserted
was unclear at the time of the plea. (Id. at 5-6, 11-12.) Defendants also contend that
Plaintiff cannot show he was ignorant of the potential consequences of his plea agreement,
as Plaintiff was represented by at least 14 lawyers during his 2012 post-conviction
proceeding, and statements the lawyers made to the press show they were aware that
Plaintiff’s no-contest plea could lead to a Heck bar in a future civil lawsuit. (Id. at 7-9, 12.)
Defendants also note that Plaintiff cited the attorney-client privilege in refusing to answer
questions during his deposition regarding whether he knew the consequences of his plea.
(Id. at 8-9.) Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s own statements regarding his
reasons for accepting the plea agreement show that he would have accepted the plea
regardless of its effect on his ability to obtain damages in a future civil lawsuit, meaning
he cannot prove detrimental reliance. (Id. at 9-10, 13.) Finally, Defendants argue that there
is no injustice outweighing the damage to the public interest in estopping the government.
(Id. at 13-14.)
In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants offered him a no-contest plea to set a Heck
trap, they concealed the implications from him, and his own criminal lawyers never
discussed a civil action or monetary damages when they negotiated the plea because they
were retained to represent him on the criminal charges only. (Doc. 1232 at 2-8.) Plaintiff
submits a declaration by attorney Noel Fidel, who represented him during the 2012 post-
conviction proceeding, stating that at no time during the negotiation of Taylor’s plea
agreement did attorneys for either side raise the subject of Taylor’s potential later ability
to seek civil damages for his prosecution and conviction, nor of any impact the plea might
have on such a lawsuit. (Doc. 1232-1 at 2.) Fidel further avers that, “during that process,”
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Taylor’s lawyers did not discuss the subject among themselves or with Taylor. (Id.)
Plaintiff also submits a declaration by attorney Stanley Feldman, who represented Taylor
during the 2012 post-conviction proceeding and represents him in this civil action. (Doc.
1232-2.) Feldman avers it was obvious to him that “any guilty plea would have a damaging
effect should Taylor ever assert any damage claim,” but that Feldman had not previously
“considered proceeding past the post-conviction hearing,” and he had not discussed any
damage claim with his colleagues. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s Reply is not accompanied by a
declaration by Taylor averring whether he was aware of the potential consequences of his
2013 plea agreement on his ability to obtain damages in a future civil lawsuit, or whether
he would have rejected the plea had he known of those potential consequences.
The parties’ briefs raise factual disputes concerning some of the elements of
equitable estoppel, but Plaintiff has still not shown that he can prove all the requisite
elements. Furthermore, the Court agrees with Defendants that it would be highly
prejudicial to allow Plaintiff to insert this theory of equitable estoppel at this juncture. The
above-captioned case has been pending for over a decade. Plaintiff has amended his
complaint in this matter multiple times, but in no version of the pleading has he asserted
an equitable estoppel theory. He first raised the issue of equitable estoppel in his Motion
re: Equitable Estoppel filed in April 2024, but he did not argue or show in that Motion that
he could prove the elements of equitable estoppel.
The Court noted in its March 31, 2026 Order:
If Defendants affirmatively misrepresented or affirmatively concealed the
consequences of Plaintiff’s no-contest plea on their future civil liability, and
Plaintiff was ignorant of the consequences and detrimentally relied on
Defendants’ affirmative misconduct, then this theory could potentially align
with principles of equitable estoppel.
(Doc. 1218 at 7 n.10.) But even after the Court identified that plausible theory of equitable
estoppel, when Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his Motion re:
Equitable Estoppel, he still did not assert that theory. Instead, he conceded that his original
Motion re: Equitable Estoppel “probably did fail to adequately prove all elements of
equitable estoppel.” (Doc. 1220 at 2.) Plaintiff’s Reply in support of his Motion for
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Reconsideration marks the first time that Plaintiff has claimed he can prove that Defendants
affirmatively misrepresented or concealed the consequences of his no-contest plea on their
future civil liability, and that Plaintiff was unaware of those consequences. Given
Plaintiff’s failure to assert this theory earlier in this litigation, Defendants have had no
opportunity to conduct discovery to defend against the theory, and they would be severely
prejudiced if Plaintiff were allowed to assert the theory at this stage of the proceedings.
Rather than asserting the theory of equitable estoppel identified by the Court,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration re: Equitable Estoppel urges the Court to preclude
Defendants from asserting Heck based on its inherent equitable powers. (Doc. 1220.) But
Plaintiff has not shown that the Court erred in declining to invent an equitable remedy
untethered to any existing doctrine. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
D. Compensatory Damages
Discovery in this case closed on October 1, 2021. (Doc. 248.)5 Prior to the close
of discovery, Taylor served a supplemental disclosure statement indicating that he would
testify as a fact witness regarding the mental and emotional suffering he experienced as a
result of the alleged constitutional violations relating to his 1972 conviction that are at issue
in this action. (Doc. 956-3 at 3.) He also disclosed unnamed members of the Arizona
Justice Project team, indicating that they were expected to testify regarding their work on
his case. (Id. at 14.) He stated that he would seek as general damages the reasonable
monetary value of his pain, suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life. (Id.
at 50.)
Approximately 2 months after the close of discovery, Plaintiff disclosed witnesses
Lindsay Herf, Lesley Hoyt-Croft, and Jeanette Mare. (Doc. 956-4 at 16-17.)
Approximately 17 months after the close of discovery, Plaintiff disclosed a psychiatric
evaluation completed by psychiatrist Mavis J. Donnelly, along with a probate investigator
report. (Doc. 956-7 at 63; Doc. 956-8; Doc. 956-9.) Plaintiff disclosed Donnelly as a
5 The Court later reopened discovery multiple times for limited purposes not relevant here.
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witness approximately 23 months after the close of discovery. (Doc. 956-10 at 20-21.)
Plaintiff listed Herf, Hoyt-Croft, Mare, and Donnelly as fact witnesses—with Herf and
Hoyt-Croft specified as “fact and damage witnesses”—in the parties’ Joint Proposed
Pretrial Order. (Doc. 932 at 289, 291-292.)
At Plaintiff’s deposition conducted prior to the close of discovery, defense counsel
asked Plaintiff what he is claiming as damages in this case. (Doc. 341-2 at 159-161, 232-
233.) Plaintiff’s counsel directed Plaintiff not to answer if he would have to refer to
conversations he had had with his attorneys, and Plaintiff followed that advice. (Id. at 159-
161, 233-240.) Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that defense counsel ask Plaintiff’s lawyers
how much Plaintiff is seeking in damages, and that defense counsel ask Plaintiff questions
not involving what Plaintiff’s attorneys had spoken to Plaintiff about, such as questions
about how the alleged constitutional violations at issue affected Plaintiff. (Id. at 159-161,
237-238.)
In a Joint Motion in Limine re: Compensatory Damages, Defendants argued that
Plaintiff should be precluded from presenting evidence of compensatory damages because
he failed to timely disclose—and thwarted Defendants’ efforts to discover—any such
evidence, and because his damages witnesses are not qualified or competent to testify as
experts. (Doc. 956 at 7-10.) In response, Plaintiff argued that he could not have disclosed
Donnelly’s psychiatric report earlier, because it was prepared in December 2022 as part of
Plaintiff’s guardianship proceeding; that it would be unfair to preclude him from presenting
witnesses and evidence disclosed after the close of discovery when Defendants also served
multiple post-discovery supplemental disclosure statements; and that Herf and Mare are
fact witnesses while Hoyt-Croft is a non-retained expert who will testify under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C). (Doc. 1038 at 11-14.)
The Court granted Defendants’ Motion in Limine re: Compensatory Damages,
finding that Heck bars Plaintiff from seeking incarceration-based damages and Plaintiff
failed to disclose or identify compensatory damages that can be disentangled from
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incarceration-based damages. (Doc. 1218 at 9.)6 The Court finds that it erred in precluding
Plaintiff’s evidence of compensatory damages based on disclosure violations without fully
analyzing the disclosure violations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The Court
analyzes below whether the sanction of preclusion is warranted based on (1) Plaintiff’s
refusal to answer questions about his damages during his deposition; and (2) Plaintiff’s
untimely disclosure of damage witnesses and evidence.
1. Plaintiff’s Deposition
If a deponent fails to answer a question asked during a deposition, the party seeking
discovery may move for an order compelling an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i). If
the Court orders the deponent to answer the question and the deponent still fails to do so,
the Court may impose a variety of sanctions, including “prohibiting the disobedient party
. . . from introducing designated matters in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Here, Defendants did not move to compel Plaintiff to answer the questions asked
during his deposition concerning his damages. Plaintiff’s failure to answer the questions
did not violate any Order of the Court, and sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) are therefore
inappropriate. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s refusal to answer Defendants’ questions concerning
damages resulted from a good-faith disagreement amongst counsel regarding the attorney-
client privilege. Defendants could have, but largely did not, re-phrase their questions to
attempt to elicit information concerning the emotional impact on Plaintiff of the
constitutional violations alleged in this action, while avoiding privileged information. The
Court does not find that Plaintiff’s conduct during the deposition warrants the extreme
sanction of precluding Plaintiff from testifying to the jury regarding non-incarceration-
based emotional damages arising from the alleged constitutional violations that occurred
during Plaintiff’s original criminal proceedings.
2. Plaintiff’s Disclosures
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), a party must, without awaiting a
6 The Court also granted Motions in Limine that the City of Tucson had filed seeking
specifically to exclude the testimony of Hoyt-Croft and Herf, on the grounds that their
testimony was relevant only to compensatory damages. (Doc. 1218 at 9-10.)
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discovery request, disclose to the other parties “the name and, if known, the address and
telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information—along with
the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses[.]” A party’s disclosure of non-retained experts not subject to the written report
requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) must include “the subject matter on which the witness is
expected” to present expert testimony, and “a summary of the facts and opinions to which
the witness is expected to testify.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). A party must supplement
or correct its Rule 26(a) disclosures “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some
material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional
or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during
the discovery process or in writing[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).
Pursuant to Rule 37(c), “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness
as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness
to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). However, the Court may impose other
appropriate sanctions in addition to or instead of the sanction of exclusion, including
ordering the payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the
failure to disclose. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A).
Plaintiff argues in his Motion for Reconsideration re: Compensatory Damages that
he adequately disclosed his damages for mental and emotional suffering caused by the
alleged constitutional violations relating to his 1972 conviction, and that he disclosed
medical witnesses, including Hoyt-Croft, “who has a Ph.D. in behavioral science,” Herf,
who has “expertise in the psychological effects of wrongful convictions,” and Donnelly,
who conducted a psychiatric evaluation during Taylor’s guardianship proceedings. (Doc.
1222 at 7-11.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff timely and adequately disclosed his own testimony
and his intent to seek compensatory damages arising from the emotional impact of the
alleged constitutional violations at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court erred in
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finding that Plaintiff should be limited to seeking nominal damages based on a failure to
disclose non-incarceration-based compensatory damages.
However, Plaintiff has not justified his untimely and incomplete disclosure of the
testimony of Hoyt-Croft, Herf, Mare, and Donnelly. Hoyt-Croft, Herf, and Mare were all
known to Plaintiff prior to the close of discovery, and Plaintiff has not explained why he
could not have disclosed them as witnesses earlier. Although Donnelly’s evaluation was
conducted after the close of discovery, Plaintiff does not explain why he failed to hire an
expert to conduct a psychiatric evaluation prior to the close of discovery, and he does not
explain why he waited approximately three months after Donnelly’s evaluation to disclose
her report, and then waited an additional six months to disclose her as a witness. (See Doc.
956-8 (report dated December 14, 2022); Doc. 956-7 at 63, 75 (report disclosed March 10,
2023); Doc. 956-10 at 20-21, 77 (Donnelly disclosed as witness September 14, 2023).)
Furthermore, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to introduce expert testimony from
Hoyt-Croft, Herf, and Donnelly, but Plaintiff failed to adequately disclose them as expert
witnesses. In his disclosure statements, Plaintiff stated that Herf will testify about her work
on Plaintiff’s behalf with the Arizona Justice Project, including her evaluation of the
psychological effects on Plaintiff of being wrongly convicted; that Hoyt-Croft is a
documentary filmmaker and member of the Arizona Justice Project who has a Ph.D. in
behavioral science who will testify about Plaintiff’s history, his damages, and her
experiences with him; and that Donnelly will testify regarding her report and “her
observations, analysis, diagnosis, conclusions and treatment” regarding Plaintiff. (Doc.
956-4 at 16-17; Doc. 956-10 at 20-21.) Plaintiff did not identify Herf, Hoyt-Croft, or
Donnelly as Rule 26(a)(2)(C) experts, nor did he disclose “a summary of the facts and
opinions” to which he expected each witness to testify.7 Even in the Joint Proposed Pretrial
Order, Plaintiff failed to identify Herf, Hoyt-Croft, and Donnelly as Rule 26(a)(2)(C)
expert witnesses; he identified Herf and Hoyt-Croft as “fact and damage” witnesses, and
he identified Donnelly as a “fact witness” who would also testify “based on her medical
7 Furthermore, in his Response to Defendants’ Motion in Limine re: Compensatory
Damages, Plaintiff asserted that Herf is a fact witness. (Doc. 1038 at 13.)
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training and experience.” (Doc. 932 at 289, 291-292.) Plaintiff did not summarize the
facts and opinions to which each witness is expected to testify in the Joint Proposed Pretrial
Order. (See id.)
The Court finds that sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) are appropriate because
Plaintiff’s failure to adequately and timely disclose Herf, Hoyt-Croft, Mare, and Donnelly
as witnesses was neither “substantially justified” nor “harmless.” To the extent Plaintiff
seeks to introduce expert testimony from Herf, Hoyt-Croft, and Donnelly, the Court finds
that preclusion is the appropriate sanction, as Plaintiff’s disclosure violations prevented
Defendants from conducting expert depositions and hiring rebuttal experts. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks to introduce fact testimony from Herf, Hoyt-Croft, and Mare, the Court finds
that preclusion is too harsh a sanction. Plaintiff disclosed unnamed members of the
Arizona Justice Project prior to the close of discovery, and he disclosed Herf, Hoyt-Croft,
and Mare within two months of the close of discovery, in 2021. The Court will allow
Plaintiff to present fact witness testimony from Herf, Hoyt-Croft, and Mare regarding their
observations of Plaintiff, but the Court will order as a sanction that, if Defendants seek to
depose Herf, Hoyt-Croft, and Mare before trial, they may do so at Plaintiff’s expense.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration re: Equitable
Estoppel (Doc. 1220) is denied.
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
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. . . .
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration re:
Compensatory Damages (Doc. 1222) is partially granted. Plaintiff may seek non-
incarceration-based compensatory damages at trial, and he may testify regarding the
emotional impact of his 1972 conviction and sentence and the emotional impact of the
alleged constitutional violations affecting his original trial proceedings, so long as he does
not testify regarding the emotional impact of his incarceration. Plaintiff may also present
fact witness testimony from Lindsay Herf, Lesley Hoyt-Croft, and Jeanette Mare regarding
their observations of Plaintiff. If Defendants seek to depose Herf, Hoyt-Croft, and Mare
before trial, they may do so at Plaintiff’s expense.
Dated this 6th day of August, 2026.
Case 4:15-cv-00152-RM Document 1252 Filed 08/07/26 Page 13 of 13