K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated v. Arvig Enterprises Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
v.
Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-08172-PCT-MTL
ORDER
The Court now considers Defendant Cydni Beck’s motion to set aside entry of
default. (Doc. 33.)
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2025, upon Plaintiff’s motion, the Clerk of Court entered default as
to Ms. Beck after she did not respond to the complaint. (Doc. 28.) That same day, Ms. Beck
filed an answer. (Doc. 29.) Plaintiff K.W. Brock moved to strike the answer because of
Ms. Beck’s default status. (Id.) In response, Ms. Beck moved to set aside the entry of
default. (Doc. 33.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
The Ninth Circuit’s standard for granting a motion to set aside entry of default is liberal.
Good cause exists where: (1) the movant’s conduct leading to the default was not culpable,
(2) the movant alleges facts sufficient to establish a meritorious defense, and (3) setting
aside the default would not prejudice non-moving parties. U.S. v. Signed Personal Check
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No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] case should,
whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” Id. at 1090. (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d
461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)).
A. 	Culpable Conduct
“[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice
of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v.
Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (emphasis in original). Culpability requires
more than a conscious choice not to answer; it requires an intention to take advantage of
an opposing party, interfere with judicial decision-making, or otherwise act in bad faith.
Signed Personal Check, 615 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted).
Ms. Beck states that her failure to respond to the complaint was due to lack of notice.
(Doc. 33 at 1-2.) This does not rise to the level of bad faith, so Ms. Beck did not act
culpably.
B. 	Meritorious Defense
To satisfy the requirement that the movant have a meritorious defense, Ms. Beck
must allege facts that, if true, would constitute a defense. Signed Personal Check, 615 F.3d
at 1091. “[T]he burden on a party seeking to vacate a default judgment is not extraordinarily
heavy.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700. Ms. Beck alleges facts sufficient to constitute a
defense, including allegations related to the scope of Ms. Beck’s employment agreement.
(Doc. 52.) Ms. Beck alleges sufficient facts to establish a meritorious defense.
C. 	Prejudice
“To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm than
simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 701. “[T]he standard is
whether [Plaintiff’s] ability to pursue his claim will be hindered.” Falk, 739 F.2d at 463.
Here, setting aside default as to Ms. Beck will not hinder Plaintiff’s ability to pursue
its claim. For one, Ms. Beck filed her answer on the same day that default was entered.
(Docs. 28, 29); see TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 701 (finding that a party’s appearance one
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month 	after 	entry of default 	was timely 	enough 	to 	indicate a lack 	of prejudice).
Notwithstanding Ms. Beck’s tardy response to the complaint (Doc. 1), litigation is
proceeding as planned. The Court’s hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
Injunction was not delayed (Doc. 51), and Ms. Beck has diligently worked to provide
briefing on the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 52). Setting aside
default will not prejudice the non-moving parties.
Having considered Defendant Cydni Beck’s motion to set aside entry of default
(Doc. 33),
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to set aside entry of default (Doc. 33) is
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to set aside default against Ms. Beck at
Docket No. 28.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to strike Ms. Beck’s answer
(Doc. 30), filed on the basis that default had been entered as to Ms. Beck, is DENIED as
moot.
Dated this 24th day of October, 2025.
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