Doria v. Select Quote Insurance Services Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Daniel T Doria,
Plaintiff,
v.
SelectQuote Insurance Services
Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-08078-PCT-SMB
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23); Plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 32); Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 34); and Plaintiff’s First Motion to Amend (Doc. 36). The
Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but denies the remaining Motions for the
reasons below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff appears pro se. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges
as follows. Defendant, through Plaintiff’s corporate trainer and recruiter, told Plaintiff that
it would evaluate all newly hired employees’ performances through a quality assurance
(“QA”) monitoring tool called “Ranger.” (Doc. 13 at 4.) On October 25, 2024, Defendant
terminated Plaintiff based on a 76% QA score reported on Quicksight—a different
monitoring tool. (Id.) Defendant terminated Plaintiff within his first week of employment.
(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff avers Quicksight’s program lags behind real-time data, and Defendant
did not disclose this as an evaluation tool. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff holds that his Ranger QA
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score exceeded the required satisfactory threshold, but Defendants refused to consider the
score. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s SAC asserts a claim for breach of an implied contract.1 (Id. at 5–6.)
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached the affirmative representation that
Plaintiff would be evaluated using QA stats from Ranger by terminating him based on
Quicksight’s report. (Id. at 6.) Defendant now moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 23.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet
the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory
or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a
cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual
matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal
“probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
1 Plaintiff’s SAC reasserts the wrongful termination claim the Court previously dismissed
with prejudice. (Doc. 12 at 6.) Therefore, the Court will not consider it here.
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In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations
are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins
v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations
of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto
v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence
outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States
v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider
materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908.
III. DISCUSSION
The essence of Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendant terminated him in violation of an
implied contract that Defendant would make any performance-based decisions solely on
QA stats from Ranger. This claim is subject to the Arizona Employee Protection Act
(“AEPA”), A.R.S. § 23-1501. See Ferren v. Westmed Inc., No. CV-19-00598-TUC-DCB,
2021 WL 778545, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 1, 2021) (“The AEPA exclusively governs
employee breach of contract claims resulting from termination.”). Here, the AEPA
precludes Plaintiff’s claim.
Prior to AEPA, Arizona law was clear that all employment relationships were
presumably at-will—i.e., terminable with or without cause. Taylor v. Graham Cnty.
Chamber of Com., 33 P.3d 518, 526 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). During this pre-enactment
period, the Arizona “supreme court recognized exceptions to the at-will presumption based
not only on public policy grounds but also on theories of ‘implied-in-fact’ contracts and
the ‘implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’” Id. at 527 (quoting Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985)). “But the plain wording and
legislative intent of [AEPA] have changed [that] legal landscape.” Id.
“The legislature’s stated intent in enacting [AEPA] was to limit the circumstances
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in which a terminated employee can sue an employer to those situations involving either
qualifying written contracts or an employer violating the public policy of the state as
enunciated in the state constitution and statutes.” Johnson v. Hisp. Broadcasters of Tucson,
Inc., 2 P.3d 687, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). The first situation is implicated here but is
plainly inapplicable.
The AEPA bakes in the presumption of at-will employment with only few
exceptions. “The first exception arises if ‘both the employee and the employer have signed
a written contract to the contrary setting forth that the employment relationship shall remain
in effect for a specified duration of time.’” Taylor, 33 P.3d at 527 (quoting § 23-1501(2)).
“The second exception also requires ‘a written contract,’ signed by ‘both the employee and
the employer,’ that ‘otherwise expressly restrict[s] the right of either party to terminate the
employment relationship.” Id. (quoting § 23-1501(2)). In the absence of a written contract,
a plaintiff cannot establish either exception. Ergo, an implied contract cannot overcome
the at-will presumption. See, e.g., Rajasundaram v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No.
CV-20-01544-PHX-SPL, 2021 WL 1117324, at *10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2021) (holding that
the “AEPA precludes claims for the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing”).
There are no facts to suggest Defendant and Plaintiff memorialized in writing that
all performance would be evaluated through Ranger. But even if there were, the promise
to use Ranger is not a promise to only terminate Plaintiff based on poor metrics from
Ranger. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to plead a viable claim under AEPA
and that further leave to amend would be futile.2 The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply because Defendant does not raise any new issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23).
2 Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to Amend to file his SAC out of concern that his SAC
was not the operative complaint. (Doc. 36.) Plaintiff is mistaken. The SAC is the current
controlling pleading. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion as moot.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-
Reply (Doc. 32) and denying as moot Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 34) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 36).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice and
directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and terminate this
case.
Dated this 3rd day of June, 2026.
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