Warisuzzaman v. Phoenix, City of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Ali Warisuzzaman,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Phoenix, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-01115-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Plaintiff Ali Warisuzzaman brings this suit against the City of Phoenix, Phoenix
Police Department, Officer E. Gustafon, American Airlines, and Captain Doe. (Doc. 1
at 2-4.) He alleges that his constitutional rights were violated while traveling from
Philadelphia to Phoenix on an American Airlines flight. (Id. at 2, 6.) Pending before the
Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Doc. 47.) The Court will
deny the Motion.
I.
“[A] judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse.”
Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citation modified). “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking
disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v.
Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C-07-00915-JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2007); see also Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We presume that
Judge Newhouse was impartial because he was a judicial officer.”).
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A motion for judicial recusal under § 455 “is directed to the judge, rather than the
parties, and is self-enforcing on the part of the judge.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864,
867-68 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 455(a) requires that a “judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” It is well established in this Circuit that the test for recusal of a judicial officer
is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Carey, 929 F.3d
1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir.
1993)). A reasonable person “in this context means a well-informed, thoughtful observer,
as opposed to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” United States v. Holland, 519
F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178). “Disqualification under
§ 455(a) is necessarily fact-driven and may turn on subtleties in the particular case.” Carey,
929 F.3d at 1104 (quoting Holland, 519 F.3d at 913).
Section 455(b)(1) separately requires recusal where a judge has a “personal bias or
prejudice.” But “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Absent evidence of
an extrajudicial source, recusal is warranted only where judicial conduct displays
“deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id.
II.
Plaintiff argues that recusal is warranted based on a purported pattern of “procedural
irregularities,” “selective enforcement of Local Rules,” and rulings allegedly favoring
Defendants. (Doc. 47 at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff challenges: (1) the timing of the Court’s
rulings; (2) the Court’s management of default procedures; (3) the Court’s handling of
discovery and extensions; and (4) the enforcement of Local Rules.
These arguments do not support recusal. Plaintiff identifies no facts suggesting the
Court has any personal or financial interest in this case, nor any extrajudicial source of
bias. See Johnson v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2023). Instead, the Motion rests
entirely on disagreement with the Court’s rulings and case management decisions.
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The Court’s rulings on administrative motions, scheduling, extensions, and
procedural matters are part of its inherent authority to manage the orderly progress of
litigation. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 508-09 (9th Cir. 2008). District
courts have broad discretion in these areas, including ruling on motions, managing
discovery, and granting or denying extensions of time. See F.T.C. v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944,
957 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that district courts have broad discretion in controlling their
dockets); Barone v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:21-CV-4200-SSS-PD, 2023
WL 8042740, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2023) (“[T]he district court has broad discretion to
control its docket, including ruling on requests for extensions of time.”).
Nor does Plaintiff’s invocation of Liteky alter the analysis. (See Doc. 47 at 5-6.) The
conduct Plaintiff identifies consists entirely of rulings and case management decisions
made during this proceeding. Under Liteky, such actions “do not constitute a basis for a
bias or partiality motion” unless they reveal a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” 510
U.S. at 555. Plaintiff’s Motion, however, merely reflects dissatisfaction with the Court’s
decisions. But “[a] judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.” Sibla,
624 F.2d at 868. Because Plaintiff has not shown that a reasonable, well-informed observer
would question the Court’s impartiality, recusal is not warranted under § 455(a). Nor has
Plaintiff demonstrated personal bias under § 455(b)(1).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse (Doc. 47) is
DENIED.
Dated this 10th day of April, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-01115-MTL Document 48 Filed 04/10/26 Page 3 of 3