Pohle NV Center Incorporated v. Textron Specialized Vehicles Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Pohle NV Center Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
v.
Textron Specialized Vehicles Incorporated,
et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-01098-PHX-MTL
ORDER
This case relates to agreements between Plaintiff Pohle NV Center Incorporated, a
golf-cart retailer, and Defendant Textron Specialized Vehicles Incorporated, a golf-cart
manufacturer. (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 1, 6.) Plaintiff seeks to apply Arizona’s comprehensive motor
vehicle manufacturer-dealer and franchisor-franchisee regulatory scheme to its relationship
with Defendant, arguing that golf carts are passenger cars within the statutes’ regulatory
reach. (See generally id.) The agreements contain a forum selection clause specifying that
disputes must be heard “either in Georgia State Superior Court for the County of
Richmond, or in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
Augusta Division.” (Doc. 9-1.)
Defendant seeks to enforce the forum selection clause. It filed a Motion to Transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff opposes transfer (Doc. 13), and Defendant
filed a reply brief (Doc. 16).
Neither party seeks oral argument, and the Court finds the issue suitable for
determination on the briefs. See LRCiv 7.2(f). The Motion to Transfer (Doc. 9) will be
Case 2:26-cv-01098-MTL Document 18 Filed 04/29/26 Page 1 of 5

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granted, and the Court will transfer this case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, Augusta Division.
I.
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that, “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” District
courts ordinarily have “discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an
individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Jones v. GNC
Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation modified). But the presence
of a valid forum selection clause “requires district courts to adjust their usual § 1404(a)
analysis.” Atl. Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49,
51 (2013).
A party may enforce a forum selection clause under § 1404(a) by seeking transfer
to the federal judicial district designated in the agreement. Id. at 59. “[A] proper application
of § 1404(a) requires that a forum-selection clause be ‘given controlling weight in all but
the most exceptional cases.’” Id. at 59-60 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 33 (1988)). Well-established judicial policy favors the enforcement of forum
selection clauses as representations of the parties’ bargaining and mutual expectations,
which is why such clauses are presumptively valid. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. “[T]he
plaintiff must bear the burden of showing why the court should not transfer the case to the
forum to which the parties agreed.” Atl. Marine, 51 U.S. at 63-64; see also Yei A. Sun v.
Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming the
dismissal of a complaint because a plaintiff did not carry “their heavy burden of showing
the sort of exceptional circumstances that would justify disregarding a forum-selection
clause”).
II.
Plaintiff asserts three claims in its Complaint, including one claim for declaratory
judgment as to the applicability of the motor vehicle regulatory statutes, A.R.S. § 28-4301,
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et seq., one claim for statutory damages under A.R.S. § 38-4307, and one claim for breach
of contract under Arizona common law. (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 44-58.) All three claims arise out of
dealer agreements between the parties, and each agreement contains a forum selection
clause. (Id.) The clauses provide:
“The parties agree that this Agreement has been negotiated and executed in
the State of Georgia, and that any and all claims or disputes that in any way
arise out of or relate to this Agreement, the negotiation or execution thereof,
its performance, or the breach or enforcement thereof, or any claims or
disputes that in any way concern the conduct of any party in connection with
this Agreement, shall hereinafter be resolved, decided and litigated
exclusively either in the applicable state court in an for Richmond County,
Georgia, or in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, Augusta Division. Dealer hereby irrevocably waives any right it
may have to commence any action or proceeding against E-Z-GO in any
other court.”
(Docs. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8.) The language “any and all claims or disputes
that in any way arise out of or relate to this Agreement” is broad enough to cover Plaintiff’s
claims. Plaintiff does not contest the forum selection clause exists or that its scope applies
to the present controversy.
“When the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause,” as the parties have
here, “a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified in that
clause.” Atl. Marine Const. Co, 571 U.S. at 62. Plaintiff bears the weighty burden of
showing that “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties”
outweigh enforcing the forum selection clause. Id. To succeed, Plaintiff must make “a
strong showing” that “enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.” Sun, 901 F.3d
at 1088 (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15).
To contest the enforcement of the forum selection clause, Plaintiff invokes “‘the
local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the interest in having
the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.’” (Doc. 13 at 2 (citing
Sun, 901 F.3d 1081, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2018)).)
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Plaintiff contends that this forum has a “local interest” in hearing this case because
“all key events giving rise to the dispute occurred in Arizona,” the alleged statutory
violations occurred in Arizona, “the evidence of TSV’s misconduct is located in Arizona,”
“governmental witnesses are located in Arizona,” and Plaintiff has “no connection to
Georgia.” (Id. at 4.) These arguments, which speak only to convenience and private
interests, are insufficient to overcome an otherwise enforceable forum selection clause. See
Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63 (holding that by agreeing to be bound by a forum selection
clause, a plaintiff waives their ability to assert “venue privilege”).
Plaintiff would have this Court deny the transfer because “Arizona has a ‘strong
public policy interest’ in applying its own regulatory statutes.” (Doc. 13 at 5 (citing Kode
v. United Dental Corp., 710 F.Supp.3d 682, 687 (2024)).) Kode, the sole case Plaintiff
relies on for this proposition, involved a determination as to whether a choice of law
provision was contrary to the “fundamental policy” of a state. See Kode, 710 F.Supp.3d at
687. That Court applied the standard applicable to choice of law provisions, Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(a)-(b), and Plaintiff argues that “[t]his standard is
similar to the § 1404(a) standard applicable here.” (Doc. 13 at 4.)
But Atlantic Marine supplies the standard here because there is a valid forum
selection clause. 571 U.S. 49. There, the Supreme Court squarely rejected Plaintiff’s
position, particularly because it rested on the flawed assumption that a federal judge cannot
competently apply the laws of states outside the state in which he sits. Id. at 67-68
(“[F]ederal judges routinely apply the law of a State other than the State in which they
sit.”). This Court does not presume superior competence or familiarity in interpreting
Arizona law. Accordingly, Arizona’s generic interest in seeing Arizona law applied by
federal courts within its borders does not defeat transfer. See Tempe Hosp. Ventures LLC
v. Sheraton LLC, No. CV-23-01577-PHX-SMB, 2023 WL 9119824, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov.
28, 2023) (finding that allegations that Arizona has a strong interest in cases brought by
Arizona companies and greater familiarity with Arizona law do not overcome the
presumption in favor of enforcing forum selection clauses).
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It makes no difference if the question of state law is one of first impression, as the
Georgia district court may certify a question of Arizona law to the Supreme Court of
Arizona. See A.R.S. § 12-1861 (authorizing the Supreme Court of Arizona to answer
questions of law certified by “a United States District Court,” without geographic
limitation). It is also immaterial that the Georgia district court’s decisions would be
non-binding on Arizona courts, as this Court’s interpretation of Arizona law is not binding
on state courts either. See Arizonans for Official Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 n.21
(1997).
The Court finds that although the transferee court may have to apply Arizona law
does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying denial of transfer. This is not
an unusual case. The Court will transfer this case to the forum that Plaintiff contracted for.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Transfer (Doc. 9) is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must transfer this action to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Augusta Division
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Clerk of Court must close this case.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Question of Law (Doc. 15) are left to the discretion of the
transferee court for resolution.
Dated this 29th day of April, 2026.
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