Urinboev v. Rivas et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Azizbek Kuvonchbek Ugli Urinboev,
Petitioner,
v.
David R Rivas, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-00488-PHX-AMM (MTM)
ORDER
Self-represented Petitioner Azizbek Kuvonchbek Ugli Urinboev filed this action
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention. (Doc. 1.) Respondents
answered the Petition, and the time for Petitioner to reply has passed. (See Docs. 3, 6.)
Upon review of the briefing, the Court will grant the Petition and order Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner.
I. BACKGROUND.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Uzbekistan. (Doc. 6 at 1.) On October 15, 2023,
Petitioner was detained while attempting to enter the United States without proper
documentation. (Id.) On the same day, Petitioner was served with a notice and order of
expedited removal, charging Petitioner as removable under Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)—codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).1 (Id.)
On November 28, 2023, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear after an asylum
1 This provision states that an immigrant “who is not in possession of a . . . valid entry
document required by this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel
document, or document of identity and nationality if such document is required . . . is
inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
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officer established a positive finding of credible fear. (Id.) On December 22, 2023,
Petitioner was subsequently released from immigration detention pursuant to humanitarian
parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Id.; Doc. 6-2 at 2.)
Thereafter, on September 8, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 6 at 2.)
On January 16, 2026, Petitioner filed the present Petition.2 (Doc. 1.) In his Petition,
Petitioner asserts that: (1) Respondents have misclassified him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b);
and (2) his current immigration detention violates the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 11.)
II. DISCUSSION.
The Due Process Clause protects all persons within the United States from being
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
It is well established that the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens within the United
States “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). The Court’s due process analysis is separated
into two steps: first, courts consider “whether there exists a liberty or property interest of
which a person has been deprived, and if so,” courts ask “whether the procedures followed
by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,
219 (2011).
A. Statutory Classification and Corresponding Liberty Interest.
“A noncitizen’s place ‘within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention
is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he
wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.’” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529 (9th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Petitioner asserts that his continued detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and that he is
thus entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 11 at 6). Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject
2 On February 27, 2026, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. (Doc. 11.) The Court found
Petitioner’s Amended Petition is essentially identical to his original Petition, except that
Petitioner omits ICE Field Office Director Gregory J. Archambeault as a Respondent. (See
Doc. 14 at 1.) Because Petitioner did not raise any new claims with respect to his
immigration detention, and because Respondents answered the original Petition, the Court
ordered that Respondents were not required to respond to the Amended Petition. (Id.)
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to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Doc. 6 at 2–4.) On this matter, the Court
agrees with Respondents.
Here, Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
Because Petitioner was released upon humanitarian parole, he is properly classified under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Mohammadi v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00032-GMN-EJY, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27013, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2026) (noting that a petitioner released upon 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) remains classified “under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1226(a)”); Musaev v.
Hermosillo, No. 2:26-cv-00522-RAJ, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75938, at *9–10 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 6, 2026) (finding that a noncitizen detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and
released upon 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) humanitarian parole is “subject to Section 1225(b)’s
mandatory detention scheme upon the termination of his parole”).
Although Petitioner may be properly subject to potential detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), this finding “‘does not obviate Respondents’ obligation to comply with due
process’ in re-detaining Petitioner.” Id. at *10 (quoting Telenchana v. Hermosillo, No.
2:26-cv-00363-GJL, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51425, at *29 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2026)).
Rather, recent caselaw confirms that an immigration detainee released on parole retains a
liberty interest in his release and that “liberty interest [does] not expire along with his
parole.” Guevara Serrano v. Bondi, No. CV-26-00110-PHX-DJH, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9,
2026) (quoting Omer G.G. v. Kaiser, 815 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2025));
Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Once
established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which may only be
revoked through methods that comport with due process, such as a hearing in front of a
neutral party to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detainment is warranted . . . . That the
express terms of the [§ 1182] parole notice allowed for discretionary termination or
expiration does not somehow obviate the need for the Government to provide a[n]
individualized bond hearing prior to re-detaining the parolee.”); Mody v. Warden, No. 25-
cv-03400-FMO, 2026 WL 51976, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (issuing temporary
restraining order where petitioner had been re-detained following expiration of his § 1182
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parole); Quiroga-Chaparro v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Fac., No. 25-
cv-01731-AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4–7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025) (same); Tesara v.
Wamsley, No. 2:25-cv-01723-KKE-TLF, 2025 WL 3288295, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25,
2025) (directing immigration detainee’s immediate release after he was re-detained
following his parole’s expiration, stating petitioner’s “interest in his freedom is
constitutionally protected” and that “the Government exercises discretion in determining
whether to grant parole or extend it upon its expiration does not eliminate the protections
afforded to Petitioner’s liberty interest”).
The applicable regulations also provide that if a non-citizen is re-detained after §
1182 parole expires, they “shall again be released on parole” if their “exclusion,
deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time.” 8 C.F.R. §
212.5(e)(2)(i); D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC), 2026 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10287, at *9–10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026) (“Indeed, the applicable regulations state
that if a non-citizen is re-detained after § 1182 parole expires, they ‘shall again be released
on parole’ if their ‘exclusion, deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within a
reasonable time.’”) (citing § 212.5(e)(1), (e)(2)(i)). Although it is unclear from the records
provided whether Petitioner’s parole had expired by the time he was re-detained, because
no evidence has been presented to support that Petitioner’s deportation is likely to occur
within a reasonable time, Petitioner has a liberty interest in his release.
B. Proper Procedural Process.
Because Petitioner has a liberty interest in his release, the Court must now determine
what procedures are required to overcome that interest. To do so, the Court applies the
three-part Mathews v. Eldridge test. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under the Mathews test, the
Court considers:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
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additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
As to the first factor, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)
(“This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes
a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”); Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he government’s discretion to incarcerate
non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”); Rodriguez v.
Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of
our American government. ‘[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without
trial is the carefully limited exception.’” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
755 (1987))); cf. Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The Supreme Court
has been unambiguous that executive detention orders, which occur without the procedural
protections required in courts of law, call for the most searching review.” (citing
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781–83, 786 (2008))). This factor favors Petitioner.
Turning to the second factor, “[w]here an individual has not received a bond or
redetermination hearing, the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high.” Aceros
v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594, at *33 (N.D.
Cal. Sep. 12, 2025) (citation omitted). The Court concludes there is a significant risk of
erroneous deprivation where a bond or redetermination hearing has not been performed.
Therefore, this factor favors Petitioner as well.
Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, “[i]f the government wishes to re-arrest [a
petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in
doing so without a hearing is low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal.
2019). Further, detention hearings in immigration courts are commonplace and impose
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“minimal” cost and effort. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal.,
2025); Abduraimov v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00843-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 2912307, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025) (“Courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond
hearing is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this Court
demonstrating that providing Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or
administratively burdensome.”). In any event, “[d]etention for its own sake, to meet an
administrative quota, or because the government has not yet established constitutionally
required pre-detention procedures is not a legitimate government interest.” Pinchi v. Noem,
792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
The Court therefore finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor of finding that
Petitioner was entitled to a hearing before he was re-detained and placed in DHS custody.
Accordingly, the Court will direct Respondents to release Petitioner immediately. See 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also Singh v. Unknown Party, No. CV-26-00483-PHX-JCH
(CDB), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61597, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2026) (“The Court finds
that immediate release, rather than requiring another bond hearing, is the appropriate
remedy.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. (Doc.
11.)
(2) Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner from custody under
the same conditions that existed before his re-detention.
(3) Respondents shall provide a Notice of Compliance within THREE (3)
BUSINESS DAYS of Petitioner’s release.
Dated this 21st day of May, 2026.
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