Hatch v. Neal et al

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KM
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Kavon D. Hatch,
Plaintiff,
v.
J. Neal, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04946-PHX-JAT (JZB)
ORDER
Self-represented Plaintiff Kavon D. Hatch, who is confined in a Maricopa County
Jail, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss without
prejudice Count Two and Defendants Watkins, CIU, Maricopa County and Ramos. The
Court will stay consideration of Count One, pending the conclusion of Plaintiff’s criminal
proceedings in Maricopa County Superior Court, case number CR2025-007787.
I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing
fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited
to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government
agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.
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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff
has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does
not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts
must “continue to construe [self-represented litigant’s] filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a self-represented prisoner]
‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id.
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
. . . .
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III. Complaint
In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: SSU Officer
J. Neal, Assistant Deputy Warden Watkins, Arizona Department of Corrections
Rehabilitation & Reentry’s (ADCRR’s) Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU), CIU Officer
Ramos, and Maricopa County. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Neal used excessive force on him, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that on November 16, 2024, when
Plaintiff was confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis, Defendant Neal was
“inciting inmates to fight in the chow hall.” Plaintiff states that “upon seeing a new officer
uncomfortable with what was going on,” Plaintiff told the new officer “that his words
mattered and just be himself.” Defendant Neal told Plaintiff, “shut up Hatch you little
bitch, to which Plaintiff walked over and asked . . . ‘what did you say?’ due to the chow
hall being full and loud.” According to Plaintiff, Defendant Neal then, “unprompted[,]
began assaulting the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff “attempted to get the officer off but [was] never
given any directive by Officer Neal.” Plaintiff claims other officers watched Defendant
Neal attack Plaintiff but made no move to intervene. Defendant Neal then tased Plaintiff
while Plaintiff was “attempting to get Neal off of him.” He claims Defendant Neal
“maliciously pressed street charges.” Plaintiff alleges he suffered a concussion, “starvation
for 4 days, no restroom or water breaks for 4 days, psychological trauma from having to
urinate & defecate in a 3x3 cell and forced to sleep in the same cage with no cleaning then
[was] isolated in an abandoned pod by [himself] for a month.”
In Count Two, Plaintiff claims violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff
alleges that after Defendant Neal assaulted him, he was issued a disciplinary ticket that was
later “exonerated by video footage.” According to Plaintiff, a year later, “CIU and Lewis
Complex maliciously file[d] street charges committing double jeopardy.” He claims
Maricopa County prosecutors have “video evidence of [him] getting assaulted” but charged
him with aggravated assault. Plaintiff claims this is wasting [his] time [and] life and [he
is] unfairly being punished.”
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IV. Discussion
A. Failure to State a Claim
1. Defendants Watkins and Ramos
To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege they suffered a specific
injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between
the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72,
377 (1976). Plaintiff alleges no facts regarding Defendants Watkins and Ramos and
therefore fails to state a claim against them. The Court will dismiss without prejudice
Defendants Watkins and Ramos.
2. Defendant CIU
The Criminal Investigations Unit of ADCRR is not a proper defendant because it is
a non-jural entity. The CIU is simply an administrative division of ADCRR and is not a
“person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, CIU will be dismissed from
this action.
3. Defendant Maricopa County
“A municipality may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was
inflicted by its employees or agents.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185
(9th Cir. 2006). The actions of individuals may support municipal liability only if the
employees were acting pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality. Botello
v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2005). A § 1983 claim against a municipal
defendant “cannot succeed as a matter of law” unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the
municipal defendant maintains a policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged injury;
and (2) explains how such policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sadoski v.
Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that
Defendant Maricopa County maintained a specific policy or custom that resulted in a
violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights and has failed to explain how his injuries
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were caused by any municipal policy or custom. Thus, the Court will dismiss without
prejudice Defendant Maricopa County.
4. Count Two
Plaintiff brings his claims in Count Two against Defendants CIU and Maricopa
County. As discussed above, the Court will dismiss these Defendants. As no other
Defendants are named in Count Two, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Two.
B. Count One
On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff was charged in Maricopa County Superior Court,
case number CR2025-007787, with one count of aggravated assault on a corrections
officer, with an offense date of November 16, 2024. The proceedings are ongoing.1
Plaintiff’s criminal charges stem from the incident described in Count One.
The abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prevents
a federal court in most circumstances from directly interfering with ongoing criminal
proceedings in state court. Younger principles also apply to a plaintiff’s request for
damages, but in that situation, a temporary stay, rather than dismissal, is appropriate.
Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2004). Staying the federal case until
the state court criminal case is no longer pending
allows the federal plaintiff an opportunity to pursue constitutional
challenges in the state proceeding (assuming, of course, that such an
opportunity is available under state law), and the state an opportunity
to pass on those constitutional issues in the context of its own
procedures, while still preserving the federal plaintiff’s opportunity to
pursue compensation in the forum of his choice. In this way, neither
the federal plaintiff’s right to seek damages for constitutional
violations nor the state’s interest in its own system is frustrated.
Id.
It appears, therefore, that a stay of this case is appropriate under Gilbertson. It also
appears a stay is appropriate under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). In that case, the
1 See https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/case
Info.asp?caseNumber=CR2025-007787 [https://perma.cc/72X2-96SH].
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Supreme Court stated that if a plaintiff files a claim related to rulings that will likely be
made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial,
it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common
practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the
likelihood of a criminal case is ended. If the plaintiff is ultimately
convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction,
Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)], will require dismissal;
otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.
Id. at 393-94 (citations omitted).2 Accordingly, if Plaintiff is convicted of the aggravated
assault charge, his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim would be barred by Heck.
The Court will stay this case until Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings have
concluded. Plaintiff should note that a stay does not eliminate his federal court remedy,
but it simply delays consideration of his civil claims until after the state trial court resolves
his criminal charges. See Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.”).
The Court will order Plaintiff to file a status report reflecting the status of his
criminal case on July 1, 2026, and every 90 days thereafter, and will also require Plaintiff
to file a status report within 15 days after entry of judgment in Maricopa County Superior
2 In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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Court case CR2025-007787. If Plaintiff fails to file a status report as directed, the Court
will dismiss this case.
V. Warnings
A. Release
If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not
been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court
that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or
(2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may
result in dismissal of this action.
B. Address Changes
Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule
83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other
relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this
action.
C. Possible Dismissal
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these
warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,
963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure
to comply with any order of the Court).
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.
(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government
agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial filing
fee.
(3) Defendants Watkins, CIU, Maricopa County and Ramos are dismissed
without prejudice.
(4) Count Two of the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
. . . .
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(5) This case is stayed pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s criminal case in
Maricopa County Superior Court case CR2025-007787. The Clerk of Court must indicate
on the docket that this case is stayed.
(6) Beginning on July 1, 2026, and every 90 days thereafter, Plaintiff must file
with the Court a “Notice of Status” informing the Court of the status of Plaintiff’s criminal
case, Maricopa County Superior Court case CR2025-007787.
(7) Plaintiff must file a “Notice of Status” within 15 days after entry of judgment
in Maricopa County Superior Court case CR2025-007787.
(8) If Plaintiff fails to file a status report on July 1, 2026, and every 90 days
thereafter, the Clerk of Court must dismiss this action without prejudice.
Dated this 5th day of June, 2026.
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