Lev v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Dennis Lev,
Plaintiff,
v.
Unum Life Insurance Company of America
Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-04393-PHX-DWL
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons
that follow, the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff (who is proceeding pro se) filed a complaint in Maricopa
County Superior Court, naming Unum Life Insurance Company of America, Inc.
(“Unum”) as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1-1 at 22-32.) The complaint asserts state-law
claims for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (“IIED”), as well as a claim for attorneys’ fees, and seeks unspecified damages as
to the first two claims and damages of “$100,000-$200,000” as to the IIED claim. (Id. at
30-31.)
On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff improperly served the complaint and summons on
Unum’s registered agent in South Carolina. (Id. at 16-17.)
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that
asserted the same claims as his original complaint. (Id. at 4-14.)
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On November 21, 2025, Unum filed a notice of removal in this Court, asserting that
removal is permissible because Plaintiff is a citizen of Arizona and Unum is a citizen of
Maine, such that the parties are completely diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. (Doc. 1.)
On December 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed the motion to remand. (Doc. 12.) The motion
is now fully briefed (Docs. 16, 17) and neither side requested oral argument.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A defendant generally may remove any action filed in state court if a federal district
court would have had original jurisdiction.” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC,
840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). A federal district court has
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs” and the parties are diverse. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).1 “If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). See also Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089,
1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be
remanded to state court.”).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s first ground for opposing Unum’s removal effort is that “complete
diversity is absent: Unum is a citizen of Arizona for purposes of this lawsuit under the
‘nerve center’ test of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) and Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-
93 (2010).” (Doc. 12 at 2.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiff notes that Unum is
licensed to transact insurance business in Arizona and that the relevant conduct at issue in
this case occurred in Arizona. (Id. at 3.)
1 The “strong presumption” against removal in “mine-run diversity cases” was not
altered by Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014), which
addressed removal of class actions under the Class Action Fairness Act. See generally
Johnson v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1442644, *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2015).
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In response, Unum asserts that it “is not a citizen of Arizona,” that it is a citizen of
Maine because Maine is where it is incorporated and maintains its principal place of
business,” and that “[t]he mere fact that [it] is licensed to transact insurance business in
Arizona, transacts such business, and has a designated agent for service of process in the
state does not make it an Arizona citizen.” (Doc. 16 at 1-2.) Unum also proffers a
declaration from J. Paul Julienne, the corporate secretary of its parent company, who avows
that Unum “is, and at all times relevant was, a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Maine. with its home office and principal place of business
located in Maine.” (Doc. 16-3 ¶ 2.) And Unum also cites an array of cases recognizing
that it is a citizen of Maine for diversity purposes. (Doc. 16 at 3-4.)
In his reply, Plaintiff does not address or dispute any of these arguments. Instead,
Plaintiff contends that Unum removed the action before “formal service,” such that the
removal was “untimely” and procedurally defective, and also argues that Unum is subject
to personal jurisdiction in Arizona and that remand to state court “promotes efficient
resolution in the forum most familiar with applicable Arizona insurance law.” (Doc. 17 at
1-3.)
“The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving all jurisdictional facts,”
Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990), and Unum has
easily met that burden here. The only competent evidence of Unum’s citizenship is the
Paul declaration, which avows that Unum’s principal place of business is in Maine.
Plaintiff has not come forward with any conflicting evidence—his observation that Unum
is licensed to transact business in Arizona does not suggest that Arizona is Unum’s
principal place of business. See, e.g., Lacombe v. Bullhead City Hosp. Corp., 2007 WL
2702005, *4 (D. Ariz. 2007) (“The fact that a corporation is doing business in a given state
does not mean that that state is necessarily its ‘principal place of business’ for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction under section 1332.”).
The only other argument advanced in Plaintiff’s motion is that “removal is
procedurally barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) because Unum engaged in an abusive pre-
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service ‘snap removal’ to evade the forum-defendant rule.” (Doc. 12 at 2.) A “snap
removal” is when “in-forum defendants in potential diversity actions . . . race to file a notice
of removal before being served with process and then claim shelter under the ‘properly
joined and served’ language in § 1441(b)(2).” Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 964
n.17 (9th Cir. 2024). The Ninth Circuit has “not decided the permissibility of snap
removal.” Id. But at any rate, there could be no “snap removal” here because there are no
in-forum defendants in this action. As Unum correctly points out in its response, because
Unum is a Maine citizen and there are no other defendants, “neither the forum-defendant
rule nor the law governing ‘snap removals’ has any relevance here.” (Doc. 16 at 5.)
Plaintiff does not argue otherwise in his reply.
Instead, Plaintiff uses his reply to advance a new argument that was not raised in his
motion—namely, that Unum’s removal effort was premature because he did not properly
serve Unum via its registered agent in Arizona until December 4, 2025, about two weeks
after the removal notice was filed. (Doc. 17 at 2.) As an initial matter, this argument is
forfeited. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need
not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). At any rate, this
argument fails on the merits. Unum received a copy of Plaintiff’s initial pleading on
October 23, 2025, when Plaintiff served it on Unum’s registered agent in South Carolina.
Although this may not have been a valid service effort, “[t]he plain text of § 1446(b)(1)
sets a deadline for removal, not a ‘window’ for removal. Nothing in the statute’s text can
be construed as barring a defendant from filing a notice of removal before formal service.”
Mayes v. Am. Hallmark Ins. Co. of Texas, 114 F.4th 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2024). Thus,
Unum’s filing of the removal notice on November 21, 2025 was neither premature nor
untimely.2
2 Unum also contends that Plaintiff did not meet and confer before filing his motion,
as he claims to have done. (Doc. 16 at 3, citations omitted [“As part of the Motion, Plaintiff
certified under Rule 11 that he ‘conferred in good faith with defense counsel … via email
regarding the deficiencies in the removal and requested that Defendant voluntarily remand
this action….Counsel responded that Defendant believes removal was proper and declined
to remand.’ That is false. Defense counsel has never received any communication from
Plaintiff (or anyone else) requesting that Unum Life voluntarily remand this action.”].)
Plaintiff somewhat conspicuously does not address this issue in his reply. Given the
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The remaining arguments in the reply, which are that Arizona state courts have
“personal jurisdiction” and are better equipped to resolve issues of state law, are likewise
forfeited, Zamani, 491 F.3d at 997, and at any rate, the well-settled principles of diversity
jurisdiction establish that federal courts are equipped to apply state law. See, e.g., Tucker
v. First Maryland Sav. & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is
undisputed by the parties that the federal district court, sitting in diversity, would apply the
substantive law of Arizona. Thus, the federal court would sit in the same posture as the
Arizona state court and there should be no different result in the federal proceedings than
would have been achieved in the state court proceeding.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 12) is denied.
Dated this 23rd day of January, 2026.
outcome here, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve further into this issue, but the parties
are reminded of the necessity of making accurate representations to the Court.
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