Perfetti v. Douthit et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Francesco Perfetti,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jay Douthit, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04324-PHX-DJH
ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand this matter back to Maricopa County
Superior Court, filed by Francesco Perfetti (“Perfetti”). (Doc. 14). Jay Douthit (“Douthit”)
and Crena Transportation Services, LLC (“Crena”) (collectively “Defendants”) have filed
a Response and Plaintiff has filed a Reply. (Docs. 17 & 18). For reasons stated below, the
Court will grant the Motion to Remand.
I. Background
Perfetti was following a freight truck going eastbound on the 202 highway. (Doc. 1
at ¶¶ 9–10). The freight truck was being driven by Douthit and was owned by Crena. (Id.
at ¶¶ 10 & 26). Before either party could make it to their destination, Plaintiff’s car collided
with the freight truck. Perfetti surmises that this was due to the wheels of the freight truck
locking up and causing the truck to stop suddenly. (Id. at ¶ 11). Consequently, Perfetti says
he sustained injuries. (Id. at ¶ 12). Believing he was not at fault for the collision, Perfetti
brought a three-count complaint against Douthit and Crena in the Superior Court of
Arizona for the following claims: (1) negligence; (2) negligence per se; and (3) respondeat
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superior. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–30). When Defendants removed the case to this Court, Perfetti
opposed. (Doc. 14). While Defendants allege that this Court has jurisdiction over the state
law claims because of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMSCA”)
regulations, Perfetti believes the case properly belongs in state court. In defense of his
point, Perfetti brought a Motion to Remand to the Court’s attention. The Court will grant
that Motion.
II. Legal Standards
Absent complete diversity of opposing parties, the only avenue for original federal
jurisdiction is federal question under 28 U.S.C. §1331. The statute in full reads: “The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1331. Likewise, a state
court action may only be removed to a federal court, if the federal court could have
exercised original jurisdiction. Sacks v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Put differently, if the action could have been brought to
federal court in the first instance, it can stay here.
Federal question jurisdiction is limited to two circumstances: (1) when the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint invokes a federal cause of action or (2) the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983). In this
second category of cases, federal jurisdiction may exist if “some substantial, disputed
question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Id.
at 13. The following four factors need to be met to find that federal question jurisdiction
exists over state law claims: (1) the federal issue is necessarily raised: (2) actually disputed;
(3) substantial; and (4) capable of resolution in federal court federal court without
disturbing the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,
258 (2013). The absence of even one factor is fatal to the claim that federal question
jurisdiction exists. Id.
Additionally, the removal statutes are construed strictly and if there is any doubt as
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to the right of removal, district courts should reject the removal as improper. Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that a Court should reject removal “[I]f
there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
III. Discussion
Perfetti argues that this entire matter can be resolved using Arizona state law and
that a federal issue is not necessarily raised. (Doc. 14 at 4). Perfetti says, even if the
FMSCA regulations somehow conferred a duty of care on truck drivers and commercial
carriers, it is a corollary issue that does not necessarily implicate federal law. (Id.)
Defendants contend that the FMSCA regulations are an essential component of the
Plaintiff’s allegations. (Doc. 17 at 4). The gist of Defendants’ arguments is that only the
FMSCA regulations can provide for the underlying standard of care required of truck
drivers, so federal law must apply.
The Court finds that Defendants cannot meet the first factor of the four-factor test
to establish the Court’s jurisdiction. A federal issue is necessarily raised when a state-law
claim implicates a federal issue. Arizona ex rel. Brnovich v. Volkswagen AG, 193 F. Supp.
3d 1025, 1028 (D. Ariz. 2016). But this requirement is absolute. In other words, it is not
enough that a federal issue might be implicated, it must be implicated. Arizona ex rel.
Brnovich, 193 F. Supp. at 1028. Simply because a federal claim might also apply does not
provide enough for a federal issue to be necessarily raised. Id. In fact, when a “claim can
be supported by alternative and independent theories─one of which is a state law theory
and one of which a federal law theory─federal law does not attach because federal law is
not a necessary element of the claim. Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 675
(9th Cir. 2012). Here, Plaintiff brought three claims against Defendants: negligence,
negligence per se, and respondeat superior. (Doc. 1 at 17–18). Defendants contend that
federal law is implicated because their duty of care should be determined by the FMSCA
regulations because the FMSCA regulations are the “only duties that apply in this scenario
for Defendants.” (Doc. 17 at 4). The Court disagrees.
As an initial matter, by stating that the FMSCA regulations are the “only” duties
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that apply in this scenario, the Defendants seem to invoke preemption.1 (Doc. 17 at 4). But
preemption is an unpersuasive argument in this case. While agency regulations can pre-
empt state or local law, the circumstances giving rise to that preemption are rare. W. States
Trucking Ass'n v. Schoorl, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2019). An agency can
determine, via regulation, that a state or local law conflicts with the regulation, and is
therefore pre-empted. Id. Or the agency can decide that its authority is exclusive in a
certain area and that can lead to preemption for state and local laws as well. Id.
Neither situation applies to the FMSCA. The FMSCA regulations only prevent
states from “having any law or regulation pertaining to commercial vehicle safety in
interstate commerce which the Administrator finds to be incompatible with the provisions
of the [Regulations]. See 49 C.F.R. § 355.25(a). What the statute does not contemplate is
any type of preemption. See W. States Trucking Ass’n v. Schoorl, 377 F. Supp. at 1072
(“Congress made clear in various sections of the Motor Carrier Safety Act that no such
comprehensive preemption was contemplated or intended.”) (internal quotations omitted).
But perhaps most importantly, assuming arguendo that a duty of care under the FMSCA
could apply, does not mean that the federal question is necessarily raised. As stated by the
Court above, it is not enough that a federal issue might be implicated, it must be implicated.
Arizona ex rel. Brnovich, 193 F. Supp. at 1028. And, because Plaintiff’s claims can be
based on an independent state law theory, the FAC does not necessarily raise a federal
question. Nevada., 672 F.3d at 675. All of Plaintiffs claims can be disposed of via Arizona
state law. Id. (“When a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories—
one of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory—federal
question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the
claim.”).
Additionally, the FMSCA does not create a private right of action. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 31141; see also California Trucking Ass’n v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1148 (S.D.
1 To quote Defendants: “It is not a matter of whether the FMCSA regulations could be used
as a standard of care, but rather the fact that FMCSA regulations are the only duties that
apply in this scenario for Defendants.” (Doc. 17 at 4) (emphases in original).
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Cal. 2020) (interpreting the FMSCA to say as much). The distinction is important because
Perfetti has brought a negligence per se claim as one of his theories of liability. Negligence
per se can only be rooted in statute. Bridgeman v. United States, 2011 WL 221639, at *13
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011). Alone, the FMSCA cannot provide the basis for a lawsuit. Id. It
follows then that a statute that does not provide for a private right of action, cannot then
provide a duty of care standard for negligence per se liability to attach. But perhaps most
importantly, assuming arguendo that a duty of care under the FMSCA could apply, does
not mean that the federal question is necessarily raised. As stated by the Court above, it is
not enough that a federal issue might be implicated, it must be implicated. Arizona ex rel.
Brnovich, 193 F. Supp. at 1028. And, because Plaintiff’s claims can be based on an
independent state law theory, the FAC does not necessarily raise a federal question.
Nevada., 672 F.3d at 675. Having found that Defendants have not satisfied the first factor
of the Gunn test, the Court will remand this case to Maricopa Superior Court. See Lake v.
Ohana Mil. Communities, LLC, 14 F.4th 993, 1007 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Because Defendants
fail to satisfy the first Gunn prong, we need not address the other three.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) is granted. The
Clerk of Court is kindly directed to remand this matter back to the Maricopa County
Superior Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 23) and
Plaintiff’s First Motion to Expedite (Doc. 27) are denied as moot.
Dated this 25th day of June, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
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