Plascencia v. Bondi et al

2:25-cv-04140Azd21.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Hector Rodriguez Plascencia,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-04140-PHX-DWL (ASB)
ORDER
Petitioner filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 and
complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief challenging his immigration detention.
(Doc. 1.)1 In a November 7, 2025 order, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause
(“the OSC”) why the petition should not be granted. (Doc. 6.) The OSC is now fully
briefed.2 (Docs. 9-10.) For the reasons that follow, the petition is granted and Respondents
must either release Petitioner from custody or provide a bond hearing within seven days.
I. Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection
in 1998. (Doc. 1 at 6.) On September 11, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and taken into
custody by ICE. (Doc. 9-1 at 3 ¶ 5.) Petitioner’s Notice to Appear reflects he is an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled. (Doc. 8 at 4.) “On
1 Petitioner also filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. (Doc. 2.)
2 Petitioner also filed a motion to supplement, which contains the exhibits referenced
in (but mistakenly not attached to) the petition. (Doc. 8.) That motion is granted.
Case 2:25-cv-04140-DWL--ASB Document 11 Filed 11/21/25 Page 1 of 5
- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
October 6, 2025, Petitioner requested a custody redetermination before an Immigration
Judge, but his request was denied on the grounds that the Immigration Court lacked
jurisdiction because DHS had classified him as subject to § 1225(b)(2)” based on the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ recent decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (B.I.A.
2025). (Doc. 1 at 7.) Respondents assert that under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, noncitizens
present without admission are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),
rather than discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), because, under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1), they are deemed “applicants for admission.” (Doc. 9 at 11.)
In the petition, Petitioner challenges Respondents’ interpretation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). Petitioner requests release from custody or an order directing an Immigration
Judge to conduct a bond hearing.
II. Analysis
A. Jurisdictional Arguments
Respondents contend that “8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) preclude review of
Petitioner’s claims.” (Doc. 9 at 4-6.) Respondents are mistaken, for the reasons set forth
in Echevarria v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2821282, *2-3 (D. Ariz. 2025).
Respondents also contend that “§ 1252(a)(5) provides that a petition for review is
the exclusive means for judicial review of immigration proceedings.” (Doc. 9 at 6-7.) This
argument fares no better than Respondents’ other jurisdiction-stripping arguments—no
final order of removal has been issued as to Petitioner and Petitioner does not purport to
challenge that nonexistent order. Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2007)
(emphasizing that “Post-REAL ID Act cases considering the applicability of § 1252 have
also distinguished between challenges to orders of removal and challenges that arise
independently” and citing, with approval, a passage in an earlier case that “the REAL ID
Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions . . . does [sic] not apply [if the] claim is not a direct
challenge to an order of removal”) (citations omitted).
B. Interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226
On the merits, Respondents state they “are aware of this Court’s prior decision
Case 2:25-cv-04140-DWL--ASB Document 11 Filed 11/21/25 Page 2 of 5
- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
rejecting Respondents’ position” in Echevarria “but respectfully maintain that Petitioner
has not been deprived of due process, and falls within the definition of an ‘arriving alien’
warranting mandatory detention as the removal process unfolds.” (Doc. 9 at 13.) Among
other things, Respondents contend that Echevarria did not “consider other pieces of
statutory context.” (Id.) The Court respectfully disagrees, as Echevarria contains an
extensive discussion of the statutory context. Echevarria, 2025 WL 2821282 at *5
(“Although [Respondents’] approach has surface appeal, the Court perceives at least two
problems with it: first, it ignores some of the additional requirements imposed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A); and second, it fails to account for the broader statutory scheme,
particularly in light of how that broader scheme has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court.”); id. at *7 (“Putting aside these textual problems with Respondents’ position,
Respondents’ narrow focus on § 1225(a)(1) also ignores the complexities of interpreting
the INA, a dense statute . . . which must be interpreted against the backdrop of our
constitutional principles, administrative law, and international treaty obligations. Divining
its meaning is ordinarily not for the faint of heart. To that end, in determining whether
Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, the court should not confine itself
to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, it must place the
provision in context, interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme.”) (cleaned up). Noting in Respondents’ brief persuades the Court that
this analysis was mistaken.
Respondents also cite a handful of recent decisions in which district courts
concluded that individuals like Petitioner are subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2). Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. 2025), Chavez v. Noem,
2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Sandoval v. Acuna, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La.
2025); Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-177-H, Doc. 9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025).
In addition to the cases cited by Respondents, the Court is aware of a few more reaching
the same conclusion. Rojas v. Olson, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wisc. 2025); Valencia v.
Chestnut, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Alonzo v. Noem, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D.
Case 2:25-cv-04140-DWL--ASB Document 11 Filed 11/21/25 Page 3 of 5
- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Cal. 2025); Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. 2025). But it is
unsurprising that judges across the country are not in full agreement on how this issue
should be resolved—indeed, the Court previously emphasized that “it views this issue as
presenting a complicated and debatable question.” Echevarria, 2025 WL 2821282 at *5.
It is also fair to note that the cases cited by Respondents still represent the minority
position—in the weeks since the Court considered the issue in Echevarria, dozens of other
courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Quinapanta v. Bondi, 2025 WL
3157867, *6 (W.D. Wisc. 2025) (“[M]ore than 45 district courts have now rejected similar
arguments made by respondents here and ordered bond hearings for noncitizens who, like
petitioner, were apprehended within the United States years after entering without
admission or inspection unless implicated by any criminal activity covered by § 1226(c).
These decisions, along with a growing number of others now including this court have
concluded that the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional intent, and § 1226(a)’s
application for the past three decades support its application to noncitizens in petitioner’s
position.”) (cleaned up). At any rate, having carefully reviewed the recent decisions
adopting the minority view, the Court respectfully declines to revisit the conclusion it
reached in Echevarria.
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
Case 2:25-cv-04140-DWL--ASB Document 11 Filed 11/21/25 Page 4 of 5
- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is granted.
2. Respondents must provide Petitioner a bond redetermination hearing within
seven days or release him from custody under the same conditions that
existed before his detention.
3. Respondents must provide a notice of compliance within three days of
releasing Petitioner or providing him a bond hearing.
4. Petitioner’s Motion to Supplement (Doc. 8) is granted.
5. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this
case.
Dated this 21st day of November, 2025.
Case 2:25-cv-04140-DWL--ASB Document 11 Filed 11/21/25 Page 5 of 5

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.