Segrist v. Lippmann Motors LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Trevor Segrist,
Plaintiff,
v.
Lippmann Motors LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04123-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Trevor Segrist believes defendant Yunier Molina Ramirez negligently
operated a pickup truck, causing an accident in which Segrist was injured. Segrist filed his
original complaint in November 2025, and the case was assigned to a magistrate judge.
(Doc. 3.) On January 5, 2026, Segrist filed an amended complaint. It appears that was
Segrist’s amendment as of right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). But in amending his complaint,
Segrist did not comply with Local Rule 15.1, which requires the filing of a version of the
amended complaint indicating how it differs from the original.
The amended complaint asserts negligence claims against Ramirez, two limited
liability companies (Lippman Motors and Normed), and four individuals and their spouses
(Nikolas Binioris, Abraham Lippman, Hugo Lopez Lopez De Cardenas, and Yoan Miguel
Rodriguez Gonzalez). (Doc. 10.) The amended complaint does not explain the relationship
between Ramirez and the other defendants beyond claiming Ramirez “was driving in the
course and scope of his employment or agency” with all the other defendants. (Doc. 10 at
7.)
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Segrist experienced significant difficulties serving defendants and eventually the
magistrate judge granted him permission to complete alternative service of process. (Docs.
18, 21.) For unknown reasons, Segrist then filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 22.)
Because Segrist was not granted leave to file another amended complaint, it appears this
amendment was improper. And as with his earlier amended complaint, Segrist again failed
to comply with Local Rule 15.1(a), making it difficult to determine how it differs from the
previous complaint. But one obvious difference is that it adds more defendants: R & G
Trucking, LLC, and Yoan Miguel Rodriguez Garcia. (Doc. 22.)
On March 30, 2026, Abraham Lippman filed a motion to dismiss and to quash
service. (Doc. 33.) That motion argues the court lacks personal jurisdiction over Lippman,
service was improper, and the complaint does not state a claim for relief. Segrist filed an
opposition (Doc. 36), but Lippman did not file a reply.
On May 6, 2026, the court set a hearing for May 19, 2026, at which Lippman was
required to appear and explain why he had not completed the magistrate judge election
form. (Doc. 39 at 1.) The hearing was held on May 19, 2026, but Lippman did not appear.
(Doc. 41.) The court issued a second order requiring Lippman to explain in writing why he
“should not be sanctioned pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401 and/or the Court’s inherent authority
for failing to comply with the Court’s prior order” that he appear at the May 19 hearing.
(Doc. 42.) The deadline for Lippman’s written explanation expired without him filing
anything.
On May 26, 2026, Segrist applied for the entry of default against all defendants,
including Abraham Lippman. (Docs. 43-52.) Lippman’s motion to dismiss was still
pending and the docket does not explain why Segrist applied for Lippman’s default. But
Lippman’s default was entered, as were the defaults of the other defendants. (Doc. 53.) The
case was then reassigned from the magistrate judge to allow for Segrist “to move for
judgment of default for failure to defend.” (Doc. 54 at 1.) Having reviewed Segrist’s filings,
significant issues prevent the court from proceeding to default judgment.
The first is that it is not clear which complaint should be deemed the operative
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complaint. Segrist filed an amendment as of right (Doc. 10) and then filed (procedurally
improperly) another amendment (Doc. 22). Normally, Segrist would be required to explain
which amended complaint should be deemed the operative complaint. But Segrist will need
to file an amended complaint to fix other issues, so the confusion regarding the operative
complaint need not be resolved.
The second issue is Segrist filed in federal court based solely on diversity
jurisdiction, which requires complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. Segrist’s
complaints have consistently identified the individual defendants as “residents” of Texas,
“[b]ut the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, speaks of citizenship, not of
residency.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition,
“an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v.
Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Instead of
identifying each LLC’s members and their citizenships, Segrist has identified each LLC as
either a “foreign” or “domestic” limited liability company in Nevada or Texas. (Doc. 22 at
2.) Segrist must file an amended complaint that identifies the citizenship of each individual
defendant, and identifies each member of each LLC, and that member’s citizenship.
NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Courts may permit
parties to amend defective allegations of jurisdiction at any stage in the proceedings.”). In
filing this complaint, Segrist must comply with Local Rule 15.1 by attaching a version of
the amended complaint identifying how it differs from his previous complaint.
The third issue is that even assuming Segrist can allege complete diversity, his
current factual allegations appear insufficient. The amended complaint provides no
meaningful factual allegations explaining the relationship between Ramirez and each
defendant and between the numerous defendants. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Of particular importance, that complaint does not
explain why Ramirez might qualify as an employee or agent of each LLC and individual
defendant. The amended complaint must provide significantly more facts explaining why
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Segrist believes he can hold each defendant responsible in this case.
Finally, Segrist applied for Lippman’s default, and that default was entered, despite
Lippman’s pending motion to dismiss. But after Lippman filed his motion to dismiss, he
did not respond to any of the court’s orders requiring he show cause for failing to complete
the magistrate judge election form. Given Lippman’s refusal to comply with court orders
after filing a motion to dismiss, it is not clear whether Lippman still wishes to defend this
suit. If he does not, it would be futile to vacate his default. The default will remain in place
pending further action by Lippman. Segrist will be filing an amended complaint and
Lippman is warned that if he wishes to defend the claims against him and avoid entry of
default judgment, he must respond to the amended complaint by the applicable deadline.
The amended complaint will render most of Lippman’s motion moot, so it is denied.
Lippman may include any arguments he wishes in responding to the forthcoming
complaint. Segrist must serve his amended complaint on Lippman notwithstanding Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5(a)(2).
IT IS ORDERED no later than June 25, 2026, plaintiff shall file an amended
complaint that sufficiently alleges diversity jurisdiction and sufficient facts to state a claim
for relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
Dated this 12th day of June, 2026.
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