Kharouta v. Takkoush

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Sumaiah Said Kharouta,
Plaintiff,
v.
Fouad Omar Takkoush,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-03969-PHX-SHD
ORDER
At issue is Petitioner Sumaiah Said Kharouta’s petition (the “Petition” (Doc. 1))
seeking the return of her minor child (the “Child”) to the United States from Sweden
pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(“the Hague Convention”), Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501, as implemented by the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Petition will be
denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b).
I. BACKGROUND
Kharouta and Respondent Fouad Omar Takkoush married in Mesa, Arizona on
August 20, 2014. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 12.) Their son, the Child, was born in Gilbert, Arizona on
December 29, 2013. (Id.) Kharouta alleges that the Child’s habitual residence is Arizona.
(Id.)
In August 2014, the parties traveled with the Child to Lebanon on roundtrip tickets
to visit family. (Id. at ¶ 13.) After arriving, Takkoush refused to return to the United States,
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and the family missed their return flight. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Kharouta returned to the United
States alone in April 2015 after Takkoush purported to “verbally divorce” her under Islamic
Sharia law and left her at the Beirut airport. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Immediately upon arriving back
in the United States, she contacted the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Department of State’s Office
of Children’s Issues, and the FBI “to report the parental kidnapping by [Takkoush].” (Id.
at ¶ 17.)
In September 2024, Takkoush told Kharouta that Lebanon was no longer safe and
requested her consent to an emergency travel document for the Child. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
Kharouta consented out of concern for the Child’s safety. (Id.) Kharouta alleges that
Takkoush retained the Child in Lebanon until approximately October 2024. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Thereafter, Takkoush transported the Child from Lebanon to Sweden, where Takkoush’s
mother lives. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Kharouta alleges, on information and belief, that Takkoush and
the Child remain in Sweden. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
In 2025, the parties initiated parallel proceedings. Takkoush filed an action in
Gävle, Sweden on January 30, 2025, seeking divorce and sole custody of the Child. (Id. at
¶¶ 21, 26.) Kharouta filed for dissolution in Maricopa County Superior Court on May 1,
2025. (Id. at ¶ 29.) She filed a Hague Convention application with the U.S. Department
of State on May 13, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 27.) She also filed a Hague application in Sweden,
which the Swedish district court denied on October 14, 2025, “on the grounds the Child’s
place of residence before Sweden was Lebanon despite the fact that Lebanon is not a
contracting state or party to the Hague Convention.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) The Swedish court also
found that the parties have joint custody of the Child. (Id.)
On October 23, 2025, Kharouta filed the Petition seeking the Child’s return to the
United States under 22 U.S.C. § 9003. (Id. at 7–8.) Takkoush responded to the Petition
on January 23, 2025. (Doc. 7.) Takkoush asserted that the Petition had already been
adjudicated by a Swedish court and was therefore barred by principles of res judicata and
international comity and further asserted that this Court lacks jurisdiction over both him
and the Child—who, he contended, are Swedish citizens residing in Sweden and therefore
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subject to the jurisdiction of the Swedish courts. (Id. at 2.)
On December 23, 2025, I directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on
jurisdictional issues, the effect of the Swedish proceedings, and the Child’s habitual
residence. (Doc. 8.) In his supplemental brief, Takkoush reiterated his res judicata and
comity arguments and further asserted that ICARA “does not require personal jurisdiction
over the respondent” but “assumes jurisdiction based on location of the child,” and that
because the Child is located in Sweden, the Swedish courts have jurisdiction. (Doc. 10 at
3–4.) Kharouta reiterated that the Child remains in Sweden. (Doc. 9 at ¶ 56.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)
(quotation marks omitted). The court has an independent duty to ensure that it has subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it8 and may raise the issue at any time. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Id.
The Hague Convention seeks to “‘secure the prompt return of children wrongfully
removed to or retained in any Contracting State’ and ‘to ensure that rights of custody and
of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States.’” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010) (quoting Hague Convention
Art. 1). The United States implemented the Hague Convention through the enactment of
ICARA. Id. at 9.
Under ICARA, a petition for the return of a child is properly heard by “any court
which has jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in
the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b).
Therefore, a person seeking the return of a child under ICARA must file a petition in a
court “where the child is located.” Id.; Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir.
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014).
“‘Located’ under ICARA does not require a showing of residency, but rather turns on the
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place where the child is physically present at the time of filing.” Rubeo-Vilchis v. Aguilar
Herrera, 2025 WL 1942428, at *2 (D. Nev. 2025), report and recommendation adopted,
2025 WL 1939835 (D. Nev. 2025); see also Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 869 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2002) (adopting the “common-sense definition” of “located” as “the place where the
abducted children are discovered” (quoting Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 937 (11th Cir.
1998))); Monzon v. De La Roca, 910 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2018) (“If a parent pursues the
remedies available for the return of his/her child under ICARA, Congress has clearly
required that the parent do so by ‘filing a petition . . . in [a] court . . . where the child is
located.’” (citing 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b))).
Accordingly, “courts lack jurisdiction over ICARA claims when the child is in
another country at the time the petition is filed.” Rubeo-Vilchis, 2025 WL 1942428, at *2;
see also Olagues v. Kousharian, 177 F. App’x 537, 538 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The district court
properly dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction because at the time Olagues filed his
action the children were in New Zealand.”); Espinoza v. Mattoon, 2009 WL 1919297, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“In this case, plaintiff’s child is physically located in Canada.
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter and plaintiff’s complaint is
subject to dismissal.”).
III. DISCUSSION
The Petition alleges that the Child has been in Sweden since approximately October
2024 and that Takkoush and the Child “are currently located in Sweden.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 20,
22; see also Doc. 9 at ¶ 56.) The entire premise of the Petition is that the Child remains in
Sweden and that I should order his return to the United States.
Because the Child was not physically located within this Court’s jurisdiction when
the Petition was filed, I lack subject matter jurisdiction under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b).
Olagues, 177 F. App’x at 538 (affirming dismissal where the children were physically
located in New Zealand); Rubeo-Vilchis, 2025 WL 1942428, at *3 (dismissing where the
children were physically located in Mexico); Espinoza, 2009 WL 1919297, at *2
(dismissing where the child was physically located in Canada). Regardless of the
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circumstances presented, I cannot exercise jurisdiction ICARA has not conferred.
Because I lack jurisdiction, I do not reach Takkoush’s argument that the prior
Swedish ruling forecloses this action. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”).
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition, (Doc. 1), is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Denial is without prejudice so that
Kharouta may refile in a court with proper jurisdiction should the Child’s physical location
change.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment
accordingly and close this case.
Dated this 5th day of May, 2026.
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