de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Myrna de Jesus,
Plaintiff,
v.
UnitedHealth Group,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-03758-PHX-SMB
ORDER
Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Myrna de Jesus’s Complaint (Doc. 1),
and Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). After screening
Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court dismisses the
Complaint for the reasons explained below.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
When a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court must review the
complaint to determine whether the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Additionally, Rule 8(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
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Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555. Nor will a complaint suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions”
without “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts the following counts against Defendant UnitedHealth Group:
(1) breach of employment contract; (2) slander; and (3) negligence. (Doc. 1 at 6–7.) The
Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief as to each count.
A. Breach of Employment Contract
Plaintiff claims Defendant “knowingly and willingly breached Plaintiff’s written
employment agreement.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by
res judicata. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (“[I]f a court is on notice that
it has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte,
even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully consistent with the policies
underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant’s interest in avoiding the
burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial
waste.”).
The Supreme Court has held “as a matter of federal common law that the preclusive
effect of a federal judgment entered in a diversity case is governed by ‘the law that would
be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits.’” Rose Ct.,
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LLC v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 119 F.4th 679, 687 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Semtek
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001)). Here, another Arizona
federal court previously entered final judgment against Plaintiff and Defendant while
sitting in diversity jurisdiction. See de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Grp., No.
CV-25-02701-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 2194794, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1, 2025) (“de Jesus
I”). Thus, the Court will apply Arizona law when determining the preclusive effect of this
judgment.
In Arizona, “[u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior
suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same cause
of action.” Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gilbert v. Bd.
of Med. Exam’rs of Ariz., 745 P.2d 617, 622 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in ABC Sand & Rock Co. v. Maricopa County, No. 1 CA-CV
21-0108, 2022 WL 553167, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2022)). “This doctrine binds the
same party standing in the same capacity in subsequent litigation on the same cause of
action, not only upon facts actually litigated but also upon those points that might have
been litigated.” Id. (quoting Gilbert, 745 P.2d at 622).
In the previous litigation, Plaintiff brought a breach of employment contract claim
against Defendant. See de Jesus I, 2025 WL 2194794, at *2. There, Plaintiff argued that
Defendant “knowingly and willfully breached” an employment agreement by
“unjustifiably” terminating Plaintiff. Id. at *1. She claimed this termination “was
accompanied by racially discriminatory and derogatory remarks” in violation of Arizona
and federal law. See id. Plaintiff informed the court that Defendant terminated her on
March 2, 2021, but she did not bring suit until July 2025. Id. at *2. The court dismissed
the claim with prejudice because Plaintiff filed the claim outside of the one-year statute of
limitations. Id.; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-541(3) (stating that a action for “breach of
an oral or written employment contract” must be “prosecuted within one year after the
cause of action accrues”). This dismissal was a judgment on the merits. 480 Motors, L.L.C.
v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0410, 2012 WL 2002954, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June
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5, 2012) (“Dismissal of a claim on statute of limitations grounds is a final judgment on the
merits for purposes of claim preclusion.”); see also Roden v. Roden, 243 P. 413, 415 (1926)
(“A judgment of dismissal ‘with prejudice’ is the same as a judgment for defendant upon
the merits, and, of course, is res judicata as to every matter litigated.”).
Here, Plaintiff brings the same cause of action against the same party as before.
Because the previous judgment was on the merits, res judicata precludes Plaintiff from
relitigating that cause of action here.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of contract.
Plaintiff also appears to bring a discriminatory wrongful termination claim. Plaintiff
states Defendant violated the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), the Arizona
Employment Protect Act (“AEPA”), and Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.
(Doc. 1 at 6.) Regardless of res judicata, these claims are also time-barred.
To bring an ACRA claim against an employer, a plaintiff must file a charge of
discrimination within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 41-1481(A); see also Terry v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., No.
CV-17-04792-PHX-DJH, 2018 WL 8619996, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2018). A “non-timely
complaint” is fatal to a court’s jurisdiction over an ACRA claim. Ornealas v. SCOA Indus.,
Inc., 587 P.2d 266, 267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).1 To bring a Title VII claim against an
employer, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the violation or
300 days if first filed with a state or local agency. Bond v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 782 F.
Supp. 3d 743, 752–53 & n.3 (D. Ariz. 2025). Plaintiff failed to bring a wrongful
termination action within either timeline.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for wrongful termination under the
ACRA, AEPA, or Title VII.2
1 In Arizona, the ACRA precludes a claim for discriminatory termination under the AEPA.
See Taylor v. Graham Cnty. Chamber of Com., 33 P.3d 518, 522 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(“The [AEPA] does not provide a back door method of suing [a defendant] in tort for
wrongful termination in violation of ACRA or its public policy.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
AEPA claim is precluded.
2 Plaintiff appears to argue equitable tolling: “Plaintiff recently discovered that
Defendant’s actions violated public policy through its discriminatory breach of contract.”
(Doc. 1 at 6.) The Court disagrees. In the previous litigation, Plaintiff alleged racial
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B. Slander
Plaintiff argues Defendant, “during Plaintiff’s period of employment,” “knowingly
and maliciously published multiple false and defamatory statements concerning Plaintiff.”
(Doc. 1 at 6.) The Court finds that these claims are also precluded by res judicata.
In the previous litigation, Plaintiff alleged Defendant “published multiple false and
defamatory statements” at the time of her employment. See de Jesus I, 2025 WL 2194794,
at *1. The Court held that Plaintiff was time barred from suing for statements made at the
time of her employment. Id. at *2; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-541(1) (stating that a party
must commence “within one year after the cause of action accrues” an action for “libel or
slander”). The Court then granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint “[t]o the extent
plaintiff may be attempting to allege [Defendant] repeated the statements more recently
than March 2021.” de Jesus I, 2025 WL 2194794, at *2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint
reiterated “the same March 2021 statements the court already identified as untimely” so
the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s slander claim with prejudice. de Jesus v. United Health
Grp., No. CV-25-02701-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 2431790, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2025)
(“de Jesus II”).
Here, Plaintiff again brings a slander cause of action against Defendant. Because
the previous court’s dismissal was on the merits, re judicata precludes this claim. It matters
not that Plaintiff alleges different slanderous statements than those litigated in the previous
case because preclusion applies “not only upon facts actually litigated but also upon those
points that might have been litigated.” See Olson, 188 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Gilbert, 745
P.2d at 622). Because these statements allegedly also occurred during Plaintiff’s
employment, Plaintiff had the opportunity to litigate these same statements in the previous
case. For these reasons, the Court finds res judicata precludes Plaintiff from relitigating
her slander claim here.
animus in her termination. See de Jesus I, 2025 WL 2194794, at *1. Thus, the Court finds
equitable tolling does not apply because Plaintiff was previously aware of a claim for
discriminatory termination. See Socop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that equitable tolling applies “in situations where, despite all due diligence,
the party invoking equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the
existence of the claim.” (citation modified)).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for slander.
C. Negligence
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant UnitedHealth Group engaged in a pattern of reckless
and negligent conduct” by: (1) “Knowingly disseminating false and defamatory statements
about Plaintiff”; (2) “Failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the spread of these
statements to third parties”; and (3) “Breaching the written employment contract.” (Doc.
1 at 7.) Curiously, Plaintiff states this conduct occurred “on or about May 2, 2025, and
continu[ed] thereafter.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) However, this contradicts Plaintiff’s previous
statement that Defendant published these allegedly defamatory statements to third parties
“during Plaintiff’s employment.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s first two allegations
are restatements of her negligence claim in the previous case.
In the previous litigation, Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Defendant
based on: “Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care in making and disseminating
false and defamatory statements,” and Defendant communicating the allegedly defamatory
statements to third parties. See de Jesus II, 2025 WL 2431790, at *2. The court found that
these negligence claims were time barred by the two-year statute of limitations because
they were “based on actions in 2021.” Id.; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (establishing
a two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions).
Given the contradictions in Plaintiff’s timeline, and the fact that the first two
allegations are near identical recitations of her previous negligence claim, the Court finds
that, here, Plaintiff’s negligence claim actually references Defendant’s 2021 actions,
despite Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant did so in May 2025. Thus, res judicata precludes
these claims and Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief.
As to the third allegation, the Court finds that this claim is precluded by Arizona’s
economic loss doctrine. In Arizona, the economic loss doctrine means “a contracting party
is limited to its contractual remedies for purely economic loss.” Flagstaff Affordable Hous.
Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 670 (2010). Thus, Plaintiff cannot bring a
negligence claim for economic loss arising from Defendant’s alleged breach of the
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employment contract.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for
negligence.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation
modified). Here, Plaintiff cannot cure the above deficiencies because her claims are either
precluded or time-barred. Therefore, the Court does not grant Plaintiff leave to amend any
of her claims.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (Doc. 2.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without leave to amend Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. 1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter final
judgment and close the case.
Dated this 12th day of November, 2025.
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