Munoz v. Bondi et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Sandra Milena Arateco Munoz,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-02951-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Eileen S.
Willett (“R & R”) recommending that this Court deny the Petition for Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner filed timely objections.1
In reviewing an R & R, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s finding and recommendations de
novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original). The Court has no obligation to
review portions of the magistrate judge’s recommendations to which no party objects. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
1. Petitioner objects to the R & R because she did not receive a copy of the
response brief and the R & R and her reply were docketed almost simultaneously. The
1 The Court observes that Petitioner filed her objections on the docket twice. (See Doc. 16
and 17.) By all appearances, both filings appear to be the same and the Court concludes
that Petitioner’s counsel filed twice by mistake.
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objections also advance that arguments made in the reply should be considered, rather than
waived, because Petitioner filed her petition without counsel and she is now represented
by counsel. The Court finds this objection moot because it will consider all these arguments
in its de novo review of the R & R.
2. Petitioner next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that
Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing. The R & R found that the authority for
Petitioner’s detention is in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii),2 requiring mandatory detention of
an alien seeking asylum “for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Petitioner
cites no controlling authority abrogating the mandatory nature of detention applicable to
her circumstances. And the objections do not dispute the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
Petitioner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is still in process. As for due
process, the R & R correctly observes that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), an alien
unlawfully present in the United States “has only those rights regarding admission that
Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 140.
3. Finally, Petitioner objects to the length of her detention as “unreasonably
prolonged.” She urges this Court to adopt the six-factor test employed by the District of
Minnesota in Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858-59 (D. Minn. 2019), to
determine the reasonableness of her detention. The Court declines to do so. See Veasna
Oth, Petitioner, v. Christopher Chestnut, in his official capacity, Facility Adm’r of
California City Det. Facility, et al., Respondents., No. 1:25-cv-01367 KES-HBK (HC),
2026 WL 323053, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2026) (declining to adopt a “multi-part, judge
made reasonableness balancing test” to determine whether a petitioner’s detention was
prolonged as “unnecessary under the circumstances” given “relevant Supreme Court
precedents” (citation modified)).
. . . .
2 After the asylum officer determines that an alien seeking asylum presents a credible fear
of prosecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for
asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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The Court is unaware of—and Petitioner does not identify—any Ninth Circuit
authority adopting the proposed test. Controlling Supreme Court precedent points in the
opposite direction. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 304 (2018) (“[D]etention
under § 1226(c) has a ‘definite termination point’: the conclusion of proceedings. As we
made clear here, that ‘definite termination’—and not some arbitrary time limit devised by
the courts—marks the end of the Government’s detention authority under § 1226(c).”); see
also Veasna, 2026 WL 323053, at *5 (“Petitioner’s attempt to recast his challenge to his
detention based solely on its length as a violation of due process essentially is an end-run
of § 1[2]26(c)’s express language as already interpreted by the Supreme Court.”).
Accordingly, the Court rejects this objection.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED accepting the R & R (Doc. 14) in full. The
Petition for Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied. Petitioner’s indefinite detention claim is
denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must enter judgment
accordingly and close this case.
Dated this 11th day of February, 2026.
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