MindSight Medical LLC v. Mobile One Docs LLC

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
MindSight Medical LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
Mobile One Docs LLC,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-02212-PHX-DGC
ORDER AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff MindSight Medical, LLC, has filed an amended motion for default
judgment against Defendant Mobile One Docs, LLC, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(b). Doc. 13. No response has been filed. For reasons stated below,
Plaintiff’s motion will be granted.
I. Background.
Around May 10, 2021, Plaintiff Mindsight Medical, LLC, and Defendant Mobile
One Docs, LLC, entered a Product Purchase Agreement through which Defendant agreed
to purchase certain products from Plaintiff and make payment for each order within 45
days of each generated invoice. Doc. 1 ¶ 4-6. Defendant submitted orders and received
delivery of products, but failed to make any payment. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges an
outstanding account balance of $380,960 that Defendant has “refused to pay,” despite
Plaintiff sending a demand letter on September 22, 2022 and subsequently initiating this
lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 1 of 8

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit under diversity jurisdiction. Id.
¶¶ 1-3. Defendant failed to respond and Plaintiff secured entry of default by the clerk on
September 3, 2025. Docs. 9, 10. Plaintiff moved for default judgment (Doc. 11), but this
Court dismissed the motion because Plaintiff had not shown the parties were diverse for
purposes of jurisdiction. Doc. 12. Plaintiff filed the current motion to show the parties are
diverse and again move for default judgment. Doc. 13.
II. Diversity Jurisdiction.
“When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or
otherwise defend,” such as here, “a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its
jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712
(9th Cir. 1999). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a limited liability company ‘is a
citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.’” 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn,
880 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP,
437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff Mindsight Medical, LLC, is a limited liability company organized under
the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in Dallas County, Texas. Doc. 13
at 3. It is comprised of one member, EPSFL, LLC. Id. at 3-4. “Plaintiff has no other
members beyond EPSFL, LLC[.]” Id. at 4. EPSFL, LLC is comprised of five members
who are citizens of Delaware, Georgia, and Texas. Id.; Doc. 7 at 2.
Defendant Mobile One Docs, LLC, is a limited liability company organized under
the laws of Arizona with its principal place of business in Arizona. Docs. 13 at 4, 13-1 at
7. It is comprised of one member, Lisa Ball (aka Lisa Swansen), who is shown by public
records to be a citizen of Arizona. See Doc. 13-1 at 10, 12-13, 15-16.
On this record, the Court is satisfied that the parties are diverse for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.
III. Default Judgment.
Plaintiff moves for entry of default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “The district
court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v.
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 2 of 8

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). This Court is not required to make detailed
findings of fact, Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002), and it
may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the
merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at stake,
(5) the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable neglect, and
(7) the policy favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-
72 (9th Cir. 1986).
A. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff.
Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff’s demand letter or this lawsuit. Doc. 13 at 3.
When a defendant wholly fails to respond to litigation, it leaves the plaintiff without
recourse. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, No. 18-CV-04947-LB, 2019 WL 2180222,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-04947-
VC, 2019 WL 2180214 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2019). This factor favors default judgment.
B. Merits of the Claim and Sufficiency of the Complaint.
These factors are resolved by deciding “whether the allegations in the complaint are
sufficient to state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover[.]” Danning v. Lavine, 572
F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). The general rule is that well-pled allegations in the
complaint regarding liability are deemed true. Fair Hous. of Marin, 285 F.3d at 906.
Plaintiff pleads a claim for breach of contract. Texas law governs the dispute.
Docs. 1 ¶ 7, 1-1 at 6. Under Texas law, “[b]reach of contract requires pleading and proof
that (1) a valid contract exists; (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance as
contractually required; (3) the defendant breached the contract by failing to perform or
tender performance as contractually required; and (4) the plaintiff sustained damages due
to the breach.” Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great W. Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 882, 890
(Tex. 2019).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the parties entered a Product Purchase Agreement on
or about May 10, 2021. Doc. 1 ¶ 4. A copy of the Agreement signed by the parties is
attached to the complaint. Doc. 1-1. Defendant agreed to purchase certain products from
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 3 of 8

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff and to pay for those products within 45 days of the date of an invoice produced
when an order is placed. Docs. 1 ¶¶ 5-6, 1-1 at 4. Plaintiff tendered products to Defendant
accompanied by invoices reflecting the balance owed, but Defendant never paid Plaintiff
the outstanding balance of $380,960. Docs. 1 ¶¶ 8-9, 1-2 at 6 (copy of a Statement of
Account reflecting the balance owed).
Taking these factual allegations as true, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim for
breach of contract on which it can recover. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388. These factors
favor default judgment.
C. Amount of Money at Stake.
“When the money is substantial or unreasonable, default-judgment is discouraged.
When the sum of money at stake is tailored to the specific misconduct of the defendant,
default judgment may be appropriate.” Stephens, 2019 WL 2180222, at *4 (citing Eitel,
782 F.2d at 1472; Bd. of Trs. of the Sheet Metal Workers Health Care Plan of N. Cal. v.
Superhall Mech., Inc., No. C-10-2212 EMC, 2011 WL 2600898, at *203 (N.D. Cal. June
20, 2011)) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff seeks damages of $380,960. Docs. 1 ¶ 15, 13 at 9. This sum is significant,
but it is the amount owed under the contract as reflected by the Statement of Account
attached to the complaint. See Doc. 1-2 at 6. This sum is reasonable because it will
compensate Plaintiff for the damages caused by Defendant’s breach of contract. See
Stephens, 2019 WL 2180222, at *4.
Plaintiff also seeks $1,038.97 in court costs, and an unclear amount in attorneys’
fees – Plaintiff’s motion requests contradicting sums of $24,500 and $16,000. Docs. 13 at
2, 9, 13-1 at 4. The Court resolves this matter in the damages section below. For purposes
of this Eitel factor, even the highest sum of $24,500 is not unreasonable because the fees
were caused by Defendant’s breach of contract. The breach required Plaintiff to hire legal
counsel in 2022 (Doc. 1-3), and resulted in at least 85 hours of legal services being
performed in this litigation. Doc. 13-1 at 2. This factor favors default judgment.
/ / /
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 4 of 8

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
D. Possibility of Factual Disputes.
Defendant has had numerous opportunities to dispute the facts alleged by Plaintiff.
See Docs. 1, 9, 11, 13. Yet, Defendant has at no point responded to this litigation or
appeared to dispute the facts. Doc. 13 at 3. On this record, the Court cannot reasonably
find the possibility of a factual dispute. This factor favors default judgment.
E. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect.
Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s allegations through the demand letter sent by
Plaintiff on September 22, 2022. Docs. 1 ¶ 10, 1-3. Defendant was served with process
on July 16, 2025. Doc. 8. Plaintiff also sent Defendant, by certified mail, copies of its
request for entry of default and the entry of default. Doc. 13-1 at 4. Defendant’s failure to
respond does not support finding excusable neglect. This factor favors default judgment.
F. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits.
“[D]efault judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Cases should be decided upon their
merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. But in cases such as this
one, where Defendant has failed to respond to the litigation, deciding the merits is not
“reasonably possible.” See id. This factor favors default judgment.
In summary, all factors support default judgment. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s
motion and award damages as discussed below.
IV. Damages.
Factual allegations of the complaint relating to damages are not taken as true. See
Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Rather, there must be some
evidence on the record in support of the damages sought. See Avila v. JBL Cleaning Servs.
LLC, No. CV-23-00398-PHX-DJH, 2024 WL 863710, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 29, 2024).
The Court may enter default judgment “without a hearing on damages when the
amount claimed is capable of ascertainment from the documentary evidence or a detailed
declaration.” Gerow v. Falcone, No. CV-23-01059-PHX-DGC, 2026 WL 1450021, at *2
(D. Ariz. May 21, 2026) (citation omitted); cf. Santiago v. Tamarack Tree Co., No. CV-
06-1811-HU, 2007 WL 3171159, at *1 (D. Or. July 13, 2007).
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 5 of 8

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Statement of Account attached to the complaint provides a detailed record of
the outstanding balance owed – $380,960 – for products Plaintiff tendered to Defendant
under the Agreement. See Doc. 1-2. The Court will award Plaintiff $380,960 in
compensatory damages.
Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and court costs (Doc. 13 at 2, 9)1 is supported
by the declaration of Randall J. Poelma, Plaintiff’s lead counsel. Doc. 13-1. In its motion,
Plaintiff requests different sums of attorneys’ fees. Compare Doc. 13 at 2 (seeking
“attorney’s fees in the amount of $24,500.00”), with id. at 9 (seeking “attorneys’ fees in
the amount of $16,000.00”). Poelma’s declaration is silent on the figure of $16,000.
Instead, Poelma attests that “a reasonable attorneys’ fee for Plaintiff in this case is
$24,500.00.” Doc. 13-1 at 4. Poelma’s declaration supports an award of $24,500 in
attorneys’ fees.
The Court declines, however, to award the $5,000 in future attorneys’ fees for
services anticipated by Poelma. Id. at 3 (“Anticipated reasonable attorneys’ fees for such
services amount to $5,000.00.”). That sum is speculative and based in large part on the
assumption that a default judgment hearing will be held. Id. at 2.
The $24,500 attorneys’ fees supported by Poelma’s declaration accounted for the
$5,000 in anticipated attorneys’ fees that this Court declines to award. Id. at 4 (“[T]aking
into account the anticipated attorneys’ fees . . . , it is my opinion that a reasonable attorneys’
fee for Plaintiff in this case is $24,500.00.”). The Court will deduct the $5,000 in
anticipated attorneys’ fees from the $24,500 attorneys’ fees.
Poelma attests that more than 85 hours in legal services were performed in this case.
Id. at 2. After deducting the $5,000 in anticipated attorneys’ fees, the Court calculates
reasonable attorneys’ fees of $19,500, which reflects a $229.41 per hour fee for 85 hours
1 In its complaint, Plaintiff also requests damages for ““prejudgment and post judgment
interest, . . . and all other relief to which it may be justly entitled.” Doc. 1 ¶ 16. Because
Plaintiff has not requested prejudgment or post judgment interest in its motion for default
judgment, and offers no calculated sums for such damages, the Court awards no interest.
The Court also finds Plaintiff is not entitled to other relief beyond the damages discussed
above.
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 6 of 8

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
of legal services performed. The Court in its discretion will award Plaintiff $19,500 in
attorneys’ fees.2
Plaintiff seeks to recover $1,038.97 in court costs. Doc. 13 at 9. That sum is
itemized in the declaration of Poelma, who attests to “[c]ourt filing fees of $405.00,” and
“[s]ervice of process fees in the amount of $633.97.” Doc. 13-1 at 4. The Court will award
these costs.
Defendant LLC’s only member, Lisa Swansen, filed a petition for Chapter 13
bankruptcy in her personal capacity on March 29, 2024. Id. at 15-21. That Bankruptcy
case was closed on February 18, 2026. Doc. 108 (Case No. 2:24-bk-02407-DPC). In any
event, that case when active would have operated as an automatic stay of any actions only
against Swansen. 11 U.S.C. § 362. The only named defendant in this lawsuit is Defendant
Mobile One Docs, LLC. Doc. 1. Thus, Swansen filing for personal bankruptcy does not
affect this litigation.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff MindSight Medical, LLC’s motion for default judgment against
Defendant Mobile One Docs, LLC (Doc. 13) is granted.
2. Default judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff MindSight Medical, LLC
and against Defendant Mobile One Docs, LLC in the amount of $380,960 in compensatory
damages.
3. Plaintiff MindSight Medical, LLC is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $19,500, and court costs in the amount of $1,038.97.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
2 This Court in its discretion will grant the award of attorneys’ fees on this motion for
default judgment, rather than requiring Plaintiff to file a post-judgment motion for
attorneys’ fees, given Defendant has never responded to or appeared in this litigation, and
requiring Plaintiff to file a subsequent motion would cause unnecessary expense. See Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Carver, No. CV-24-08002-PCT-DGC, 2024 WL 4566689, at *2 & n.1 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 24, 2024).
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 7 of 8

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.
Dated this 16th day of June, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-02212-DGC Document 14 Filed 06/16/26 Page 8 of 8