Find Staff LLC v. Palm Beach Tours & Transportation LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Find Staff LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
Palm Beach Tours & Transportation LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-01429-PHX-ROS
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for an Award of Their Reasonable
Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 17) seeking $64,696.11 in fees and costs. Plaintiff responded in
opposition, (Doc. 20), and Defendants replied, (Doc. 21). For the reasons that follow, the
Court will award Defendants their requested attorney’s fees and costs.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court has already fully outlined the background and procedural history of this
case in a prior Order and will not do so again here. (See Doc. 16 at 1–3.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party seeking an award of attorney’s fees must show it is (1) eligible for and
(2) entitled to an award, as well as that the requested amount is (3) reasonable. LRCiv
54.2(c). Eligibility and entitlement to an award is dependent on “the applicable statutory
or contractual authority upon which the movant seeks an award.” LRCiv 54.2(c)(1).
Diversity jurisdiction is this Court’s sole basis for jurisdiction, so it must “appl[y] state law
in deciding whether to allow attorney’s fees when those fees are connected to the substance
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of the case.” In re Larry’s Apartment, 249 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Price v.
Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Defendants specifically seek fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), which provides that
in “any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may award
the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” Any award under § 12-341.01(A) “should
be made to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just
defense.” Id. § 12-341.01(B). Courts have broad discretion when determining whether to
award fees under § 12-341.01(A). Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184
(Ariz. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants seek $64,280.50 in attorney’s fees incurred in successfully defending
against Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 17.) Plaintiffs argue Defendants are not eligible nor
entitled to a fee award, and alternatively that the requested award is not reasonable. (Doc.
20.)
A. Eligibility
Defendants, as the successful parties in this litigation, are eligible for an award of
reasonable attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).1 Plaintiff’s six claims are all
“arising out of a contract” or interwoven with the contract claims for purposes of § 12-
341.01(A). Counts One and Two for breach of contract and breach of implied covenant
clearly arise out of contract. Count Three for unjust enrichment arises out of contract
because the claim would not have existed but for the contract between the parties. See, e.g.,
Schwab Sales, Inc. v. GN Constr. Co., Inc., 992 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
And Counts Four through Six for tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious
interference with business expectancy, and civil conspiracy are all “inextricably
interwoven” with the contract claims.2 See, e.g., Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw
1 Much of Plaintiff’s argument on this issue discusses factors relevant to whether
Defendants are entitled to a fee award, not whether they are eligible. (See Doc. 20 at 4:21–
6:6.)
2 Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the argument that the non-contract claims are interwoven
with the contract claims constitutes waiver of the issue. See, e.g., Hurry v. Fin. Indus.
Regul. Auth., Inc., 782 F. App’x 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2019); Doe v. Dickenson, No. CV-07-
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Techs., Inc., 212 P.3d 853, 860 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
Additionally, Plaintiff argues Defendants are ineligible for a fee award because “the
dismissal in this case was without prejudice and rested solely on personal jurisdiction
grounds.” (Doc. 20 at 5.) Not so. Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), “a defendant who files a
successful motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction” is eligible for a fee award.
Balestrieri v. Balestrieri, 300 P.3d 560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013); see Erskine v. Fenn,
No. CV-20-08123-PCT-JJT, 2021 WL 9597924, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2021) (“For a
defendant there can be no greater success than full dismissal. To the extent Plaintiff argues
that because the Court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds rather than on the merits of the
contract question, Defendant was not the ‘successful party,’ the Court rejects that argument
soundly. Defendant won. The case is over.”); Med. Protective Co. v. Pang, 740 F.3d 1279,
1283 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Arizona appellate courts have repeatedly held that an adjudication
on the merits is not a prerequisite to recovering attorney's fees under Section 12–341.01.”
(citation modified)).
Lastly, Defendants alternatively argue they are eligible for a fee award under the
fee-shifting provision in the contract between the parties. However, the language of this
provision only applies to arbitration and related proceedings:
The cost of the arbitration proceeding and any proceeding in court to confirm
or to vacate any arbitration award, as applicable (including, without
limitation, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs), shall be borne by the
unsuccessful party, as determined by the arbitrators, and shall be awarded as
part of the arbitrator’s award.
(Doc. 12-2 at 10, § 14.) These proceedings were not “to confirm or to vacate any arbitration
award,” so this fee-shifting provision does not provide independent grounds to award
Defendants attorney’s fees. Thus, the Court must determine whether Defendants are
entitled to fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).
B. Entitlement
“Mere eligibility [under § 12–341.01(A)] does not establish entitlement to fees.”
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1049 (Ariz. 1985). Rather, courts
1998-PHX-GMS, 2008 WL 4933964, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2008).
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must exercise their discretion to award fees under § 12-341.01(A) by considering the
following factors:
(1) whether the unsuccessful party had a meritorious claim;
(2) whether the legal question presented was novel and whether such claim or
defense had previously been adjudicated in this jurisdiction;
(3) whether litigation could have been avoided such that the successful party’s
efforts were superfluous;
(4) whether fees against the unsuccessful party would result in extreme hardship;
(5) whether the successful party prevailed in all respects; and
(6) whether an award would discourage parties with tenable claims from
litigating legitimate contract issues out of fear of incurring attorney’s fees.
Associated Indem., 694 P.2d at 1184. Courts should weigh all the factors, and no single
factor is determinative. Wilcox v. Waldman, 744 P.2d 444, 450 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). The
Court will address each factor in turn.
1. Merits & Novelty of Plaintiff’s Claims
The merits of Plaintiff’s claims and their novelty are related, so the Court addresses
these factors together. Plaintiff suggests that a fee award would be “particularly
inappropriate” because “the merits of Plaintiffs’ [sic] claims remain untested” as “the
dismissal in this case was without prejudice on and rested solely on personal jurisdiction
grounds.” (Doc. 20 at 5.) But Plaintiff cites no authority requiring a court to only consider
the substantive elements of a claim, rather than whether a claim was meritless on the whole.
Here, the only reason the Court did not reach the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s
claims is because Plaintiff’s argument that the Court had personal jurisdiction over
Defendants was meritless. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478
(1985) (noting that a “contract with an out-of-state party alone can[not] automatically
establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum”). As the Court
noted when dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, “[t]he caselaw is clear this tenuous connection
bridged only by Plaintiff’s status as an Arizona company is insufficient to establish
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personal jurisdiction.” (Doc. 16 at 7.) Plaintiff even cited abrogated case law in support of
its position that the Court had personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s tort claims. (See Doc.
14 at 8) (citing Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014)).
Moreover, there were no novel issues that might justify a good faith argument as to
personal jurisdiction. Cf. Lazar v. Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., No. CV-14-01511-PHX-
DLR, 2015 WL 12602432, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 19, 2015) (denying fees under § 12–
341.01(A) where the unsuccessful party’s “theory of personal jurisdiction was not
frivolous” as it presented an issue of first impression “worthy of exploration”). Indeed,
Plaintiff’s arguments were so meritless as to warrant an eleventh-hour attempt to
manufacture evidence in search of a jurisdictional basis. (See Doc. 16 at 6 n.2.) In these
circumstances, the Court cannot accept Plaintiff’s suggestion that a fee award would be
inappropriate because Plaintiff “acted in good faith at all stages of this litigation.” (Doc. 20
at 5.) These factors thus favor Defendants’ entitlement to a fee award.
2. Avoidance of Litigation
Much of this litigation could have been avoided after its earliest stages.
“Defendants’ counsel conferred with Find Staff’s counsel in good faith and requested that
Find Staff voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit given the apparent personal jurisdiction
deficiencies.” (Doc. 17 at 7.) In response, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants did not
respond to any attempts by Plaintiff to resolve this case prior to filing a lawsuit and when
they finally sought counsel, they didn’t provide Plaintiffs with options for arbitrators,
attempt to negotiate or do anything except make threats and demands to Plaintiff.” (Doc.
20 at 5.)
However, in reply, Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff “proffers no evidence
whatsoever showing that it took any steps to attempt to ‘resolve this case prior to filing a
lawsuit.’” (Doc. 21 at 5.) Rather, Defendants have submitted a sworn declaration attesting
that Plaintiff “never requested to schedule a meeting to attempt to resolve the dispute” and
“never sent a letter or demand requesting to arbitrate.” (Id.) Defendants attest that the only
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correspondence received from Plaintiff prior to being served with the Complaint was a
cease-and-desist letter that “did not request to arbitrate, did not state a monetary demand,
and did not request to meet and negotiate a resolution within 60 days (as required by the
arbitration provision).” (Id.) Given the factual record before the Court, it appears
Defendants made reasonable efforts to resolve this dispute without litigation and advise
Plaintiff of the jurisdictional defects in its case. This factor thus favors Defendants’
entitlement to fees.
3. Extreme Hardship
Plaintiff does not argue it would suffer extreme hardship if Defendants are granted
a fee award, so this factor is neutral.
4. Prevailing in All Respects
Defendants undoubtedly prevailed in all respects as the Court dismissed all of
Plaintiff’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. This factor thus weighs in favor of
Defendants’ entitlement to fees.
5. Discouragement of Legitimate Claims
Plaintiff argues “awarding fees under these circumstances would send a chilling
message to future litigants, potentially deterring parties from pursuing reasonable claims
or defenses for fear of incurring substantial attorneys’ fees, even when acting in good
faith.” (Doc. 20 at 5–6.) However, Defendants note that Plaintiff “can still pursue its
claims” in an appropriate forum, so “a fee award would not chill parties from seeking relief
for the types of claims asserted by Find Staff in this litigation.” (Doc. 17 at 7–8.) Given the
clear jurisdictional defects for Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds a fee award would not
deter parties from bringing similar claims in an appropriate forum. Moreover, awarding
fees in these circumstances “may serve to deter such plaintiffs from filing similarly
frivolous lawsuits.” Dickson v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV-23-01906-PHX-
DJH, 2025 WL 460819, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2025) (citing Ajman Stud v. Cains, No.
CV-15-01045-PHX-DJH, 2020 WL 5034219, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2020)); see also All-
Way Leasing, Inc. v. Kelly, 895 P.2d 125, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (“[O]ne purpose of
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section 12-341.01(A) is to encourage litigants in contract actions to consider [the risk of
paying its opponents’ attorney’s fees] before filing suit.”).
Overall, based on its consideration of the above factors, the Court finds Defendants
are entitled to the requested attorney’s fees under § 12–341.01(A).
C. Reasonableness
The Court now turns to the reasonableness of the requested fees. Defendant has
complied with LRCiv 54.2(d) by providing briefing and supporting documentation to allow
the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee award.
An award of attorney’s fees under § 12-341.01(A) “should be made to mitigate the
burden of the expense of litigation to establish a just claim or a just defense. It need not
equal or relate to the attorney fees actually paid or contracted, but the award may not exceed
the amount paid or agreed to be paid.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(B). The “beginning point” in
determining a reasonable fee for commercial litigation is “the actual billing rate which the
lawyer charged in the particular matter.” Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., 673
P.2d 927, 931 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (“Unlike public-rights litigation, and contingent-fee
litigation, for example, . . . there is no need to determine the reasonable hourly rate
prevailing in the community for similar work because the rate charged by the lawyer to the
client is the best indication of what is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular
case.”).
“Once a party establishes its entitlement to fees and meets the minimum
requirements in its application and affidavit for fees, the burden shifts to the party opposing
the fee award to demonstrate the impropriety or unreasonableness of the requested fees.”
Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass’n, 167 P.3d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
(citing State ex rel. Corbin v. Tocco, 845 P.2d 513, 520 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)). The party
opposing the fee award “must provide specific references to the record and specify which
amount of items are excessive.” In re Indenture of Tr. Dated Jan. 13, 1964, 326 P.3d 307,
319–20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); see also Tocco, 845 P.2d at 520 (“[A]n opposing party does
not meet his burden merely by asserting broad challenges to the application. It is not
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enough . . . simply to state, for example, that the hours claimed are excessive and the rates
submitted too high.” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 578 F. Supp. 1262,
1264 (D. Ariz. 1984))). A fee award may also be reduced for hours not “reasonably
expended.” China Doll, 673 P.2d at 932.
Under the Arizona Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct and Local
Rules, the following factors are to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a
request for attorney’s fees:
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(5) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(6) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(8) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services;
(10) the degree of risk assumed by the lawyer;
(11) whether the fee contracted between the attorney and the client is fixed or
contingent, the “undesirability” of the case, and awards in similar actions.
A.R.S. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 42, Rules of Prof. Conduct, ER 1.5; LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3). Here,
certain factors are not relevant and do not weigh for or against reasonableness, including
preclusion of other employment, degree of risk, working for a fixed or contingent fee, time
limitations, the undesirability of the case, and the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client.
1. Customary Fee and Counsel’s Hourly Rates, Experience,
Reputation, and Ability
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Mr. Tighe, a partner with seven years of experience, billed at a rate of $570.00 per
hour. Mr. Smith, an associate with over one year of experience, billed at a rate of $ 475 per
hour. Plaintiff disputes the reasonableness of the rates charged by Defendant’s counsel as
compared to those charged by Plaintiff’s counsel as well as counsel in Randolph v. Pravati
SPV II LLC, No. CV-21-00713-PHX-SRB, 2022 WL 1480029 (D. Ariz. Apr. 6, 2022). But
under Arizona law, “in corporate and commercial litigation between fee-paying clients,
there is no need to determine the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for
similar work because the rate charged by the lawyer to the client is the best indication of
what is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.” Design Trend Int’l
Interiors, Ltd. v. Cathay Enters., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1064 (D. Ariz. 2015) (quoting
China Doll, 673 P.2d at 931–32).
Moreover, although in Randolph a similar partner rate was charged by an attorney
with thirteen years more experience, and the associate rate was nearly $100 less than
charged here, counsel in Randolph averred that these were “discounted” rates.” 2022 WL
1480029, at *2. In contrast, Defendants cite multiple recent cases in this District finding
greater hourly rates were reasonable. See, e.g., ThermoLife Int’l LLC v. BPI Sports LLC,
No. CV-20-02091-PHX-SPL, 2023 WL 3568199, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 18, 2023) ($732.06
partner rate and $558.88 associate rate); Gross v. CitiMortgage Inc., No. CV-18-02103-
PHX-ROS, 2023 WL 5133712, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2023) ($725 partner rate and $575
associate rate); Platek v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-01161-PHX-MTL, 2023
WL 8436562, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2023) ($700 hourly rate). In light of counsel’s
experience, reputation, and ability, (see Doc. 17 at 11), the hourly rates of Mr. Tighe and
Mr. Smith are reasonable.
2. Time and Labor Required
Mr. Tighe billed a total of 51.30 hours in defending this action, while Mr. Smith
billed a total of 85.20 hours. “Generally, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney’s fee for every item of service which, at the time rendered, would have
been undertaken by a reasonable and prudent lawyer to advance or protect his client’s
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interest.” Dickson, 2025 WL 460819, at *5 (citation modified). Overall, the Court finds the
time and labor required to represent Defendants as accounted for in the billing entries are
accurate and reasonable. (See Doc. 17-1.) The Court also denies Plaintiff’s objections to
specific billing entries as follows.
Plaintiff argues the billing records of Mr. Tighe and Mr. Smith “reveal multiple
inefficiencies, excessive hours, and duplication of effort.” (Doc. 20 at 8.) In essence,
Plaintiff contends that because both attorneys billed to prepare the same filings, this means
they were “both attending to tasks that could reasonably have been delegated to the
associate alone or other legal staff.” (Id.) But such time entries related to the same task are
not duplicative if they “merely reflect each attorney’s contribution in completing a single
task, such as reviewing records, conducting legal research, and drafting or revising
documents.” Maki v. N. Sky Partners II LP, No. CV-15-02625-PHX-SRB, 2018 WL
4042455, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2018); see, e.g., Kaufman v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., No.
CV-16-02248-PHX-JAT, 2019 WL 2084460, at *14 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2019); Andreason
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-04102-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 5544367, at *2
(D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2020) (“The Court finds no fault with the fact that two attorneys
collaborated on this case and recognizes that legal collaboration often requires multiple
attorneys to review the same documents in order to contribute meaningfully to the drafting
and editing process.”). Indeed, in making this argument, Plaintiff acknowledges that Mr.
Tighe and Mr. Smith contributed to each filing in discrete ways, noting, for example, that
Mr. Smith “conduct[ed] legal research and draft[ed] the notice of removal,” while Mr.
Tighe “edit[ed] and revis[ed] the notice of removal.” (Doc. 20 at 8.) Similarly, Mr. Smith
conducted “research on personal jurisdiction standards and draft[ed] motions and
supporting declarations,” while Mr. Tighe “review[ed], edit[ed], and revis[ed] the same
motions and declarations.” (Id.) These entries do not demonstrate overlap between partner
and associate time, as they clearly demonstrate Mr. Smith and Mr. Tighe contributed
discrete work in completing a single task. Moreover, multiple “NO CHARGE” billing
entries totaling approximately 10 hours of unbilled time further support the conclusion that
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Mr. Smith and Mr. Tighe exercised reasonable billing judgment in defending this action.
(See Doc. 17-1 at 13–14.)
Plaintiff also suggests the records of Defendants’ counsel contain “block-billing
entries [that] obscure how much time is devoted to each discrete task, making the
reasonableness of the hours more difficult to assess.” (Doc. 20 at 8–9.) Block billing is “the
time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily time
spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.” Welch
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Harolds Stores, Inc.
v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1554 n.15 (10th Cir. 1996)). But the itemization
of services provided by Defendant’s counsel does not support Plaintiff’s assertion. For
example, Plaintiff points to one of Mr. Smith’s entries on May 4, 2025, where he billed a
total of 5.90 hours to conduct research and draft motions and supporting declarations, but
the entry description clearly itemizes the time spent on each task:
Continue conducting legal research, including Arizona’s standard for
establishing personal jurisdiction (1.9) and the standard for establishing
general jurisdiction (1.2); and drafting motion to dismiss, including
Arizona’s standard for establishing personal jurisdiction (1.7), and why
general jurisdiction has not been established (1.1).
(Doc. 17-1 at 9.) The same is true for other allegedly block-billed entries, where the total
billed time is discretely itemized within the entry description. These entries are not block
billed and are sufficiently detailed for the Court to determine their reasonableness.
Plaintiff objects to “over 12 combined hours dedicated solely to client declarations
that largely recited basic jurisdictional facts and routine procedural matters.” (Doc. 20 at
11.) On average, this would reflect about four hours spent preparing each of the three
declarations filed by Defendants, which collectively totaled 70 pages including exhibits.
(See Docs. 12-1 to -3.) The Court does not find this is an unreasonable amount of time to
spend preparing these declarations as they were crucial to Defendant’s success and had to
be verified for their truthfulness and accuracy under penalty of perjury. Moreover, the
Court relied on each of these declarations in granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
particularly a second declaration from Ms. Elam which was prepared only after Plaintiff
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attempted to manufacture evidence to establish a jurisdictional hook. (See Doc. 16 at 6 n.2.)
3. Novelty and Difficulty of the Issues
The issues of personal jurisdiction here were not novel or difficult. However,
Plaintiff’s continued persistence in arguing the Court had personal jurisdiction over
Defendants—despite Defendants’ attempts to advise Plaintiff this argument was
groundless—was directly responsible for many of the hours Defendants spent in defending
this case. Moreover, Defendants had to spend further time addressing and responding to
Plaintiff’s manufacturing of evidence in a bad faith attempt to create a jurisdictional hook.
4. Amount Involved and Results Obtained
Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiff’s claims asserting a right to
recover at least $125,231.43, in addition to punitive and other damages. The results
obtained—“full dismissal before having to engage in discovery, dispositive motion
practice and trial—militate toward the fee being reasonable.” Erskine, 2021 WL 9597924,
at *2. Prevailing at this early stage of litigation saved the parties further unnecessary
expense in litigating this meritless claim.
5. Awards in Similar Actions
The only case cited by Plaintiff as a similar action is Randolph, which as previously
discussed, involved discounted hourly rates and is not a useful point of comparison here.
Additionally, the Court in Randolph had to make numerous reductions to the requested
award that are not at issue here, including multiple unsupported billing entries from
individuals whose identities were not explained, as well as an unreasonably excessive
amount of time spent preparing the fees motion.3 See 2022 WL 1480029, at *4.
Defendants note their requested award of $64,280.50 is within the range of recent
cases from the District of Arizona granting fee awards after a successful motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Erskine, 2021 WL 9597924 (awarding $98,891);
WNDG LLC v. Susan Lanto Living Tr., No. CV-23-01194, Doc. 33 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2024)
3 Counsel in Randolph billed 72 hours preparing the fees motion and reply, but the district
court awarded only 25 hours based on the reasonable limits established by many other
courts. See 2022 WL 1480029, at *4. By contrast, here Defendant’s counsel billed only
16.6 hours for their work preparing the fees motion. (See Doc. 17-1 at 14–15.)
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(awarding $55,491.50). Defendants’ requested award is also within the range of awards in
cases from the District of Arizona for successful motions to dismiss on other grounds. See,
e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Crown Corr, Inc., No. CV-11-0965-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL
2798653 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012) (awarding $105,284.10); Biltmore Assocs., L.L.C. v. Twin
City Fire Ins. Co., No. CV-05-04220-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 496766 (D. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2007)
(awarding $52,241.00 to one defendant and $58,124.00 to another defendant).
Taken together, these factors demonstrate the reasonableness of the requested fee
award of $64,280.50 to which Defendants are eligible and entitled, and Plaintiffs have not
specifically shown how any fees were excessive, duplicative, or otherwise unreasonable.
The Court will also award Defendants $415.61 in costs, which comply with the rules’
requirements.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED Defendants’ Motion for an Award of Their Reasonable
Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 17) is GRANTED. Defendants are awarded $64,280.50 in fees and
$415.61 in costs, for a total of $64,696.11 against Plaintiff Find Staff LLC. The Clerk of
Court shall enter judgment accordingly and this matter shall remain closed.
Dated this 20th day of May, 2026.
Honorable Roslyn O. Silver
Senior United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-01429-ROS Document 22 Filed 05/20/26 Page 13 of 13