Montes v. Suns Legacy Partners LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Chelsea Montes,
Plaintiff,
v.
Suns Legacy Partners LLC,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-01295-PHX-GMS
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16), Motion to
Strike (Doc. 18), and Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 49). For the reasons below, the Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is granted in part and denied in part; the Motion to Strike (Doc. 18)
is denied; and the Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 49) is granted.1
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Chelsea Montes,2 a Hispanic female, is a former employee of Defendant
Suns Legacy Partners LLC (“SLP”). (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 4, 10).3 Plaintiff was the “highest-ranking
Hispanic member” of Defendant’s corporate staff, which consisted of ten Hispanic
individuals total, among other employees. (Id. ¶ 10). As a part of her role, for over two
1 Defendant’s request for oral argument is denied because the parties have had an
adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence, and oral argument will not aid the
Court’s decision. See Lake at L.V. Invs. Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d
724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).
2 Montes initially brought her complaint under the “Jane Doe” pseudonym (Doc. 1)
and sought leave to proceed anonymously (Doc. 6). The Court denied Plaintiff’s request
on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 46). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint revealing her identity
on September 9, 2025. (Doc. 54).
3 The facts alleged in the complaint (Doc. 54) are presumed true and construed in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
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years, Plaintiff led the development, management, and execution of “The Campaign”—“a
high-profile cultural project designed to honor the contributions of the Hispanic community
to [Defendant’s] mission and success.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-13).
Plaintiff avers that, despite her high level of responsibility, she did not receive
compensation or a title that reflected “the scope or impact of her work.” (Id. ¶¶ 22-23).
For reference, Plaintiff identifies a male employee—Shawn Martinez—who held the title
of “Senior Director of Live Presentation” and led a separate initiative “nearly identical in
scope” to The Campaign. (Id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff does not state what her title was when she
was employed by Defendant, only pleading that she “held a prominent position” within the
organization. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff claims that while other male employees who had directed
similar campaigns in the past had “received extensive media attention and public
acknowledgment for their work,” Plaintiff was informed by Defendant that “she would not
receive recognition for her contributions” to The Campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53).
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant—specifically Stacy Mitch, the Senior
Vice President of Communication—denied her work opportunities based on her race and
national origin. (Id. ¶ 41). While Plaintiff’s colleagues “were regularly featured in
English-language media and publicly recognized” for their work,4 Plaintiff was restricted
“to a single interview on a Spanish-speaking network,” despite her role in the success of
The Campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41). Plaintiff and Mitch were frequently at odds with one
another during Plaintiff’s tenure at SLP.
For example, Plaintiff avers that Mitch falsely told Graham Wincott, Plaintiff’s
supervisor, that Plaintiff had confided that she did not believe Wincott should be an
executive. (Id. ¶ 45). When confronted by Wincott, Plaintiff denied making such a remark.
(Id. ¶ 46). Though Plaintiff sought a meeting with both Mitch and Wincott to resolve the
issue, no such meeting ever took place. (Id.). Additionally, on a different occasion,
Wincott informed Plaintiff that Mitch had previously stated that when a “high-profile
media opportunity” came down to a selection between a qualified Hispanic female
4 Plaintiff alludes that such opportunities were “offered to her white and non-Hispanic
colleagues.” (See Doc. 54 ¶ 70).
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candidate and a Caucasian female candidate, Mitch would not choose the Hispanic
candidate because “she wasn’t polished enough.” (Id. ¶ 47).
Plaintiff further describes her experience at SLP as one marred by a hostile work
environment. (Id. ¶ 14). She highlights three events to support this assertion.
First, Plaintiff claims that Kyle Pottinger, the former Senior Vice President of Ticket
Sales and Services, “repeatedly abused his authority by making inappropriate advances
towards Plaintiff under the guise of professional meetings.” (Id. ¶ 17). During these
meetings, Pottinger frequently mentioned that “he and his wife were getting a divorce.”
(Id. ¶ 18). Pottinger “insinuated” to Plaintiff “that a romantic or sexual relationship with
him could result in career advancement.” (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff rejected Pottinger’s
advances, which she says led to a “clear decline in professional support” from senior
executives at SLP. (Id. ¶ 20). Defendant purportedly failed to investigate or discipline
Pottinger for his misconduct. (Id. ¶ 21).
Second, Plaintiff, during a meeting, was forced by two of Defendant’s male
“agents”5 to “view a sexually inappropriate image.” (Id. ¶¶ 29-30). The “agents” pressured
Plaintiff into discussing the photo. (Id.). Plaintiff characterizes their discussion as
“discriminatory,” “demeaning,” “centering on the sexual objectification of women in the
Hispanic community,” “violating [Plaintiff’s] personal boundaries,” and “demonstrating
[SLP]’s disregard for cultural respect.” (Id.). Plaintiff reported the incident to Wincott,
but her concerns were dismissed, and no corrective action was taken against the “agents.”
(Id. ¶ 31).
Third, in separate meeting where Plaintiff and Wincott were “discussing ideas for a
Pride Night halftime show,” Martinez entered the room and “expressed strong opposition
to the concept and made blatantly homophobic comments.” (Id. ¶¶ 32-33). After Plaintiff
voiced her disagreement with Martinez’s comments, Martinez questioned her sexuality,
asking “why she cared so much” and inquiring into whether Plaintiff “was a lesbian.” (Id.
¶ 33). Martinez was not disciplined for his remarks: Wincott “downplayed the incident,”
5 Plaintiff only describes these “agents” as “collaborators.” (Doc. 54 ¶ 29).
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described Martinez as “from a different generation,” and suggested that Plaintiff not take
offense. (Id. ¶ 34).
As a result of these incidents and “the mounting stress and workplace hostility,”
Plaintiff recorded voice messages on her phone to document her frustrations with SLP’s
workplace. (Id. ¶ 36). Though Plaintiff meant to send these messages only to her fiancé
in private, Plaintiff inadvertently sent one message to Wincott. (Id. ¶ 37). In that message,
Plaintiff “expressed her belief that Wincott was an ineffective leader, citing his repeated
failures to address misconduct directed at her.” (Id.). Defendant disciplined Plaintiff for
this incident, describing her behavior as “rude” and “unprofessional.” (Id. ¶ 38).
Though Plaintiff repeatedly raised her concerns with Defendant’s “discriminatory
conduct and the hostile work environment” to the organization’s human resources
department, no corrective action was taken. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51). But in February 2024, after
Plaintiff shared a social media post from her personal account highlighting her involvement
with The Campaign, Defendant “issued a disciplinary action against Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 55-
56). Plaintiff does not describe the disciplinary action that was taken against her, and
instead conclusorily alleges that the action “had the effect of suppressing [her] career
advancement and eliminating future professional opportunities within the organization.”
(Id. ¶ 56).
Plaintiff subsequently resigned on February 5, 2024. (Id. ¶ 57). During her exit
interview, Plaintiff requested to receive public recognition for her role in The Campaign.
(Id. ¶ 61). The request was denied. (Id. ¶ 62). Plaintiff later learned in September 2024
that The Campaign team—“comprised of male and non-Hispanic female employees”—had
been nominated for the Rocky Mountain Emmy.6 (Id. ¶ 63).
Plaintiff initially brought eight claims against Defendant:
• Count I: Race and national origination discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
• Count II: Retaliation under § 1981;
• Count III: Constructive discharge under § 1981;
6 See generally About Us, Nat’l Acad. of Television Arts & Scis.: Rocky Mountain
Sw. Chapter, https://rockymountainemmy.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2026).
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• Count IV: Violation of the Equal Pay Act, 26 U.S.C. § 206(d);
• Count V: Discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), A.R.S.
§ 41-1463;
• Count VI: Violation of the Arizona Equal Pay Law, A.R.S. § 23-341;
• Count VII: Inflection infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”);
• Count VIII: Sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and quid pro quo
under ACRA, A.R.S. § 41-1463(B).
(Doc. 54). Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss Count V and Count VI. (Doc. 56). The
Court dismissed the two claims, with prejudice, on September 23, 2025. (Doc. 58).
Defendant makes three motions. First, Defendant moves to dismiss Count III and
Count VII for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 16). Second, Defendant asks the Court to
strike Plaintiff’s allegations under Count II and Count III that do not pertain to race-based
discrimination. (Doc. 18). And third, Defendant seeks the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
on Plaintiff’s counsel—Sheree Wright and Cortney Walters—for citing to fabricated cases
generated by artificial intelligence (“AI”) in multiple pleadings filed with the Court. (Doc.
49). The Court will discuss each motion in turn.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16)
a. Legal Standard
The Court must dismiss an action where a plaintiff “fail[s] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While the Court must “construe the pleadings in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005),
a complaint may still be dismissed as a matter of law “for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a
cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” Robertson
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”). The Court need not accept the legal conclusions contained in a complaint as
true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice” as factual content. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
b. Analysis
i. Count III: Constructive Discharge
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that her resignation from SLP constituted a
“constructive discharge” because she was “effectively forced [] to resign” due to
Defendant’s “intolerable work environment.” (Doc. 54 ¶ 93). A plaintiff alleging that a
resignation in response to a hostile work environment constitutes a constructive discharge
“must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt
compelled to resign.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). Defendant
contends that Count III must be dismissed as a matter of law because, “[w]hile constructive
discharge may be alleged as a component of Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim, it is not an
independent cause of action.” (Doc. 16 at 11).
Plaintiff brings her claim for constructive discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
statute guarantees “[a]ll persons” the same right to “make and enforce contracts”7 as that
“enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 claims are limited to and
require proof of intentional racial discrimination. Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s
Union, Loc. No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1982). “To prevail, a plaintiff must
initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of
a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589
U.S. 327, 341 (2020). Section 1981 reaches both state action and “purely private acts of
racial discrimination.” Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976).
A different but overlapping statute—Title VII—“prohibits employment
7 The statute defines the term “make and enforce contracts” as including “the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
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discrimination on account of race, sex, religion, and national origin.” Gay, 694 F.2d at 536
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the “legal principles
guiding a court in a Title VII dispute apply with equal force in a § 1981 action.”8 Manatt
v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing string of cases); Fonseca v.
Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). And in the Title VII
context, the Supreme Court has held that “constructive discharge is a claim distinct from
the underlying discriminatory act.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 559 (2016); Suders,
542 U.S. at 142, 149 (holding that “a claim for constructive discharge lies under Title VII”
and noting that a hostile-work-environment claim is a “lesser included component” of the
“graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge”).
Given the unambiguity of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Green and Suders, those
principles “apply with equal force in a § 1981 action,” and Plaintiff is thus permitted to
bring a claim for constructive discharge under § 1981. See Manatt, 339 F.3d at 797;
Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 625 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where a plaintiff
alleges constructive discharge in violation of a federal statute, constructive discharge is
governed by a federal standard.” (citing Suders, 542 U.S. at 141)). To succeed on her claim
of constructive discharge, Plaintiff must ultimately prove (1) that she “was discriminated
against by [SLP] to the point where a reasonable person in [her] position would have felt
compelled to resign” and (2) that she “actually resigned.” Green, 578 U.S. at 555.
District courts within the Ninth Circuit have similarly allowed plaintiffs to bring
such claims under § 1981. See, e.g., Small v. Feather River Coll., 2011 WL 1670236 (E.D.
Cal. May 3, 2011) (permitting a claim for constructive discharge under § 1981 to proceed
past the pleading stage); Stewart v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,
2022 WL 558261, at *2-4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2022) (treating constructive discharge claim
under § 1981 as its own claim at summary judgment stage); Garcia v. PSI Env’t Sys., 2012
WL 914829, at *3-5 (D. Idaho Mar. 16, 2012) (granting defendant’s motion for summary
8 “Title VII, however, requires the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies, such
as filing a claim with the EEOC, before seeking a private action for damages, whereas
§ 1981 has no such requirement.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103
(9th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
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judgment for a Title VII constructive discharge claim where plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, but considering plaintiff’s § 1981 claim for constructive
discharge on the merits).
Defendant’s caselaw cited in support of its assertion that Plaintiff cannot bring an
individual claim for constructive discharge under § 1981 is all inapposite. (Doc. 16 at 11).
First, in Wood v. University Physicians Healthcare, the district court, citing the
Supreme Court in Suders, stated that “the federal law doctrine of constructive discharge is
not a cause of action in its own right.” 2013 WL 6170604, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2013)
(citing Suders, 542 U.S. at 141). But the district court there was addressing whether an
action for constructive discharge could be brought separately from a wrongful termination
action under Arizona law, and cited to Suders to demonstrate that, in the federal context, a
claim for constructive discharge involves the same remedies as an action for wrongful
discharge. Id. at *3-5 (noting that the relevant state statute did “not specify any remedy for
constructive discharge” and looking at federal law “for comparison”); Suders, 542 U.S. at
141 (“Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to
resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for
remedial purposes.” (emphasis added)); id. at 147 n.8 (“[A] prevailing constructive
discharge plaintiff is entitled to all damages available for formal discharge.” (emphasis
added)). And even if the court in Wood did hold that a plaintiff cannot bring a separate
claim for constructive discharge under Title VII, such a holding would have later been
abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Green. See 578 U.S. at 559.
Second, in Anderson v. Arizona, the district court also stated that “constructive
discharge is not a cause of action in its own right.” 2007 WL 1461623, at *16 (D. Ariz.
May 16, 2007). But there, the district court did not hold that a plaintiff never can bring an
individual claim for constructive discharge. Instead, the district court held that a “prima
facie case for constructive discharge requires ‘something more’ than actionable
discrimination.” Id. (quoting Suders 542 U.S. at 147). Anderson merely stands for the
proposition that, for a plaintiff to succeed on a constructive discharge claim, they must
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demonstrate “actionable discrimination” and “conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
person would leave the job.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Suders, 542 U.S. at 146-47,
149. Thus, like in Anderson, failure to prove the existence of actionable discrimination or
a hostile work environment will lead to the dismissal of a claim for constructive discharge,
but that does not foreclose Plaintiff from bringing the claim in the first instance. 2007 WL
1461623, at *16; Green, 578 U.S. at 559 (“a hostile-work-environment claim is a lesser
included component of the graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge”
(citation modified)).
Third, while the Fifth Circuit in an unpublished opinion in Wells v. City of
Alexandria stated that “constructive discharge is not itself a cause of action,” 2004 WL
909735, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2004), the court’s decision was issued pre-Suders (June
2004) and pre-Green (May 2016). It thus lacks persuasive value here.
And fourth, Defendant cites three cases that discuss constructive discharge in the
context of state law. See Cohn v. Guaranteed Rate Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1209-10
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (plaintiff adequately pleaded breach of contract under Illinois law by
pleading constructive discharge); Arnold v. X Corp., 2024 WL 4987032, at *10-11 (D. Del.
Dec. 5, 2024) (plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded constructive discharge under California law
with regard to breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims); Lenk v. Monolithic
Power Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 1258862, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) (dismissing claim
under California Labor Code § 2802(a) where constructive discharge was an element of
the cause of action). These cited cases, however, have no bearing on whether Plaintiff can
bring a claim for constructive discharge in the federal context.
The Court notes that Plaintiff also brought additional claims under § 1981 for racial
discrimination (Count I) and retaliation (Count II). (Doc. 54 at 13-18); see Surrell, 518
F.3d at 1105-06 (discussing the elements of a § 1981 racial discrimination claim); id. at
1107-08 (discussing the elements of a § 1981 retaliation claim). Whether Count III can
exist as a “standalone” claim—i.e., even if the racial discrimination or retaliation claims
are dismissed—is a question that the Court need not address at this stage. Defendant did
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not move to dismiss Count I or Count II.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count III is denied.
ii. Count VII: IIED
Defendant next moves to dismiss Count VII, in which Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant, “through its officers, executives, and employees, engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct by subjecting Plaintiff to repeated and pervasive discrimination,
harassment, retaliation, and mistreatment in the workplace.” (Doc. 54 ¶ 127; Doc. 16 at
13-17). Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to (1) allege “outrageous” conduct and (2)
adequately plead intent to cause emotional distress. (Doc. 16 at 13, 16).
An IIED claim under Arizona law has three elements: (1) “the conduct by the
defendant must be ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’”; (2) “the defendant must either intend to
cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will
result from his conduct”; and (3) “severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result
of defendant’s conduct.” Cox v. Glob. Tool Supply LLC, 629 F. Supp. 3d 963, 972 (D.
Ariz. 2022) (quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987)).
1. “Outrageous” Conduct
To prevail on an IIED claim, a “plaintiff must show that the defendant’s acts were
so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int’l, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 554, 905 P.2d 559,
563 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). “It is extremely rare to find conduct in the
employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a
basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (citation
modified). At the pleading stage, the Court “determines whether the acts at issue are
sufficiently outrageous to state a claim for relief,” but “if reasonable minds could differ
about whether the conduct is sufficiently outrageous, the issue should be decided by a
jury.” Johnson v. McDonald, 197 Ariz. 155, 160, 3 P.3d 1075, 1080 (Ct. App. 1999).
Plaintiff relies primarily on the following conduct for her IIED claim:
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• Pottinger, a former executive, repeatedly scheduled “professional meetings”
with Plaintiff, in which he mentioned that “he and his wife were getting a
divorce.” After rejecting Pottinger’s advances, Plaintiff suffered a “clear decline
in professional support.” (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 17-21).
• Two of SLP’s “agents” forced Plaintiff to view a sexually inappropriate image
and pressured her into discussing the photo. Plaintiff reported the incident, but
no corrective action was taken by Defendant. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31).
• Defendant disciplined Plaintiff on two occasions: first, for inadvertently sending
a voice memo to Wincott in which she called him an “ineffective leader,” and
second, for sharing a social media post from her personal account highlighting
her involvement with The Campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 36-38, 55-56).
• Defendant limited Plaintiff’s public recognition for her work on The Campaign.
Plaintiff was allowed only a single interview on a Spanish-speaking network,
whereas her colleagues were regularly featured in English-language media.
Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request from her exit interview to receive public
recognition for her work on The Campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 61-62).
(Doc. 20 at 18; Doc. 16 at 14-15). Taken together, these incidents are not indicative of the
type of conduct that a reasonable person would find to be sufficiently outrageous to state
an IIED claim.
Plaintiff identifies only one case—Ford v. Revlon, Inc.—to support her allegation
that Defendant’s behavior was outrageous. (Doc. 20 at 19 (citing 153 Ariz. at 45, 734 P.2d
at 587)). But that case involved a materially different set of facts from the ones at hand.
There, plaintiff’s supervisor sexually harassed and assaulted her on multiple occasions:
• The supervisor first invited plaintiff to a dinner to purportedly discuss business
matters. When plaintiff tried to leave, her supervisor told her to sit down
“because he planned to spend the night with her.” After plaintiff rejected his
advances, the supervisor told plaintiff, “you will regret this.” 153 Ariz. at 39-
40, 734 P.2d at 581-82.
• One month later, at a company picnic, the supervisor followed plaintiff for most
of the day and, at one point, approached plaintiff and said, “I want to f*** you.”
When plaintiff again spurned his advances, the supervisor continued, “I am
going to f*** you if it takes me ten years.” 153 Ariz. at 40, 734 P.2d at 582.
• Later that afternoon, as plaintiff was leaving the restroom, the supervisor
grabbed her and “restrained her in a chokehold.” He then “ran his left hand over
[plaintiff’s] breasts, stomach, and between her legs” and stated, “I want to f***
you. I am going to f*** you.” Id.
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The plaintiff in Ford repeatedly reported her supervisor’s conduct to the company’s
management and human resources staff, yet no action was taken until “a full year and one
month after [the supervisor’s] initial act of harassment.” 153 Ariz. at 40-41, 734 P.2d at
582-83. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s determination of IIED liability,
stating that defendant-employer’s conduct was “outrageous” because (1) plaintiff “made
numerous [company] managers aware of [supervisor’s] activities”; (2) plaintiff “did
everything that could be done . . . to bring this matter to [company’s] attention”; and (3)
defendant-employer “ignored [plaintiff] and the situation she faced, dragging the matter
out for months and leaving [plaintiff] without redress.” 153 Ariz. at 43, 734 P.2d at 585.
In contrast, SLP’s conduct falls well short of the “level of outrageousness
necessary” to state a claim for IIED. See Mintz, 183 Ariz. at 554, 905 P.2d at 563 (citation
modified). First, Pottinger’s conduct—though certainly not appropriate—cannot
reasonably be viewed as “threatening to shatter the frame upon which one’s emotional
fabric is hung.” See Christakis v. Deitsch, 250 Ariz. 246, 250, 478 P.3d 241, 245 (Ct. App.
2020) (citation omitted). Though Pottinger insinuated that he was open to a romantic
relationship with Plaintiff by mentioning that he was divorcing his wife (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 17-
21), such conduct is not analogous to the way that the supervisor in Ford behaved. Mintz,
183 Ariz. at 554, 905 P.2d at 563 (citations omitted); Ford, 153 Ariz. at 39-40, 734 P.2d at
581-82.
Next, the conduct of Defendant’s two “agents” is a closer call, but it too fails to meet
the high bar for outrageousness under IIED. See, e.g., Loos v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., 796 F.
Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (D. Ariz. 2011) (dismissing IIED claim against supervisor at pleading
stage where plaintiff alleged that the supervisor “engaged in sexual talk and made sexual
gestures in her presence and attempted to involve her in some conversations with sexual
topics”). Loos is particularly instructive here. While the agents’ behavior here, like the
supervisor’s in Loos, “certainly was inappropriate, it does not rise to the level of extreme
and outrageous.” Id. And though Plaintiff alleges that no corrective action was taken
against the agents (Doc. 54 ¶ 31), Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate
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that any “failure to investigate” “constitute[d] atrocious and utterly intolerable behavior.”
796 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
Finally, neither Defendant’s discipline of Plaintiff for sending the inadvertent voice
memo to Wincott and sharing a social media post from her private account about The
Campaign (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 36-38, 55-56), nor Defendant’s limitation on Plaintiff’s public
recognition for her work on The Campaign (id. ¶¶ 40-41, 61-62), can reasonably be
considered “outrageous.” Outrageous conduct under IIED “does not include mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Christakis, 250
Ariz. at 250, 478 P.3d at 245 (citation modified). Plaintiff thus has not alleged any acts by
Defendant sufficiently outrageous to state a claim for relief under IIED.
2. Intent
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to include any “plausible” allegations demonstrating that
Defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near
certainty that such distress would result from its conduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Instead, Plaintiff only includes a mere threadbare recital of the intent element, conclusorily
stating that Defendant’s “conduct was intentional or, at a minimum, reckless, as Defendant
[] knew or should have known that such conduct would cause severe emotional distress.”
(Doc. 54 ¶ 129). Such a bare assertion is insufficient under the pleading standards set forth
in Twombly and Iqbal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Plaintiff argues that intent “may be alleged generally and inferred from conduct.”
(Doc. 20 at 20 (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); then citing Watkins v. Arpaio, 239 Ariz.
168, 170-71, 367 P.3d 72, 74-75 (Ct. App. 2016)). But neither of Plaintiff’s cited
authorities support her position. While Rule 9(b) only requires a party to allege intent
“generally” when pleading fraud or mistake (which is not the case here), see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b), that “merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated
pleading standard. It does not give h[er] license to evade the less rigid—though still
operative—strictures of Rule 8.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87 (citation omitted) (“Rule 8 does
not empower [Plaintiff] to plead the bare elements of h[er] cause of action, affix the label
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‘general allegation,’ and expect h[er] complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”). And
Watkins contains no discussion on the appropriate pleading standard for IIED claims. See
239 Ariz. at 170-71, 367 P.3d at 74-75 (listing the elements for an IIED claim).
Plaintiff next claims that “[c]ourts routinely uphold IIED claims at the pleading
stage where plaintiffs allege a consistent pattern of conduct from which intent or
recklessness may reasonably be inferred.” (Doc. 20 at 20 (citing only Ford, 153 Ariz. at
45, 734 P.2d at 587)). But Ford was not a case at the pleading stage. See 153 Ariz. at 42,
734 P.2d at 584 (reviewing the intermediate appellate court’s reversal of a jury verdict
finding defendant-corporation liable for IIED). And Plaintiff identifies no other case in
support of this assertion.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VII is granted.
II. Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 18)
a. Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(f), the Court “may strike from a pleading . . . any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of
a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from
litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v.
A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Striking part of a pleading is a “drastic
remedy” that is “often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory or harassing tactic.”
Ocean Garden Prods. Inc. v. Blessings Inc., 2019 WL 396873, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29,
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 5C Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure §§ 1380, 1382 (3d ed. 2018)). Such motions are thus generally “viewed with
disfavor by the federal courts and are infrequently granted.” Id. (citation omitted).
To succeed, the movant must demonstrate that the challenged allegations (1) “have
no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy” and (2)
“may cause some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Court “views the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and resolves any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged allegations
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in favor of plaintiff.” Gaines v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 424 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1014
(S.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted). “Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations
to be stricken weighs in favor of denying the motion to strike.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Rule 12(f) motions can and should be adjudicated with relative dispatch.” 5C Wright &
Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1382 (3d ed. 2025).
b. Analysis
Defendant asks the Court to strike Plaintiff’s allegations regarding “non-race-based
discrimination under Counts II and III.” (Doc. 18 at 7). The request is denied on both
counts.
In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliation under § 1981, alleging that she
was treated less favorably than her non-Hispanic colleagues through “workplace
discipline” and loss of “access to high-visibility professional opportunities” after “speaking
out and drawing attention to the discrimination she faced” at SLP. (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 81, 83).
Defendant identifies five allegations of discriminatory conduct in Count II that have “no
connection to Plaintiff’s race.” (Doc. 18 at 8). In these paragraphs, Plaintiff includes
allegations that SLP retaliated against her after she turned down Pottinger’s advances and
shared a social media post highlighting her involvement with the Campaign. (Doc. 54 ¶¶
78, 79, 82, 86, 87). Defendant avers that these allegations “are not actionable under Section
1981, which only protects against discrimination on the basis of race,” and are “therefore
irrelevant to Count II.” (Doc. 18 at 9).
In Count III, Plaintiff brings a claim for constructive discharge under § 1981,
alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment stemming from
“discriminatory treatment” on the basis of her “gender and race.” (Doc. 54 ¶¶ 93-95). She
claims that she continued working under these conditions but ultimately began
experiencing significant emotional distress, anxiety, insomnia, loss of appetite, and Bell’s
Palsy. (Id. ¶ 101). After seeking counseling and taking short-term disability leave, Plaintiff
resigned from SLP in February 2024, citing “Defendant’s creation of a workplace so
intolerable that continued employment was no longer possible.” (Id. ¶¶ 102-03).
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Defendant contends that allegations of a hostile work environment stemming from gender
discrimination (e.g., id. ¶¶ 94, 95, 99) should be stricken as well. (Doc. 18 at 9).
Defendant fails to meet its high burden of demonstrating that these allegations “have
no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy.” See
Ocean Garden Prods. Inc., 2019 WL 396873, at *1. While Defendant correctly identifies
that § 1981 only protects against intentional racial discrimination—a point that Plaintiff
does not dispute (Doc. 19 at 3)—these facts could be used to “illustrate the broader
discriminatory environment” at SLP. (Id.). Gaines is on all fours here. In that case, a
group of former employees brought a claim under § 1981 against their employer and
manager. 424 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-09. In their cause of action, plaintiffs included sexual
harassment allegations against the manager and another employee. Id. at 1013-14. The
district court denied defendant-employer’s motion to strike the allegations related to sexual
harassment, reasoning that the allegations were “relevant to [d]efendants’ conduct and
culpability,” “relevant for understanding the nature of [manager’s] termination,” and
“related to [manager’s] alleged racial discrimination.” Id. at 1014. Similarly, here,
Plaintiff’s allegations of sex or gender discrimination—some of which were brought to the
attention of SLP management (e.g., Doc. 54 ¶¶ 31, 50-51, 143)—could be relevant to
Defendant’s purported decision to take retaliatory action against Plaintiff and otherwise
maintain a hostile working environment based on Plaintiff’s race.
Moreover, though Defendant cites to a host of district court opinions dismissing
§ 1981 claims where plaintiffs brought claims for sex discrimination or national origin
discrimination (Doc. 18 at 10),9 this line of argumentation improperly wades into the merits
of the dispute. See, e.g., Zhou v. Fu, 2025 WL 3677415, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2025)
(“Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a Rule 12(f) motion does not test the
sufficiency of the complaint.” (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970,
9 In the one case that Defendant cites where the district court struck allegations of
gender discrimination under § 1981, the plaintiff sought to “pursue gender discrimination
claims pursuant to § 1981,” and the district court ultimately dismissed the claim. Naylor
v. Streamwood Behav. Health Sys., 2012 WL 5499441, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012). In
contrast, Plaintiff here “does not assert gender discrimination or harassment under § 1981.”
(Doc. 19 at 5).
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974 (9th Cir. 2010)). Because Defendant has not moved to dismiss Counts II or III on the
basis that Plaintiff has failed to plead intentional racial discrimination, the Court finds that
summary judgment is the more apt forum for Defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence for Plaintiff’s allegations of racial discrimination.10
Defendant’s motion to strike is thus denied.
III. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 49)
a. Background
Plaintiff is represented in this action by Sheree Wright, a member of the State Bar
of Arizona and the State Bar of New Mexico, and Cortney Walters, a member of the Florida
Bar who is appearing in this action pro hac vice. (Doc. 49 at 3). On April 18, 2025,
Plaintiff’s counsel signed and filed the initial complaint in this action and cited to a
fabricated case: “E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-20-01788-PHX-
JJT, 2021 WL 3081160, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2021).” (Doc. 1 at 21 n.2). Even though
this case does not exist,11 Plaintiff’s counsel included the following detailed parenthetical
describing the purported “holding” in the “case”:
(denying motion to dismiss Equal Pay Act claim where
plaintiff alleged that female employees performed
substantially equal work under similar conditions and received
lower pay than male employees, despite differences in job titles
and descriptions; court held that “factual plausibility” under
Twombly was satisfied by identifying comparators and
alleging disparity based on sex)
(Id. at 21-22 n.2).
On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel signed and filed the response to Defendant’s
10 Defendant also urges the Court to deny Plaintiff’s allegations of national origin
discrimination. (Doc. 24 at 4-5). For instance, Plaintiff in one sentence alleges that she
was subject to “discriminatory treatment based on her gender and national origin,” (Doc.
54 ¶ 94), but in the next paragraph states that she was discriminated on the basis of “gender
and race” (id. ¶ 95). While it is true that “national origin discrimination is not within the
ambit of § 1981,” the Ninth Circuit has observed that “race has been defined broadly to
cover immigrant ethnic groups.” Fonseca, 374 F.3d at 850 (citation omitted). Plaintiff
here—like the plaintiff in Fonseca (id.)—alleges discrimination on the basis that she is
Hispanic. (E.g., Doc. 54 ¶¶ 83, 99). The Court thus will not strike the allegation.
11 The Court considers a case fictitious in the scenario where the Court inputs
Plaintiff’s provided reporter number into a legal database and either (1) no result is found
or (2) the given reporter number corresponds to a different case or authority.
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Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20). In the reply, counsel again cited purported holdings from
fictitious cases:
No. Pleading Purported “Citation” Purported “Holding”
2 Doc. 20
at 12
Pizzo v. City of Chandler, No.
CV-20-02309-PHX-MTL, 2021
WL 7540814, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 21, 2021)
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “courts in the
District of Arizona have
consistently held that civil rights
plaintiffs are not required to
allege facts that eliminate every
alternative inference or prove
discriminatory animus outright at
the pleading stage.”
3 Doc. 20
at 15
Pizzo v. City of Chandler, No.
CV-20-02309-PHX-MTL, 2021
WL 7540814, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 21, 2021)
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “Courts in this
District routinely recognize that
EEOC charges, when cross-filed,
satisfy the ACRA’s
administrative prerequisites.”
4 Doc. 20
at 15
McIntyre v. Phx. Newspapers,
Inc., No. CV-06-02903-PHX-
JAT, 2007 WL 9702526, at *3
(D. Ariz. May 24, 2007).
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “Courts in this
District routinely recognize that
EEOC charges, when cross-filed,
satisfy the ACRA’s
administrative prerequisites.”
On the same date, Plaintiff’s counsel signed and filed a reply in support of Plaintiff’s
Motion to Proceed Anonymously. (Doc. 21). That pleading, too, contained multiple
fictitious citations:
No. Pleading Purported “Citation” Purported “Holding”
5 Doc. 21
at 9
Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
22-cv-1231, 2023 WL 3568691,
at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 19,
2023)
Plaintiff claims that, in that
“case,” “the court granted
anonymity to protect a plaintiff
who feared career-ending
retaliation after harassment in a
competitive industry.”
6 Doc. 21
at 11
Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2023
WL 3568691, at *2–3 (W.D.
Wash. May 19, 2023)
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “Courts routinely
hold that the illegal conduct
factor is case-specific and non-
dispositive.”
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7 Doc. 21
at 12
Doe v. Amazon.com, 2023 WL
3568691, at *2.
Cited to support “Plaintiff’s
genuine fears of retaliation and
professional harm as a woman of
color confronting institutional
power are well-recognized
grounds for anonymity,
especially where the defendant
knows the plaintiff’s identity.”
8 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Maricopa County
Community College District,
2017 WL 4460441, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 5, 2017)
Cited to support Plaintiff’s
assertion that she “has made a
particularized showing of well-
founded fears of retaliation,
reputational damage, and
professional harm in a male-
dominated industry where silence
is the norm.”
9 Doc. 21
at 15
Doe v. Maricopa County
Community College District,
2017 WL 4460441, at *2
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “Arizona courts
similarly grant pseudonymity in
discrimination and harassment
cases where disclosure risks
harm.”
10 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Northrop Grumman Sys.
Corp., 2022 WL 3447983, at *4
(E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2022)
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “The public’s
interest is satisfied so long as the
proceedings remain open and
accessible, with all substantive
pleadings, testimony, and
arguments publicly available.”
11 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Hobart & William Smith
Colleges, 2021 WL 392929, at
*3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2021)
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “The public’s
interest is satisfied so long as the
proceedings remain open and
accessible, with all substantive
pleadings, testimony, and
arguments publicly available.”
12 Doc. 21
at 11
Doe v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
App. 5th 1069, 1091 (2016)
Cited in support of Plaintiff’s
assertion that “Courts
consistently reject prejudice
claims where defendants know
the plaintiff’s identity and enjoy
full discovery access.”
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Defendant brought these fabricated citations to the attention of Plaintiff’s counsel
through responsive filings. (Doc. 23 at 2, 4-5; Doc. 25 at 2, 4 & nn.1-2). Plaintiff’s counsel
subsequently signed and filed a Notice of Errata (Doc. 27) to amend the fictitious citations
in the reply in support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously (Doc. 21) but did not
simultaneously file any similar notice for the fictitious cases in the initial complaint (Doc.
1) or the response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20).
On June 24, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel signed and filed a reply in support of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File a Reply Out of Time. (Doc. 26). In this filing, Plaintiff’s counsel
cited real cases, but included several fictitious quotes that do not appear in the opinions:
No. Pleading Citation Purported “Quote”
13 Doc. 26
at 5
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2010)
“we disapprove the overly rigid
application of the
Pioneer/Bateman standard in
cases such as Kyle,”
14 Doc. 26
at 5
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2010)
“with a spirit of cooperation and
civility”
15 Doc. 26
at 7
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2010)
“failed to show any prejudice”
16 Doc. 26
at 5
Briones v. Riviera Hotel &
Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th
Cir. 1997)
“[n]eglect encompasses both
simple, faultless omissions and
omissions caused by
carelessness.”
17 Doc. 26
at 8
Sibley v. Choice Hotels Int’l,
Inc., 304 F.R.D. 125, 129
(E.D.N.Y. 2015)
“Baseless and speculative
attacks on opposing counsel’s
conduct do not substitute for
legal argument.”
18 Doc. 26
at 11
Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g
Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th
Cir. 1998)
“[d]ispositive sanctions for
violations of procedural rules
should be reserved for cases of
willfulness, bad faith, or fault.”
Defendant’s counsel served Plaintiff’s counsel with a Rule 11 motion for sanctions
on July 30, 2025. (Doc. 49 at 7; Doc. 50-1). Under the rule, such motion should not be
filed with the Court if the “challenged paper” is “withdrawn or appropriately corrected
within 21 days after service.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). On August 5, 2025, Plaintiff’s
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counsel signed and filed a second Notice of Errata (Doc. 39), this time amending the
fictitious citations in the initial complaint (Doc. 1) and the response to Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 20), as well as amending the fictitious quotations in the reply in support
of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply Out of Time (Doc. 26).
Plaintiff’s counsel’s amendments to their fictitious citations and quotations, per their
Notices of Errata, are summarized in the table below (Doc. 27; Doc. 39):
No. Pleading Plaintiff’s Citation/Quote Plaintiff’s Corrected Authority
1 Doc. 1
at 21 n.2
E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa County
Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-20-
01788-PHX-JJT, 2021 WL
3081160, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 21,
2021)
E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa County
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510
(9th Cir. 1984)
2 Doc. 20
at 12
Pizzo v. City of Chandler, No.
CV-20-02309-PHX-MTL, 2021
WL 7540814, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 21, 2021)
Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa
County, 189 Ariz. 462 (App.
1997)
3 Doc. 20
at 15
Pizzo v. City of Chandler, No.
CV-20-02309-PHX-MTL, 2021
WL 7540814, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 21, 2021)
Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa
County, 189 Ariz. 462 (App.
1997)
4 Doc. 20
at 15
McIntyre v. Phx. Newspapers,
Inc., No. CV-06-02903-PHX-
JAT, 2007 WL 9702526, at *3 (D.
Ariz. May 24, 2007).
Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa
County, 189 Ariz. 462 (App.
1997)
5 Doc. 21
at 9
Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-
cv-1231, 2023 WL 3568691, at *3
(W.D. Wash. May 19, 2023)
Doe v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1140,
1144–45 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
6 Doc. 21
at 11
Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2023
WL 3568691, at *2–3 (W.D.
Wash. May 19, 2023)
Citation removed.
7 Doc. 21
at 12
Doe v. Amazon.com, 2023 WL
3568691, at *2. Citation removed.
8 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Maricopa County
Community College District, 2017
WL 4460441, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct.
5, 2017)
Citation removed.
9 Doc. 21
at 15
Doe v. Maricopa County
Community College District, 2017
WL 4460441, at *2
Citation removed.
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10 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Northrop Grumman Sys.
Corp., 2022 WL 3447983, at *4
(E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2022)
Doe v. Penzato, No. CV10-05105
MEJ, 2011 WL 1833007, at *3
(N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011)
11 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Hobart & William Smith
Colleges, 2021 WL 392929, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2021)
Doe v. Hobart & William Smith
Colleges, No. 6:20-cv-
06338EAW-MJP, 2021 WL
1062707 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
2021)
12 Doc. 21
at 11
Doe v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
App. 5th 1069, 1091 (2016) Citation removed.
13 Doc. 26
at 5
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2010): “we disapprove the
overly rigid application of the
Pioneer/Bateman standard in
cases such as Kyle,”
Clarification that the “sentence
was intended as a paraphrased
reference to general principles
derived from case law.”
14 Doc. 26
at 5
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2010): “with a spirit of
cooperation and civility”
Clarification that the “phrase was
a paraphrased summary, not a
direct quotation.”
15 Doc. 26
at 7
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures,
Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2010): “failed to show any
prejudice”
Clarification that the “phrase was
a paraphrased summary, not a
direct quotation.”
16 Doc. 26
at 5
Briones v. Riviera Hotel &
Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th
Cir. 1997): “[n]eglect
encompasses both simple,
faultless omissions and omissions
caused by carelessness.”
Clarification that “the statement
was a paraphrase of the Ninth
Circuit’s discussion of the
Supreme Court’s definition of
‘neglect’” in another case.
17 Doc. 26
at 8
Sibley v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
304 F.R.D. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y.
2015): “Baseless and speculative
attacks on opposing counsel’s
conduct do not substitute for legal
argument.”
Clarification that “sentence is
therefore not a direct quotation,
but rather a paraphrased
summary of the court’s
reasoning.”
18 Doc. 26
at 11
Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g
Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.
1998): “[d]ispositive sanctions
for violations of procedural rules
should be reserved for cases of
willfulness, bad faith, or fault.”
“Plaintiff withdraws the
quotation marks and
acknowledges that the sentence
should not have been presented
as a direct quotation.”
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During the 21-day safe harbor period, Plaintiff’s counsel also signed and filed a
Motion for Leave to Substitute a Reply Brief. (Doc. 36). In this motion, counsel attempted
to explain the appearance of fictitious citations in Doc. 21, claiming that what was filed on
June 12 was an “older working draft containing multiple citation placeholders and
quotation formatting issues.” (Doc. 36 at 3). Counsel blamed a law clerk for uploading
the “earlier draft,” averring that a version that was “reviewed, finalized, and distributed”
by counsel on June 11 should have been filed instead. (Id. at 3-4). The Court permitted
counsel to file their substituted reply brief12—which removed all fictitious citations in Doc.
21 and even removed some of the corrected authorities in the first Notice of Errata (Doc.
27)13—but made clear that the substituted filing did not “resolve[] any concerns about”
Doc. 21. (Doc. 46 at 1 n.1).
Plaintiff’s counsel also flagged that Ms. Wright was on bereavement leave14 from
June 9 through June 15, but that she was still participating in virtual team meetings to get
Doc. 21 submitted on file. (Doc. 36 at 3-4). But counsel confusingly claimed that “[u]pon
returning to the office and receiving Defendant[’s] Rule 11 letter, counsel promptly
initiated an internal audit, verified each citation, and located the correct draft.” (Id. at 3;
see also Doc. 50 at 5 (Plaintiff’s counsel claim that the “inadvertent filing mistake” in Doc.
21 “went unnoticed until Defendant served its Rule 11 motion on July 30, 2025.”)).
Counsel made no mention of their first Notice of Errata (Doc. 27)—filed on June 24, nine
days after the end of Ms. Wright’s bereavement leave, and more than one month before
12 The substituted reply brief, lodged at Doc. 38 and filed at Doc. 47, is quite different
from the initially filed reply brief. For example, the substituted brief lowers the number of
cited cases, reduces the amount of substantive content by about one page, and
simultaneously raises new arguments while modifying or abandoning others. (Compare
Doc. 47 with Doc. 21).
13 Plaintiff’s counsel, in their substituted reply brief (Doc. 47), removed any citations
to Doe v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2016) and Doe v.
Hobart & William Smith Colleges, No. 6:20-cv-06338EAW-MJP, 2021 WL 1062707
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2021). These two real cases were added as “Corrected Authority” by
Plaintiff’s counsel in the first Notice of Errata (Doc. 27), filed on June 24. (Compare Doc.
27-1 at 9, 14 with Doc. 47).
14 Counsel state that “Sheree Wright experienced the unexpected death of a close
family member while at work and immediately left the office” on June 9. (Doc. 36 at 2).
In Ms. Wright’s affidavit, she notes that she was “on bereavement leave due to the sudden
death of [her] beloved dog.” (Doc. 36-10 at 2).
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Defendant served its Rule 11 motion—that purportedly already fixed the so-called “clerical
or formatting errors” in Doc. 21. (See Doc. 27 at 1).
Plaintiff’s counsel also boldly asserted in their Motion for Leave to Substitute a
Reply Brief that the fictitious cases cited in Doc. 21 “do exist,” and instead avowed that
the fictitious citations were “typographical or formatting errors.” (Doc. 36 at 6). Counsel
noted that citations with the same case names (but with different case numbers, reporter,
date, and in some instances, court) were either “properly located in LexisNexis” or were
“real decision[s],” “albeit misdated.”15 (Id.). The cases that “do exist” are identified in the
table below (Doc. 36):
No. Pleading Plaintiff’s Fictitious Case Plaintiff’s Corresponding
“Real” Case
5-7
Doc. 21
at 9, 11-
12
Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-
cv-1231, 2023 WL 3568691
(W.D. Wash. May 19, 2023)
Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
C11-1709MJP, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159053 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 23, 2011)
8-9 Doc. 21
at 14-15
Doe v. Maricopa County
Community College District, 2017
WL 4460441 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5,
2017)
Counsel does not identify a
corresponding “real” case,
instead stating that the fictitious
case “had been flagged for
revision or removal before
filing.”
10 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Northrop Grumman Sys.
Corp., 2022 WL 3447983 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 17, 2022)
Doe v. Northrop Grumman Sys.
Corp., No. 5:19-CV-00991-CLS,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182435
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 22, 2019)
11 Doc. 21
at 14
Doe v. Hobart & William Smith
Colleges, 2021 WL 392929
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2021)
Doe v. Hobart & William Smith
Colls., No. 6:20-CV-06338
EAW, 2021 WL 1062707
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2021)
12 Doc. 21
at 11
Doe v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
App. 5th 1069 (2016)
Doe v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
App. 5th 915 (2016)
Plaintiff’s counsel did not cite to any of the fictitious cases, or the corresponding “real”
cases, in the substituted reply brief (Doc. 47), and Ms. Wright declared under penalty of
15 Plaintiff’s counsel neglected to mention that their fictious citation to a “misdated”
case—“Doe v. Hobart & William Smith Colleges, 2021 WL 392929 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
2021)”—also included a fictitious Westlaw reporter number. Inputting “fi: 2021 WL
392929” into Westlaw results in the following message: “We were unable to find the
document you’re looking for.”
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perjury that the “placeholder citations challenged by Defendant[] are verifiable cases”16
that were “verified using LexisNexis, not AI tools.” (Doc. 36-10 at 2-3). Counsel did not
explain why, despite having apparently used LexisNexis to conduct “all legal research”
(Doc. 36 at 3), nearly all the fictitious citations contained Westlaw reporter numbers. Nor
did counsel explain how mere “placeholders during the drafting process” (id.) so strikingly
mimicked the form of actual case citations without any commensurate accuracy.
Defendant ultimately filed its motion for sanctions under Rule 11 on August 26,
2025—more than 21 days after it served the motion on Plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc. 49).
Defendant avers that sanctions are appropriate because Plaintiff’s counsel’s explanations
for the fictious citations and quotations were “implausible,” and that the Notices of Errata
(Docs. 27, 39) and the Motion for Leave to Substitute a Reply Brief (Doc. 36) did not
“withdraw or appropriately correct the full set of issues identified” by Defendant. (Doc.
49 at 9 (citation modified)). Defendant contends that “[t]he only plausible explanation for
these recurring issues is that Plaintiff’s counsel used artificial intelligence tools without
verifying their outputs.” (Id. at 2).
b. Legal Standard
Under Rule 11, an attorney presenting a pleading to the Court “certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances: the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Failure to comply with
this provision “gives grounds for monetary sanctions.” Lake v. Gates, 130 F.4th 1064,
1068 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)). The inquiry into whether a pleading is
sanctionable under Rule 11 is an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (citation
omitted). “[T]he district court must determine that a pleading is both baseless and made
16 However, Ms. Wright omitted any discussion of “Doe v. Maricopa County
Community College District, 2017 WL 4460441 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2017)”—a fake citation
in Doc. 21 for which Plaintiff’s counsel did not identify any corresponding “real” case—
thus casting doubt on Ms. Wright’s blanket assertion that the placeholder citations are
verifiable cases. (See Doc. 36-10).
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without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Id. (citation modified).
c. Analysis
The conduct of Ms. Wright and Ms. Walters is sanctionable. The Court has
identified at least 18 instances where Plaintiff’s counsel included either a fictitious citation
or a fictitious quotation. Counsel thus violated their obligation to present “claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions” that are “warranted by existing law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Federal courts across the country have increasingly grappled with the issue of
“hallucinated content” appearing in court filings.17 Such content, which is generated by AI
large language models (“LLMs”), may “read[] like real legal authority.”18 A hallucinated
case generated by an LLM (1) “looks like a real case with a case name”; (2) includes “a
citation . . . to a reporter that publishes opinions from federal district courts”; and (3)
“identifi[es] [] a district court” and “the year for that decision.” United States v. Hayes,
763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2025), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 1067323
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025). In their filings with the Court, Ms. Wright and Ms. Walters
included citations that had “all the markings of a hallucinated case created by generative
artificial intelligence (AI) tools.” Id. Yet at no point did Plaintiff’s counsel ever take
responsibility for submitting filings that contained hallucinated cases and fabricated
quotations. Instead, counsel resorted to a blame game: blaming a law clerk for preparing
and filing the wrong version of a pleading (Doc. 50 at 11); blaming the same law clerk for
drafting fabricated quotations in another pleading19 (id. at 16); blaming a LexisNexis tool
17 See, e.g., Evan Ochsner, AI-Faked Cases Become Core Issue Irritating Overworked
Judges, Bloomberg L. (Dec. 29, 2025, at 03:00 MST),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/legal-ops-and-tech/ai-faked-cases-become-core-issue-
irritating-overworked-judges.
18 Mark H. Francis & Ashwini Jarral, A Legal Practitioner’s Guide to AI and
Hallucinations, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. 5-6 (Jan. 2026),
https://nationalcenterforstatecourts.app.box.com/v/Legal-practitioner-guide-AI (noting
that “LLMs develop working models of how legal language and reasoning fit together,”
but that LLMs “may invent” cases or “distort information from” actual cases since they
“are essentially a predictive text function”).
19 Ms. Wright states in her affidavit that she terminated the law clerk after the law
clerk declined to “prepare a declaration explaining her role in the incorrect filings.” (Doc.
50-5 at 14).
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for not catching fictitious cases and quotations (id. at 14-16); and even blaming
Defendant’s counsel for a “profound lack of diligence” in failing to find “the existence of
the cited authorities” (id. at 24).
Nowhere do counsel address their actual obligations under Rule 11—to read the
cases they cite, make arguments they know are legitimate, and review the work of law
clerks and paralegals before filing it with the Court. Counsel violated these ethical
obligations. The imposition of appropriate sanctions is warranted.
i. Safe Harbor Period
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s counsel raise a procedural defense to Defendant’s
motion, arguing that the motion filed by Defendant was not the same as the motion served
on Plaintiff’s counsel during the Rule 11 safe harbor period. (Doc. 50 at 7-10). Plaintiff’s
counsel primarily contend that, in the motion served (Doc. 50-1), Defendant claimed that
Plaintiff’s fictitious cases “do[] not exist,” but in the motion filed (Doc. 49), Defendant
instead alleged that the “case[s] do[] not exist as cited.” (Doc. 50 at 8 (emphasis added)).
Plaintiff’s counsel claim, without citing any authority, that under Rule 11, a “party seeking
sanctions must first serve the exact motion it intends to file.” (Id. at 7).
But “[t]he Ninth Circuit has never imposed a requirement that a served Rule 11
motion be identical to the filed motion.” Richter v. Oracle Am., Inc., 2023 WL 8586690,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2023). Instead, district courts within the Ninth Circuit “have found
that a served motion that rests on substantially the same grounds as a filed motion complies
with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.” Id. (citing string of cases). Still, the filed motion
“cannot raise any new arguments,” Beaver v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2024 WL 4979792, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2024) (citations omitted), and “any difference” between the served
and filed motions should “cause[] no prejudice to” Plaintiff and her counsel, Hodgson v.
Roper, 2022 WL 297089, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022).
Defendant’s filed motion (Doc. 49) rests on substantially the same grounds as the
served motion (Doc. 50-1), does not raise any new arguments, and caused no prejudice to
Plaintiff and her counsel. Both the served motion and the filed motion seek sanctions on
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the same set of fabricated cases and quotations. (Compare Doc. 49 at 6-7 with Doc. 50-1
at 9-10). Plaintiff’s counsel’s arguments that Defendant somehow “abandoned the core
theory of its served motion” (Doc. 50 at 8), or that Defendant “acknowledg[ed] the cases
exist” (id.), are without merit. During the safe harbor period, Plaintiff’s counsel asserted
that that the fictious cases in Doc. 21 “do exist,” implying that the cases were legitimate
simply because some other case existed that had the same name as the hallucinated one.20
(Doc. 36 at 6). Plaintiff’s counsel make this argument throughout their response brief for
this motion. (Doc. 50 at 4, 8, 14-16, 22, 24-25). The Court rejects this argument as legally
insufficient and factually unsupported.
Just because a hallucinated case adopts the same name as a real case, does not mean
that the hallucinated case “exists.” In fact, this occurrence is to be expected on occasion.
Because LLMs are “train[ed] on enormous volumes of text,” which include caselaw, an
LLM “may . . . distort information from an actual case” that “looks correct.” Francis &
Jarral, supra, at 5-6; see also Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“fictitious case citations
created by generative AI tools” can “look[] like a real case with a case name”). Thus,
Defendant’s adjustment of language in the filed motion, by noting that some of the
fictitious “case[s] do[] not exist as cited,” does not substantially alter the grounds of
Defendant’s served motion. (Doc. 50 at 8 (emphasis added)). The contention is still the
same argument: Plaintiff’s counsel included fabricated cases and quotations that bear the
characteristics of AI-hallucinated content.21
20 Defendant notes that it “adjusted certain language from ‘Case does not exist’ in the
served version of the motion to ‘Case does not exist as cited’ in the filed motion to
distinguish two forms of fake citations found in the offending filings: (1) fake citations
where there is not even a case with the same name, and (2) fake citations that include the
name of a real case, but which are otherwise fabricated—with made-up dates, courts, or
Westlaw or reporter numbers—and where the real case with the same name generally does
not support, and sometimes even directly contradicts, the proposition for which Plaintiff’s
counsel relied on the fabricated citation.” (Doc. 55 at 10).
21 Plaintiff’s counsel further argue that the “Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that such
deviations are fatal.” (Doc. 50 at 9 (first citing Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710-11 (9th
Cir. 1998); then citing Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir.
2001))). These cases say nothing to that effect. In Barber, the movant served its motion
for sanctions at the same time it filed the motion. 146 F.3d at 709. Because Rule 11
requires the movant to serve the motion 21 days before filing it, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court’s award of sanctions. Id. at 711. Barber contains no discussion on
whether the served motion and the filed motion must be identical. The same is true in
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Plaintiff’s counsel also claim that they were prejudiced by Defendant’s addition of
exhibits in the filed motion (Docs. 49-7 through 49-16) that detailed prior state bar
disciplinary records and emails between Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s counsel. (Doc. 50 at
24). But Defendant described these exhibits in the background section of the served
motion. (Doc. 50-1 at 2-3). Moreover, the disciplinary records are public, and Plaintiff’s
counsel had all exhibit documents in their possession. See, e.g., Shared Med. Res., LLC v.
Histologics, LLC, 2013 WL 12138991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (finding that a
motion for sanctions satisfied Rule 11’s procedural requirements, even where the served
motion did not include the exhibits referenced in that motion, because the movant
“describe[d] each of the documents,” and the non-movant had the documents “in its
possession or were publicly available”). And, in any event, the Court does not consider
these exhibits in resolving this motion. Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel fails to demonstrate any
prejudice to Plaintiff’s counsel through Defendant’s inclusion of exhibits in the filed
motion.
The Court finds that Defendant complied with Rule 11’s procedural requirements.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The Court will turn to the merits of Defendant’s motion.
ii. Plaintiff’s Fictitious Citations and Quotations are Baseless
The Court has little difficulty determining that the fabricated citations and
quotations present in Doc. 1, Doc. 20, Doc. 21, and Doc. 26 are “baseless.” See Lake, 130
F.4th at 1068 (citation omitted). “A fake opinion is not ‘existing law’ and citation to a fake
opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law, or for establishing new law.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443,
461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). This applies to fake quotations as well. See Safe Choice, LLC v.
City of Cleveland, 2025 WL 2958211, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2025) (“[A]s it always
has, misrepresenting the holdings of case law violates Rule 11.” (citing string of cases)).
Plaintiff’s counsel’s use of fake cases and quotations violated Rule 11(b)(2).
//
Radcliffe. 254 F.3d at 789 (similarly reversing an award of sanctions where the movant
“did not follow the mandatory service procedure” of Rule 11).
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iii. Counsel Did Not Conduct a Reasonable and Competent Inquiry
For each of the offending pleadings signed and filed by Ms. Wright and Ms.
Walters—Doc. 1, Doc. 20, Doc. 21, and Doc. 26—Plaintiff’s counsel also failed to make
a “reasonable and competent inquiry” into the existence of the fabricated citations and
quotations. See Lake, 130 F.4th at 1068 (citation omitted). The Court addresses each
offending document in turn.
1. Initial Complaint (Doc. 1)
The initial complaint contains one fictitious case: “E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa County
Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-20-01788-PHX-JJT, 2021 WL 3081160, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 21,
2021).” (Doc. 1 at 21 n.2). Plaintiff’s counsel state that a non-attorney law clerk, who had
been a member of Ms. Wright’s firm for almost a year and whose bar examination results
were pending, “prepared the initial draft” of the complaint and “conducted legal research
under the supervision of senior attorneys.” (Doc. 50 at 4-5, 14). Before filing the initial
complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel “used LexisNexis’s Document Analysis Tool to verify the
accuracy of all case law citations,” but the fictitious citation was not flagged. (Id. at 14).
Counsel contend that the fictitious case was a “formatting” error, and that it was intended
to reference a Ninth Circuit case with the same name. (Id.). Counsel’s explanation is either
insufficient or highly problematic for at least three reasons.
First, counsel seek to pass the buck to their law clerk. But an attorney’s Rule 11
duties cannot be delegated. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 125
(1989) (“The signing attorney cannot leave it to some trusted subordinate . . . to satisfy
himself that the filed paper is factually and legally responsible; by signing he represents
not merely the fact that it is so, but also the fact that he personally has applied his own
judgment.”); see also Davis v. Marion Cnty. Superior Ct. Juv. Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 2502308,
at *1-4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 2, 2025) (recommending Rule 11 sanctions on attorney where a
paralegal drafted a brief, the attorney did not have time to review the paralegal’s draft
before filing, and the brief contained hallucinated citations). As Defendant correctly notes,
“Plaintiff’s counsel cannot avoid sanctions by blaming someone else.” (Doc. 55 at 6).
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Second, counsel readily admit that they did not actually read the cases cited in the
initial complaint. When an attorney submits a court filing, she “certifies to the court that
[she] has read the document, has conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law
and is satisfied that the document is well grounded in both.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542 (1991). As the Second Circuit has observed,
“the duties imposed by Rule 11 require that attorneys read, and thereby confirm the
existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely.” Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th
610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024). By failing to actually check the cases and citations contained in
the complaint, counsel failed to conduct any reasonable inquiry into whether the fictitious
case existed.
Third, counsel’s explanation attributing the fictitious citation to a “formatting” error
does not withstand even basic scrutiny. In the initial complaint, counsel included a
parenthetical for the fictitious case that stated that the “court” there “held that ‘factual
plausibility’ under Twombly was satisfied by identifying comparators and alleging
disparity based on sex.” (Doc. 1 at 21 n.2 (emphasis added)). Counsel now attribute that
parenthetical to a different Ninth Circuit case published in 1984, stating that the
“substance” of the parenthetical “was accurate and drawn directly from applicable legal
standards.” (Doc. 50 at 14-15). This contention is not possible. Plaintiff’s “corrected”
authority—E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1984)—
was published 23 years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly. The Court
struggles to see how “formatting” errors—with the reporter number, page number, court,
and year—could also explain the inclusion of a parenthetical referencing a case from the
future.
It is apparent that an LLM was used to conduct legal research, or even generate the
initial complaint, thus leading to the inclusion of a fictitious case with a hallucinated
parenthetical. Plaintiff’s counsel offer no other plausible explanation. But even if the case
and parenthetical were not generated by AI, Plaintiff’s counsel still “failed to take even
th[e] most basic of actions”—actually reviewing the complaint, reading the cases cited,
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and not simply running it through a legal cite checking tool and calling it a day—“and
therefore did not catch the fact that the [complaint] contained [a] citation[] that did not
exist.” Davis, 2025 WL 2502308, at *2; see also Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (“Citing
nonexistent case law or misrepresenting the holdings of a case is making a false statement
to a court. It does not matter if generative AI told you so.” (citation modified)). Plaintiff’s
counsel thus did not make a “reasonable and competent inquiry” into the existence of the
fictitious citation in the initial complaint.
2. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 20)
The same holds for Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
20). Plaintiff’s counsel again attribute the inclusion of two fictitious cases—“Pizzo v. City
of Chandler, No. CV-20-02309-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 7540814 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2021)”
and “McIntyre v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., No. CV-06-02903-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL 9702526
(D. Ariz. May 24, 2007)”—to their non-attorney law clerk, who prepared a “draft” of the
brief. (Doc. 50 at 19). While counsel aver that they “did not invent those authorities, nor
did they rely on generative AI for case generation” (id. at 20), they again fail to give any
plausible explanation as to how such realistic looking cases ended up in their submitted
filing. And counsel again try to excuse this mistake by claiming that the “LexisNexis
database” did not catch the errors. (Id.). The Court finds, as it did for Doc. 1, that Plaintiff’s
counsel did not make a “reasonable and competent inquiry” into the existence of fictitious
citations in Doc. 20.
3. Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Her Motion to Proceed
Anonymously (Doc. 21)
Plaintiff’s counsel present a convoluted tale about the inclusion of multiple fictitious
citations in Plaintiff’s reply in support of her Motion to Proceed Anonymously (Doc. 21).
Counsel describe a situation where the litigation team prepared a final version of the brief
on June 11, the law clerk inadvertently filed an earlier version of the brief on June 12 (that
contained fictitious citations) while Ms. Wright was out of office, and counsel did not
realize that an erroneous brief was submitted until July 30 (when Defendant served its
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motion for sanctions). (Doc. 50 at 4-5). When counsel realized this mistake, they sought
to correct the record by filing the June 11 brief, as confirmed by “metadata.” (Id. at 11).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel’s narrative regarding Doc. 21 is invention.
The idea that the filing of an erroneous brief “went unnoticed” (Doc. 50 at 5) from June 12
through July 30 is demonstrably false. Defendant brought these fictitious citations to
Plaintiff’s attention on June 17 and June 20—after Ms. Wright’s bereavement leave had
ended. (Doc. 23 at 2, 4-5; Doc. 25 at 2, 4 & nn. 1-2). Plaintiff’s counsel—both Ms. Wright
and Ms. Walters—then signed and filed a Notice of Errata on June 24 (Doc. 27), purporting
to fix “clerical or formatting errors” present in Doc. 21. Yet Plaintiff’s counsel make no
mention of this Notice of Errata in their response to Defendant’s motion for sanctions. (See
Doc. 50). Because counsel completely omit any discussion of this key event, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s counsel did not make a “reasonable and competent inquiry” into
the existence of fictitious citations in Doc. 21.
Moreover, the Court can give no credence to counsel’s regurgitated defense of
“formatting” or “clerical” errors. Errors are to be expected—on occasion. But when the
same issue appears one time in Doc. 1, three times in Doc. 20, and eight times in Doc. 21,
it can no longer be attributed to mere oversight. Though counsel admit that the fictitious
citations “turned out not to exist,”22 they still cling to their claim that “[t]here was a good-
faith filing based on real legal research.” (Doc. 50 at 21). Both cannot be true.
4. Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Her Motion for Leave to File
Reply Out of Time (Doc. 26)
Finally, the Court also finds that Plaintiff’s counsel did not make a “reasonable and
competent inquiry” into the existence of fictitious quotations in Doc. 26. Plaintiff’s counsel
give the same song and dance here: the law clerk “handled” the drafting process of the
22 Plaintiff’s counsel’s supposedly “real and citable authorities” (Doc. 50 at 22)
generally do not support the propositions advanced by the corresponding fictitious
citations. For example, counsel cite a fictitious case—“Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-
cv-1231, 2023 WL 3568691, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2023)”—and state that the court
there granted a motion to proceed anonymously. (Doc. 21 at 9). But the “real” case later
identified by Plaintiff’s counsel—Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C11-1709MJP, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 159053, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2011)—denied leave to proceed
anonymously. (Doc. 36-8 at 2).
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brief, counsel ran the brief through the LexisNexis cite checking tool, and no fake quotes
were flagged. (Doc. 50 at 16-17). Counsel could have caught the fabrications by reading
the cases cited in their brief. See Park, 91 F.4th at 615. They failed to do that.
iv. Sanctions
Counsel’s conduct was not objectively reasonable under Rule 11. See Lake, 130
F.4th at 1068 (9th Cir. 2025). The Court will thus impose sanctions on Ms. Wright and
Ms. Walters.
The Court “may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney” that violates Rule
11(b), and the Court “must” hold the attorney’s law firm “jointly responsible” for the
violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Rule 11 sanctions “must be limited to what suffices to
deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by other similarly situated.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The Court may impose “nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty
into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order
directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other
expenses directly resulting from the violation.” Id.
Having carefully considered the conduct of counsel, the Court will order Ms. Wright
and Ms. Walters—and their respective law firms, IBF Law Group, PLLC and The Law
Office of Cortney E. Walters, PLLC—to pay Defendant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred in discovering the non-existent citations and quotations and briefing the Rule 11
motion for sanctions. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108 &
n.5 (2017) (holding that when district courts award attorneys’ fees pursuant to civil
procedures, the award “must be compensatory” in nature); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). This
endeavor has ultimately resulted in a great deal of wasted time and judicial resources. By
being more forthcoming with the Court, Plaintiff’s counsel could have avoided sanctions
altogether. The Court thus finds that the payment of attorneys’ fees is an appropriate award
to compensate Defendant for “wast[ing] time and money in exposing the deception.” Mata,
678 F. Supp. 3d at 448; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). It will also serve as an effective
deterrent to Ms. Wright, Ms. Walters, and other attorneys practicing in the District of
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Arizona. See Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 461 (“An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an
adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.” (citation
omitted)).
Furthermore, like other district courts have similarly done, the Court will require
that: (1) Plaintiff’s counsel serve a copy of this order on their client; (2) Plaintiff’s counsel
participate in a Continuing Legal Education course of at least one hour regarding the ethical
use of AI in the practice of law; (3) the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this order on the
various state bars for which Ms. Wright and Ms. Walters are members; and (4) the Clerk
of the Court serve a copy of this order on all the district judges and magistrate judges in
this district. See, e.g., Oneto v. Watson, 808 F. Supp. 3d 97, 980-814 (N.D. Cal. 2025);
Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1073; Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 466. These sanctions are intended
help cure the “[m]any harms” in this case that “flow from the submission of fake opinions.”
Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 448.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count VII is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 18) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 49) is
GRANTED. The Court issues the following sanctions:
1. Defendant shall file, within two weeks from the date of this order, its request for
reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in discovering the non-existent citations and
quotations and briefing the Rule 11 motion for sanctions. Defendant shall not seek
to recover expenses incurred in filing those aspects of its motion papers that did not
relate to the non-existent citations or quotations. Any responsive and reply
memoranda must be filed in accordance with the deadlines set forth in LRCiv. 7.2.
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The Court will then issue its award—holding Ms. Wright, Ms. Walters, IBF Law
Group, PLLC, and The Law Office of Cortney E. Walters, PLLC jointly liable—
once it has Defendant’s cost figures.
2. Within seven (7) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff’s counsel shall serve a copy
of this order on Plaintiff and file a Notice of Proof.
3. Within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff’s counsel shall file on the
docket a declaration identifying and certifying their participation in a Continuing
Legal Education course of at least one hour regarding the ethical use of artificial
intelligence in the practice of law.23
4. The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order on the State Bar of Arizona, of
which Ms. Wright is a member, the State Bar of New Mexico, of which Ms. Wright
is a member, and the Florida Bar, of which Ms. Walters is a member.
5. The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order on all the district judges and
magistrate judges in this district.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2026.
23 See, e.g., https://learningcenter.americanbar.org/courses/112401.
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