Rafi Law Group PLLC v. Negrete et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Rafi Law Group PLLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
Gil Negrete, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00778-PHX-DJH
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Rafi Law Group PLLC’s (“Rafi”) Motion to Dismiss
his lawsuit voluntarily with prejudice. (Doc. 76). Both Defendants in this action, Gil
Negrete (“Negrete”) and Jesus Soto (“Soto”) (collectively “Defendants”) have filed their
Responses. (Docs. 83 & 84). Neither Defendant opposes the voluntary dismissal with
prejudice, but both ask the Court to retain jurisdiction to determine possible sanctions and
attorney fees and costs. The Court will grant Rafi’s Motion to Dismiss with prejudice
and retain jurisdiction to determine the possible sanctions and attorney fees and costs, and
if they should be awarded, at a later time.
I. Background
Rafi’s Complaint is peppered with allegations of a years-long campaign of
extortion, death threats, physical assaults, and false statements by Negrete and Soto, all in
an attempt to extort clients and money from Rafi and his law firm. (Doc. 1 at 1). Both
Negrete and Rafi are attorneys here in Phoenix, though Rafi reminds the Court that
Negrete has been suspended from practicing law in Arizona since 2023. (Id. at 2 & 3).
Case 2:25-cv-00778-DJH Document 88 Filed 03/05/26 Page 1 of 4

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
But Negrete is not just a former attorney. He owns several businesses throughout town.
(Id. at 9–10). Rafi, on the other hand, is the founder and owner of Rafi Law Group,
PLLC. (Id. at 7). Rafi also names a second Defendant in this case: Jesus Soto. Soto is
described by Rafi as a close associate of Negrete’s and together, according to Rafi, Soto
and Negrete are part of an association called the “Negrete Gang.” (Id. at 19). Initially,
Rafi claimed that the Negrete Gang was responsible for the crime of extortion,
accomplished by making physical threats and committing violence against Rafi and his
employees. (Id. at 21). In total, he alleged three claims in his Complaint: (1) violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), otherwise known as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”); (2) a pattern of unlawful activity under A.R.S. § 13-
2314.04, Arizona’s RICO statute; and lastly, (3) tortious interference with contract and
business expectancy. Almost immediately after Rafi filed his Complaint, both Defendants
filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 11 & 12; see also Doc. 37). The Court,
concerned that Rafi had not adequately pled the jurisdictional component of a federal
RICO claim, ordered Rafi to provide the Court with supplemental briefing. (Doc. 75). In
response, Rafi filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss his case with prejudice under Rule
41(a)(2). (Doc. 76). The Court will grant the Motion for the reasons stated below.
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) (“Rule 41(a)(2)”) allows a plaintiff, by
court order and subject to any terms and conditions the court deems proper, to voluntarily
dismiss a lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). A district court should grant a plaintiff’s
motion to voluntarily dismiss the case unless defendants can show that they will suffer
some plain legal prejudice as a result. Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583
(9th Cir. 1987). Legal prejudice means “prejudice to some legal interest, some legal
claim, some legal argument.” Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 96
(9th Cir. 1996). Uncertainty about some future litigation or a dispute remaining
unresolved does not qualify as legal prejudice. Id. at 97. Neither does a defendant being
inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum constitute legal prejudice. Id.
Case 2:25-cv-00778-DJH Document 88 Filed 03/05/26 Page 2 of 4

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
However, a district court may retain jurisdiction for sanctions under Rule 11 even
after a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
395–396 (1990). The same is true for a defendant’s motion for costs and attorneys fees,
as these are considered collateral issues that the district court may consider after an action
is no longer pending. “Motions for costs and attorneys fees are independent proceedings
supplemental to the original proceeding and not a request for a modification of the
original decree.” Id. at 395 (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
170 (1939)).
III. Discussion
The Court will grant Rafi’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Neither Negrete nor Soto set forth any argument about why
the Court should not grant Rafi’s Motion. Certainly, neither Defendant has advanced an
argument why granting voluntary dismissal with prejudice would result in a legal
prejudice against either of them. Both, however, do argue that the Court should retain
jurisdiction to decide sanctions and attorney fees and costs at a later time. The Court
agrees that it has the authority to decide sanctions and attorney fees and costs even after
the voluntary dismissal of this lawsuit. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 395–96
(recognizing the authority of district courts to decide sanctions and attorney fees after an
action is no longer pending).
Soto’s request that the Court retain jurisdiction to decide his anti-SLAAP defense
to Rafi’s lawsuit under A.R.S. § 12-751, however, will be denied. (Doc. 84). The only
claim providing the Court with jurisdiction over this matter was Rafi’s federal RICO
claim. Now that Rafi is voluntarily dismissing the lawsuit, including the federal RICO
claim, the Court finds it would be inappropriate to retain jurisdiction over a state claim
solely to resolve a purely state law issue. See Scott v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 306
F.3d 646, 664 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that when a district court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction, it has no authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims). Moreover, “[t]he judicial branch loses its power to render a decision on the
Case 2:25-cv-00778-DJH Document 88 Filed 03/05/26 Page 3 of 4

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
merits of [a] claim when a federal court can no longer effectively remedy a present
controversy between the parties.” Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d
827, 834 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Because the Court is granting Rafi’s Motion to
Dismiss his claims with prejudice, there is no longer a live controversy between the
parties that the Court must adjudicate on the merits. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998). Therefore, Soto’s request is denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Rafi Law Group PLLC’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 76) is granted. This matter is dismissed, with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court
shall enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following Motions shall be terminated as
moot: Defendant Gil Negrete’s Motion to Dismiss at (Doc. 11); Defendant Jesus Soto’s
Motion to Dismiss at (Doc. 12); and Defendant Jesus Soto’s Motion to Dismiss at
(Doc. 37).
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that any motion for sanctions and attorneys’ fees
shall be filed within thirty (30) days of this Order.
Dated this 5th day of March, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-00778-DJH Document 88 Filed 03/05/26 Page 4 of 4