USA v. Valenzuela-Muro

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Miguel Guillermo Valenzuela-Muro,
Defendant.
No. CR-25-01135-PHX-GMS
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c), the Court announced its findings of fact and its
conclusions of law in the above case in open court, with the Defendant present, on October
7, 2025. This Order serves to memorialize those findings and conclusions. (See Doc. 38).
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Government has established the identity of the Defendant as being Miguel
Guillermo Valenzuela-Muro.
2. Defendant Miguel Guillermo Valenzuela-Muro was indicted with one count of illegal
reentry as a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), on August 12, 2025.
3. Defendant first entered the United States on May 6, 2016, in Sasabe, Arizona.
Defendant entered the country afoot.
4. Defendant was arrested by United States Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) on May
9, 2016, in Tucson, Arizona. He was fingerprinted on the same day. From a statement
signed by Defendant and Border Patrol Agent Christopher Apodaca, Defendant claimed
that he was a citizen of Mexico and did not claim any legal status in the United States.
Case 2:25-cr-01135-GMS Document 47 Filed 11/14/25 Page 1 of 7

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5. On May 10, 2016, Defendant was found inadmissible to the United States and
deportable for a period of 5 years from the date of his departure from the United States
as a consequence of having been found inadmissible as an arriving alien.
6. Defendant was removed from the United States on May 13, 2016, through Del Rio,
Texas. Defendant exited the United States afoot over the Del Rio International Bridge
and entered Mexico.
7. Defendant was previously deported and removed from the United States on May 13,
2016.
8. Defendant was arrested by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) Officer Victor Ortiz-Maldonado on August 1, 2025, in Phoenix, Arizona. In
Defendant’s possession was a voter identification card from Mexico. While the Court
did not allow the voter identification card to be admitted into evidence under Fed. R.
Evid. 803(8) as a matter of the Defendant’s Alien file (“A-file”), the Court accepts the
testimony from Officer Ortiz that Defendant had a voter identification card from
Mexico in his possession when he was arrested.
9. Officer Ortiz testified that the first time that immigration officials observed Defendant
in the United States (after his May 2016 deportation) was in Phoenix, Arizona in July
2025. Officer Ortiz also testified that, to his knowledge, the Defendant had been under
constant surveillance by immigration authorities starting on July 30, 2025. The Court
accepts Officer Ortiz’s testimony.
10. Prior to his arrest, Defendant was inhabiting a residence in Phoenix, Arizona.
Defendant had also registered a car in his name in Arizona.
11. On August 1, 2025, Defendant was placed in ICE custody, and he was later
fingerprinted.
12. Defendant was fingerprinted again on October 1, 2025.
13. Defendant’s fingerprints from May 9, 2016, August 1, 2025, and October 1, 2025, were
all a match based on Defendant’s right index finger, as confirmed by Marie Yochum, a
fingerprint examiner for CBP.
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14. Upon Defendant’s arrest on August 1, 2025, ICE Officer Chrstopher Spohn reviewed
Defendant’s A-file. Defendant’s A-file did not contain any visa applications for
Defendant. The A-file also did not have any records that Defendant had a valid visa to
enter the United States, nor did it show that Defendant had a lawful resident card.
Furthermore, there were no records of Defendant having entered the United States after
May 13, 2016—the date of his initial removal from the United States—nor was there
any record of Defendant attempting to enter a port of entry to the United States. No
record of the above was found in corresponding immigration enforcement databases.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. For a defendant to be found guilty under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), the Government must
prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was previously
deported from the United States; (2) thereafter, the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily reentered the United States without having obtained the consent of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to reapply
for admission into the United States; (3) the defendant was an alien1 at the time of
reentry; and (4) the defendant was free from official observation or restraint2 between
the moment he physically crossed into U.S. territory and the moment he was
apprehended.
2. A defendant need not obtain consent from the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security to reapply for admission, however, if the defendant can “establish
that he was not required to obtain [] advance consent [from the Attorney General]
under this chapter or any prior Act.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(a) states that an alien who has been deported is “inadmissible to the
United States unless the alien has remained outside of the United States for five
1 An alien is a person who is not a natural-born or naturalized citizen of the United
States.
2 “Official restraint” means the defendant was under constant, continuous observation
by a United States officer, either directly or by camera surveillance, from the moment he
first crossed the border and entered the territory of the United States up until the time of
his apprehension. If the individual was first observed after he had physically crossed the
border of the United States, then he is not under constant official restraint.
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consecutive years,” and that if an alien seeks to reenter the U.S. prior to the completion
of the five-year period, then he “must apply for permission to reapply for admission.”
4. Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) provides that “[a]ny alien who has been ordered
removed . . . and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal
. . . is inadmissible. . . . [This clause] shall not apply to an alien seeking admission
within a period if, prior to the date of the alien’s reembarkation . . . the Attorney General
has consented to the alien’s reapplying for admission.”
5. 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 and 8 U.S.C. § 1182 establish that once-deported aliens are
categorically barred from reentering the United States for a five-year period. If an alien
seeks to reenter before the five-year period has expired, he must seek permission from
the Attorney General. After the five-year period, the alien still needs consent from the
Attorney General, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), to reenter the United States—else
the alien faces the threat of criminal liability. The alien can avoid such liability if he
can demonstrate that consent from the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland
Security was “not required.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(B).
6. The Ninth Circuit has previously declined to address the specific issue presented here,
and the Court need not necessarily reach the issue, given that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(B)
places the burden on the Defendant to establish that he was not required to obtain
advance consent after the five-year period, and Defendant did not proffer any evidence
that he entered the United States after the five-year period. However, even assuming
that Defendant entered the United States after the five-year period, the Fifth, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits have construed the exception under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(B) to
apply to situations where a former alien has reentered the United States upon receiving
a visa, after the five-year period and without the express consent from the Attorney
General. See United States v. Bernal-Gallegos, 726 F.2d 187, 188 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The
interplay between §§ 1182 and 1326 can best be demonstrated by applying them to
concrete facts. If, prior to [end of five-year period], defendant in this case had applied
to the immigration service for a visa, and had he met all other requirements, he would
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have been eligible to receive a visa without special permission of the Attorney General
since his deportation occurred more than five years before his visa application. If,
however, defendant had been deported less than five years before applying for a visa,
he would not have been eligible for a visa without permission from the Attorney
General.”); United States v. Joya-Martinez, 947 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1991)
(“While we hold that § 1326 has not been amended or repealed by implication, we do
not deny [defendant] the benefit of a defense based on [§ 1182], namely that he was
legally in the country because he had obtained a visa as permitted by [§ 1182].”); United
States v. Romero-Caspeta, 744 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The [Fifth Circuit]
explained that § 1182 would only serve as a defense to § 1326 liability if, after the
expiration of the five-year exclusionary period, the alien had obtained a visa, with or
without the express consent of the Attorney General.”).
7. The Court similarly adopts the reasoning of the Fifth, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits and
holds that a defendant cannot categorically assert that he was no longer required to seek
advance consent from the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security to
reapply for admission to the United States solely on the basis that five years have passed
since his initial removal.
8. Instead, a defendant can only offer a defense, based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182, that he was
legally present in the United States pursuant to a visa or other lawful means (e.g.,
permanent residency)—such that he was not “required to obtain [] advance consent”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(B).
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACT
A. Defendant was previously deported from the United States.
1. Defendant was previously deported and removed from the United States on May 13,
2016, as confirmed by documentary evidence and live testimony from ICE Officers
Rodrigo Escamilla and Christopher Apodaca.
2. Fingerprint records confirmed that Defendant’s fingerprints taken in 2025 (in August
upon his arrest, and in October before his trial) matched his fingerprints recorded in
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May 2016, when Defendant was first removed from the United States.
3. The Government has thus established beyond a reasonable doubt that the man arrested
and fingerprinted in this case was the man that was deported on May 13, 2016.
B. Defendant knowingly and voluntarily reentered the United States without
having obtained the consent of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security to reapply for admission into the United States.
4. The Government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant knowingly
and voluntarily reentered the United States. Immigration authorities observed
Defendant’s presence in Phoenix, Arizona in July 2025. Defendant was inhabiting a
residence in Phoenix, Arizona. Defendant had also registered a car in his name in
Arizona.
5. The Government has also established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant did
not obtain consent from the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security to
apply for readmission to the United States. Defendant’s A-file did not contain any
evidence to indicate the contrary.
6. Defendant does not fall under the category of individuals who are exempt from seeking
consent from the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security prior to
applying for reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(B). Defendant did not proffer any
evidence that he entered the United States more than five years after his May 13, 2016
deportation and removal to Mexico. Defendant also did not offer any defense that he
did not need to obtain consent because he was legally present in the United States
pursuant to a visa or other lawful means. Defendant’s A-file did not contain any
evidence that Defendant was lawfully in the United States pursuant to a visa or
permanent residency.
C. Defendant was an alien at the time of reentry.
7. The Government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant is an alien,
based on the lack of records indicating lawful entry into the United States, the
Defendant’s possession of a voter registration card from Mexico, and Defendant’s
previous statement in May 2016 stating that he was a national of Mexico and did not
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have legal status in the United States.
8. The Court finds that Defendant has not established a basis to suppress his deportation
record from May 2016, which includes Defendant’s previous statement regarding his
alienage. Even if the statement were to be suppressed, the Court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant is not an authorized resident of the United States and
is an alien, based the lack of records indicating lawful entry into the United States and
the Defendant’s possession of a voter registration card from Mexico.
D. Defendant was free from official observation or restraint between the
moment he physically crossed into U.S. territory and the moment he was
apprehended.
9. The Government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was free
from official observation or restraint between the moment he physically crossed into
U.S. territory and the moment he was apprehended. Defendant was first observed in
the United States only after he had physically crossed the border of the United States—
and he thus was not under constant official restraint.
10. Immigration officials first observed Defendant in the United States (after his May 2016
deportation) in Phoenix, Arizona—hundreds of miles away from the U.S.-Mexico
border—in July 2025. Defendant had been under constant surveillance by immigration
authorities starting on July 30, 2025.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and for the reasons stated on the record on October 7,
2025, the Court finds that Defendant is guilty under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) for illegal reentry
to the United States.
Dated this 14th day of November, 2025.
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