Bell #212285 v. Hakeman et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Richard Cortez Bell,
Plaintiff,
v.
K. Hakeman, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-24-03377-PHX-SHD (JZB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE SHARAD H. DESAI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, and
Exceed Complaint Page Limit, Pursuant to Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”
(“Third Motion for Leave to Amend”) (doc. 43), “Motion for Issuance of Subpoena, and
for Court to Review Full Hangar Clinic Medical Records Before Ruling on Preliminary
Injunction—T.R.O. Motion” (“Motion for Subpoena”) (doc. 46), “Motion to Compel
Discovery Pursuant to Rule 34(b) and 37(a), Fed. R. Civ. Procedure” (“Motion to Compel”)
(doc. 49), and “Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants for Failure to Timely Serve
Responsive Pleadings on Plaintiff” (“Motion for Sanctions”) (doc. 50). Additionally,
pending before the Court is Defendant Hakeman’s “Motion to Stay Current Deadlines”
(doc. 48). This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to Judge Bolton’s April 17,
2025, Order1 referring this matter under Rules 72.1 and 72.2, Local Rules of Civil
1 This case was reassigned to the Honorable Sharad H. Desai in the District Court’s
September 19, 2025, minute order. See (doc. 27.)
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Procedure, for “all pretrial proceedings as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).” (Doc.
7 at 11.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Leave to Amend, the Court recommends the
Motion be denied for failure to meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 16’s good cause standard. Additionally,
for the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Subpoena without
prejudice for failure to provide an address for the proposed subpoenas, and grant Defendant
Hakeman’s Motion to Stay Current Deadlines in part and deny it in part. Furthermore, the
Court will require Defendant Hakeman to file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
(doc. 49) and Motion for Sanctions (doc. 50).
I. Procedural Background.
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights complaint against
medical provider Hakeman, assistant deputy warden Freeland, nurse Wofford, and Steve
Bender. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants were “deliberate[ly]
indifferen[t] to [a] serous medical condition[]” in violation if the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Id. at 3.)
In his original Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that he is a chronic care patient
struggling with Type-One Diabetes and weight gain, which requires “special care,
treatments, and medication.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that prior to incarceration, he was
prescribed medications, including Trulicity injections, to suppress his appetite and a knee
brace designed to support his “weight while ambulating.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserted that prison
staff stopped his treatment and took his knee brace from him, resulting in Plaintiff
undergoing “a great deal of pain and discomfort for months.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff
asserted that every medical decision made by the prison staff was contrary to his off-site
ordered treatments, and that the knee sleeve and pain medications he was given did not
remedy his pain. (Id. at 4.)
On April 17, 2025, the Court screened Plaintiff’s original Complaint and dismissed
without prejudice: (a) Defendant Wofford for failure to allege when or how Plaintiff made
him aware of his medical issues, or if Wofford ever saw or examined him; (b) Defendant
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Freeland for failure to allege how he acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
medical needs; (c) Defendant Bender for failure to show Bender “knew of and disregarded
an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health”; and (d) Plaintiff’s diabetes claim because “mere
disagreement over the type of medical treatment . . . does not amount to deliberate
indifference[.]” (Doc. 7 at 6–7.)
The sole remaining claim was against Defendant Hakeman, which involved her
allegedly depriving Plaintiff Bell of his knee brace. (Id. at 8.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant Hakeman prevented him from receiving his knee brace because it
contained metal. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleged that he was permitted to have the brace
while at an Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry facility, and
that other inmates at ASP La Palma are permitted to have canes and knee braces containing
metal. (Id. at 3–4.)
On June 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first Motion for Leave to Amend. See (doc. 9.)
While the first Motion for Leave to Amend was pending, Defendant Hakeman filed an
Answer to the original Complaint on July 8, 2025, and a Rule 16 Case Management Order
was filed on July 9, 2025. See (docs. 12–13.) The Case Management Order stated that
“[m]otions . . . for leave to amend pleadings shall be filed by October 10, 2025.” (Doc. 13
at 1.) The Court further warned that “the Court will enforce the deadlines set forth in this
Order; the parties should plan their litigation activities accordingly.” (Id. at 3.)
On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed his “Motion Requesting a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.” (Doc. 14.) That Motion remains pending.
On July 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed his second Motion for Leave to Amend. See (doc.
19.) Because of this second Motion for Leave to Amend, his first Motion for Leave to
Amend was denied as moot on August 29, 2025. See (doc. 26.)
On October 14, 2025, this Court filed a Report and Recommendation recommending
that Plaintiff’s second Motion for Leave to Amend proceed in part. See (doc. 28.) On
December 12, 2025, the District Court issued an Order adopting the Report and
Recommendation in part and rejecting it in part. (Doc. 41.) Specifically, the District Court’s
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Order reject the recommendation that Defendant Weddle be dismissed without prejudice,
that Defendants Bender, Freeland, and Wofford remain dismissed, and Plaintiff’s renewed
Trulicity claim be denied without prejudice. Compare (doc. 28 at 13) with (doc. 41 at 10–
11). However, the District Court reaffirmed this Court’s recommendation the Dr. Iven be
dismissed, specifically stating that “Because Plaintiff’s amendment is futile as to his claims
against Ivens, he will be denied leave to amend to add Ivens.” Compare (doc. 28 at 10–11,
13) with (doc. 41 at 9–10).
On December 16, 2025, five days after his second Motion for Leave to Amend was
granted in part by the District Court, and over two months past the amendment deadline,
Plaintiff filed his Third Motion for Leave to Amend. (Doc. 43.)
II. Third Amended Complaint.
In this Motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend “to cure all deficiencies outlined in
the Court’s Report and Recommendation Doc. 28 and the Court’s Screening Order Doc.
7[], and seeks leave to extend the 21 page limit imposed by Local Rule 3.4.” (Id. at 1.)
Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to add an additional claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments “for Defendants’ discrimination, selective treatment, selective indifference,
and disparate treatment[.]” (Id. at 8–9.)
Regarding the renewed Eighth Amendment claims for inadequate medical care
against Defendants Bender, Freeland, Hakeman, Weddle, and Wofford, Plaintiff’s
assertions in the Proposed Third Amended Complaint (“PTAC”) largely mirror those that
were permitted to proceed by the District Court. Compare (doc. 19) with (doc. 43); see also
(doc. 41.) Regarding Dr. Ivens, Plaintiff’s PTAC provides that a referral was submitted to
Dr. Ivens on February 21 2024, that Dr. Ivens examined Plaintiff once in person and had a
correspondence with Plaintiff via virtual appoints, and that complaints were sent to Dr.
Ivens between February to June 2024. (Doc. 43 at 28–32.)
Respecting his added Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claim,
Plaintiff’s PTAC argues discriminatory treatment because of the Defendants’ denial of his
custom knee brace and Trulicity medication. (Id. at 27.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that
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Defendants’ refusal to provide him with “a life-saving appetite deterrent to treat [his]
morbid obesity and diabetes, while providing other inmates with non-medical related
treatments constitutes selective indifference, discrimination, and disparate treatment in
violation of his constitutional right to Equal Protect.” (Id. at 42.)
A. Legal Standards.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend its complaint before
trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). For timely motions for leave to amend, the Court applies Rule
15, which states that “[t]he [C]ourt should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.” Id. at 15(a)(2). However, Rule 15 does not govern Plaintiff’s Third Motion for
Leave to Amend. Rather, Rule 16 does.
“Once the district court had filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 which established a timetable for amending pleadings[, Rule
16’s] standards control[.]” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08
(9th Cir. 1992). Although Rule 15 governs timely motions for leave to amend, once the
case management order’s amendment deadline has expired, the moving “party must first
satisfy the requirements of Rule 16, and then must demonstrate amendment is proper under
Rule 15.” Acosta v. Austin Elec. Servs. LLC, 325 F.R.D. 325, 328 (D. Ariz. 2018) (citing
Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608). Because the deadline to amend in this action has expired,
Plaintiff must satisfy both Rules 15 and 16. See Acosta, 325 F.R.D. at 328.
“Under Rule 16, a court may only modify a scheduling order for ‘good cause.’” Id.
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). “A court’s evaluation of good cause is not coextensive
with an inquiry into the propriety of the amendment under Rule 15.” Morgal v. Maricopa
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 284 F.R.D. 452, 459 (D. Ariz. 2012) (cleaned up). “Unlike Rule
15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to
interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’
standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson,
975 F.2d at 609. In other words, the focus of the inquiry is on the moving party’s reason
for seeking amendment. See Morgal, 284 F.R.D. at 459 (citing C.F. ex rel. Farnan v.
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Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Courts within the Ninth Circuit apply the following three-part test to determine
whether a party acted diligently in Rule 16’s good cause inquiry:
To demonstrate diligence under Rule 16’s “good cause” standard, the movant
may be required to show the following: (1) that he was diligent in assisting
the court in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that his noncompliance
with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding his diligent
efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not
have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16
scheduling conference; and (3) that he was diligent in seeking amendment of
the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that he could not comply with the
order.
See Morgal, 284 F.R.D. at 460 (cleaned up) (citing Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D.
605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999)).
The good cause inquiry ends if the moving party has not shown diligence in seeking
amendment. Cano v. Schriro, 236 F.R.D. 437, 439 (D. Ariz. 2006), aff’d, 269 F. App’x
755 (9th Cir. 2008). “The existence of prejudice to the opposing party might supply
additional reasons to deny a motion.” Id.
B. Discussion.
For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to amend his
Complaint after the time for doing so has expired. First, the deadline to amend was October
10, 2025. (Doc. 13 at 1.) Plaintiff filed his Third Motion for Leave to Amend over two
months after the deadline expired. (Doc. 43.) Plaintiff does not explain the delay or argue
that he was diligent in seeking amendment. Rather, Plaintiff explains that his Third Motion
for Leave to Amend is submitted to cure deficiencies outlined in this Court’s Report and
Recommendation (doc. 28) and the District Court’s Screening Order (doc. 7), and to add
an additional claim. (Id. at 1–2.) What is more, Plaintiff does not address the District
Court’s December 11, 2025, Order granting in part his second Motion for Leave to
Amend—which, notably, did not extend the amendment deadline or permit Plaintiff to file
an additional motion for leave to amend. Compare (doc. 43) with (doc. 41).
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Second, regarding Rule 16’s good cause analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff was
not diligent in seeking to file his Third Motion for Leave to Amend. Specifically, Plaintiff
fails to establish that “his noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred . . . because of
the development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated
at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference” or “that he was diligent in seeking
amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that he could not comply with
the order.” See Morgal, 284 F.R.D. at 460. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any unforeseen
or unanticipated circumstances that prevented him from filing a timely motion to amend.
Nor has Plaintiff established that any of the facts underlying his Third Motion for Leave to
Amend were unknown at the time the Court entered its Case Management Order setting
the amendment deadline. Because Plaintiff has not established that he was diligent, the
Court does not find the requisite good cause to recommend granting a tardy motion for
leave to amend.
Third “even under the liberal Rule 15 standard, late amendments to assert new
theories are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the theory have been known to the
party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of action.” Hodge v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank NA, No. CV-24-00932-PHX-SHD, 2025 WL 2898392, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct.
10, 2025) (cleaned up). In Hodge, the plaintiff filed a tardy motion for leave to amend to
add new claims “based in the same factual allegations asserted in his FAC.” Hodge v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank NA, No. CV-24-00932-PHX-SHD, 2025 WL 2898392, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 10, 2025). With this factor in mind, the District Court found the plaintiff was not
diligent because the facts underlying the new claims were known at the time of the FAC,
and because the plaintiff did not provide any explanation for why he was unable to file the
motion for leave to amend prior to the deadline. Id.
The facts in the instant action are akin to the facts underlying the District Court’s
decision in Hodge. In the instant action, Plaintiff’s new Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
discrimination claim is based upon the same factual allegations in his Second Amended
Complaint and his original Complaint. The only new facts are that others within the
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ADCRR system are provided medications that may or may not be necessary to preserve
those individuals’ life or health. “Despite every indication that this information was
available to [Plaintiff] ‘since the inception of’ this case, [Plaintiff] offers no ‘explanation
for [his] failure to amend [his] complaint’ prior to the deadline for amendment.” See id.
(quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000)). Therefore,
just as was the case in Hodge, the Court does not find that Plaintiff was diligent in
attempting to assert a new cause of action against Defendants.
Fourth, while Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Leave to Amend may only be over two
months late, Courts in this District “have found a lack of good cause for motions filed on
the amendment deadline or shortly thereafter.” MiCamp Sols. LLC v. Nat’l Processing
LLC, No. CV-19-05468-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 289661, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2021)
(“denying a motion to amend after new evidence was discovered one month before for lack
of diligence); Brooks v. Eclipse Recreational Vehicles, Inc., No. CV-08-1731-PHX-LOA,
2009 WL 1616017, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2009) (denying a motion to amend filed 11 days
after the deadline); Villa v. Brass Eagle, LLC, No. CV-06-0870-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL
446349, *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2007) (denying 3 month late unopposed motion for leave to
amend). Although a two month delay may appear to be minor, such a delay—without any
showing of diligence—is sufficient to deny a moving party’s motion to amend.
C. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not diligent in seeking
to file his Third Motion for Leave to Amend. While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se and may not have been aware of Rule 16’s requirements, “even a good
faith mistake ‘establishes no more than inadvertence,’ which is not a sufficient reason to
modify the Court's scheduling order.” Hall v. Apodaca, No. CV-25-00139-TUC-JCH, 2025
WL 3097683, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2025) (quoting Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302
F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)). As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state
systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient
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treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the
deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the best way to encourage
that is to enforce the deadlines. Parties must understand that they will pay a
price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders[.]
Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). To ensure that this
case efficiently proceeds towards resolution—which benefits all Parties in this action—
and because Plaintiff has not established the requisite good cause to allow his PTAC to
proceed, this Court recommends Plaintiff’s Third Motion for Leave to Amend be denied.
III. Motion for Subpoena.
In his Motion for a Subpoena, Plaintiff requests leave to issue two proposed
subpoenas upon his Hangar Clinic doctor “to obtain a full [and] complete record of
Plaintiff’s Hangar Clinic Records for the Court’s review prior to ruling on Plaintiff’s
Preliminary Injunction Motion.” (Doc. 46 at 1.) While Plaintiff’s Motion and attached
proposed subpoenas largely complies with General Order 18-19, his proposed subpoenas
do not contain an address where service would occur. See (id. at 5–11.) Without an address
provided, the U.S. Marshals Service is unable to serve a subpoena. Accordingly, the Court
will deny Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice. If he intends to file a renewed motion for
subpoena, Plaintiff must provide an address where service may be executed.
IV. Motion to Stay Current Deadlines.
In her Motion, Defendant Hakeman requests a stay of the current scheduling order
and an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint “pending
resolution of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Exceed Page Limit
(Doc. 43) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.
14).” (Doc. 48 at 1.) Defendant’s Motion was filed on December 24, 2025. See (id.) Her
deadline to respond to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was due on December 26, 2025. See
(doc. 41 at 10); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(3)(A). For the following reasons, the Court
will grant the Motion in part and deny the motion in part.
“The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its
power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). “[T]he power
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to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
Defendant Hakeman has not met her burden in establishing the need for a stay in
this action. However, because Defendant’s Motion was timely filed, and good cause
supports issuing a brief extension, the Court will extend Defendant Hakeman’s deadline to
respond to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint to January 16, 2026.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint,
and Exceed Complaint Page Limit, Pursuant to Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (doc. 43) be DENIED for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Subpoena (doc. 46) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to provide Plaintiff with
two copies of blank subpoena forms, two blank USM-285 forms, and a copy of General
Order 18-19. To serve the subpoena, Plaintiff is directed to comply with General Order 18-
19.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hakeman’s “Motion to Stay Current
Deadlines” (doc. 48) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hakeman shall respond to Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint on or before JANUARY 19, 2026.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hakeman shall respond to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 34(b) and 37(a), Fed. R. Civ. Procedure
(doc. 49) on or before JANUARY 19, 2026.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hakeman shall respond to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants for Failure to Timely Serve Responsive
Pleadings on Plaintiff (doc. 50) on or before JANUARY 19, 2026.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should
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not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The Parties shall have 14 days
from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific
written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6,
72. Thereafter, the Parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the objections.
Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 5th day of January, 2026.
Honorable John Z. Boyle
United States Magistrate Judge
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