Albertson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Shannon Marie Albertson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-02708-PHX-JAT
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Shannon Marie Albertson’s appeal from the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA,” “Commissioner,” or
“Defendant”) denial of Social Security benefits. (Doc. 12-2). The appeal is fully briefed
(Doc. 15; Doc. 17; Doc. 18), and the Court now rules.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Overview
Plaintiff was 45 years old on her date last insured of September 30, 2023. (Doc. 12-
2 at 26; Doc. 15 at 4). She has a high school education and a history of past relevant work
as a server. (Doc.15 at 4). On October 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning February
28, 2018. (Doc. 12-2 at 24). After an administrative hearing, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s claim. (Id. at 34). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request
for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final decision. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff
filed the present appeal following this unfavorable decision. (Doc. 1).
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B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process
To qualify for social security disability insurance benefits, a claimant must show
that he “is under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). To be “under a disability,” the
claimant must be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 423(d)(1). The impairment must be of
such severity that the claimant cannot do his previous work or any other substantial gainful
work within the national economy. Id. § 423(d)(2). The SSA has created a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The steps are followed in order, and each step is potentially
dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial
gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that
is (1) “substantial,” i.e., doing “significant physical or mental activities,” and (2) “gainful,”
i.e., usually done “for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)–(b). If the claimant is
engaging in substantial gainful work activity, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment” or severe “combination of impairments.” Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be “severe,” the claimant’s impairment must “significantly limit”
the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c).
If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ
will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
At Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or
equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled, but if not, the ALJ
must assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) before proceeding to
Step Four. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(e). The claimant’s RFC is his ability
perform physical and mental work activities “despite [his] limitations,” based on all
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relevant evidence in the case record. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). To determine RFC, the ALJ
must consider all the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not “severe,” and
any related symptoms that “affect what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id.
§ 404.1545(a)(1)–(2).
At Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the
physical and mental demands of “his past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
404.1520(e). “Past relevant work” is work the claimant has “done within the past five years
that was substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn
to do it.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1)(i). If the claimant has the RFC to perform his past relevant
work, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the
claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will proceed to Step Five in the
sequential evaluation process.
At Step Five, the final step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work,” considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(v). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled. Id. If the claimant
cannot make this adjustment, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled. Id.
C. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors
Here, at Step One, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial
gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of February 28, 2018 through
her date last insured of September 30, 2023. (Doc. 12-2 at 26). At Step Two, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “systemic lupus
erythematosus and rheumatoid arthritis.” (Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Doc. 12-2 at 29). The ALJ
then found that Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except
she can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds
frequently, stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour day, and sit
for 6 hours in an 8 hour day. She can occasionally climb, stoop,
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kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can frequently perform handling
and fingering with both upper extremities.
(Doc. 12-2 at 29.)
At Step Four, the ALJ established that Plaintiff was capable of performing past
relevant work as a server. (Id. at 33). At Step Five, the ALJ found that in addition to past
relevant work, there were other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff could also have performed, considering her age, education, work
experience, and RFC. (Id.).
II. LEGALS STANDARD
This Court may not set aside a final denial of disability benefits unless the ALJ
decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Substantial evidence” is relevant
evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)).
It involves “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278
F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.
1997)). This Court must consider the record in its entirety, “weighing both the evidence
that supports and evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Id. (quoting
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The ALJ—not this Court—is responsible for resolving ambiguities, resolving
conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and drawing logical inferences
from the medical record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Gallant v. Heckler, 753
F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, when the evidence of record could result in
more than one rational interpretation, “the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,
1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one
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rational interpretation, [courts] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.”). Further, this Court
may only review the reasons the ALJ provides in the disability determination; it “may not
affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two issues: (1) the ALJ failed to state specific, clear and convincing
reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom and limitation testimony, and (2) the
ALJ failed to resolve an apparent conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”) in determining that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. (Doc. 15 at 2).
A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to provide specific, clear and
convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective limitation and pain testimony. (Doc.
15 at 12). Conversely, Defendant argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. (Doc. 17 at 3).
1. Legal Standard for Evaluating Subjective Symptom Testimony
In assessing the credibility of a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ
must engage in a two-step analysis. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
“First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical
evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Second, if the claimant meets the
first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s
testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281).
The “specific, clear, and convincing” standard is satisfied where the “ALJ’s
rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th
489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). To be sufficiently specific, the ALJ must identify “what testimony
is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Ghanim v.
Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he evidence
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upon which the ALJ relies must be substantial.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,
1208 (9th Cir. 2001). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence
in the record, [courts] may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.
Factors an ALJ may consider when determining credibility include: “(1) ordinary
techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior
inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that
appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek
treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily
activities.” Id. at 1163 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284).
2. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony
Here, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony as follows:
The claimant testified at the hearing she was unable to work
due to difficulty with concentrating due to lupus, and
rheumatoid arthritis. The claimant reported she had infusions
once a month for an hour. She alleged difficulty walking due
to hip joints, and difficulty with activities like washing her hair
or taking a shower. The claimant testified on a typical day she
got her kids to school, she took a nap every day for an estimated
2 hours. She reported she stayed in touch with her family.
(Doc. 12-2 at 29–30).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause some of her alleged symptoms and did not make a finding
that she was malingering. (Id. at 30). However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were
“not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.).
The Court finds that the ALJ gave specific, clear and convincing reasons for
discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. In addition to finding no objective medical evidence to
support Plaintiff’s descriptions of the limiting effects of her symptoms, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment history and medical exam
results. (Id. at 32). “Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting
the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (quoting Carmickle v.
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Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Furthermore, the ALJ identified the testimony he found not credible and explained
what evidence undermined the testimony. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208. The ALJ examined
Plaintiff’s treatment records from her rheumatology clinic and found that “[d]espite the
claimant’s complaints, the examination noted no specific restriction in movement or
strength.” (Doc. 12-2 at 31). The ALJ pointed to a May 2020 medical examination where
“the claimant noted she was not having much joint pain and she was engaging in yoga and
walking.” (Id.; see Doc. 12-10 at 64). The ALJ pointed to an August 2022 medical
examination where Plaintiff indicated that yoga helps with her neck pain and reported
doing yoga or walking 4 to 5 days per week for 30 to 90 minutes. (Doc. 12-2 at 31; see
Doc. 12-16 at 9). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treatment history indicated that her
treatments were effective and resulted in reports of improvements. (Doc. 12-2 at 27, 32).
The ALJ explained that there are no treatment records assessing weakness consistent with
Plaintiff’s “allegations regarding frequency and severity of fatigue,” but rather “review of
systems frequently indicate the claimant denied fatigue.” (Id. at 32).
Moreover, the ALJ found the medical opinion of reviewing consultant Dr. Shabnam
Rehman persuasive because Dr. Rehman’s opinion was consistent with and supported by
the evidence available at the time of Dr. Rehman’s assessment, including Plaintiff’s
allegations, activities of daily living, and available treatment records. (Doc. 12-2 at 32).
The ALJ adopted Dr. Rehman’s opined limitations in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC at Step
Three, except that the ALJ adopted “more restrictive handling and fingering limitations”
based on updated treatment records and Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id. at 29, 31–32; see Doc.
12-3 at 13–14; Doc. 12-10 at 78). Therefore, the Court finds that in discounting Plaintiff’s
testimony, the ALJ gave specific, clear and convincing reasons that were supported by
substantial evidence.
3. Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Fatigue
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s complaints regarding
the frequency and severity of fatigue as inconsistent with the record. (Doc. 15 at 10).
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Plaintiff contends that “[t]hough treatment notes often reported that [Plaintiff] was negative
for fatigue, many also reported that she was not working due to her symptoms of fatigue.”
(Id. at 11). Plaintiff points to medical reports from May 2018, March 2019, June 2019, July
2021, June 2022, and August 2022, where she was positive for fatigue. (Doc. 15 at 10–11;
Doc. 18 at 3).
The May 2018 report indicated that Plaintiff was negative for fatigue and extremity
weakness but reports a fatigue score of 80. (Doc. 12-10 at 9). The March 2019 and June
2019 reports indicated that Plaintiff was positive for fatigue and extremity weakness. (Doc.
12-12 at 35; Doc. 12-10 at 47). The July 2021 report indicated that Plaintiff was positive
for fatigue but negative for extremity weakness. (Doc. 12-10 at 86). The June 2022 report
indicated that Plaintiff was positive for fatigue and numbness in extremity but negative for
extremity weakness. (Doc. 12-16 at 30). The August 2022 report indicated that Plaintiff
was positive for fatigue and muscle weakness but negative for extremity weakness. (Doc.
12-16 at 38).
The ALJ cited to medical reports where Plaintiff was negative for fatigue and
extremity weakness in May 2018, July 2018, October 2018, January 2019, October 2019,
February 2020, May 2020, August 2020, March 2021, June 2021, October 2021, January
2022, April 2022, November 2022, and May 2023. (Doc. 12-2 at 27, 30–32; see Doc. 12-
10 at 9, 13, 24, 30, 53, 60, 65, 70, 74, 80, 93, 98, 103; Doc. 12-14 at 4; Doc. 12-16 at 51;
Doc. 12-17 at 14). The ALJ also cited to an August 2022 visit where Plaintiff was negative
for fatigue but positive for muscle weakness. (Doc. 12-2 at 31; see Doc. 12-16 at 9). The
August 2022 report also notes that Plaintiff reported doing yoga or walking 4 to 5 days per
week. (Doc. 12-16 at 9).
Given that Plaintiff frequently denied fatigue and weakness, it was rational for the
ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s symptoms of fatigue were not as frequent, severe, or
limiting as Plaintiff alleged. Even if a different factfinder could have possibly reached a
different conclusion based on the record cited, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more
than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s
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conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954. Additionally, Plaintiff does not
suggest how her intermittent symptoms of fatigue would impact the ALJ’s determination
that Plaintiff was not disabled.
4. Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding Waxing and Waning Symptoms
Plaintiff further argues that with systemic lupus erythematosus, “waxing and
waning” of symptoms is to be expected, and therefore a medical record indicating
“intermittent” symptoms is not inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony. (Doc. 15 at 11).
Plaintiff cites to Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2021), as
support. (Doc. 15 at 11). In Smith, the ALJ discredited the claimant’s testimony as
inconsistent with the record but only cited to evidence that contradicted the claimant’s late-
period testimony. Smith, 14 F.4th at 1113–14. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the ALJ “erred by disregarding all of Smith’s testimony, including the portion about his
early-period incapacity, on the basis of inconsistencies only clearly applicable to the late-
period testimony. Id. at 1113. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Smith may have been
disabled for a qualifying portion of time, even if not for the full period of time alleged. Id.
at 1114.
Here, however, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s entire longitudinal treatment history
and cited to evidence spanning the period of alleged disability. (Doc. 12-2 at 30–32); see
Smith v. Berryhill, 752 F. App’x 473, 475–76 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Smith correctly notes that
fibromyalgia symptoms can wax and wane, but the ALJ did not cherry-pick the medical
record . . . .”). After examining Plaintiff’s entire longitudinal treatment history, including
periods of waxing and waning severity of symptoms, the ALJ concluded that the “intensity,
persistence and limiting effects” of Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms were inconsistent
with the evidence in the record. (Doc. 12-2 at 30). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in
finding that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity and frequency of her symptoms
was inconsistent with the evidence in the record.
5. Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding the Effectiveness of Treatment
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in citing the “effectiveness of
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treatment” as inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony because “[t]he record does not support
the conclusion that [Plaintiff] enjoyed sustained relief from her treatment regimen.” (Doc.
15 at 11–12). Defendant counters that the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s allegations
were inconsistent with the improvement she achieved with treatment. (Doc. 17 at 4).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s treatment for lupus and rheumatoid arthritis, “which
notably consists of prescribed medications, creams, and injections, resulted in reports of
improvements.” (Doc. 12-2 at 32). The ALJ added that “[a]ccompanying these reports of
overall feeling well were physical exam results, which routinely show the claimant was
assessed with normal gait and balance, no edema, negative neurological tests, grossly intact
sensation, and normal range of motion,” but acknowledged that Plaintiff sometimes
reported having tender points. (Id.).
An ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony based on effective treatment. Warre
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that
can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of
determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”). The medical evidence indicates that some of
Plaintiff’s symptoms were effectively controlled by treatment. For example, the August
2020 report indicates that Plaintiff’s rash cleared up in 1 week after she was given a topical
steroid cream. (Doc. 12-10 at 70). The February 2022 report indicates that Plaintiff’s facial
rash was “slowly improving” after a month of using a topical cream. (Doc. 12-10 at 109).
Plaintiff specifically argues that substantial evidence does not support that treatment
was effective for the joint pain in her hands, hips, and shoulders. (Doc. 15 at 11–12; Doc.
18 at 4–5). The Court agrees that the medical record demonstrates that Plaintiff’s joint pain
was not consistently controlled by treatment, as reports indicate that some treatments were
not effective, Plaintiff experienced negative side effects with certain medications, or
Plaintiff could not afford certain treatments such as physical therapy. (See, e.g., Doc. 12-
10 at 12, 45, 48, 52).
However, in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ specifically took into account
Plaintiff’s recent treatment records that “showed consistent complaints regarding the
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hands,” and Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing regarding her hand pain. (Doc. 12-2 at 32).
Based on this evidence, the ALJ “adopted more restrictive handling and fingering
limitations,” limiting Plaintiff to frequent handling and fingering with both upper
extremities. (Doc. 12-2 at 29–30).
Similarly, the ALJ’s summary of Plaintiff’s treatment history acknowledged several
treatment records where Plaintiff reported hip pain. (See Doc. 12-2 at 30–31). Despite
numerous treatment records indicating that Plaintiff had no limitations in range of motion
and no reported hip pain, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited to standing and walking
for 6 hours in an 8 hour day, sitting for 6 hours in an 8 hour day, and occasional climbing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. (Doc. 12-2 at 29–32).
Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing
reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony to the extent
that it conflicted with the effectiveness of treatment.
B. Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work
At the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert (“VE”) to assume a hypothetical
individual with the same age, education, and work experiences as Plaintiff who was also
limited to Plaintiff’s RFC (including a limitation to frequent handling and fingering). (Doc.
12-2 at 62–63). The VE testified that such a person could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant
work as a server, DOT (4th ed. 1991) § 311.477-030, 1991 WL 672688, and could perform
other work in the national economy, including routing clerk, id. § 222.687-022, 1991 WL
672133, inspector and hand packager, id. § 559.687-074, 1991 WL 683797, and sales
attendant, id. § 299.677-010, 1991 WL 672643. (Doc. 12-2 at 61–63). Relying on the VE’s
testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a server,
and in the alternative, Plaintiff could perform other work that existed in significant numbers
in the national economy. (Id. at 33–34).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to specify whether Plaintiff “could
frequently perform handling and fingering independently or in combination,” leading to an
apparent conflict with the DOT. (Doc. 15 at 15). Plaintiff contends that because
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“frequently” is defined as existing “from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time,” DOT (4th ed. 1991) App’x
C, 1991 WL 688702, “[a] limitation to frequent handling and frequent fingering, by
definition, amounts to constant use of the hands and fingers.” (Doc. 15 at 14–15).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s method of calculation “would lead to absurd
results.” (Doc. 17 at 9). The Court agrees. As Defendant points out, the server occupation
entails frequent reaching and handling (1/3 to 2/3 of the time) and occasional fingering (up
to 1/3 of the time). DOT (4th ed. 1991) § 311.477-030, 1991 WL 672688. Under Plaintiff’s
method of calculation, the server occupation would require using the upper extremities 5/3
of the day. (Doc. 17 at 9–10).
“For a difference between an expert’s testimony and the [DOT’s] listings to be fairly
characterized as a conflict, it must be obvious or apparent.” Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d
804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016). “This means that the testimony must be at odds with the [DOT’s]
listing of job requirements that are essential, integral, or expected.” Id. The ALJ did not err
because there was no apparent or obvious conflict between the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff
could perform as a server, despite her handling and fingering limitations, and the DOT’s
general statement that serving requires frequent handling and occasional fingering. See id.
at 808; DOT (4th ed. 1991) § 311.477-030, 1991 WL 672688.
The DOT describes the general tasks for a server as:
Serves food to patrons at counters and tables of coffeeshops,
lunchrooms, and other dining establishments where food
service is informal: Presents menu, answers questions, and
makes suggestions regarding food and service. Writes order on
check or memorizes it. Relays order to kitchen and serves
courses from kitchen and service bars. Observes guests to
respond to additional requests and to determine when meal has
been completed. Totals bill and accepts payment or refers
patron to [cashier].
DOT (4th ed. 1991) § 311.477-030, 1991 WL 672688. Though the job description suggests
a need for frequent handling and fingering, it does not suggest that constant handling and
fingering with both hands is required. Additionally, an individual with a limitation to
frequent handling and fingering is commonly considered able to perform the jobs of sales
attendant and routing clerk. See, e.g., Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV-17-02543-
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PHX-BSB, 2018 WL 6660009, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2018) (routing clerk); Nivison v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-00143-TUC-RM (JR), 2022 WL 7348471, at *2
(D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2022) (routing clerk); Garcia v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-2592, 2017 WL
4142223, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2017) (routing clerk); Jiminez v. Colvin, No. CV 13-
8676, 2014 WL 5464949, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (sales attendant); Helm v. Saul,
No. 19-cv-00983, 2020 WL 5039262, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (sales attendant);
Johnson v. Berryhill, No. 18-cv-00818, 2019 WL 2009530, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2019)
(sales attendant).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in concluding that Plaintiff
could perform her past relevant work as well as other work that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment
accordingly.
Dated this 20th day of February, 2026.
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