Knoll v. BSI America Professional Services Incorporated et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 77). Also pending before the Court
is Plaintiff’s Request that the Court disregard arguments and evidence submitted for the
first time in Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 90). The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for
review. (See Docs. 75, 84, 88, 77, 86, 89, 90). The Court now rules as follows.1
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Katherine Knoll brings claims against Defendants BSI America
Professional Services, Inc. and BSI America, Inc. (“Defendants”) for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for denial of reasonable accommodations,
discriminatory termination, and coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference. (Doc. 1 at
12–14). Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant BSI America Professional Services, Inc.
1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the
pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).
Katherine L. Knoll,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BSI America Professional Services
Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. CV-23-02448-PHX-SPL
ORDER
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 1 of 12

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(“Defendant BSI” or “BSI”) beginning on March 17, 2014.2 (Doc. 76 at 2, ¶ 2; Doc. 78 at
2, ¶ 1). Plaintiff suffers from several impairments, including Hypermobile Ehlers-Danlos
Syndrome, Postural Orthostatic Tachycardia Syndrome, and spinal disc herniations. (Doc.
76 at 3, ¶ 10; Doc. 78 at 3, ¶ 12). These conditions cause Plaintiff substantial limitations in
activities and result in pain. (Doc. 76 at 3; Doc. 78 at 3–4). Specifically, “[s]itting in a chair
compresses Plaintiff’s spine and triggers Plaintiff’s back pain, which gets progressive[ly]
worse.” (Doc. 78 at 4, ¶ 15).
In December 2014, Plaintiff made a verbal request to her manager, Shelley Sjerven,
for a hybrid work schedule that would include part-time telework. (Doc. 76 at 3, ¶ 15; Doc.
78 at 6, ¶ 31). Ms. Sjerven denied the request. (Doc. 76 at 4, ¶¶ 16–17). Plaintiff made a
second accommodations request in March 2015, asking for “part-time telework and an
ergonomic chair for the periods of time that she would be in the office, or in the alternative,
a zero-gravity chair for her office.” (Doc. 78 at 6, ¶ 35). In response to the request,
Defendant BSI provided Plaintiff with a form that could be used for FMLA leave requests,
but Plaintiff submitted a different form that she found on the internet. (Doc. 76 at 5, ¶¶ 29–
30; Doc. 78 at 6, ¶ 36). In April 2015, Defendant BSI purchased Plaintiff an ergonomic
chair for her office that she selected, but it arrived without the lumbar support component.
(Doc. 76 at 5, ¶ 32; Doc. 78 at 8, ¶ 49). Defendant BSI also reached out to Plaintiff’s
medical provider to request more information about her conditions. (Doc. 78 at 7–8, ¶¶ 44–
46).
On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”) due to complications from a medical procedure, and she was approved for
two weeks of leave. (Doc. 76 at 7, ¶ 39, 41; Doc. 78 at 9, ¶ 57). Plaintiff’s medical provider
2 Defendants assert that BSI America, Inc. did not employ Plaintiff. (Doc. 76 at 2).
BSI America is “a separate, sister corporation.” (Doc. 78 at 2, ¶ 4). In Plaintiff’s Response
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, she contends that Defendants were “joint
employers” and “genuine issues of fact exist on the question of whether Defendants are
jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for ADA violations.” (Doc. 84 at 16). However, it
does not appear that either party has raised this issue on summary judgment. (See Docs.
75, 77). Therefore, the Court will not make any determinations regarding Defendants’
liability as Plaintiff’s employer.
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 2 of 12

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
requested an extension of FMLA leave until June 22, 2015, which was also approved. (Doc.
78 at 9, ¶ 58). Plaintiff requested two more extensions, and her FMLA leave was extended
until July 31, 2015, totaling to twelve weeks of leave. (Doc. 76 at 8). While Plaintiff was
on leave, Plaintiff’s position was eliminated due to a “financially-driven restructure” within
BSI. (Doc. 76 at 8, ¶ 8). Defendant BSI created a new position “specifically for Plaintiff to
fill upon her return to work.” (Id. at 9, ¶ 56).
On July 29, 2015, Plaintiff was informed that her FMLA leave had been exhausted,
and she was expected to return to work on August 3, 2015. (Doc. 76 at 9, ¶ 54; Doc. 78 at
10, ¶ 64). Plaintiff questioned if she would be terminated if she did not return to work, and
Ms. Hueseman, a human resources (“HR”) business partner, told Plaintiff that she would
have to see “what options we will have.” (Doc. 78 at 10, ¶¶ 65–66; Doc. 76 at 10, ¶ 58).
On July 31, 2015, Plaintiff’s medical provider requested that Plaintiff’s leave be extended
until October 1, 2015. (Doc. 78 at 10, ¶ 67). When Plaintiff did not return to work, she was
terminated effective August 4, 2015. (Doc. 76 at 10, ¶ 62).
Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on December 23, 2015. (Doc. 78 at 11, ¶ 80). On September 22, 2022, the EEOC
issued a reasonable cause determination letter, and on August 25, 2023, the EEOC sent a
notice of right to sue, which Plaintiff received on September 5, 2023. (Doc. 76 at 11, ¶ 66–
67; Doc. 78 at 11–12, ¶¶ 81–82). On November 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit, bringing two
claims against Defendants under the ADA: (1) “Denial of Reasonable Accommodations
and Discriminatory Termination,” and (2) “Coercion, Intimidation[,] Threats and
Interference.” (Doc. 1 at 12–14). Now, Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing
that Plaintiff’s claims are “barred by the doctrine of laches due to [Plaintiff’s] unreasonable
and highly prejudicial delay” and that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to her
discrimination and retaliation claims. (See Doc. 75). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 84)
and submitted a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability for Plaintiff’s
claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA. (Doc. 77).
//
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 3 of 12

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden
of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential
to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. When
considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the factual record and draw
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Leisek v.
Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). When parties file cross-motions for
summary judgment, the court must review each motion “separately, giving the nonmoving
party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Eat Right Foods Ltd. v.
Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 880 F.3d 1109, 1117 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment first on the issue of laches, arguing that
Plaintiff’s entire complaint should be dismissed because of unreasonable, prejudicial delay.
(Doc. 75-1 at 5–11). Next, Defendants and Plaintiff both move for summary judgment on
whether 1) Plaintiff’s accommodations requests were granted or if Defendants engaged in
the required interactive process and 2) whether Plaintiff was terminated because of her
extended leave request. (Doc. 75-1 at 11–17; Doc. 77 at 9–17).
A. Laches
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety
because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by laches. (Doc. 75-1 at 6–8). Defendants assert that
Plaintiff “filed her EEOC charge in December 2015 and became eligible to request a right-
to-sue letter by June 2016,” but did not obtain the notice until August 2023. (Id. at 7).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown why she could not bring a lawsuit during
that time. (Id.). Further, Defendants point to evidentiary and expectations-based prejudice
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 4 of 12

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
resulting from the delay. (Id. at 8–10).
“Laches is an equitable time limitation on a party’s right to bring suit.” Boone v.
Mech. Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1979). “The defense of laches requires
proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2)
prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d
658, 666 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The first element of
laches, unreasonable delay, is met when the plaintiff “has offered no viable justification
for the delay.” Romans v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 658 F. App’x 304, 306 (9th
Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “Laches questions are seldom susceptible of resolution by
summary judgment,” because they usually require “evidentiary inquiry.” Bratton, 649 F.2d
at 666–67.
In the case of delays resulting during or after an EEOC investigation, the Ninth
Circuit has found that laches bar a plaintiff’s Title VII claims when the plaintiff chooses
“to sleep on his rights.” Boone, 609 F.2d at 959. In that case, the EEOC informed the
plaintiff “that he could have a right-to-sue letter” and offered to assist him in bringing a
lawsuit. Id. With no other explanation for his failure to initiate an action, the plaintiff’s
delay was found unreasonable. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit has determined that delay
was not unreasonable when the plaintiff “did not deliberately delay seeking a right-to-sue
letter” and “filed within ninety days of a valid right-to-sue letter.” Brown v. Cont’l Can
Co., 765 F.2d 180, 815 (9th Cir. 1985). It is reasonable “for an aggrieved employee to
allow the EEOC to retain jurisdiction over a Title VII action.” Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Boone, 609 F.2d at 960).
In Plaintiff’s controverting statement of facts in support of her Response to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, she details the parties’ participation in the
long EEOC investigation process, including Defendants’ submission of a Statement of
Position, interviews with the EEOC investigator, and conciliatory efforts. (Doc. 85 at 15–
18). In addition, Plaintiff submits that legal counsel advised her that the investigation
process is lengthy, and that the EEOC “could bring a lawsuit . . . on her behalf” or “issue a
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 5 of 12

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
finding in her favor which could be used as evidence.” (Id. at 15, ¶¶ 88–90). Based on these
facts, it appears that Plaintiff did not “deliberately delay” seeking a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC. Brown, 765 F.2d at 815. Instead, she waited for the EEOC to finish its
investigation. See Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1152 (“Ordinarily, if the EEOC retains control over
a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with its mistakes.”). Therefore, there are
material issues of fact regarding the delay.
Defendants assert that they have been prejudiced by the delay because of lost
evidence and memory as well as changed expectations surrounding remote work after the
COVID-19 pandemic.3 (Doc. 75-1 at 8–11). Further, Defendants argue that prejudice
should be assessed “on a sliding scale: the longer the plaintiff delays in filing her claim,
the less prejudice the defendant must show.” Smith v. Caterpillar, 338 F.3d 730, 734 (7th
Cir. 2003); (Doc. 75-1 at 8). The time between Plaintiff filing her EEOC charge and
initiating this action was about eight years. However, Defendants still have not shown that
delay was caused by any unreasonable conduct on Plaintiff’s part. Therefore, despite any
evidence of prejudice, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that laches bar
Plaintiff’s claims, and Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
B. Reasonable Accommodations
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “The ADA defines discrimination to
include an employer’s failure to make a reasonable accommodation.” Dunlap v. Liberty
Nat. Prods., Inc., 878 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and alteration omitted).
“Whether an accommodation is reasonable ‘depends on the individual circumstances of
each case, and requires a fact-specific, individualized analysis of the disabled individual’s
3 In Defendants’ Reply in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 88),
Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) data
regarding remote work and attach a BLS publication for the Court’s consideration. (Doc.
88-2). Plaintiff asks the Court not to consider this argument or the publication because it is
evidence submitted for the first time in a reply brief. (Doc. 90). For the reasons explained
above, this evidence does not factor into the Court’s analysis. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion
(Doc. 90) will be denied as moot.
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 6 of 12

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
circumstances and the potential accommodations.’” Id. (citing Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620
F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010)) (alteration omitted). Once the employer knows of the
need for an accommodation, the employer must “‘engage in an interactive process with the
employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations’ that will
enable the employee to perform her job duties.” Id. (citing Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp.
Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001)). “The interactive process requires
communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between
employers and individual employees. . . . Both sides must communicate directly, exchange
essential information and neither side can delay or obstruct the process.” Barnett v. U.S.
Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability.
(Doc. 75-1 at 11). The parties’ Motions focus on whether Defendant BSI adequately
engaged in the interactive process in response to Plaintiff’s requests. Two accommodations
requests are at issue here: Plaintiff’s request in March 2015 for either a hybrid work
schedule or an ergonomic chair and Plaintiff’s request on July 31, 2015 for eight additional
weeks of leave after her twelve weeks of FMLA leave.
1. March 2015 Request
As to the first request for accommodations, Defendants argue that BSI granted the
accommodations by “purchasing the chair [Plaintiff] selected for $528.88.” (Doc. 75-1 at
13). Further Defendants assert that “[w]hen a component [of the chair] was missing, BSI
worked swiftly with the vendor and Plaintiff to resolve it.” (Id.). Essentially, Defendants
argue that BSI made a “good-faith effort to implement one of [Plaintiff’s] chosen
accommodations.” (Id.). Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not meet the requirements
under the law because “the only attempt Defendants made to meet their obligations was
the belated attempt to provide an office chair that was delivered without the necessary
lumbar support piece and, therefore, was ineffective.” (Doc. 77 at 14).
“Employers that delay or obstruct the interactive process may fail to act in good
faith, and they may thereby incur liability ‘if a reasonable accommodation would have been
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 7 of 12

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
possible.’” Anders v. Del Toro, No. 22-35158, 2023 WL 2345054, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 3,
2023) (citing Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, “summary
judgment is proper if the employer acted reasonably and in good faith.” Anders v.
Braithwait, No. 3:19-cv-5433 BHS-TLF, 2021 WL 5890852, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20,
2021) (collecting cases where courts granted summary judgment in favor of the employer
despite delays and lengthy accommodations processes), aff’d, Anders, 2023 WL 2345054
(9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2023).
Here, there is a dispute of fact regarding when, if ever, Plaintiff’s accommodations
requests were denied and if Defendant properly engaged in the interactive process. In
response to Plaintiff’s March 2015 request, HR asked Plaintiff to complete paperwork
(Doc. 78 at 6, ¶ 36). Defendant BSI’s HR manager then emailed Plaintiff on April 2, 2014
to “obtain specifications for an ergonomic chair,” and Plaintiff responded with her selected
ergonomic chair on April 6, 2015. (Id. at 7, ¶¶ 41, 43). Defendant BSI ordered the chair on
April 8, 2015. (Doc. 76 at 5, ¶ 32). Defendant’s HR employee also communicated with
Plaintiff’s medical provider to request additional information by email and phone. (Doc.
78 at 8, ¶¶ 45–46). Plaintiff asserts that on or around April 23, 2015, she talked to Dan
Purtell about her accommodations requests “because she was in an increasing amount of
pain” and he asked her if she was going to quit, leading Plaintiff to believe that BSI was
not going to engage any further in the interactive process. (Doc. 78 at 8, ¶¶ 50–52). The
chair arrived in late April (Doc. 76 at 6, ¶ 36), but it was missing a lumbar support
component that Plaintiff requested. (Doc. 78 at 8, ¶ 49). On May 4, 2015, the HR Manager
emailed Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s supervisor about the accommodations request, stating that
HR had “reached out to the vendor to obtain the status of this lumbar support.” (Doc. 76 at
6, ¶ 37). The email also stated: “Since we do not have all of the necessary information from
her doctor, we are unable to make a formal determination on the home based requirement.”
(Id. at 6–7, ¶ 37).
On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, FMLA leave. (Doc. 78 at 9,
¶¶ 56–57). Defendants assert that Defendant BSI worked “to obtain medical
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 8 of 12

9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
information . . . during [Plaintiff’s] 12 weeks of FMLA leave,” particularly with respect to
Plaintiff’s ability to travel. (Doc. 86 at 6 (citing Doc. 75-7 at 2)). Defendants assert that
“BSI never abandoned the interactive process” and “BSI and Plaintiff never reached an
impasse where the company denied any accommodation request.” (Doc. 86 at 15). On the
other hand, Plaintiff asserts that when she used her FMLA leave, she believed that she “had
not yet been granted any of her requested accommodations.” (Doc. 77 at 14). There are
genuine disputes of material fact regarding Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s
accommodations request. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate.
2. July 31, 2015 Request
Plaintiff also asserts that her request for extended leave after her FMLA leave
expired constitutes a reasonable accommodation. (Doc. 77 at 15). She argues that
Defendants failed to engage in the interactive process because BSI “made no good faith
analysis of Plaintiff’s request to determine if it would impose an undue burden or even
considered her doctor’s note as a request for accommodations under the ADA at all.” (Id.).
On the other hand, Defendants argue that the request for additional leave was unsupported,
and “was tantamount to a request for indefinite leave,” which is unreasonable as a matter
of law. (Doc. 75-1 at 14).
“A leave of absence for medical treatment may be a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA.” Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1135. “Even an extended medical leave, or an
extension of an existing leave period, may be a reasonable accommodation if it does not
pose an undue hardship on the employer.” Nunes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243,
1247 (9th Cir.1999). “Determining whether a proposed accommodation (medical leave in
this case) is reasonable, including whether it imposes an undue hardship on the employer,
requires a fact-specific, individualized inquiry.” Id. A “recovery time of unspecified
duration may not be a reasonable accommodation” when “then employee will not be able
to return to his former position and cannot state when and under what conditions he could
return to work at all.” Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006). “In the
summary judgment context, a court should weigh the risks and alternatives, including
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 9 of 12

10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
possible hardships on the employer, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to the reasonableness of the accommodation.” Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1247.
There are disputed issues of fact surrounding the reasonableness of the
accommodations request and whether BSI was required to engage in the interactive process
in response. Defendants argue that an indefinite period of leave is, as a matter of law,
unreasonable, citing Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th
Cir. 2012). In Samper, the employer “never quantified the number of additional unplanned
absences she was seeking.” Id. at 1239. But here, although Plaintiff extended her FMLA
leave requests multiple times, the July 31, 2015 request was limited to a specific period of
time, until October 1, 2015. (Doc. 76 at 10, ¶ 60). Moreover, Defendants have not argued
that the extended period of leave would have created an undue burden. (See Doc. 75-1).
Therefore, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the request was reasonable. This
genuine dispute of fact precludes summary judgment on either side.
C. Retaliation
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must
show that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employee will avoid summary judgment unless the employer offers legitimate reasons for
the adverse employment action, whereupon the burden shifts back to the employee to
demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether such reasons are pretextual.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that her request for additional, post-FMLA leave was a protected
activity, and that her employment was terminated in retaliation for making the request.
(Doc. 77 at 15–16). Indeed, “requesting a reasonable accommodation is protected activity.”
Valenzuela v. Bill Alexander Ford Lincoln Mercury Inc., No. CV-15-00665-PHX-DLR,
2017 WL 1326130, at *4 (D. Ariz. April 11, 2017). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has
failed to show a causal link between a protected activity and her termination. (Doc. 75-1 at
16). However, Plaintiff asserts that she was terminated “only a few days after she requested
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 10 of 12

11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
additional leave for a definite period post-FMLA leave.” (Doc. 77 at 15). This is sufficient
to state a prima facie claim of retaliation. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen adverse employment decisions
are taken within a reasonable period of time after complaints of discrimination have been
made, retaliatory intent may be inferred.”).
Defendants also assert that BSI terminated Plaintiff for legitimate reasons, namely,
that “she failed to return to work after her FMLA leave expired and declined a new position
following the elimination of her original role.” (Doc. 75-1 at 16; Doc. 86 at 16).
Specifically, Defendants assert that while Plaintiff was on leave, her role was eliminated
“as part of a company-wide restructuring,” but Defendant BSI created a new role for
Plaintiff and offered it to her “before her expected return on August 3, 2015.” (Doc. 75-1
at 16). Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not accept the new position, so she was
terminated when she did not return to work on August 3, 2015. (Id. at 17).
The burden shifts to Plaintiff to show pretext, and based on the evidence submitted
by both parties, there is a triable dispute of fact. While Plaintiff was on leave, she was in
communication with HR throughout May, June, and July of 2015. (Doc. 78 at 9, ¶¶ 58–
61). After Defendant BSI’s HR employee contacted Plaintiff on July 29, 2015 to offer her
the new position and confirm her return to work, Plaintiff asked whether she would be fired
if she did not return. (Id. at 10, ¶¶ 64–66). The HR employee told Plaintiff that they “would
have to see what options ‘we will have.’” (Id. ¶ 66). Plaintiff also argues that after she was
terminated, she “did not receive any explanation why she was terminated, even after [she]
promptly repeated her requests for reinstatement and accommodation.” (Doc. 77 at 15).
Based on the facts submitted by both parties, there is a genuine dispute of material fact
about the reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. Therefore, the Court will deny the parties’
motions for summary judgment on this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, summary judgment is not warranted on any of the issues raised by the
parties. First, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s claims are barred
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 11 of 12

12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
by laches. Second, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff’s reasonable
accommodations claims and retaliation claim. These claims must be resolved at trial by a
finder of fact. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendants’ Motion are both denied.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) is
denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 77) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion that the Court disregard
evidence and argument submitted for the first time in Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 90) is
denied as moot.
Dated this 20th day of February, 2026.
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge
Case 2:23-cv-02448-SPL Document 92 Filed 02/20/26 Page 12 of 12