Melendres et al v Sheridan et al

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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 3564 _ Filed 09/10/26 Page1of 72

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Manuel de Jesus Ortega Melendres, on | No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS

behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated; et al. ORDER
Plaintiffs,

and

United States of America,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

V.

Gerard A. Sheridan, in his official capacity

as Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona; et
al.

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (Doc. 3368). For the reasons stated below, the
motion is denied without prejudice. Nevertheless, the parties are further directed to meet
and confer to determine whether they can reach any agreement as to paragraphs that the
Court should terminate or make inactive pursuant to the terms further outlined below.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiffs in this lawsuit—Manuel de Jesus Ortega Melendres, David and Jessica
Rodriguez, Manuel Nieto, Jr., Velia Meraz, the organization Somos America, and a class

of Latino motorists in Maricopa County—initially alleged that Sheriff Arpaio and the

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MCSO had a “custom, policy and practice of racial profiling toward Latino persons in
Maricopa County and an unconstitutional policy and practice of stopping Latino drivers
and passengers pretextually and without individualized suspicion or cause, and of
subjecting them to different, burdensome, stigmatizing and injurious treatment once
stopped, under the auspices of enforcing federal immigration laws and/or Arizona state
immigration-related laws.” Melendres v. Arpaio (Melendres I), 695 F.3d 990, 994 (9th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court issued a preliminary injunction on December 23, 2011, when it held that
Plaintiffs “provide[d] evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that MCSO
racially profiles Latinos.” (Id. at 27). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary
injunction in full, reasoning that “because mere unauthorized presence is not a criminal
matter, suspicion of unauthorized presence alone does not give rise to an inference that
criminal activity is ‘afoot.’” Melendres I, 695 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
After a seven-day bench trial, the Court, in a 142-page decision, issued its First
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 24, 2013. (Doc. 579). The Court
“concluded that Defendants employed an unconstitutional policy of considering race as a
factor in determining where to conduct patrol operations, in deciding whom to stop and
investigate for civil immigration violations, and in prolonging the detentions of Latinos
while their immigration status was confirmed.” Melendres v. Arpaio (Melendres II), 784
F.3d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 2015). Finding violations of the Fourth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Court permanently enjoined Defendants from: “(1) detaining, holding or arresting
Latino occupants of vehicles in Maricopa County based on a reasonable belief, without
more, that such persons are in the country without authorization; (2) using race or Latino
ancestry as a factor in deciding whether to stop any vehicle with a Latino occupant, or in
deciding whether a vehicle occupant was in the United States without authorization; (3)
detaining Latino occupants of vehicles stopped for traffic violations for a period longer
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than reasonably necessary to resolve the traffic violation in the absence of reasonable
suspicion that any of them have committed or are committing a violation of federal or state
criminal law; (4) detaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of a vehicle for violations
of the Arizona Human Smuggling Act without a reasonable basis for believing that, under
all the circumstances, the necessary elements of the crime are present; and (5) detaining,
arresting or holding persons based on a reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with
their employer to violate the Arizona Employer Sanctions Act.” Id. at 1258–59 (citation
modified).
The Court further determined that—despite the Court’s preliminary injunction
prohibiting such conduct—MCSO continued to detain individuals based solely on a belief
that the person was in the country without authorization. (Doc. 579 at 112–15 (discussing
MCSO’s “LEAR” Policy,1 under which MCSO deputies detained persons whom they
believed to be unauthorized aliens but could not be arrested on state charges)). Noting at
the time that “MCSO is aggressively responsive to the wishes of a significant portion of
the Maricopa County electorate that desires vigorous law enforcement operations against
unauthorized residents by state and local law enforcement authorities,” the Court stated
that it would confer with the parties about the need for additional injunctive relief. (Id. at
139). After that conferral, the Court requested the parties to submit a consent decree to
completely resolve the question of the stops necessary to resolve the discrimination;
however, if the parties were unable to agree on the terms of an injunctive order, the Court
requested that they submit a proposed order that denoted areas of agreement and
disagreement. (Doc. 586 at 30).
The parties were unable to fully agree on an order, and they submitted a joint report
(Doc. 592) that, in the Court’s review, constituted an “agreement about a general
framework through which supplemental injunctive relief could go forward.” (Doc. 603 at
5:07–16). The parties disagreed on a range of matters, including the appointment and scope
of an independent Monitor, the creation of a Community Advisory Board, and increased
1 “LEAR” stands for Law Enforcement Agency Response.
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supervision over MCSO’s internal affairs (“IA”) disciplinary process. (See generally Doc.
592-1). Following an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ proposals, the Court issued the
First Supplemental Injunctive Order (the “First Order”) on October 2, 2013. (Doc. 606).2
“This injunction required Defendants, among other things, to increase training,
improve traffic-stop documentation, develop an early identification system for racial
profiling problems, enhance supervision and evaluation of MCSO deputies, and improve
reporting of misconduct complaints. The supplemental injunction also directed the
appointment of an independent Monitor to assess and report on Defendants’
implementation of the original and supplemental injunctions.” Melendres II, 784 F.3d at
1259. The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the First Order, save for two provisions regarding
internal investigations and officer misconduct that were not narrowly tailored to the
violations of federal law at issue.3, 4 Id. at 1267.
Nevertheless, the Court later discovered that MCSO had never complied with the
ordered injunctive relief and had also deliberately withheld from providing discovery
requested by Plaintiff in the initial trial that demonstrated additional constitutional
violations being committed against the Plaintiff class. Melendres v. Maricopa County
(Melendres IV), 897 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 915 (2019)..
2 The First Order has been amended four times. (See Doc. 670 (amending ¶¶ 1(r),
38, 39, 107–18, 126, 136, 141); Doc. 748 (amending ¶¶ 1(r), 57, 61–63); Doc. 1270
(amending ¶ 136); Doc. 2431 (amending ¶¶ 109–12, 115–18)).
3 In light of the Ninth Circuit’s directive, the Court—after discussing proposed
amendments with the parties at a status conference—amended these two provisions to
ensure proper tailoring to the violations of federal law found in the First Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. (Doc. 1270).
4 In Melendres II, the Ninth Circuit also substituted the MCSO with Maricopa
County as a party in this lawsuit because the MCSO, under Arizona law, is a non-jural
entity that is incapable of being sued in its own name. 784 F.3d at 1260 (citing Braillard v.
Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 481, 487, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ct. App. 2010)). Maricopa
County then appealed the Court’s preliminary injunction, First Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and the First Order. The Ninth Circuit rejected the appeal, reasoning
that Maricopa County’s presence in this lawsuit “assure[s] a meaningful remedy for the
plaintiffs despite MCSO’s dismissal” and holding that Maricopa County’s appeal was
untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).
Melendres v. Maricopa County (Melendres III), 815 F.3d 645, 648–51 (9th Cir. 2016).
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After 21 days of additional evidentiary hearings conducted between April 2015 through
November 2015,5 the Court in May 2016 issued its Second Findings of Fact (Doc. 1677)
that detailed “particularly egregious and extraordinary” conduct by the Defendants. (Doc.
1765 at 2). In addition to finding that Sheriff Arpaio and members of his Command Staff—
including then-Chief Deputy Gerard Sheridan—knowingly failed to implement the Court’s
preliminary injunction, the Court also determined that Defendants: (i) failed to disclose
thousands of relevant items of requested discovery that they were legally obligated to
disclose, such as audio and video recordings of traffic stops (ii) deliberately violated court
orders after the post-trial disclosure of additional evidence, and (iii) prevented a full
recovery of relevant evidence in this case that impeded the litigation, thus “resulting in a
trial that did not completely address—and remedies that did not fully repair—the MCSO’s
violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” (Id. at 1–2 (citing Doc. 1677 ¶¶ 165–217,
239–94)).
In 162 pages, the Second Findings of Fact detailed, among other items, the bad faith
of MCSO’s misconduct investigations and disciplinary process as it pertained to the
5 While these contempt proceedings were ongoing, the United States moved to
intervene in this action as of right. (Doc. 1177 at 1 (citing 42 U.S.C § 2000h-2 and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1))). Months after the Court issued its preliminary injunction in this case,
the United States separately filed suit against Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa County alleging,
among other things, the discriminatory traffic enforcement actions that this Court
ultimately found unlawful. (Id. at 2). In that separate action, the district court granted
summary judgment for the United States on its discriminatory policing claim. (United
States v. Maricopa County, Case No. 2:12-cv-981 (D. Ariz.), ECF No. 379). The parties
in the separate action reached settlement agreements on all claims in that case except the
discriminatory policing claims. (Doc. 1177 at 2).
In its motion to intervene in this case, the United States remarked that if the motion
were to be granted, it would not pursue any further relief in its parallel case beyond that
provided by its settlement agreements with Sheriff Arpaio and Maricopa County. (Id. at
5). It claimed that its “active participation in the remedial phase of this action as a plaintiff-
intervenor is necessary to protect the United States’ interests in the effective nationwide
enforcement of civil rights laws relating to police misconduct and in ensuring that the
defendants’ equal protection violations are remedied through vigorous enforcement of the
remedial orders in this case.” (Id. at 2). The Court granted the United States’ motion to
intervene on August 13, 2015, noting that the parties did not raise objections to the United
States’ intervention. (Doc. 1239 at 2).
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Plaintiff class. (See Doc. 1677). The Court found that MCSO—under the leadership of
Sheriff Arpaio and Chief Deputy Sheridan—engaged in “manipulation and misconduct that
[] prevented the fair, uniform, and appropriate application of discipline on MCSO
employees as that misconduct pertains to the members of the Plaintiff class.” (Doc. 1765
at 15).
Specifically, the Court determined that:
• MCSO deputies wrongfully took personal property of members of the
Plaintiff class including forms of identification, credit cards, license
plates, money, bank cards, cell phones, purses, wallets, weapons, memory
cards, passports, religious statuettes, CDs, and homemade footwear that
were not turned into property and evidence. (Doc. 1677 ¶¶ 616–40, 659,
681).
• The MCSO’s Professional Standards Bureau (“PSB”)6 did not conduct
adequate investigations of those charged with misconduct for the
wrongful seizure of personal property from the Plaintiff class. (Id. ¶¶
648–54, 718–51).
• MCSO promulgated a special discriminatory policy pertaining only to
misconduct investigations arising from this case. According to this
Melendres-only policy, multiple independent violations of MCSO
policies committed by MCSO personnel in Melendres-related traffic
detentions counted as only one policy violation for purposes of applying
MCSO’s disciplinary matrix. (Id. ¶¶ 509, 571–72). This policy
discriminated against the Plaintiff class.
• MCSO, and Chief Deputy Sheridan specifically (id. ¶ 576; Doc. 1043 at
Trial Tr. 977–78), manipulated the timing of investigations in this case so
as to prevent officers guilty of misconduct from being disciplined due to
state law limits in which investigations are to be completed if discipline
is to be imposed. (Doc. 1677 ¶¶ 574–83, 714, 717).
• MCSO intentionally created conflicts by designating subordinates and
personal friends to decide on the discipline of their commanding officers.
(Id. ¶¶ 484, 707–11, 769–73, 775).
6 “The PSB is a division within MCSO that ensures that MCSO employees adhere
to the highest ethical standards. It handles internal investigations and complaints regarding
officer conduct, ensuring accountability and transparency within the department.” (Doc.
3307 at 2 n.1 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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• PSB investigations were completed in compliance with the pre-
dispositions of members of the MCSO Command Staff that no discipline
should be imposed. (Id. ¶¶ 684–89).
• Chief Deputy Sheridan inappropriately intervened in PSB investigations
and their parameters. (Id. ¶¶ 610–12, 614, 616, 628–29). For example,
Chief Deputy Sheridan ordered that disciplinary records reflecting the
imposition of previous discipline be expunged so as not to reflect that he
overturned discipline that has been previously sustained. (Id. ¶¶ 756–58).
• Sheriff Arpaio and Chief Deputy Sheridan promoted and gave pay raises
to persons who were under investigation for misconduct involving failure
to comply with the Court’s orders in this case. (Id. ¶¶ 499–500).
• MCSO did not provide adequate training on how to conduct an internal
investigation (id. ¶¶ 862–67), nor were PSB investigators adequately
trained to conduct competent investigations of misconduct involving the
Plaintiff class (id. ¶¶ 584-91). PSB investigators offered false reasons for
the detention of the Plaintiff class’s property in their investigations. (Id.
¶¶ 616–90).
• MCSO did not track complaints registered against MCSO officers. (Id.
¶¶ 550–51, 853–64). MCSO attempted to blame the Monitor for MCSO’s
own investigative inadequacies. (Id. ¶ 675).
• MCSO policy, at the time, failed to require any written justification for
the Sheriff or his designee to explain employee grievance decisions, nor
did the Sheriff or his designee actually explain such decisions, even when
deciding not to impose discipline. (Id. ¶ 760).
• MCSO did not adequately train its leaders on how to supervise
subordinates. (Id. ¶¶ 838–49).
• MCSO had inadequate internal affairs (“IA”) policies. (Id. ¶¶ 868–75).7
The Court held Sheriff Arpaio, Chief Deputy Sheridan, and two other members of
MCSO Command Staff in civil contempt. To properly cure the MCSO’s constitutional
violations, which were “broad in scope, involve[d] its highest ranking command staff, and
flow[ed] into its management of internal affairs investigations” (Doc. 1765 at 2), the Court
issued the Second Supplemental Injunctive Order (Doc. 1765, the “Second Order”) in this
7 See also Melendres IV, 897 F.3d at 1219–20 (summarizing the Court’s Second
Findings of Fact).
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case.8 The Order “mandate[s] reforms of the MCSO’s internal affairs system in order to
ensure the MCSO’s continued compliance with the Court’s permanent injunction (Doc.
606) and to coerce the MCSO’s compliance with the Court’s previous orders, as well as
with orders the Court may enter in the future as the need arises.” (Doc. 1765 at 6). As the
Ninth Circuit previously summarized, the Second Order:
revised MCSO’s disciplinary matrix, conflict of interest and
whistleblower policies, training requirements for internal
affairs staff, and complaint intake and tracking procedures.
The injunction also vested the independent monitor with the
authority to supervise and direct internal investigations related
to the Plaintiff class and to inquire and report on other internal
investigations. It ordered the appointment of an independent
investigator with disciplinary authority to investigate and
decide discipline for internal investigations deemed invalid by
the court. The district court also directed the County to
implement a victim compensation program for individuals
injured by MCSO’s violations of the first injunction.
Melendres IV, 897 F.3d at 1220 (citations omitted).
The Second Order required the Sheriff and the MCSO to ensure that all allegations
of employee misconduct are fully, fairly, and efficiently investigated in an objective,
comprehensive, and timely manner. (Doc. 1765 ¶¶ 163, 183). The Court expanded the
scope of the Monitor’s authority to inquire and report on all MCSO internal affairs
investigations and not those merely related to the members of the Plaintiff class, “because
absent such reforms, there is no way to determine whether policies or practices that
insulated those who violated the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class from
investigation and discipline would continue to do so.” (Doc. 1765 at 5 (“[T]he reforms are
aimed at eliminating a condition that flows from the MCSO’s violation of the constitutional
rights at issue—namely, the tacit authorization and condonation that the MCSO conveys
to its deputies when police misconduct related to members of the Plaintiff class is exempted
from the normal internal affairs system and is treated with special leniency or is entirely
8 Certain provisions of the Second Order have been amended over time. (See Doc.
3076 (amending ¶ 204); Doc. 3422 (amending ¶ 268); Doc. 3448 (amending ¶ 228)).
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swept under the rug.”)).
On appeal, the Second Order was affirmed in full. The Ninth Circuit held:
[W]e are satisfied that the challenged provisions flow from
MCSO’s violations of court orders, constitutional violations,
or both. Each challenged provision addresses the internal
affairs and employee discipline process, which the district
court found based on ample evidence MCSO had
“manipulated” to “minimize or entirely avoid imposing
discipline on MCSO deputies and command staff.” The
district court explained that it “would have entered injunctive
relief much broader in scope” had it known about “the evidence
withheld by the MCSO and the evidence to which it led” when
imposing the first injunction. MCSO’s repeated bad-faith
violations of court orders and Judge Snow’s seven years of
experience with this case at the time he issued the challenged
orders lead us to believe that the district court chose the remedy
best suited to cure MCSO’s violations of court orders and to
supplement prior orders that had proven inadequate to protect
the Plaintiff class.
Melendres IV, 897 F.3d at 1222 (citations omitted).
Sheriff Arpaio left office at the end of 2016, and Chief Deputy Sheridan retired from
the MCSO. Sheriff Paul Penzone assumed office, but his tenure was also marked by
significant violations of the Court’s injunctive orders. The MCSO, under Sheriff
Penzone’s leadership, continually failed to complete timely investigations of employee
misconduct, resulting in a mammoth backlog of police misconduct cases left unresolved.
In November 2022, the Court observed how the MCSO’s failure to complete investigations
in a timely manner became so extreme as to render IA investigations completely ineffectual
and render no service to either the complainant or MCSO personnel:
[S]ince the Court entered th[e] [Second Supplemental
Injunctive] order the Defendants have continually failed to
complete their investigations in a timely manner. . . . In 2018,
two years after the Court entered its order, the average closure
of a case took 204 days—about two and a half times the
maximum permitted by this Court’s order. This, in itself,
violated the Court’s order and state law. That number,
however, continued to increase. In 2019 the average closure
ballooned to 499 days and 552 days in 2020. . . . [T]he timeline
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to complete an investigation has grown to approximately 600
days per investigation. . . . For full administrative cases
involving sworn personnel, the timeline to complete an
investigation is now apparently in excess of 800 days. . . .
MCSO now has 2,137 pending investigations.
(Doc. 2830 at 2–4 (citations omitted)). The Court thus held Sheriff Penzone in civil
contempt and issued the Third Supplemental Injunctive Order (Doc. 2830, the “Third
Order”)9 “to protect the interests of the Plaintiff class” and “ensur[e] that investigations are
completed in sufficient time to administer discipline.” (Doc. 2830 at 6; see also Doc. 2681
at 3 (“delays in investigation have the tendency to deny justice because the matter remains
unresolved, memories fade, and witnesses become unavailable”)).
Central to the Third Order’s remedial structure was the additional designation of the
Monitor as the Constitutional Policing Authority (“CPA”). As the CPA, the Monitor has
the “authority to oversee all of MCSO’s complaint intake and routing.” (Doc. 2830 ¶
346).10 With this authority, and in consultation with the PSB Commander, the Monitor
“shall make determinations and establish policy decisions pertaining to backlog reduction
regarding, by way of example, which complaints should be (a) investigated by PSB; (b)
sent to the Districts11 for investigation or other interventions; or (c) handled through other
methods, to include diversion and/or outsourcing of cases.” (Id.). The Monitor is required
to consult with the PSB Commander on these policy decisions, and the “Sheriff and the
MCSO shall expeditiously implement the Monitor’s directions or decision with respect to
intake and routing.” (Id. ¶¶ 346–47). Furthermore, the Monitor has the authority to “audit
and review [MCSO’s intake and routing] decisions made with respect to individual cases
and, if necessary, to change such designations.” (Id. ¶ 347). Once the backlog is
9 Certain provisions of the Third Order were later amended in 2024 and in 2026.
(See Doc. 3076 (amending ¶¶ 356–58); Doc. 3497 (amending ¶ 345 and ¶ 358)).
10 In the Third Order, the Court also created a “PSB Staffing Fund” to ensure that
the PSB was adequately staffed and funded to meet the Court’s backlog reduction
requirements. Defendants did not appeal the provisions of the Third Order relating to the
PSB Staffing Fund. (See generally Doc. 3497 at 5–6).
11 “Districts” refer to the police service areas of MCSO. (Doc. 606 ¶ 1(n)).
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eliminated, the Monitor’s authority as the CPA is no longer applicable.12 However, if the
backlog reemerges while Defendants remain under monitoring, the Monitor’s authority as
the CPA will be reinstated. (Id.). A case is added to the “backlog” if it is not completed
within the 180-day state law time limit and the Monitor has not granted an extension of the
investigation deadline. (Doc. 2830 ¶ 356).
The Ninth Circuit fully affirmed the Third Order. Determining that the Court “acted
within the general bounds of its inherent powers,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
Court appropriately vested the Monitor with control over narrow areas of MCSO’s
operations, and that the Court maintained its ability to conduct judicial review of the
Monitor’s decisions as CPA. Melendres v. Skinner (Melendres V), 113 F.4th 1126, 1134–
39 (9th Cir. 2024).13
Issues with the backlog continued to persist after the issuance of the Third
Supplemental Injunctive Order. The Court thus issued the Fourth Supplemental Injunctive
Order (the “Fourth Order”), which (i) granted Defendants relief by increasing the timeline
for the completion of IA investigations and (ii) set a timeline for backlog reduction that
would lead to the elimination of the backlog by 2026. (Doc. 3076). If MCSO fails to reach
its backlog reduction targets, it must invest additional resources into the PSB. (Id.; see also
Doc. 3497 (granting in part Defendants’ motion for relief for failure to hit backlog
reduction targets during 2025 and 2026 and amending the Third and Fourth Orders to
reduce the required quarterly case reduction figures)). Defendants did not appeal any
provisions in the Fourth Order.
B. The Sheridan Administration
In November 2024, former Chief Deputy Sheridan was elected Sheriff, and he
rejoined the MCSO in 2025. So far, during his tenure, the parties have litigated a broad
range of issues beyond the instant motion, including: (i) the cost of compliance with the
12 MCSO is on track to eliminate the backlog sometime in early 2027. (Doc. 3497).
13 During the pendency of the appeal of the Third Order, Sheriff Penzone resigned
from office, and the newly appointed Sherriff, Russ Skinner, was substituted in this case
for Sheriff Penzone. Melendres V, 113 F.4th at 1132.
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Court’s orders in this case (see Docs. 3263, 3301, 3396); (ii) MCSO’s progress in reducing
the PSB backlog (see Doc 3497); (iii) the appointment of an Independent Investigator and
an Independent Disciplinary Authority (see Docs. 3191, 3297, 3448, 3504), including the
scope of the attorney-client privilege as it relates to the Independent Investigator’s ability
to conduct her investigations (see Docs. 3307, 3334, 3487, 3551); (iv) key personnel
staffing decisions and routing the investigation of PSB complaints to district sergeants (see
Docs. 3305, 3497); (v) the appointment of the Commander of the PSB (Doc. 3422); and
(vi) whether the Sheriff has the authority under state law to alter a final disciplinary finding
sustaining allegations of serious misconduct against an MCSO officer (see Docs. 3422,
3425, 3448, 3509).
C. Current State of Compliance
The Monitor assists the Court in assessing MCSO’s compliance with the
requirements in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders. The Monitoring Team makes
quarterly visits to Maricopa County to meet with MCSO’s Court Implementation Division
(“CID”) and other personnel. During these visits, the Monitoring Team observes MCSO
practices, reviews MCSO’s policies and procedures, and collects and analyzes data from
MCSO activities covered by the Court’s orders using appropriate sampling and analytic
procedures. The Monitor then issues a quarterly report that summarizes the status of
MCSO’s compliance. (E.g., Doc. 3509).
The Court’s injunctive orders span 368 paragraphs. Not all paragraphs require or
are subject to the Monitor’s assessments.
The Monitor assesses compliance in two phases for each paragraph monitored.14
For Phase 1 compliance, the Monitor evaluates whether MCSO has developed and
approved requisite policies and procedures, and whether MCSO personnel have received
documented training on those policies and procedures. For Phase 2 compliance—generally
considered “operational implementation”—MCSO must demonstrate that it is complying
14 Not all paragraphs assessed for Phase 1 compliance are assessed for Phase 2
compliance, and vice versa.
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with applicable order requirements more than 94% of the time, or in more than 94% of the
instances under review.15
Since September 2024, MCSO has attained 100% Phase 1 compliance. For Phase
2, based on the most recent quarterly report issued by the Monitor for the third quarter of
2025 (the “Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report”), MCSO has reached the following levels of
operational compliance: 84% for the First Order; 79% for the Second Order; 68% for the
Third Order; and 75% for the Fourth Order. (Doc. 3509 at 6–7).16 MCSO has yet to reach
operational compliance for 46 paragraphs (see Appendix C), and the Monitor has deferred
assessment of 3 paragraphs (see Appendix D).
The Monitor can find that MCSO is in Full and Effective Compliance with a given
provision and then later reassess that determination upon concluding that the agency is no
longer in compliance with the provision. For example, in the Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report,
the Monitor determined that 14 paragraphs that were previously found to be in Full and
Effective Compliance were no longer in compliance after the Monitoring Team initiated
and concluded a special inquiry pursuant to its authority under the Third Order. (Doc. 3509
15 The Monitor uses four levels of compliance: (1) “In compliance”; (2) “Not in
compliance”; (3) “Deferred”; and (4) “Not applicable.” “Deferred” is used in
circumstances in which the Monitoring Team is unable to fully determine the compliance
status, or in situations where MCSO is fulfilling the requirements of a paragraph in practice
but has yet to memorialize the requirement in a formal policy. “Not applicable” is used for
Phase 1 compliance for a paragraph where a policy is not required; and for Phase 2
compliance for a paragraph that does not necessitate a compliance assessment.
16 These percentages include both paragraphs that are in “Compliance” and in “Full
and Effective Compliance.” Generally, MCSO asserts to the Monitoring Team that a
paragraph is in “Full and Effective Compliance,” and the Monitor either concurs or rejects
MCSO’s assertion. As of the Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report, the Monitor has deemed
MCSO to be in Full and Effective Compliance with 156 paragraphs. The full list of the
paragraphs that the Monitor has deemed MCSO to be in Full and Effective Compliance
can be found in Appendix A.
Even if MCSO does not assert that a paragraph in “Full and Effective Compliance,”
the Monitor still assesses each paragraph in the Court’s injunctive orders for “Compliance.”
In addition to the paragraphs where MCSO is in Full and Effective Compliance, there are
32 paragraphs where MCSO is currently in operational compliance (i.e., Phase 2
compliance), as found in Appendix B.
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at 3–4; Doc. 2830 ¶¶ 346–47).
Under the First Order, the Court maintains jurisdiction over this action until
Defendants have achieved Full and Effective Compliance and maintained such compliance
for no less than three years. (Doc. 606 ¶ 3). In this context, Defendants can only reach
“Full and Effective Compliance” once they are in compliance “with all relevant
provisions” of the Court’s injunctive orders. (Id. ¶ 1(r) (emphasis added)). The Court has
further specified the procedure by which the parties may seek termination of the injunctive
orders if they disagree on whether Defendants have achieved Full and Effective
Compliance. That procedure includes a 60-day meet-and-confer process involving the
parties and the Monitor to determine whether any disagreements can be resolved before a
motion to terminate is filed with the Court. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5). And at all times, Defendants bear
the burden of demonstrating Full and Effective Compliance with the Court’s orders. (Id.
¶ 6).
D. The Instant Motion
Despite having not yet reached Full and Effective Compliance with the Court’s
injunctive orders. Defendants now move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to
terminate the Court’s orders in this case. (Doc. 3368, “Defs.’ Mot.”).17 Calling the
litigation in this case a “success,” Defendants contend that the MCSO has achieved
sustained constitutional compliance, implemented durable institutional reforms, and
maintained long-term compliance with most of the provisions in the Court’s injunctive
orders. (Id. at 2–3). Specifically, Defendants identify four items that, in their view, warrant
relief: (1) MCSO has completely changed their written and operational policies and
practice from the Arpaio-era; (2) MCSO’s traffic stop data analysis suggests that deputies
operate bias-free; (3) MCSO has “embraced” the structural and management reforms
required under the Court’s orders; and (4) federalism concerns and democratic
accountability are heightened in this case. (Id. at 11–14). Claiming that “continued federal
17 Though the Rule 60(b) motion was initially brought by Defendant Maricopa
County, on January 13, 2026, Defendant Sheriff Sheridan gave notice that the MCSO was
joining “in the entirety” of Maricopa County’s motion. (Doc. 3361).
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monitoring” is “inequitable” in light of this “success,” Defendants ask this Court to vacate
the entirety of the injunctive orders in this case or, in the alternative, grant partial relief by
dissolving those provisions that they contend have been satisfied or are duplicative, vague
and untethered from the constitutional violations at issue, beyond the Court’s jurisdiction,
or arbitrarily assessed. (Id. at 2, 14–30).
Plaintiff-Intervenor United States supports Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 3383,
“DOJ’s Resp.”). The United States argues that relief is warranted here on three grounds:
(1) MCSO is in Full and Effective Compliance with significant portions of the Court’s
injunctive orders; (2) MCSO has achieved “substantial compliance” with other portions of
the injunctive orders; and (3) the Court should terminate the provisions related to the
internal affairs backlog (i.e., the Second, Third, and Fourth Orders) because MCSO has
implemented a “durable remedy” to address the constitutional violations that gave rise to
this case. (Id. at 5).
Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion on the merits. (Doc. 3459, “Pls.’ Resp.”).
They further reject any partial termination of the Court’s injunctive orders, but they
indicate that they are amenable to meeting with opposing counsel and submitting a joint
proposal for reducing the monitoring of certain paragraphs. (Id. at 46–48).
The motion was fully briefed on May 22, 2026 (Doc. 3496, “Defs.’ Reply”), and the
Court held oral argument on the motion on June 26, 2026 (Docs. 3519, 3544, “Oral Arg.
Tr.”).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “is an extraordinary remedy and
may be granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program,
880 F.3d 1176, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2018). Here, Defendants move for relief pursuant to
Rules 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6).
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)
Under Rule 60(b)(5), a party may be relieved from an injunctive order if it can
demonstrate that the order (i) “has been satisfied, released, or discharged,” (ii) “it is based
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on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated,” or (iii) “applying it prospectively
is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “[E]ach of the provision’s three grounds”
is “independently sufficient” to warrant relief. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 454 (2009).
Defendants rely primarily on the provision’s third ground regarding the equitability of
prospective application, but they also ask the Court, in the alternative, to find certain
injunctive paragraphs “satisfied” under the first ground.
1. Equitability of Prospective Application
a. Changed Circumstances
A party can obtain relief from a judgment if “applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). This provision “provides a means by which a party
can ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if ‘a significant change either in
factual conditions or in law’ renders continued enforcement ‘detrimental to the public
interest.’” Horne, 557 U.S. at 447 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502
U.S. 367, 384 (1992)). Defendants, as the parties seeking relief, bear “the burden of
establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief.” Id. (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383).
Upon making such a showing, “a court abuses its discretion ‘when it refuses to modify an
injunction or consent decree in light of such changes.’” Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997)).
Critically, a motion brought under a theory of changed circumstances through Rule
60(b)(5) cannot “challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests.”
Id.; see also 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2863 (3d ed. 2026)
(“The fact that [Rule 60(b)(5)] allows relief if it is ‘no longer equitable’ for the judgment
to have prospective application is not a substitute for an appeal. It does not allow
relitigation of issues that have been resolved by the judgment.” (footnotes omitted)).
Instead, in resolving such a motion, the reviewing court is required to take a “flexible
approach” that considers whether “changes in the nature of the underlying problem,
changes in governing law or its interpretation by the courts, and new policy insights” exist
such that “reexamination of the original judgment” is warranted. Horne, 557 U.S. at 447–
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50. Such flexibility is required because “institutional reform injunctions”—such as the
Court’s injunctive orders in this case—“often raise sensitive federalism concerns” and
involve “areas of core state responsibility.” Id. at 448.
Partial compliance with the terms of an injunction, standing alone, does not establish
the “significant change” in “factual conditions or in law” required for relief under Rule
60(b)(5). Id. at 454 (holding that “an inquiry into whether the original order had been
satisfied” did not constitute a Rule 60(b)(5) “changed circumstances” inquiry); see also
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383 (stating that Rule 60(b)(5) does not provide a vehicle for relief merely
when “it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree”); (Doc. 3544
at 26:21-23 (counsel for Maricopa County recognized that “satisfaction” and “changed
circumstances” are different inquiries)). Instead, changed circumstances cognizable under
Rule 60(b) generally involve developments independent of those that the district court may
have required under its injunctive orders. See, e.g., Horne, 557 U.S. at 465–66 (identifying
structural and management reforms beyond those required by the district court as a
“relevant change in circumstances”); Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384–93 (finding that an
“unanticipated increase in jail population” constituted a significant change in factual
conditions because it could render compliance with a consent decree requiring inmates to
be housed only in single cells—as opposed to “double bunking”—“substantially more
onerous” (emphasis removed)).
For example, in Horne, the Supreme Court considered whether continued
enforcement of a series of injunctions and a contempt order requiring the State of Arizona
to remedy deficiencies in its English Language-Learner (ELL) programs—which the
district court held inadequate under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974
(EEOA)—was inequitable in light of changed circumstances. 557 U.S. at 439–43. There,
in evaluating the defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion, the lower courts had primarily focused on
whether the amount of funding provided by Arizona for ELL programs was rationally
related to the cost of such programs. Id. at 444. This was an explicit requirement in the
district court’s orders. Id. at 441. Yet the Supreme Court held that the lower courts
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committed legal error by “focus[ing] excessively on the narrow question of the adequacy
of the State’s [] funding for ELL instruction instead of fairly considering the broader
question whether, as a result of important changes during the intervening years, the State
was fulfilling its obligation under the EEOA by other means.” Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court then identified “four important factual and legal changes that may
warrant the granting of relief from the judgment: [1] the State’s adoption of a new ELL
instructional methodology, [2] Congress’ enactment of [the No Child Left Behind Act], [3]
structural and management reforms in [the school district], and [4] increased overall
education funding.” Id. at 459. These changes represented “new means that reflect new
policy insights and other changed circumstances.” Id. at 439.
b. Objective of the Court’s Orders
Once changed circumstances have been identified, the appropriate inquiry is to
determine whether, in light of these changed circumstances, the “objective” of the Court’s
injunctive orders “has been achieved.” Id. at 450. To determine this, the Court must
“ascertain whether ongoing enforcement of the original order [is] supported by an ongoing
violation of federal law.” Id. at 454 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977));
see also Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1202 (stating that, under Horne, courts “must broadly inquire
whether the party obligated by the decree is at that time in compliance with federal law”).
Importantly, the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) still has the burden of proof in
demonstrating that it is in compliance with federal law. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 447;
Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1203 (placing the onus on the “Rule 60(b)(5) movant” to establish
“the absence of an ongoing violation of federal law”). Any rule to the contrary would
improperly require plaintiffs to reprove federal law violations they have already
established. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390 (rejecting the position of Rule 60(b)(5) movants
that “would make necessary . . . a constitutional decision every time an effort was made to
. . . modify the decree by judicial action”); see also Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 170
(2d Cir. 2016) (“Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the ends of justice and
preserving the finality of judgments.” (citations omitted)).
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c. Durable Remedy
If the Rule 60(b) movant demonstrates that the objective of the injunctive orders has
been achieved, then the final inquiry is whether a “durable remedy has been implemented.”
Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. If one has been implemented, then “continued enforcement of the
order is not only unnecessary, but improper.” Id. (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282).
A remedy is sufficiently “durable” if—absent federal monitoring—it is unlikely that
Defendants will resume the violations that led to the issuance of the injunctive orders. See
id.; Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89, Okla. Cnty., Okla. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding in a case seeking to terminate a desegregation
consent decree that it was “unlikely” that a school board previously engaging in segregation
“would return to its former ways”); John B. v. Emkes, 710 F.3d 394, 412 (6th Cir. 2013)
(defining the durable remedy inquiry as considering “whether the [defendant] would
continue that compliance [with federal law] in the absence of continued judicial
supervision”); Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1202 (interpreting the Horne Court’s “reference to a
‘durable remedy’ as recognition that fleeting federal compliance is insufficient to warrant
relief”); Petties ex rel. Martin v. District of Columbia, 662 F.3d 564, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(remanding to the district court to assess “the likely risk of imminent harm to plaintiffs” if
“court supervision [were] to be withdrawn”). In assessing whether a durable remedy exists,
“factors that a district court may consider include the party’s commitment to compliance,
the duration of the party’s compliance with federal law, and whether or not the effects of
the violation of federal law persist.” Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1200–01 (first citing Freeman
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490–91 (1992); and then citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–50).
“Ultimately, the district court’s wealth of experience overseeing the litigation should
inform its assessment of whether the Defendants are now in compliance with federal law,
and whether they are committed to remaining in compliance.” Id. at 1203; see also Petties,
662 F.3d at 571.
2. Satisfaction, Release, or Discharge
A party can independently obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(5) if “the judgment has
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been satisfied, released, or discharged.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). This ground for relief
“has been relied on very rarely.” 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 2863 (3d ed. 2026). In context of relief from an injunctive order, the Ninth Circuit has
not yet defined “satisfaction” under Rule 60(b)(5).18
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “satisfaction of judgment” as “[t]he complete
discharge of obligations under a judgment.” Satisfaction of judgment, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). “Generally, a satisfaction of a judgment is the final act and
end of a proceeding.” 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1006, at 443 (1995). In this case,
Defendants will be completely discharged of their obligations in this case—and
proceedings will thus end—once they have reached “compliance with all relevant
provisions” of the Court’s orders and “maintained such compliance for no less than three
years.” (Doc. 606 ¶¶ 1(r), 3; see also id. ¶ 5 (requiring compliance with all relevant
provisions of the Court’s orders before Defendants can move for partial termination)). And
though the Monitor aids the Court in assessing MCSO’s compliance with the Court’s
orders, the “ultimate arbiter of compliance is the Court.” (Id. ¶ 128). Thus, as the Court’s
orders currently stand, Defendants can only demonstrate that the Court’s judgment has
been “satisfied” under Rule 60(b)(5) if they can demonstrate to the Court that they are in
compliance with all provisions in the Court’s injunctive orders.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)
Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court may also relieve a party from an injunctive order for
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In situations where more
than one year has passed since judgment was entered—as is the case here—courts consider
whether “extraordinary circumstances” justify the movant’s requested relief. 11 Wright &
Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2864 (3d ed. 2026) (first citing Klapprott v.
18 In Zamani v. Carnes, the Ninth Circuit stated that the “‘satisfied, released, or
discharged’ clause of Rule 60(b)(5) is generally invoked when a party seeks entry of
satisfaction of judgment because no acknowledgment of satisfaction has been delivered
due to an ongoing dispute over the judgment amount.” 491 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added). This rule is inapplicable to this case where the Court’s remedies are
equitable, rather than legal, in nature.
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United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); and then citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S.
193 (1950)); BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 210–14 (2025). “This very
strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved.”
Honickman, 605 U.S. at 213 (citation modified). “[R]elief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available
only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable.” Id. at 211 (citation modified).
Under this stringent standard, courts have only found “extraordinary circumstances” met
“in a limited number of cases,” which have included “cases in which there was inaction by
the government and unusual delays by the courts, and when there is a strong public interest
in the case and the conduct of the parties is egregious.” 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2864 (3d ed. 2026) (footnotes omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Continued Enforcement of the Court’s Orders is Equitable
Defendants’ request under the third prong of Rule 60(b)(5) for full termination of
the Court’s injunctive orders is denied. Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the
objectives of the Court’s orders have been achieved. Nor have they established a durable
remedy sufficient to ensure that, absent the Court’s orders, they will not resume the
violations that led to the issuance of those orders.
Defendants identify four categories of “changed circumstances” that, in their view,
justify full termination. First, they contend that they have achieved 100% Phase 1
compliance, resulting in a complete change in written and operational policies. None of
the offending Arpaio-era policies, such as the LEAR Policy, remain in effect today. (Doc.
3368 at 7, 13). Second, they argue that racial bias no longer infects MCSO’s operations
because data analyses from the Traffic Study Annual Reports (“TSARs”) and Traffic Stop
Monthly Reports (“TSMRs”)—which are prepared by the MCSO—only demonstrate a
statistically significant difference in arrest rates between White and Hispanic drivers. And
even then, Defendants aver that any indicia of bias do not directly represent discriminatory
policing. (Id. at 7–8, 13–14). Third, they highlight the low number of recent complaints
of misconduct by deputies against the Plaintiff class and emphasize that the remaining PSB
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backlog of investigative complaints contains no cases involving the Plaintiff class. (Id. at
8–11, 14). Fourth, they assert that MCSO has embraced structural and management
reforms under the leadership of three different Sheriffs, each of whom has been committed
to unbiased policing. (Id. at 14). In light of these changes, Defendants claim that full relief
“is appropriate in this case because the objective of bringing MCSO’s policing into
constitutional compliance is achieved.” (Id. at 15).
Yet, Defendants have not yet carried their burden of establishing their entitlement
to the “extraordinary remedy” of complete relief under Rule 60(b).
1. Objectives of the Court’s Orders
The Court’s orders serve two overarching objectives. The First Order is intended
to remedy MCSO’s unconstitutional and discriminatory policing practices that resulted in
the unlawful detention, arrest, and racial profiling of members of the Plaintiff class. (See
generally Doc. 606). The Second, Third, and Fourth Orders are intended to reform
MCSO’s internal affairs system by ensuring that allegations of police misconduct are
investigated in an appropriate, uniform, and fair manner, thereby fully vindicating the
rights of the Plaintiff class. (See generally Docs. 1765, 2830, 3076). Neither objective has
yet been fully achieved.
a. Discriminatory Policing
Defendants have not met their burden of proving that the purpose of the First
Order—eliminating racial bias in MCSO’s police operations—has been achieved.
Evidence produced by Plaintiffs indicates that large, statistically significant disparities
exist between Hispanic and White drivers in Maricopa County for three key traffic stop
outcomes: (a) arrest rates, (b) stop duration, and (c) search rates. These disparities are
substantial: based on all traffic stops conducted by MCSO deputies and controlling for
relevant variables, Hispanic motorists are (a) approximately 40% more likely to be arrested
than White motorists, (b) stopped approximately 30% longer than White motorists, and (c)
approximately 2.5 times more likely to be searched than White motorists. (Doc. 3459 at
24–25).
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While Defendants correctly note that disparities, alone, do not prove intentional
racial discrimination in the first instance, Defendants—not Plaintiffs—bear the burden at
this stage of setting forth legitimate, alternative explanations for why such large disparities
remain. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 447; Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1203 (placing the onus on the
“Rule 60(b)(5) movant” to establish “the absence of an ongoing violation of federal law”).
Defendants bear the burden because they are already subject to a federal civil rights
judgment in which the Court found “direct evidence of discriminatory intent based on the
MCSO’s policies, operations plans and procedures.” (Doc. 579 at 125). They have failed
to do so. After reading the briefing of the parties on this issue, the Court indicated to the
Defendants the factual record was underdeveloped and suggested the possibility of
evidentiary hearings. Defendants, nevertheless, indicated that they wanted to submit the
arguments on the factual record set forth with the briefs. (Doc. 3544 at 30:14–32:03, 40:05-
13, 61:24-25). The factual record, absent more, is simply inadequate to meet their burden
under Rule 60(b).
The arguments in the briefs are as follows: Every year since July 2014, MCSO has
published a TSAR that conducts analyses of MCSO patrol activity to determine whether
racial disparities exist in MCSO traffic stop enforcement outcomes. The TSAR looks at
five benchmarks: stop length, citation rate, search rate, arrest rate, and seizures. It
compares outcomes of Hispanic, Black, and all racial and ethnic minority drivers to those
of White drivers in Maricopa County after controlling for confounding variables.19 MCSO
19 The TSAR relies on “propensity score matching”—rather than regression
models—to control for confounding variables. (Doc. 3459-3 at 7–8). Propensity score
matching aims to match individuals across racial groups with similar “propensity scores”—
i.e., similar characteristics—so that any remaining differences in outcomes can be more
directly attributed to race rather than other factors. (Id.). By contrast, linear regression
estimates racial disparities by including race as a predictive factor—alongside other
“control” factors—to isolate race’s association with the outcome. (Id.). Both of these
approaches are “widely used, conceptually similar in their goals, and acceptable in this
setting.” (Id. at 7); see also Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless
Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion, Princeton Univ. Press 59–66 (Mar. 2008),
https://www.dsecoaching.com/pdf/2008%20Angrist%20Pischke%20MostlyHarmlessEco
nometrics.pdf.
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releases the TSAR pursuant to Paragraph 70 of the First Order, which requires MCSO to
investigate indicators of bias or unlawful conduct and implement documented
interventions, corrective actions, or discipline if such bias or unlawful conduct exists.
(Doc. 606 ¶ 70). During the entire course of federal monitoring, MCSO has never
demonstrated operational compliance with Paragraph 70.
i. Arrest Rates
Arrest rates (defined as the percentage of traffic stops resulting in an arrest) are a
central issue in this case. During the initial trial, the Court found that, during the MCSO’s
“saturation patrols”—in which deputies conducted traffic enforcement operations for the
purpose of detecting unauthorized aliens during routine traffic stops—officers were more
likely to investigate and arrest passengers if they were Hispanic. (Doc. 579 at 11, 71–74).
Those disparities remain. The TSAR has found statistically significant disparities20 in
arrest rates between Hispanic and White drivers in every year except 2023.21, 22 In the most
20 “In research, statistical significance measures the probability of the null
hypothesis being true compared to the acceptable level of uncertainty regarding the true
answer.” Steven Tenny & Ibrahim Abdelgawad, Statistical Significance, StatPearls (Nov.
23, 2023), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459346/. In other words, a finding
that something is “statistically significant” indicates that an observed outcome is unlikely
to be explained by random chance.
21 See generally Traffic Stop Reports, Bureau of Internal Oversight: Maricopa Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., https://www.mcsobio.org/traffic-stop-data (last visited July 30, 2026).
22 In the TSAR for 2023 (“TSAR 9”), MCSO found no statistically significant
difference in arrest rates between Hispanic and White drivers, reporting a 0.91-percentage-
point disparity. Traffic Stop Annual Report January 2023–December 2023, CNA 27,
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_8b0225bf8d7f4067913eee84b9618294.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2026) [hereinafter TSAR 9]. However, in TSAR 9, MCSO controlled
for a categorical variable called “Stop Classification” that represents whether a traffic stop
is criminal or civil in nature. Id. at 9, 11, 20–21. This control variable—“essentially a
proxy for arrests”—uses a post-stop outcome that might itself “be the product of racial
bias.” (Doc. 3459-3 at 10, 13). Controlling for a proxy for an outcome variable (arrest
rates) is an example of using “bad controls” that can lead to overcontrol bias. Angrist &
Pischke, supra, at 47 (“Bad controls are variables that are themselves outcome variables in
the notional experiment at hand. That is, bad controls might just as well be dependent
variables too.”). Tellingly, MCSO stopped controlling for “Stop Classification” in
subsequent TSARs, thus recognizing that the variable should not have been used when
analyzing arrest rate disparities. (Doc. 3459-3 at 17).
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recent TSAR for 2025 (“TSAR 11”), MCSO reported a 2.61-percentage-point disparity in
arrest rates between Hispanic and White drivers.23 In 2024 (“TSAR 10”), this disparity
was 3.86 percentage points.24 And in regression analysis conducted by Dr. Emma
Pierson—an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of California,
Berkeley who submitted an expert report on Plaintiffs’ behalf (Doc. 3459-3, “Pierson
Report”)—after controlling for confounding variables, the disparity from 2023-2024 was
2.0 percentage points and statistically significant.25 These disparities are also substantively
large, given the fact that the arrest rate for White drivers in Maricopa County was 4.99%
in 2025 (TSAR 11 at 33), 4.78% in 2024 (TSAR 10 at 26), and 4.6% from 2023 to 2024
(Doc. 3459-3 at 13). These large, statistically significant disparities thus suggest at least
the potential for racial bias in the decision to make an arrest during a traffic stop.
Defendants do not contest that these arrest-rate disparities exist. Instead, they ask
the Court to merely ignore them, contending that the disparities can be explained by “a host
of reasons.” (Doc. 3496 at 13). They identify only one such reason, and only speculatively:
they contend that Hispanic drivers are statistically more likely to have outstanding warrants
and that, when a driver has an active warrant, arrest is mandatory. (Id. (citing A.R.S. § 13-
3897(A))). But arrests stemming from warrants constitute a relatively small portion of
total arrests conducted by MCSO. For example, in 2024, warrant arrests without additional
charges constituted only 4.03% of all traffic stop arrests.26 Thus, Defendants have not put
23 Traffic Stop Annual Report January 2025–December 2025, CNA 33,
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_3e383ec250b64d78bb9cc9bca423e8fc.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2026) [hereinafter TSAR 11].
24 Traffic Stop Annual Report January 2024–December 2024, CNA 26,
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_67bf9768cf3c474888c562442a393dab.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2026) [hereinafter TSAR 10].
25 Dr. Pierson validated her results using propensity score matching, which
demonstrated that “estimated disparities remain similar and statistically significant.” (Doc.
3459-3 at 15).
26 Traffic Stop Quarterly Report 20: 2024 Traffic Stop Arrests, Maricopa Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off. 15 (Dec. 2025),
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_6555aa3bd7b1470f9fb41be985d00c87.pdf
[hereinafter TSQR 20].
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forth sufficient evidence explaining the reason why the arrest rate for Hispanic drivers is
higher than that for White drivers.
ii. Stop Lengths
Another central issue in this case is prolonged traffic stops stemming from racial
bias. The Court previously found that MCSO improperly used race as a factor, to the
detriment of the Plaintiff class, in deciding to prolong traffic stops without a sufficient legal
basis. (Doc. 579 at 131–34). Significant disparities in traffic stop durations persist when
all of MCSO’s traffic stop data are considered.
TSAR 11 and TSAR 10 both found no statistically significant disparities in stop
duration between Hispanic drivers and White drivers. TSAR 11 at 32 (finding a -1.80-
minute difference in stop length between Hispanic and White drivers, which suggests that
White drivers are stopped for a longer duration than Hispanic drivers, all else equal); TSAR
10 at 25 (finding a 0.23-minute difference in stop length between Hispanic and White
drivers). However, the TSAR does not capture the full picture.
In conducting the TSAR analysis for stop duration, MCSO excludes stops where an
“ETSI” (Extended Traffic Stop Indicator) has been marked by the deputy conducting the
traffic stop. There are seven ETSI categories: (1) DUI stop, (2) language barrier, (3)
technical issue, (4) training stop, (5) vehicle towed, (6) driver documentation, and (7) other
issue. TSAR 11 at 24. Two of these categories (“driver documentation” and “other”) were
introduced in 2022. (Doc. 3459-3 at 19).
MCSO introduced ETSIs into the TSAR analysis “to identify when circumstances
prolong a typical traffic stop” and “extend the stop length beyond what is typical.”27 Yet
ETSIs now account for a majority of all traffic stops. In 2024, MCSO deputies conducted
20,265 traffic stops and marked 10,194—or 50.30%—as ETSIs. TSAR 10 at 18. And in
2025, MCSO deputies conducted 24,647 traffic stops and marked 13,631—or 55.30%—as
27 Traffic Stops Quarterly Report: Extended Traffic Stop Indicator Use, Maricopa
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. 1–2 (Mar. 2021), https://aea232ab-5659-4c2d-bc16-
d074bd7f96e0.filesusr.com/ugd/c866a6_f37279fd33394818bb370ab6af46820e.pdf
[hereinafter TSQR 3].
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ETSIs. TSAR 11 at 24. In other words in these years: when analyzing whether disparities
in stop duration exist, MCSO (1) excluded the longest stops from the analysis and (2)
excluded the majority of all stops from the analysis.
The usage of ETSIs, upon an initial analysis, presents at least three potential
problems. First, since the majority of all traffic stops are marked with an ETSI, MCSO
uses only a minority of traffic stops in evaluating whether disparities in stop duration exist.
This casts doubt on whether ETSIs truly capture circumstances where a traffic stop is
extended “beyond what is typical.” Contra TSQR 3 at 1–2 (emphasis added). Dr. Pierson,
after evaluating all of MCSO’s stop length data from 2023 to 2024 (a dataset of 38,897
stops that included stops marked as ETSIs), found statistically significant and substantively
large disparities in stop duration. After applying controls, Dr. Pierson found a 4.7-minute
difference in stop duration between Hispanic drivers and White drivers. (Doc. 3459-3 at
12). These figures differ drastically from the relatively minute, statistically insignificant
differences that the TSAR found when excluding ETSIs from the analysis.28
Second, the use of ETSIs has grown dramatically year over year, creating a “moral
hazard”29 problem. In 2021—the year prior to the addition of the “driver documentation”
and “other” categories—deputies marked 3,442 stops, or 20.4% of all stops, as ETSIs.30
Since introducing the “driver documentation” and “other” categories in 2022, the
percentage of traffic stops marked with an ETSI has increased every year:
28 In TSAR 11, in a secondary analysis that did not control for ETSIs, researchers
found a statistically significant difference in stop length—1.84 minutes—between
Hispanic and White drivers in 2025. TSAR 11 at 32. This represents a 3.64-minute
increase in the disparity when compared to the figure that excludes ETSIs from the analysis
(-1.80 minutes).
29 “Moral hazard” refers to the tendency of individuals or institutions to engage in
riskier behavior when they are shielded from the potential consequences of their actions.
Will Kenton, Moral Hazard: Meaning, Examples, and How to Manage, Investopedia (Apr.
30, 2026), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp.
30 Traffic Stop Annual Report January 2021–December 2021, CNA 16
https://aea232ab-5659-4c2d-bc16-
d074bd7f96e0.filesusr.com/ugd/c866a6_8933296049054c60802affad84436943.pdf (last
visited July 30, 2026) [hereinafter TSAR 7].
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Year Number of Stops Marked ETSI Percentage of Stops Marked ETSI
2022 5,366 27%
2023 6,956 37%
2024 10,194 50%
2025 13,631 55%
(See TSARs 8–11). Moreover, the frequency with which MCSO deputies classify ETSIs
as involving “driver documentation” or “other issues” has increased dramatically year over
year since 2022 (note: multiple ETSI categories can be marked for one traffic stop):
ETSI Category 2022 2023 2024 2025
Driver
Documentation 14% 25% 37% 44%
Other
Issues 3% 7% 13% 17%
(See TSARs 8–11).
These trends cast doubt on whether ETSIs have been applied correctly and
consistently across time. (Doc. 3459-3 at 19). As Dr. Pierson explains:
If ETSIs are not being recorded consistently across years, it
means that analyses of disparities using ETSIs will not be
comparable across years. For example, it is impossible to
reliably conclude that disparities have been reduced, because
the underlying data are not comparable. This is a known issue
in analyses of policing data, where changes in data recording
and analysis practices have contaminated past analyses of
racial disparities: for example, when the Texas Department of
Public Safety changed its policies for recording driver race in
response to public scrutiny, it significantly affected
downstream analyses of disparities.
(Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). Inconsistent or discretionary use of the ETSI
designation creates a moral hazard by incentivizing MCSO to classify lengthy traffic stops
as ETSIs to avoid their inclusion in the TSAR dataset, thus artificially reducing measured
traffic stop lengths and creating the appearance of diminished disparities without any
corresponding change in actual enforcement practices. This risk is exacerbated by the
growing use of the “other issues” category and the potential for that category to become a
catch-all mechanism for removing lengthy traffic stops from the analysis.
And finally, the decision whether to classify a traffic stop as an ETSI is itself
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associated with racial disparities. Since 2023, MCSO has observed statistically significant
differences in ETSI classifications between minority drivers—including Hispanic
drivers—and White drivers. Minority drivers are more likely to have their stops marked
as ETSIs. The table below demonstrates the percentage of total stops for each racial or
ethnic group that were marked as ETSIs in the last three years:31
Race/Ethnicity 2023 2024 2025
Hispanic 52% 64% 69%
Black 52% 62% 68%
All Minorities 51% 62% 68%
White 32% 47% 51%
Dr. Pierson finds that these differences “emerge consistently for almost every type of ETSI
and every race group, even for ETSIs where it is very unclear why racial disparities should
occur.” (Doc. 3459-3 at 20). The problem with the inconsistent use of ETSIs across racial
groups is that the TSAR is more likely to exclude longer stops involving Hispanic drivers
than those involving White drivers, thus underestimating disparities in stop durations. Dr.
Pierson illustrates the issue:
[T]he primary concern is not that ETSI use is itself an indicator
of racial bias; rather, it is that inconsistent use of ETSIs across
race groups renders downstream analyses of racial disparities
that rely on ETSIs unreliable. Consider a hypothetical but
plausible example to make this point: imagine that when ETSIs
truly occur, they are always correctly recorded for Black and
Hispanic drivers, but recorded only 80% of the time for white
drivers. (A gap like this would explain the observed pattern of
disparities in ETSI use.) MCSO then discards all ETSIs in its
primary analyses of stop duration. This will result in
31 MCSO’s quarterly analyses provide these figures. Traffic Stops Quarterly Report
13: 2023 Extended Stop Indicator Use, Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. 15 (Mar. 2024),
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_ac4262279ed84a10b0815b362e687837.pdf
[hereinafter TSQR 13]; Traffic Stops Quarterly Report 17: 2024 Extended Stop Indicator
Use, Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. 22 (Mar. 2025),
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_b8a448b652854dfebe00cb2c2109b283.pdf
[hereinafter TSQR 17]; Traffic Stops Quarterly Report 21: 2025 Extended Stop Indicator
Use, Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. 22 (Mar. 2026),
https://www.mcsobio.org/_files/ugd/b6f92b_624516127a9d44898ac44f9ab2788e8c.pdf
[hereinafter TSQR 21].
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disproportionately discarding long stops of Black and
Hispanic drivers (who are more likely to have ETSIs correctly
marked) relative to white drivers; and that will lead to an
underestimate of disparities in stop length.
(Id. at 20–21 (emphasis added)).
Defendants present three points in rebuttal, each largely conjectural. First, they
argue that the increased use in ETSIs is attributable to the introduction of the “driver
documentation” category in 2022. (Doc. 3496 at 14 (arguing that “Hispanic motorists are
more than ten times likelier to lack a license than white drivers”)). However, the
introduction of the category does not explain why use of the “driver documentation”
category has increased every year. Defendants present no evidence indicating that the rate
at which Hispanic drivers carry a driver’s license has increased over time at a rate
commensurate with the increase in the “driver documentation” ETSI category. Second,
they point to the “vehicle towed” ETSI category as a primary driver in stop duration
disparities because “Arizona law requires a vehicle to be towed if the driver lacks a
license,” and, as mentioned, Hispanic motorists are relatively more likely to lack a license.
(Id. at 13). But tows constitute one of the least used ETSI categories—from 2022 to 2025,
the category has been marked for 1.73% to 1.99% of stops. TSQR 21 at 15. Defendants
fail to reconcile the large increase in use of the “driver documentation” category with the
relatively stable instances of tows over time. See id. at 17. And third, they contend that
ETSI use has increased because—after reviewing body worn camera footage—MCSO
determined that deputies were underutilizing ETSIs. (Doc. 3496 at 14). Even if that were
so, Defendants present no evidence—such as an expert report or an affidavit from a
member of the Command Staff—that gives this Court assurance that the increased use of
ETSIs is commensurate with any purported underutilization observed by MCSO. It also
undercuts Defendants’ assertion that “MCSO has identified that deputies utilize ETSIs with
fidelity when documenting delays during traffic stops” (Doc. 3459-6 at 2)—both cannot be
true.
Defendants have not met their burden of adequately explaining the rapid increase in
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the use of ETSIs. Nor have they satisfactorily explained why statistically significant and
substantively large disparities in stop duration exist between Hispanic and White drivers
when all traffic stops are analyzed. As Plaintiffs correctly note, “it would be premature to
terminate this case under Rule 60(b) based on stop duration data infected by this as yet
suspicious and uninvestigated ETSI racial disparity.” (Doc. 3459 at 22).
iii. Search Rates
Lastly, monitoring disparities in traffic stop search rates plays a key role in
evaluating whether Defendants have satisfied the First Order’s objective of eliminating
racially discriminatory policing. (Doc. 494 at 39 (defining the Plaintiff class, in part, as
Latino motorists who have been or will be searched by MCSO officers); see also Doc. 606
¶¶ 28(f), 51(i), 54(k), 67(c), 70, 75(h), 81(b)). Both TSAR 11 and TSAR 10 found no
statistically significant disparities in search rates between Hispanic and White drivers.
TSAR 11 at 33 (-0.05-percentage-point difference); TSAR 10 at 26 (0.06-percentage-point
difference). But MCSO excludes “incidental searches”—defined as searches incident to
arrest or tow—from the TSAR analysis, which constitute the vast majority of searches.
Instead, MCSO only analyzes discretionary searches. TSAR 11 at 28–30.
This, according to Dr. Pierson, has the potential to mask racial bias, because the
decision to arrest a driver “is itself a decision that may result from racial bias.” (Doc. 3459-
3 at 7). And, as no party contests, significant racial disparities exist for arrest rates between
Hispanic and White drivers. When including all searches in the dataset and applying
controls, Dr. Pierson found 3.5-percentage-point disparity in search rates for Hispanic and
White drivers from 2023 to 2024. (Id. at 13). This result was statistically significant and
substantively large, given the search rate for White drivers during that period was 1.4%.
(Id. at 14).
The relevant question is whether Defendants have met their evidentiary burden.
They have not on this issue. Defendants criticize Dr. Pierson’s decision to include
incidental searches in her analysis of search rate disparities here, stating that, “[i]n her
seminal paper, Dr. Pierson excluded incidental searches for the very reasons the TSARs
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do.” (Doc. 3496 at 14 (citing Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 Nature Hum. Behav. 736, 739
(2020))). Defendants selectively quote Dr. Pierson’s seminal paper and ignore her stated
reason as to why she excluded incidental searches in her previous analysis.
There, Dr. Pierson and her team found that, in certain jurisdictions, stopped Black
and Hispanic drivers were searched at approximately twice the rate of stopped White
drivers. To determine whether these search-rate disparities resulted from bias, the
researchers applied a test examining the proportion of searches that successfully yielded
contraband. The team theorized that, even if minority drivers were more likely to possess
contraband, in the absence of discrimination, searched minority drivers should still be
found to possess contraband at the same rate as searched White drivers because officers
should apply the same discretionary standard when deciding whether to initiate a
contraband search. If searches of minority drivers yielded contraband at lower rates than
searches of White drivers, that would suggest that officers applied a different, biased
standard to minority drivers by initiating searches based on less evidence. The team
therefore excluded searches incident to arrest from their analysis because those searches
are not discretionary and are not conducted for the purpose of discovering contraband.
Pierson, supra, at 739. Dr. Pierson highlights this distinction in her expert report:
It is true that some past analyses of search rates exclude
incidental searches, although the literature is mixed in this
regard. However, generally the motivation for excluding
incidental searches is to assess whether there are different
thresholds in searching for contraband (in which case
incidental searches, whose purpose is not to search for
contraband, should arguably be excluded). That is not
MCSO’s purpose here.
(Doc. 3459-3 at 16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). Indeed, even the Court in the
First Order has recognized that disparities in contraband seizure during discretionary
searches can represent indicia of racial profiling. (Doc. 606 ¶ 67(c) (“[W]arning signs or
indicia of possible racial profiling or other misconduct include . . . a low rate of seizure of
contraband or arrests following searches and investigations[.]”)).
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Thus, Plaintiffs have put forth at least a plausible basis for including incidental
searches in the search rate analysis. Defendants do not rebut Plaintiffs’ argument that the
decision to conduct an arrest—and thus a search incident to arrest—can itself be motivated
by racial bias and merely assert that “arrests are measured separately.” (Doc. 3496 at 13).32
That response does not address the underlying point and therefore fails to undermine the
probative value of Plaintiffs’ analysis.
iv. MCSO’s Burden of Proof
Taken together, the record before the Court does not indicate that Defendants have
satisfied their burden under Rule 60(b)(5) to demonstrate that the objective of the First
Order has been achieved. Although the Court must apply the “flexible” inquiry required
by Horne—which does not turn on compliance alone, see 557 U.S. at 447–50—that
flexibility does not relieve Defendants of their burden of proof. Plaintiffs, though it is not
their burden of proof, have put forth significant, probative evidence that racial bias may
continue to affect MCSO’s traffic stop operations. Defendants have not presented
sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that the underlying violation of federal law is
no longer ongoing.
To be clear, evidence of racial disparities does not, by itself, establish intentional
racial discrimination. Nor must MCSO eliminate every statistical disparity before it can
establish that prospective enforcement of the First Order is no longer warranted. But
further explanation is needed. Where the Court has previously found that MCSO engaged
in intentional racial discrimination, and where Plaintiffs have produced substantial
evidence that indicators of bias persist, Defendants must do more than ask the Court to
ignore these metrics without presenting sufficient explanation why the Court should do so.
Most notably, Defendants offer limited evidence explaining the disparities
identified by Plaintiffs. They do not, for example, introduce any declarations or testimony
from MCSO Command Staff explaining why Hispanic drivers continue to be arrested and
32 And as discussed in the section on arrest rates, see supra Section III(A)(1)(a)(i),
Defendants do not adequately explain why the arrest rate for Hispanic drivers is higher
than that for White drivers.
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searched at higher rates than similarly situated White drivers, or why they continue to be
stopped for longer periods. Nor do Defendants offer any expert testimony or an expert
report rebutting Plaintiffs’ expert analysis. And when the Court offered the parties the
opportunity to further develop the factual record through an evidentiary hearing, both
Defendants and the United States declined. (Doc. 3544 at 30:14–32:03, 40:05-13, 61:24-
25).
The evidence Defendants do emphasize is likewise insufficient. They point to
MCSO’s 100% Phase 1 compliance and the removal of the LEAR policy. However,
compliance, standing alone, is not the relevant benchmark—a proposition Defendants
themselves acknowledge. Horne, 557 U.S. at 454; (Doc. 3544 at 26:21-23). And even if
compliance were the relevant benchmark, MCSO’s task would still be far from complete,
given that it never has been found in full and effective compliance. (Doc. 3459 at 13).
Nor is it the Court’s responsibility to scour the record, much less materials outside
the record, to find evidence supporting Defendants’ arguments. See Keenan v. Allan, 91
F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). For example, Defendants point to the required monthly
analyses of traffic stop data—the TSMRs—and state that they demonstrate an absence of
discriminatory policing:
MCSO reviews twelve-month data for every deputy and flags
any aberrant statistics. Deputies who have been flagged are
then investigated by the Traffic Stop Analysis Sergeant, who
reviews body worn camera footage in a process agreed to by
the parties and the Monitor. Since it began this process in
2021, MCSO has never identified discriminatory or biased
policing, and neither has the Monitor.
(Doc. 3496 at 15 (citing Doc. 3199-1 at 10)). Defendants’ assertion here is bootstrapped
from its own contention in TSAR 10, in which MCSO claims: “Upon review of statistically
significant TSMR findings from ongoing research, the Court Monitor has concurred with
MCSO that the inequalities in traffic stop outcomes were not associated with bias.” (Doc.
3199-1 at 10). But MCSO does not identify that part of the factual record where the
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Monitor made such concurrence, and the Court has not found it.33 Nor do Defendants place
any of the TSMRs into the record as exhibits, summarize their results or methodologies,
document or explain the interventions34 provided to deputies whose traffic-stop data
identified them as outliers, or identify how TSMR interventions are considered by
supervisors in assessing deputy performance and promotions.
The Court last had occasion to address the TSMR program nearly five years ago,
when it was still a “pilot program.” (Doc. 2718 at 3 (noting that the TSMR program “is
not impervious to testing and improvement”)). At the time, Plaintiffs and the United States
argued that the TSMR’s methodology did not properly flag potentially “problematic
officers.” (Id.). The Court held a hearing on the issue, at which it heard from experts from
the United States, MCSO, and the Monitoring Team. (Id.). The Court—and the public—
would benefit from a similar update on the program before granting the full relief
Defendants now seek, including through the presentation of expert testimony or further
factual development regarding the program’s methodology and effectiveness.
Furthermore, Defendants’ contrary framing of the Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is
misplaced. At oral argument, Defendants suggested that the relevant question is whether
Plaintiffs could prevail if they filed this case today. (Doc. 3544 at 11:13-15). That framing
reads Horne far too expansively and flips the 60(b)(5) inquiry on its head. Such a standard
would improperly shift the burden to Plaintiffs to reprove a constitutional violation each
time Defendants seek relief from an institutional injunction. However, Horne is clear:
Defendants have the burden of proof. 557 U.S. at 447.
Finally, Defendants are not required to prove a negative—that no constitutional
violation has occurred during every traffic stop conducted over the past fourteen years.
33 And in the Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report, the Monitor notes that “the findings of
disparities continue to identify possible systemic racial bias in MCSO’s patrol function.”
(Doc. 3509 at 89 (emphasis added)).
34 “An intervention educates deputies on how to correct their conduct, using a range
of methods such as formal and informal training, supervisor ride-alongs, action plans,
review of implicit bias videos, and/or review and discussion of the deputy’s own body-
worn camera recordings.” (Doc. 2718 at 2 n.2 (citation modified)).
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(Doc. 3544 at 15:13-21). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held as much. See Shakman v.
Pritzker, 43 F.4th 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2022).35 But even then, Defendants must still
demonstrate that the MCSO has satisfied the objective of the First Order. Id. Even
assuming the Defendants could make such a showing, they have not done so on the present
record.
b. Appropriate, Uniform, and Fair Discipline
Defendants have similarly not shown (and do not even attempt to demonstrate) that
the purpose of the Second, Third, and Fourth Orders (collectively, the “Internal Affairs
Orders”)—ensuring a constitutionally adequate internal investigation process for officer
misconduct—has been achieved.
As summarized at length in the background section, see supra Section I.A, the
Court, through the Second Order, developed a comprehensive remedial scheme to address
the “particularly egregious and extraordinary” conduct by the Defendants. (Doc. 1765 at
2). The Second Findings of Fact, in nearly 500 paragraphs, set forth how Sheriff Arpaio,
Chief Deputy Sheridan, and the MCSO, in conducting internal investigations of extensive
misconduct against members of the Plaintiff class, “manipulated all aspects of the internal
affairs process to minimize or entirely avoid imposing discipline on MCSO deputies and
command staff whose actions violated the rights of the Plaintiff class.” (Id. (citing Doc.
1677 ¶¶ 387–875)). Then Chief Deputy, now Sheriff, Sheridan in particular was found to
have abused his authority over MCSO’s internal affairs process by obstructing and
35 Shakman involved the requested termination of a consent decree. 43 F.4th at 728.
Notably, and without detailed explanation as to why, the Seventh Circuit applied Horne’s
two-step inquiry analysis to the first prong of Rule 60(b)(5), which allows a party to move
to terminate a consent decree based on satisfaction. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). Yet the
Supreme Court explicitly stated in Horne that “petitioners’ Rule 60(b)(5) claim [was] not
based on satisfaction of the judgment.” 557 U.S. at 446 n.2; id. at 454 (noting that “each
of [Rule 60(b)(5)]’s three grounds for relief is independently sufficient and therefore that
relief may be warranted even if petitioners have not ‘satisfied’ the original order”
(emphasis added)). And the Seventh Circuit’s observation in Shakman that a party need
not “prove a negative” arose in its discussion of whether the defendants had “satisfied” the
consent decree. 43 F.4th at 728, 730.
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manipulating misconduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings—including those
involving himself—to shield deputies and Command Staff from accountability and
undermine the enforcement of remedies designed to address the constitutional violations
against the Plaintiff class. (Doc. 1677 ¶¶ 389, 397, 435–55, 574–83, 752–64).
The Court expressly made findings that “the scope of Defendants’ constitutional
violation [was] broad” and “permeate[d] the internal affairs investigatory processes, which
have been manipulated to provide impunity to those who violate the rights of the Plaintiff
class.” (Doc. 1765 at 11). The Court determined that the appropriate remedy—the Second
Order—“must reach as far as the violation flows.” (Id. (first citing Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 98 (1995); and then citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282)). The Court further
determined that, based on the MCSO’s history of noncompliance with the Court’s
injunctive orders, the scope of the remedies needed to encompass the entire internal affairs
system to adequately protect the rights of the Plaintiff class. (Id. at 5). The Monitor’s
supervisory authority of the entire internal affairs process was then temporarily expanded
through the Third and Fourth Orders because MCSO failed to complete investigations in a
timely manner so as to be effective under state law. (Doc. 2830 at 2–4). These “extreme”
delays rendered MCSO’s internal investigations “completely ineffectual” and deprived the
Plaintiff class of its right to have misconduct complaints investigated and, when
appropriate, disciplinary action imposed on the offending officers. (Id. at 4).
The objective of the Internal Affairs Orders, thus, is to ensure that MCSO
investigates allegations of misconduct by its deputies in an appropriate, uniform, and fair
manner. Defendants contend that they need not establish whether that objective has been
achieved. Instead, they argue that because the “objectives of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint”—
which did not allege the internal affairs violations established in the later contempt
proceedings—“have been achieved” (a position the Court has now rejected), federal
monitoring is no longer appropriate. (Doc. 3368 at 13, 15). Relying on Horne, they further
argue that it is inappropriate for the Court to consider whether the objectives of “additional
orders and injunctions” have been achieved under the equity prong of Rule 60(b)(5). (Doc.
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3496 at 11–12). Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.
It is true that the Supreme Court in Horne did not separately consider whether the
objective of a contempt order issued by the district court had been achieved. 577 U.S. at
441–42. But there was good reason for that. The contempt order in Horne served the same
objective as the initial injunction: ensuring that defendants were in compliance with the
EEOA. The district court, in its initial findings, determined that the defendants were
violating the EEOA by not adequately funding certain language instruction programs. Id.
at 441. The district court, after giving Arizona time to appropriately fund those programs
(which it failed to do), held the State in contempt and established an escalating schedule of
fines for each day the State failed to comply with the district court’s funding requirements.
Id. at 441–42. The Supreme Court reasoned that since it was possible for Arizona to fulfill
its obligation under the EEOA by “other means,” the appropriate 60(b)(5) inquiry was
whether the State was taking “appropriate action” to comply with the EEOA. Id. at 439,
450. Accordingly, there was no need to separately consider whether the objectives of the
later contempt order or other “additional orders and injunctions” had been independently
achieved.
The contempt orders in this case do not resemble the one in Horne. Rather than
simply levying fines, the Internal Affairs Orders set forth a detailed remedial scheme that
requires changes in policy and training and imposes supervision over the entire internal
affairs process. Melendres IV, 897 F.3d at 1220; Melendres V, 113 F.4th at 1130–32. Their
purpose is to cure a condition that “flows” from the initial constitutional violations: “the
tacit authorization and condonation that the MCSO conveys to its deputies when police
misconduct related to members of the Plaintiff class is exempted from the normal internal
affairs system and is treated with special leniency or is entirely swept under the rug.” (Doc.
1765 at 5). This objective differs from the First Order’s objective. The Horne Court was
not presented with a circumstance in which later remedial orders imposed additional
obligations designed to remedy later-discovered conditions flowing from the underlying
federal violations. But as Horne nonetheless recognizes, “federal-court decrees” are within
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“appropriate limits” when they are directed at remedying conditions that “flow” from
violations of federal law. See 577 U.S. at 450 (citing Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282); Milliken,
433 U.S. at 282 (“[W]here, as here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy
does not exceed the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the condition that offends the
Constitution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And in this case, the Ninth Circuit
stated it was “satisfied that the challenged provisions [in the Second Order] flow from
MCSO’s violations of court orders, constitutional violations, or both.” Melendres IV, 897
F.3d at 1222; id. at 1220 (rejecting Defendants’ argument that the Court failed to tailor the
terms of the Second Order to remedy the violations found).
Because the Internal Affairs Orders are themselves prospective equitable orders, the
Horne inquiry applies to them as well under Rule 60(b)(5). To hold otherwise would
require the Court to dissolve those Orders without first determining whether the condition
they were designed to remedy has been eliminated. As Defendants have not even attempted
to answer a “critical question in th[e] Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry”—“whether the objective” of
the Internal Affairs Orders “has been achieved,” see Horne, 557 U.S. at 450—they have
failed to carry their burden.
And to the extent that Defendants argue that enforcement of the “backlog”
provisions in the Third and Fourth Order is no longer prospectively equitable, that
argument likewise fails. (Contra Doc. 3496 at 11). Those Orders arose in the context of
the explosive growth in the PSB backlog. Their purpose is to eliminate the backlog—cases
in which the MCSO has exceeded state law time limits in which they can enforce effective
discipline-- insofar as a massive backlog prevents MCSO from administering discipline in
a fair, uniform, and appropriate manner. (Doc. 2830 ¶¶ 346–49, 352; Doc. 3076; Doc.
3497). At the time of the Third Order, the backlog was over 2,100 cases. (Doc. 2830 at
4). As of July 31, 2026, 256 cases remained in the backlog. (Doc. 3558). MCSO is on
track to eliminate the backlog in early 2027. (Doc. 3497 at 18). Thus, the backlog still
remains, but it should be eliminated soon. The Court has instituted a self-terminating
mechanism in the Third Order that extinguishes the Monitor’s authority as the CPA once
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the objective of backlog reduction has been accomplished. (Doc. 2830 ¶¶ 346–49, 352).36
Defendants’ insistence that “continuing federal oversight based on the (disappearing)
backlog is inequitable” is therefore misplaced. (Doc. 3496 at 11).
2. Durable Remedy
Even if Defendants could demonstrate that the objectives of the Court’s orders have
been achieved, they still have not carried their burden of establishing that a durable remedy
is in place. The record does not support a finding that, absent federal monitoring,
Defendants are unlikely to resume the conduct that necessitated the Court's injunctive
orders.
As previously noted, Defendants did not accept the Court’s offer to conduct further
factual findings. See supra Part III(A)(1)(a)(iv). Yet in a number of Rule 60(b)(5) cases
cited by Defendants in support of termination, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing in the first instance or was ordered by the appellate court to conduct further factual
development. Horne, 557 U.S. at 455–56, 469–70 (eight-day evidentiary hearing);
Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1207 (remanding to the district court to “make up-to-date findings”
through “necessary proceedings to develop a record that would allow it to make [a
determination as to whether Defendants are currently violating class members’ rights]”);
Peery v. City of Miami, 977 F.3d 1061, 1068 (11th Cir. 2020) (seven-day evidentiary
hearing); John B., 710 F.3d at 399 (18-day evidentiary hearing); Petties, 662 F.3d at 571
(“we remand the case for the district court to conduct the necessary factual inquiry”). But
see Shakman, 43 F.4th at 732 (reversing the denial of a Rule 60(b)(5) motion and
remanding the case with instructions to vacate 50-year-old consent decree without
requiring an evidentiary hearing). Here, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the
Court is unable to make an “assessment of the likely risk of imminent harm to plaintiffs”
if “court supervision [were] to be withdrawn.” Petties, 662 F.3d at 571. Full termination
of the Court’s orders is thus not appropriate.
36 Moreover, upon elimination of the PSB backlog, Defendants are authorized to
return any unused payments in the PSB Staffing Fund to their source of origination
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a. Discriminatory Policing
MCSO has not yet demonstrated that it has implemented a durable remedy sufficient
to prevent the recurrence of the constitutional violations involving discriminatory policing
and racial profiling that gave rise to this lawsuit. Defendants primarily contend that a
durable remedy exists because they have achieved 100% Phase 1 compliance. (Doc. 3496
at 5–7). Of course, such Phase I compliance is welcome. Nevertheless, Phase 1
compliance, as defined by the Monitoring Team, evaluates whether MCSO has developed
and approved requisite policies and procedures, and whether MCSO personnel have
received documented training on their contents. (Doc. 3509 at 5). It is, as Plaintiffs frame
it, proof of “compliance on paper.” (Doc. 3459 at 15). By contrast, Phase 2 compliance
evaluates “operational compliance”—in other words, whether MCSO is actually
implementing the Court’s requirements in practice. (Doc. 3509 at 5). As of the Monitor’s
most recent quarterly report, MCSO has achieved 84% compliance with the First Order.
(Id. at 6).
In assessing the durability of such reforms, Defendants must present evidence that
answers a hypothetical question: if supervision were withdrawn, would the reforms
endure? E.g., Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1207 (district court needs to analyze whether defendants
“are likely to maintain compliance with federal law absent continued oversight”); Petties,
662 F.3d at 571. In Jackson, the Tenth Circuit held that “there is no one way for a movant
to show that its federal compliance is fleeting.” 880 F.3d at 1203. It identified two
examples of a party’s commitment to future compliance: (1) the adoption of a “statute
designed to cure the specific federal violation” and (2) “a record of sustained good-faith
efforts to remedy federal violations and, to the extent possible, eliminate the vestiges of the
federal violation.” Id. But ultimately, it is “the district court’s wealth of experience
overseeing the litigation” that informs the assessment of “whether [Defendants] are
committed to remaining in compliance.” Id.
Neither of the two examples offered in Jackson are present here. First, Defendants
do not identify any statute designed to cure the specific federal violations regarding
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discriminatory policing. Second, the record, on the whole, does not indicate a history of
sustained, good-faith efforts by Defendants to remedy the federal violations. Defendants
completely omit in their papers any discussion of the Second Findings of Fact, in which
Sheriff Sheridan—then, Chief Deputy Sheridan—was held in civil contempt for failing to
implement the Court’s preliminary injunction. (Doc. 1677 ¶¶ 1–164) During the contempt
hearing, “Chief Deputy Sheridan made multiple intentional misstatements of fact while
under oath.” (Id. at 3). He knowingly and intentionally failed to implement the preliminary
injunction. (Id. at 16). Specifically, the Court found that “Chief Deputy Sheridan was fully
apprised of the terms of the preliminary injunction and fully informed of Sheriff’s Arpaio’s
decision to ignore it. He was responsible for implementing its terms, and he did nothing
to do so.” (Id. ¶ 92). This lack of implementation caused great harm to the Plaintiff class—
including illegal traffic stops and detentions—and led to the issuance of a victim
compensation plan. (Doc. 1791). Then Chief Deputy Sheridan was also found to have
manipulated the internal affairs investigation process in a number of different ways already
detailed on pages 6-8 above to avoid providing the members of the Plaintiff class with
appropriate remedies for the MCSO’s violations of Plaintiffs’ rights.
Defendants ask the Court to ignore these “prior bad acts”, (Doc. 3496 at 17) while
giving credence to their previous good faith efforts. (See Doc. 3496 at 6). Certainly, the
Court agrees, the Court must consider the totality of the Defendants’ conduct in considering
whether the Defendants have established the durability of their reforms to include both
their good and their bad acts.37
37 Defendants ask this Court to “presume elected officials’ good faith and lawful
performance of their work.” (Doc. 3368 at 14 (citing Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 739
(9th Cir. 2025)). Cruz discusses the “presumption of regularity,” under which courts
presume that “official acts of public officers, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, properly discharged their official duties.” 146 F.4th at 739 (citation modified).
The presumption is not applicable here. First, the presumption is retroactive, not
prospective. See id. Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion evaluates prospective equitability
through the durable remedy analysis. Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1207; Petties, 662 F.3d at 571.
Second, even if the presumption was available, it cannot be found here when looking at
MCSO’s past misconduct of civil contempt and noncompliance, which is “clear evidence”
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Defendants next aver that, even putting aside Jackson’s “good faith” framework,
courts still find that “constitutionally sufficient policies and procedures—standing alone—
establish a durable remedy.” (Doc. 3496 at 6–7 (citing Peery, 977 F.3d at 1075) (emphasis
added)). That is incorrect. The Eleventh Circuit, in Peery, demanded more than the
presence of “policies and procedures” to establish a durable remedy. In that case, the City
of Miami moved to terminate a consent decree designed to protect the constitutional rights
of homeless persons. Peery, 977 F.3d at 1068. In affirming the district court’s finding of
a durable remedy, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the City of Miami was unlikely to
return to its former ways because it had “developed a wide array of programs” to “provide
shelter, medical care, and other services, as well as to avoid putting the mentally ill in jails.”
Id. at 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was those programs, “along with formal
police policies,” that constituted a durable remedy. Id.
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, policies alone were insufficient. Instead, it
was the City’s actual actions and practices—akin to operational compliance in this case—
that demonstrated “it [was] unlikely to revert to arresting or mistreating the homeless.” See
id. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “[t]he City provided ‘ample evidence’ [that its]
procedures [and training] were followed, such as through the placement of notices in
advance of clean-ups and the provision of shelter beds for the displaced homeless.” Id.
(emphasis added). Hence, under Peery, Defendants must show more than the mere
adoption of new policies. They must demonstrate that such policies will persist and
continue to be followed once federal oversight ends.38 But see infra Section
that the agency has not “properly discharged [its] official duties.” 146 F.4th at 739.
38 Defendants assert that since Peery (1) involved training requirements—such as
body-camera-usage and better documentation—“similar to the systems MCSO created to
achieve Phase 1 compliance” and (2) “arose in the more-demanding context of showing a
consent decree’s satisfaction rather than changed circumstance for relief from an
involuntary order,” the case demonstrates that MCSO’s “materially identical reforms” are
“more than enough to show changed circumstances.” (Doc. 3496 at 6–7). This argument
is wrong on both counts. First, just because the training requirements between this case
and Peery are “similar” does not make them “materially identical.” Second, though the
Eleventh Circuit did determine that the City of Miami had “satisfied” the consent decree
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III(A)(2)(b)(iii) (discussing the Monitor’s Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report, which “found
blatant disregard by MCSO of longstanding policies, their review and approval, and of the
policy development process”).
The Court’s First Order sets forth certain supervisory requirements that MCSO must
follow, if it is to enforce immigration-related laws, that ensure that such enforcement does
not run afoul of the Constitution and violate the rights of the Plaintiff class. (E.g., Doc.
606 ¶¶ 12, 26, 28, 35, 40, 49–54, 67, 69–70, 72, 81, 85, 88–89, 101, 103); see also Trump
v. Illinois, 607 U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 432, 436 n.4 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The
Fourth Amendment requires that immigration stops must be based on reasonable suspicion
of illegal presence, stops must be brief, arrests must be based on probable cause, and
officers must not employ excessive force. Moreover, the officers must not make interior
immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity.” (emphasis added)).
Defendants have given this Court no evidence—either through affidavits,
testimony, or exhibits—to make an assessment that, upon termination of the Melendres-
orders, a durable system is in place that will mitigate the risk of the unconstitutional actions
that led to this lawsuit, such as the racial profiling of Hispanic motorists, from reappearing.
Further factual findings are necessary before the Court can relieve Defendants from the
judgment against them.
b. Appropriate, Uniform, and Fair Discipline
Nor is the remedy yet durable in the case of MCSO’s internal affairs disciplinary
under the first prong of Rule 60(b)(5), it still—like the Seventh Circuit in Shakman—
applied elements of Horne’s standard for the equitability of prospective application,
including the “durable remedy” analysis. Peery, 977 F.3d at 1075; but see Horne, 557 U.S.
at 446 n.2, 454. And under Horne, the “durable remedy” analysis does not hinge on
whether the order at issue is a consent decree or involuntary judgment. Jackson, 880 F.3d
at 1198–99 (discussing Horne’s interchangeable use of the two terms). It is only when
evaluating the threshold inquiry of changed circumstances that modification of a consent
decree arises in a more-demanding context. United States v. Asarco Inc., 430 F.3d 972,
979 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384–85, for the proposition that a party moving
under the third prong of Rule 60(b)(5) to modify a consent decree must demonstrate the
“changed conditions” were not “anticipated at the time it entered into a decree”).
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system. Defendants contend that a durable remedy is in place because there are a low
number of pending internal affairs cases involving Class Remedial Matters (“CRMs”), and
that no CRMs are in the PSB backlog. (Doc. 3368 at 8–11, 14; Doc. 3496 at 8). These
arguments too are insufficient.
CRMs are defined in the Second Order as “possible misconduct involving members
of the Plaintiff class and the MCSO or the remedies to which such class members are
entitled as set forth in the Findings of Fact and various supplemental orders of this Court.”
(Doc. 1765 ¶ 162(i)). The Second Order vests the Monitor with the authority to supervise
and direct all of the MCSO’s internal affairs investigations pertaining to CRMs. (Id. ¶
275). The Monitor’s authority over such investigations is “plenary,” and he may “conduct
whatever review, research, and investigation he deems necessary to determine whether
such matters qualify as Class Remedial Matters and whether the MCSO is dealing with
such matters in a thorough, fair, consistent, and unbiased manner.” (Id. ¶¶ 277, 279; see
also id. ¶¶ 274–88 (defining the full scope of the Monitor’s authority and duties over CRM
investigations)).
The Monitor’s authority over all CRM investigations ceases when the Court
determines that for a period of three continuous years the MCSO has, among other
requirements, “adequately investigated and adjudicated all matters that come to its
attention that should be investigated no matter how ascertained, has done so consistently,
and has fairly applied its disciplinary policies and matrices with respect to all MCSO
employees regardless of command level.” (Id. ¶ 288). For the Court to be able to make
this determination, the Monitor has the authority to inquire and report on all MCSO internal
affairs investigations—not just those involving CRMs. (Id. ¶ 289). This requirement was
“necessitated” by the facts that showed that MCSO “manipulate[d] internal affairs
investigations other than those that ha[d] a direct relation to the Plaintiff class.” (Id. ¶ 290).
The Monitor has “full access to all MCSO internal affairs investigations or matters that
might have been the subject of an internal affairs investigation by the MCSO.” (Id. ¶ 292).
Furthermore, as the temporary Constitutional Policing Authority while the backlog
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remains, the Monitor has the “authority to oversee all of MCSO’s complaint intake and
routing,” which includes the ability to “make determinations and establish policy decisions
pertaining to backlog reduction.” (Doc. 2830 ¶ 346). The Monitor has the “power to audit
and review decisions made with respect to individual cases and, if necessary, to change
such designations.” (Id. ¶ 347).
In light of the Monitor’s mandate under the Internal Affairs Orders, the relevant
“durable remedy” inquiry is whether Defendants have established that, absent judicial
supervision, MCSO will continue to uniformly investigate misconduct and apply
appropriate, uniform, and fair discipline at all levels of command. See, e.g., Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 353 n.9 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is of course true that
actions by police must comport with the Constitution. Police departments and prosecutors
have an obligation to instill this understanding in officers, and to discipline those found to
have violated the Constitution.”); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1181 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (In addition to written policies, training, supervision, and investigation, “a
meaningful disciplinary system is essential, for if there are no sanctions imposed for
misconduct, [an organization’s] policies and procedures become a dead letter.”). The
answer is currently no.
i. Jackson’s Good-Faith Framework
First, under Jackson’s good-faith framework, Defendants’ argument falls flat. Here,
the record does not demonstrate a history of “sustained good-faith efforts to remedy federal
violations and, to the extent possible, eliminate the vestiges of the federal violation.”
Jackson, 880 F.3d at 1203. Defendants claim that the Court “ordered MCSO to track
CRMs in response to former Sheriff Arpaio’s failure to follow the Court’s first order.”
(Doc. 3496 at 7 (emphasis added)). This framing completely omits the role that Sheriff
Sheridan—then, as Chief Deputy—played in the manipulation of the disciplinary process
for misconduct levied against members of the Plaintiff class.
At the time, Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO policy had delegated “all authority regarding
internal affairs investigations within the MCSO” to Chief Deputy Sheridan. (Doc. 1677
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¶ 389). He had the “authority to make all findings in internal affairs investigations.” (Id.
¶ 397). Yet Chief Deputy Sheridan misused that authority to the detriment of the Plaintiff
class. He personally obstructed disciplinary hearings against himself for his failure to
implement the Court’s preliminary injunction. (Id. ¶¶ 435–55). He manipulated the timing
of major investigations into misconduct against the Plaintiff class to prevent the imposition
of any discipline. (Id. ¶¶ 574–83). He even went so far as to direct—without any written
decision or factual inquiry—the vacatur of final disciplinary records reflecting sustained
allegations of misconduct against the Plaintiff class in an attempt to, as described by the
Court, “change history.” (Id. ¶¶ 752–64). The Court found that “Chief Deputy Sheridan’s
directive” to “change the already established facts of the disciplinary adjudication”
transcended “the authority given to Sheriff Arpaio or his designee by MCSO policy and
[was] an abuse of that authority.” (Id. ¶ 759).
In sum, Chief Deputy Sheridan “manipulated the Internal Affairs process at the
MCSO to ensure that many employees”—including himself—“were disciplined in a
relatively lenient manner or not at all for violating the right of the Plaintiff class.” (Doc.
1765 at 15). This weighs strongly against the finding of a durable remedy under Jackson.
Considering this history of “egregious and extraordinary” misconduct (Doc. 1765 at 2),
more is needed from Sheriff Sheridan to demonstrate that the Court’s internal affairs
reforms are durable. The Court has not been able to weigh any future commitment from
Sherrif Sheridan to continue these reforms absent Court supervision. He has not submitted
an affidavit or testified in support of this motion.
ii. Durability of Reforms Absent Supervision
Second, the durability question is—itself—built into the Court’s orders. Paragraph
288 considers the durability of reforms and returns the final authority of the Sheriff over
CRMs when MCSO has demonstrated, for a period of three continuous years, that it
appropriately, uniformly, and fairly applies its disciplinary policies with respect to all
MCSO employees. (Doc. 1765 ¶ 288). It has not yet been able to make that showing.
(Doc. 3509 at 306–07 (finding MCSO not in compliance with the provision)). By contrast,
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in Shakman—which found that the Governor of Illinois had “identified and instituted
durable remedies to help ensure that compliance sticks”—though the district court had
“expanded the special master’s duties to include review of all positions under the
Governor’s authority,” it “set no deadline for either the special master to complete her
review or for the Governor to demonstrate sufficient compliance with the decree.” 43 F.4th
at 726 (emphasis added). There is no similar concern in this case: the Court has set forth
what a durable remedy looks like and imposed a clear expiration date of when PSB
oversight will end.
Defendants highlight that the Monitor has concurred with MCSO’s handling of all
CRMs. (Doc. 3496 at 8). They point out that there have been 162 CRMs involving the
Plaintiff class in the last decade, of which ten resulted in a sustained finding of misconduct.
(Id.). Certainly, MCSO has dedicated substantial efforts towards prioritizing CRMs and
ensuring that it is working side-by-side with the Monitoring Team to investigate complaints
of misconduct against the Plaintiff class. But as Plaintiffs point out, Defendants’ own
description of the process demonstrates that it is substantially aided by federal supervision
itself:
MCSO works closely with the Monitoring Team on Class
Remedial Matters (“CRMs”), which receive investigative
priority. Every complaint with a Latino surname goes through
the CRM vetting process. The complaint is initially put onto
the CRM list, reviewed, and briefed. . . . The Monitor Team
meets with PSB every two weeks to track the progress of
CRMs under investigation, review, and finalization. The
Monitor Team must approve all steps of the process.
(Doc. 3459 at 35 n.11 (quoting Doc. 3399 at 11)).
That is not to fault Defendants for working with the Monitoring Team. That is a
fact to be commended. But again, the Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry here is not whether the
“changed circumstances” are a by-product of compliance with the Court’s order. See
Horne, 557 U.S. at 454, 465–66; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383–93. Defendants must be able to
demonstrate that the reforms are durable once compliance is no longer required. At a
minimum, Defendants needed to have provided evidence—either through a transition plan,
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affidavit, or testimony—demonstrating how they plan on broadly maintaining the PSB
reforms upon termination of federal supervision. They have not made that showing.
Defendants also argue that a durable remedy exists because there are no CRMs in
the backlog. The Monitor rejected this assertion in the latest Quarterly Report, stating that
“there have been numerous occasions where PSB would bring a [CRM] case forward
months – or in some cases, years – after the initial complaint was made.” (Doc. 3509 at
303). The Monitor explained that this occurs because backlog cases—which have been
pending for months, if not years—may not initially be identified as CRMs, but when the
case is finally reviewed during the investigation, the PSB discovers that the allegations
include bias affecting members of the Plaintiff class. (Id.). While the Monitor did not find
MCSO noncompliant for these failures, the Monitor notes that, while the backlog remains,
it is not feasible to make the determination that no CRM cases are in the backlog. (Id.).
Defendants have not yet established that a durable remedy exists by virtue of any lack of
CRMs in the backlog.
iii. Monitor’s Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report
Finally, Defendants have not demonstrated that, even under current judicial
supervision currently, MCSO applies appropriate, uniform, and fair discipline at all levels
of command. As a part of the Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report, the Monitoring Team
conducted an inquiry pursuant to its authority under the Third Order. (Doc. 2830 ¶¶ 346–
47). The inquiry— initiated in April 2025 after the Monitoring Team learned about the
filing of certain complaints of misconduct against the Commander of the Professional
Standards Bureau, Captain Gregory Lugo—“found blatant disregard by MCSO of
longstanding policies, their review and approval, and of the policy development process.”
(Doc. 3509 at 23). The Monitor concluded that “MCSO failed to engage in appropriate,
uniform, and fair discipline as required by the Court Orders.” (Id. at 179).39 Based on the
Monitor’s report, the Court has serious questions as to the durability of the PSB reforms in
39 The full report can be found at Doc. 3509, pp. 159 to 197. MCSO’s response is
available at Doc. 3509-4, pp. 1 to 48.
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this case. Two areas in particular stand out.
Manipulation of Prior and Ongoing Disciplinary Proceedings: The Monitor’s
Report identified several instances where members of MCSO Command Staff either
inquired into the possibility of reversing disciplinary decisions, actually reversed such
decisions without a change in circumstances, or sought to change MCSO policy to affect
the outcome of an ongoing investigation. These included:
• Members of incoming MCSO Command Staff inquired into whether the
PSB could investigate closed complaints. (Doc. 3509 at 180).
• Undersheriff Jeffrey Gentry requested Captain Lugo to bring to a meeting
the disciplinary records of two deputies who were found to have been
untruthful as a result of disciplinary violations and placed on the “Brady
List.”40 (Id.). At the meeting, Executive Chief Melissa Palopoli inquired
about PSB’s role in placing members on the Brady List. (Id.).
• After a detention sergeant was arrested for driving under the influence
and placed on administrative leave, Undersheriff Gentry informed
Captain Lugo that he and Sheriff Sheridan were considering changing
MCSO’s DUI policy and inquired into whether changing the policy
would prevent the sergeant from being terminated. (Id. at 181). In
response, Captain Lugo stated that he would need to apply the policy in
a uniform manner to the facts of the investigation. (Id.).
• Captain Lugo previously recommended that Sergeant Aaron Engelbeck,
who was then serving as a probationary lieutenant under Captain Lugo,
not complete his probationary period based on deficient performance
issues. (Id. at 182). Sergeant Engelbeck was then the subject of a PSB
investigation for insubordination. (Id.). After a disciplinary hearing in
front of Hearing Officer Kenneth Holmes, the allegations of
insubordination were sustained in October 2024, and Sergeant Engelbeck
received a one-week suspension. (Id.). While Sergeant Engelbeck’s
suspension was pending appeal before the Maricopa County Merit
40 Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972), prosecutors must disclose evidence favorable to criminal defendants.
This includes impeachment evidence that affects the credibility of government witnesses,
including law enforcement officers. In Arizona, prosecutors use the “Rule 15.1 Disclosure
Database” to track the list of officers who have potential impeachment or credibility
information. Prosecuting agencies—like the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office—make
the determination on whether to place a law enforcement officer’s name in the Rule 15.1
Disclosure Database. See A.R.S. § 38-1119.
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Systems Commission,41 in January 2025, Hearing Officer Holmes issued
a letter to Sergeant Engelbeck overruling his previous decision imposing
discipline. (Id. at 182–83). Hearing Officer Holmes later acknowledged
that such reversal was “very unusual” and that there were no changes in
circumstances between his initial findings and the later reversal. (Id. at
183). The reversal in discipline occurred after Sheriff Sheridan took
office.
• Sergeant Engelbeck—after his discipline was reversed by Hearing
Officer Holmes—submitted a complaint against Captain Lugo with
Undersheriff Gentry for a matter that had previously been resolved during
the previous Sheriff’s administration. This complaint was investigated
by MCSO, even though it had previously been finalized. (Id. at 186).
These events served as the basis, in part, for the Monitor to hold MCSO out of
operational compliance with Paragraph 219. (Doc. 3509 at 252). That paragraph of the
Court’s order states, in full:
The Sheriff shall ensure that discipline for sustained
allegations of misconduct comports with due process, and that
discipline is consistently applied, fair, and based on the nature
of the allegation, and that mitigating and aggravating factors
are identified and consistently applied and documented
regardless of the command level of the principal of the
investigation.
(Doc. 1765 ¶ 219).
The harms from the manipulation of law enforcement misconduct investigations are
severe and pose a great risk to the Plaintiff class and, by extension, the public. See, e.g.,
Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is axiomatic that misconduct
41 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-353 and A.R.S. § 38-1002, Maricopa County created the
“Maricopa County Merit Systems Commission.” Merit Systems Commission, Maricopa
Cnty., https://www.maricopa.gov/380/Merit-Systems-Commission (last visited Aug. 6,
2026). The Commission oversees both the Employee Merit System (under the provisions
of A.R.S. §§ 11-351 through 11-357) and the Law Enforcement Officers’ Merit System
(under the provisions of A.R.S. §§ 38-1001 through 38-1007). Id. “Any appeal concerning
demotion, dismissal or suspension shall be filed . . . not later than ten (10) days following
the date of receipt by the employee of a written order from the appointing authority.” Law
Enforcement Officers’ Merit System Resolution, Maricopa Cnty. 8 (Apr. 2018),
https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16949/Law-Enforcement-Officers-
Merit-System-Resolution-.
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within a police department implicates a matter of public concern, especially when it is
traceable to potentially unconstitutional policies.”); Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia, 719
F.3d 295, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When a citizen lodges a credible complaint of police
misconduct, it is imperative that it is investigated, both to protect the citizen who may be
wronged and the officers who may be falsely accused.”). As this Court explained at length
in the Second Order, the Court had “previously fashioned less intrusive remedies” after the
issuance of the First Order, “but those remedies were not effective due to Defendants’
deliberate failures and manipulations.” (Doc. 1765 at 10). The Court, in its Second
Findings of Fact, determined that Chief Deputy Sheridan sought to “change history” by
vacating the previous disciplinary factual findings in cases sustaining allegations of
misconduct against the Plaintiff class. (Doc. 1677 ¶ 756). Chief Deputy Sheridan then
sought to conceal this reversal from the Court, even though the Court had ordered MCSO
to contemporaneously advise it of any disciplinary decisions and the results of any appeals
involving misconduct against the Plaintiff class. (Id. ¶¶ 756–58). The Court also found
that members of the MCSO Command Staff improperly manipulated the application of
disciplinary matrices “so as to render” any discipline imposed “meaningless.” (Id. ¶ 536).
The manipulation of discipline can have wide-ranging effects. It heightens the risk
of impunity for sustained findings of serious misconduct. For example, the Sheriff has
maintained the authority to vacate final disciplinary findings that, if otherwise sustained,
would require the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office under A.R.S. § 38-1119 to place a
law enforcement officer on the Rule 15.1 “Brady List” database for
impeachment/credibility issues. (Doc. 3447 at 11–12). Inquiring into the reopening of
final disciplinary decisions, or modifying policies while investigations are ongoing to avoid
certain disciplinary outcomes, is inconsistent with the principles of fair, appropriate, and
uniform discipline. While the Court’s orders permit the Sheriff or his designee to rescind,
alter, or revoke disciplinary decisions when acting under his authority under state law (see
Doc. 3448 ¶ 228), the Sheriff is not permitted under the Court’s orders to “alter discipline
in a way that violates” the above principles or state law.
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Defendants must demonstrate that they will not, once supervision is released, revert
to practices in which internal affairs investigations are improperly conducted, resolved
arbitrarily, or result in inadequate discipline for sustained findings of serious misconduct
as it pertains to members of the Plaintiff class. The Monitor’s Forty-Sixth Quarterly Report
casts serious doubts on whether they can indeed do so.
Integrity of the PSB’s Structure and Leadership: The Monitor also identified
several incidents that demonstrate ongoing risks to the durability of PSB’s structure and
leadership. These include:
• Deputy Chief Matthew Summers proposed to install Captain Dominick
Reaulo as a co-commander for the PSB in March 2025. Captain Reaulo
previously was the Commander of the Bureau of Internal Oversight
(“BIO). Deputy Chief Summers proposed appointing Captain W. Cory
Morrison as Captain Reaulo’s replacement in BIO. (Doc. 3509 at 187).42
Deputy Chief Summers authored a memo in support of Captain
Morrison’s transfer to BIO to influence the Monitor’s approval of the
transfer, even though he was aware that Captain Morrison’s prior
disciplinary history made him ineligible for the position. Id. at 189–90).
• Captain Lugo, in a meeting with Command Staff, expressed concerns
with the proposed PSB dual-commander structure. He also expressed
concerns with Sergeant Engelbeck’s March 2025 complaint, believing
that it was motivated by retaliation for his previous recommendation that
Sergeant Engelbeck not receive a promotion due to performance issues.
(Id. at 191–92).
• Two days after the meeting with Command Staff, Captain Lugo was
placed on leave. Executive Chief Palopoli also filed a complaint for
insubordination against him for allegedly accessing the Engelbeck
complaint. The two complaints were investigated by the Arizona
Department of Public Safety for any criminal violations. None were
found. (Id. at 192–93). The complaints were also reviewed by an
independent investigator to determine whether Captain Lugo committed
any administrative violations. The independent investigator determined
that any allegations involving violations of MCSO policy were either
unfounded, not sustained, or required exoneration. (Id. at 194).
42 The Court denied MCSO’s request for the proposed co-captaincy structure in
November 2025, finding that the Court’s orders did not provide for such a structure. (Doc.
3305 at 11–14).
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• After the independent investigator’s findings, Captain Lugo returned
from his leave of absence. However, MCSO Command Staff sought to
transfer Captain Lugo out of PSB and into the Court Implementation
Division (“CID”). The Monitor denied the request transfer, finding that
it was retaliatory. (Id. at 196). Then, without the Monitor’s approval,
MCSO placed Captain Reaulo—who was the Deputy Commander of the
PSB—as the PSB Commander and placed Captain Lugo as the PSB
Deputy Commander. (Id. at 197). The Court determined on March 13,
2026, that Captain Reaulo’s elevation and Captain Lugo’s demotion were
in violation of the Court’s orders. (Doc. 3422).
As a result of these events, MCSO was deemed out of operational compliance with a
number of provisions in the Court’s orders prohibiting retaliation in the context of the IA
system. (Doc. 3509 at 167, 204–05 (holding MCSO out of compliance with ¶ 102, ¶ 168,
and ¶ 169)).
Under the Court’s orders, the PSB Commander is tasked with the important role of
ensuring that MCSO is complying with the Court’s IA requirements. The Commander of
the PSB is charged with ensuring that IA “investigations comply with MCSO policy and
all requirements” of the Court’s orders, “including those related to training, investigators’
disciplinary backgrounds, and conflicts of interest.” (Doc. 1765 ¶ 194). He has the
“ultimate authority within the MCSO for reaching the findings of investigations and
preliminarily determining any discipline to be imposed.” (Id. ¶ 197).
Lack of stability at the top of command at the PSB poses substantial risk to the
timely and thorough completion of internal affairs investigations. For example, during
Captain Lugo’s absence from the PSB during his administrative leave, the MCSO fell well
short of their PSB backlog reduction requirements under the Third and Fourth Orders.
(Doc. 3497). While the Sheriff has the authority to manage his office and appoint a
“qualified Commander” of the PSB (Doc. 1765 ¶ 197), MCSO must still comply with the
remaining provisions of the Court’s orders to durably remedy past defects that
“permeate[d] the internal affairs investigatory processes.” (Id. at 11). The Commander of
the PSB must be able to carry out of his duties—and effectuate the Court’s requirements—
to ensure the organization continues to meet its mission of “ensur[ing] that MCSO
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employees adhere to the highest ethical standards.” (Doc. 3307 at 2 n.1). These recent
events involving Captain Lugo do not give the Court confidence in MCSO’s continued
ability to do so, absent oversight.
If Defendants wish to rebut the Monitor’s report for the purposes of finding a
durable remedy, further proceedings—involving testimony or presentation of evidence
from MCSO Command Staff and key PSB personnel—are necessary to demonstrate
MCSO’s commitment to ensuring discipline is appropriately, uniformly, and fairly
imposed.43
* * *
Defendants’ request for full termination of the Court’s orders under the equity prong
of Rule 60(b)(5) is denied.
B. Partial Relief is Not Warranted
Defendants are not entitled to any partial relief under Rule 60(b)(5). First,
Defendants have not demonstrated full compliance with all provisions of the Court’s
orders, so the judgment against them has not yet been satisfied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
Second, Defendants’ arguments for partial termination based on the equity prong of Rule
60(b)(5) and Rule 60(b)(6) largely repeat their previous arguments seeking full termination
or improperly attack prior legal conclusions.
1. Satisfaction
Defendants list a host of paragraphs that the Court should terminate on an individual
basis for satisfaction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“[T]he court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if “the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged.”). They first state the Court should terminate all
paragraphs for which the Monitor has concurred in MCSO’s assertions of Full and
Effective Compliance. (Doc. 3368 at 16). They next ask the Court to terminate all
43 To the extent that Defendants allege that the issuance of the Monitor’s Forty-Sixth
Quarterly Report was aimed at deterring the success of this Rule 60(b) motion (Doc. 3544
at 31:03-07), the special inquiry began before (April 2025) Defendants filed this present
request (December 2025) for relief. (Doc. 3509 at 349).
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paragraphs with which MCSO is in compliance, even if MCSO has not yet asserted Full
and Effective Compliance or maintained compliance for the required three-year period.
(Id. at 16–18). Finally, they ask the Court to terminate a separate set of provisions that are
either definitional or impose one-time obligations on MCSO. (Id. at 19).
The Court’s orders in this case establish a highly integrated remedial framework in
which many provisions serve as the foundation for others. As a result, the provisions are
not necessarily severable. Defendants have not undertaken the analysis necessary to
demonstrate which provisions can be terminated without impairing the continued
implementation of the remaining remedial scheme. Accordingly, partial termination is not
warranted at this stage. The Court has below, however, recommend a framework for the
parties to consider as they move forward. See infra Section III.D.
Furthermore, Defendants do not address Paragraph 1(r) and Paragraph 3, which
define when Defendants’ obligations in this case will be discharged. (Doc. 606 ¶¶ 1(r), 3).
Only once Defendants have reached “compliance with all relevant provisions” of the
Court’s orders and “maintained such compliance for no less than three years” can they
demonstrate that their obligations in this case have been fully discharged. (Id.);
Satisfaction of judgment, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); 47 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 1006, at 443 (1995). They have not met that level of compliance to warrant
the judgment “satisfied.”
Defendants’ argument that “Rule 60 relief is available on a partial basis if relief
from the entire order or judgment is unavailable” is incorrect here. (Contra Doc. 3368 at
16 (citing United Com. Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir.
1992))). Defendants elide a key distinction between Paymaster Corp. and this case. In
Paymaster Corp.—which involved legal, rather than equitable, remedies (i.e., money
damages)—the parties disputed the remaining judgment amount in light of two post-
judgment settlement agreements. 962 F.2d at 855. The defendant therefore moved for
partial relief under Rule 60(b)(5), arguing that the agreements reduced the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages it owed. Id. Paymaster Corp. thus demonstrates that
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partial relief based on “satisfaction” may well be available where portions of a court’s
judgment are severable or reducible, as is often the case for monetary judgments. But it
does not stand for the broad proposition that partial relief based on “satisfaction” is always
available, particularly in the context of equitable remedies that require compliance with all
injunctive provisions before the proceedings may be terminated.
Defendants cite no authority holding that, in the context of an injunctive judgment,
partial termination is always available, even if the Court’s orders define when the parties’
obligations will be satisfied. The doctrine of “substantial performance” is not applicable
here either. (Contra Doc. 3368 at 16). In the context of consent decrees, the Ninth Circuit
construes “satisfaction” to mean “substantial compliance” or “substantial performance.”
Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278, 283–84 (9th Cir. 2011) (defining the doctrine as “something
less than a strict and literal compliance with the contract provisions,” such that “any
deviation from literal compliance [does] not defeat the essential purposes of the decrees”).
“Because consent decrees have many of the attributes of ordinary contracts and should be
construed basically as contracts,” contract law principles—such as substantial
performance—generally govern requests to modify a consent decree. Id. (citation
modified). However, this case does not involve a consent decree. Thus, the “substantial
performance” standard does not govern here because the Court’s injunctive orders cannot
be construed as “contracts” in any sense.
At oral argument, the United States claimed that the “substantial compliance”
standard applies to involuntary judgments. (Doc. 3544 at 35:12-19 (citing Spangler v.
Pasadena City Bd. Of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979)). But Spangler, which dealt
with an institutional reform injunction remedying de jure public school segregation, makes
no mention of Rule 60(b)(5). Instead, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis involved an
“[a]pplication of equitable principles” that more closely resembles the framework that the
Horne Court set forth under the third ground of Rule 60(b)(5)—equity. See Spangler, 611
F.2d at 1241 (considering “the nature and scope of the constitutional violation,” the
“remedial objective” of the injunction, and “the interests of state and local authorities in
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managing their own affairs.”). Satisfaction, however, is covered under the first ground in
Rule 60(b)(5). Spangler thus is inapposite here as well.
And finally, Defendants contend that other circuit courts apply the doctrine of
substantial performance to involuntary judgments. (Doc. 3368 at 16 (first citing Jackson,
880 F.3d at 1198; and then citing Chisom v. Louisiana, 116 F.4th 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2024)
(en banc))). But the cases Defendants cite do not so hold. In Jackson, while the Tenth
Circuit stated that it “considers a consent decree and an injunctive order equivalent for
purposes of evaluating a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for modification,” it made that statement in
reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne, which used “consent decree”
interchangeably with “injunction.” 880 F.3d at 1198–99. But Horne only clarified the
legal standard for the third ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(5) (equity), and it did not set
forth any legal standard for “satisfaction” under the first ground for relief. And in Chisom,
the Fifth Circuit held that the appropriate standard in assessing satisfaction under Rule
60(b)(5) for consent decrees is “substantial compliance.” 116 F.4th at 318–19 (reaffirming
“the application of state contract law to motions to dissolve consent decrees under the first
prong of Rule 60(b)(5)”). Chisom does not address whether that standard for “satisfaction”
applies to involuntary judgments.44
Defendants’ request for partial termination based on satisfaction is denied.
2. Equitability of Prospective Relief or Lack of Justification
Lastly, Defendants ask the Court to terminate certain provisions on the basis that
enforcement is no longer equitable or justified. (Doc. 3368 at 21–30). They state that these
paragraphs are untethered to the initial violations that gave rise to this case and thus exceed
44 Defendants cite Chisom for the proposition that some circuits “require only the
elimination of the prior constitutional violation and good faith compliance with prospective
requirements.” (Doc. 3368 at 16 (citing Chisom, 116 F.4th at 318)). This misreads Chisom.
There, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected a standard for satisfaction that considered “good
faith” compliance with a consent decree because it “ignore[ed] basic contract principles
and instead impos[ed] a new burden of proof on the State.” Chisom, 116 F.4th at 318
(finding that the district court erred when assessing the State’s argument for satisfaction
under the first prong of Rule 60(b)(5) by using the “flexible standard” typically applied to
institutional reform decrees).
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the Court’s jurisdiction, or that the provisions are vague or arbitrarily assessed by the
Monitor. (Id. at 21).
Defendants’ arguments here relitigate what has already been decided and ask the
Court to retrace old legal ground. This is improper in a Rule 60(b) inquiry. Horne, 557
U.S. at 447; 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2863. The Ninth
Circuit has already rejected Defendants’ arguments here. Melendres IV, 897 F.3d at 1220
(rejecting Defendants’ argument that the “district court failed to tailor the terms of the
second supplemental injunction to remedy the constitutional and court order violations it
found”); Melendres V, 113 F.4th at 1139 (rejecting Defendants’ vagueness arguments
against the Third Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which requires that “an
injunction order must state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail the act
or acts restrained or required” (citation modified)). Defendants are not entitled to a third
bite at the apple.
C. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6) is Denied
Defendants half-heartedly assert that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is warranted “based
on extraordinary circumstances, including prolonged and burdensome processes covering
even the most minute aspects of running a democratic institution long after Sheriff Arpaio
and his immigration policies are no longer effective.” (Doc. 3496 at 21). But this
barebones, one-sentence argument found on the last page of Defendants’ reply brief is
legally insufficient to satisfy the “extraordinary circumstances” test. Courts “will not
manufacture arguments” for a litigant, and “a bare assertion does not preserve a claim,
particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review.” See Greenwood
v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). No relief under Rule 60(b)(6)
can thus be granted here.
D. Reduced Monitoring May Be Appropriate
Lastly, the Court addresses Defendants’ arguments concerning the dynamics of
institutional reform litigation and federalism. (Doc. 3368 at 12). These considerations,
while important, do not carry as much weight here as they might under other facts.
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Several of the concerns with “the dynamics of institutional reform litigation” that
animated the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne are not present in this case. See Horne,
557 U.S. at 448–49. As the Horne Court observed: “Scholars have noted that public
officials sometimes consent to, or refrain from vigorously opposing, decrees that go well
beyond what is required by federal law.” Id. at 448; id. at 449 (“Nominal defendants [in
institutional reform cases] are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose.” (citing
Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1294–95)). Critically in Horne, “[t]he defendants did
not appeal any of the District Court’s orders, and the record suggest[ed] that some state
officials supported their continued enforcement.” Id. at 442.
In many respects, this case could not be more different, particularly given the
vigorous opposition demonstrated by Defendants. The parties have vigorously litigated
the Court’s orders—including the preliminary injunction, First Order, Second Order, and
Third Order. The Court held not one but two trials to resolve the initial complaint and the
later-discovered misconduct. The Ninth Circuit has issued five published decisions in this
case. Accordingly, the Court’s remedial orders have been repeatedly tested through
extensive litigation and appellate review.
Defendants’ federalism objections are also attenuated under these facts. As the
Court explained in the Second Order:
Under the facts of this case, the Court has fashioned remedies
which account for and balance the need to respect the
prerogatives of state officials with the need to prevent them
from exercising their discretion in a way that violates
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the need to provide a
remedy for the past deprivation of those rights. The Court
previously fashioned less intrusive remedies, but those
remedies were not effective due to Defendants’ deliberate
failures and manipulations. The Court must do what is
necessary to achieve the end goal of “restoring the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of that conduct” and eventually
restoring authority to MCSO command staff, once there is a
“system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution.”
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(Doc. 1765 at 10–11 (citations omitted)). Certainly, once a party has demonstrated that
“the objects of the [injunction] [has] been attained, responsibility for discharging the
State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.” Frew ex rel. v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004). However, Defendants have not demonstrated that the
objects of the Court’s orders have been obtained. See supra Section III(A)(1). And while
the Sheriff of Maricopa County is elected and democratically accountable to the people,
federal courts must still utilize “whatever powers are necessary to remedy constitutional
violations because they are charged with protecting these rights.” Stone v. City & County
of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh’g (Aug.
25, 1992). To be sure, “federal courts should exercise the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed.” Id. (citation modified). But considering the “extraordinary
circumstances” necessitating the remedies imposed in this case, cf. Shakman, 43 F.4th at
731, continued judicial supervision remains appropriate.45
Nonetheless, the Court is mindful of the passage of time. When the Court issued its
First Order, it could not have anticipated either the breadth of the remedial measures that
would ultimately prove necessary or the duration of these proceedings. Although the
passage of time alone does not guide the Court’s analysis, the Court recognizes the burdens
that continued monitoring may impose when it is no longer necessary in light of sustained
compliance. Accordingly, the Court has conducted a preliminary analysis of the
severability of the provisions in its orders. The Court has identified three broad categories
of provisions: (1) paragraphs that may be appropriate for termination; (2) paragraphs that
45 Defendants, citing Horne, 557 U.S. at 448, claim that the Court’s orders “have
the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities.” (Doc. 3368 at 15 (citation
modified)). But Defendants do not—and did not when offered the opportunity by the
Court—grapple with the Monitor’s previous finding in October 2025 that approximately
72% of MCSO’s operational expenses from 2014 to 2024 it publicly attributed to this case
were “misattributed or improperly prorated.” Melendres v. Sheridan, 2026 WL 411745,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2026). As this Court previously held in February 2026, “the issue
of costs cannot be used as an argument against implementing necessary constitutional
reforms.” Id. at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2026) (citing Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S.
526, 537 (1963)).
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may be appropriate for placement in “inactive” status; and (3) paragraphs that may be
appropriate for continued monitoring at this time.
In the first category listed above, the Court tentatively identifies 27 paragraphs that
may be appropriate for termination without impacting the assessment of other active
paragraphs. These paragraphs are listed in Appendix E.
In the second category listed above, the Court tentatively identifies 57 paragraphs
that may be appropriate for “inactive” status. Under this status, the Monitor would
discontinue actively monitoring these requirements because there has been asufficient
duration of performance and compliance on the part of MCSO. If the Court, through the
Monitor or the parties, later learns of any future issue that arises with these “inactive”
provisions while the monitoring of the other active provisions is ongoing, any inactive
provision will reactivate as necessary. These paragraphs are listed in Appendix F.
In the third category listed above, the Court tentatively identifies—in addition to the
other 128 paragraphs that are administrative or define the Monitor’s duties—156
paragraphs that may be appropriate to be maintained for monitoring at this time. These
paragraphs either provide a foundation for the core issues in the case (bias in traffic stops
and appropriate internal affairs investigations); have a significant nexus to other paragraphs
where assessment is still active; relate to MCSO’s capacity to achieve compliance; pertain
to the duties of the Monitor; are currently noncompliant; have not been in Full and Effective
Compliance for three years; or were previously in Full and Effective Compliance but had
the designation rescinded recently. These paragraphs are listed in Appendix G.
Using these categories as a framework, the parties are directed to meet and confer
and issue a joint notice indicating whether they agree to a modification of the Court’s orders
in respect to any of these provisions. The parties shall include whether they have reached
any agreement as to the severability of certain provisions in the Court’s orders.
Furthermore, if the parties are unable to agree on a framework for severability of the
Court’s orders, the Court will discuss setting a hearing with the parties at which they may
argue severability and satisfaction.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Defendants’ motion for relief is denied for a failure to
meet their burden of proof with respect to their obligations under Rule 60(b). The parties
shall submit their joint notice concerning modification or partial modification of any of the
paragraphs of the Court’s orders contained within these exhibits within sixty days of the
date of this order. Upon submission of this notice, the Court will schedule a status
conference if necessary to set a further hearing or hearings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Relief (Doc. 3368)
is DENIED without prejudice.
Dated this 10th day of September, 2026.
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APPENDIX A
The 156 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders which the Monitor has
found MCSO to be in Full and Effective Compliance, as of the Forty-Sixth Quarterly
Report issued on June 12, 2026. (Doc. 3509).
¶ 9
¶ 10
¶ 11
¶ 12
¶ 13
¶ 19
¶ 21
¶ 22
¶ 23
¶ 24
¶ 26
¶ 27
¶ 28
¶ 31
¶ 34
¶ 35
¶ 36
¶ 37
¶ 38
¶ 39
¶ 40
¶ 43
¶ 44
¶ 45
¶ 47
¶ 48
¶ 49
¶ 50
¶ 51
¶ 52
¶ 53
¶ 55
¶ 57
¶ 58
¶ 59
¶ 60
¶ 61
¶ 62
¶ 63
¶ 66
¶ 68
¶ 71
¶ 73
¶ 74
¶ 75
¶ 76
¶ 77
¶ 78
¶ 80
¶ 83
¶ 84
¶ 85
¶ 86
¶ 88
¶ 89
¶ 90
¶ 91
¶ 93
¶ 94
¶ 101
¶ 103
¶ 104
¶ 105
¶ 106
¶ 113
¶ 114
¶ 116
¶ 170
¶ 171
¶ 172
¶ 174
¶ 175
¶ 176
¶ 177
¶ 178
¶ 179
¶ 180
¶ 181
¶ 182
¶ 184
¶ 185
¶ 186
¶ 187
¶ 188
¶ 189
¶ 190
¶ 191
¶ 192
¶ 193
¶ 196
¶ 197
¶ 198
¶ 199
¶ 200
¶ 201
¶ 202
¶ 203
¶ 205
¶ 206
¶ 207
¶ 208
¶ 209
¶ 210
¶ 212
¶ 213
¶ 214
¶ 215
¶ 217
¶ 218
¶ 222
¶ 224
¶ 225
¶ 229
¶ 230
¶ 231
¶ 232
¶ 233
¶ 234
¶ 235
¶ 236
¶ 238
¶ 239
¶ 240
¶ 241
¶ 242
¶ 243
¶ 244
¶ 245
¶ 246
¶ 247
¶ 248
¶ 249
¶ 250
¶ 251
¶ 252
¶ 253
¶ 254
¶ 255
¶ 256
¶ 257
¶ 258
¶ 259
¶ 260
¶ 264
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T286
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APPENDIX B
The 35 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders which the Monitor has
found MCSO to be in Phase 2 compliance, but MCSO has not asserted or achieved Full
and Effective Compliance. (Doc. 3509).
¶ 25
¶ 42
¶ 56
¶ 64
¶ 65
¶ 67
¶ 69
¶ 87
¶ 92
¶ 95
¶ 96
¶ 97
¶ 98
¶ 99
¶ 100
¶ 216
¶ 267
¶ 269
¶ 270
¶ 338
¶ 339
¶ 340
¶ 341
¶ 342
¶ 343
¶ 344
¶ 345
¶ 350
¶ 355
¶ 356
¶ 357
¶ 358
¶ 364
¶ 365
¶ 368
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APPENDIX C
The 46 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders which the Monitor has
found MCSO to not be in Phase 2 compliance. (Doc. 3509).
¶ 14
¶ 15
¶ 16
¶ 17
¶ 29
¶ 30
¶ 32
¶ 33
¶ 54
¶ 70
¶ 72
¶ 79
¶ 81
¶ 102
¶ 163
¶ 165
¶ 166
¶ 167
¶ 168
¶ 169
¶ 173
¶ 194
¶ 195
¶ 204
¶ 211
¶ 219
¶ 220
¶ 221
¶ 223
¶ 226
¶ 227
¶ 228
¶ 266
¶ 268
¶ 281
¶ 288
¶ 289
¶ 291
¶ 292
¶ 293
¶ 346
¶ 347
¶ 348
¶ 353
¶ 361
¶ 362
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APPENDIX D
The 3 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders which the Monitor has
deferred assessment. (Doc. 3509).
¶ 46 ¶ 115 ¶ 300
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APPENDIX E
The 27 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders that may be appropriate
for dismissal.
¶ 23
¶ 58
¶ 78
¶ 83
¶ 93
¶ 103
¶ 106
¶ 177
¶ 198
¶ 218
¶ 229
¶ 230
¶ 231
¶ 235
¶ 236
¶ 242
¶ 244
¶ 247
¶ 254
¶ 255
¶ 256
¶ 257
¶ 258
¶ 259
¶ 260
¶ 272
¶ 273
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APPENDIX F
The 57 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders that may be appropriate
to be placed in a newly-designated “inactive” category.
¶ 24
¶ 26
¶ 27
¶ 28
¶ 35
¶ 36
¶ 37
¶ 38
¶ 39
¶ 40
¶ 57
¶ 61
¶ 63
¶ 68
¶ 77
¶ 80
¶ 85
¶ 88
¶ 89
¶ 101
¶ 104
¶ 105
¶ 113
¶ 114
¶ 175
¶ 182
¶ 186
¶ 187
¶ 190
¶ 191
¶ 192
¶ 193
¶ 199
¶ 201
¶ 203
¶ 205
¶ 207
¶ 208
¶ 212
¶ 215
¶ 217
¶ 222
¶ 224
¶ 225
¶ 232
¶ 233
¶ 234
¶ 238
¶ 239
¶ 240
¶ 241
¶ 243
¶ 245
¶ 246
¶ 250
¶ 271
¶ 287
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APPENDIX G
The 156 paragraphs in the Court’s supplemental injunctive orders that may be appropriate
for maintaining monitoring at this time.
¶ 9
¶ 10
¶ 11
¶ 12
¶ 13
¶ 14
¶ 15
¶ 16
¶ 17
¶ 19
¶ 21
¶ 22
¶ 25
¶ 29
¶ 30
¶ 31
¶ 32
¶ 33
¶ 34
¶ 42
¶ 43
¶ 44
¶ 45
¶ 46
¶ 47
¶ 48
¶ 49
¶ 50
¶ 51
¶ 52
¶ 53
¶ 54
¶ 55
¶ 56
¶ 59
¶ 60
¶ 62
¶ 64
¶ 65
¶ 66
¶ 67
¶ 69
¶ 70
¶ 71
¶ 72
¶ 73
¶ 74
¶ 75
¶ 76
¶ 79
¶ 81
¶ 84
¶ 86
¶ 87
¶ 90
¶ 91
¶ 92
¶ 94
¶ 95
¶ 96
¶ 97
¶ 98
¶ 99
¶ 100
¶ 102
¶ 115
¶ 116
¶ 163
¶ 165
¶ 166
¶ 167
¶ 168
¶ 169
¶ 170
¶ 171
¶ 172
¶ 173
¶ 174
¶ 176
¶ 178
¶ 179
¶ 180
¶ 181
¶ 184
¶ 185
¶ 188
¶ 189
¶ 194
¶ 195
¶ 196
¶ 197
¶ 200
¶ 202
¶ 204
¶ 206
¶ 209
¶ 210
¶ 211
¶ 213
¶ 214
¶ 216
¶ 219
¶ 220
¶ 221
¶ 223
¶ 226
¶ 227
¶ 228
¶ 248
¶ 249
¶ 251
¶ 252
¶ 253
¶ 264
¶ 265
¶ 266
¶ 267
¶ 268
¶ 269
¶ 270
¶ 276
¶ 278
¶ 279
¶ 281
¶ 282
¶ 284
¶ 286
¶ 288
¶ 289
¶ 291
¶ 292
¶ 293
¶ 300
¶ 337
¶ 338
¶ 339
¶ 340
¶ 341
¶ 342
¶ 343
¶ 344
¶ 345
¶ 346
¶ 347
¶ 348
¶ 350
¶ 353
¶ 355
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