Shannon v. Byers et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
ROYDELL SHANNON 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 6:25-cv-06124-SOH-MEF
SUPERINTENDENT JAMES BYERS;
DEPUTY DIRECTOR AUNDREA CULCLAGER;
DIRECTOR DEXTER PAYNE;
CHIEF DEPUTY MARSHALL DALE REED;
SGT. JAWAUN LEE 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was directly assigned
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to General Order 2024-02, but not all parties to the
action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly,
for the purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically
be reassigned to United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey and referred to the undersigned for
a report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on November 24, 2025. (ECF No. 1). On December 1, 2025,
the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to submit an Amended Complaint to address
deficiencies in his Complaint. 	(ECF No. 6). 	Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint on
December 16, 2025, but he did not provide dates for two of his three claims in his Complaint,
instead stating “culmination of dates over my time here.” (ECF No. 7). Accordingly, the Court
entered an Order directing him to file a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff did
so on December 30, 2025. (ECF No. 9).
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”)
Ouachita River Unit. 	His claims center on his placement in either punitive or administrative
isolation0F
1 in that Unit on unidentified dates for unspecified periods of time after a disciplinary
charge which Plaintiff alleges was false. Plaintiff does not give the specific periods that he was in
isolation; instead, he states that he provides dates that are indicative of when he submitted
complaints to Defendants about his claims. (Id. at 4).
For Claim One, Plaintiff names Defendant Payne, Culclager, Reed, and Byers. (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants received complaints about the violations Plaintiff suffered,
and they refused to put an end to the practices. (Id. at 4-5). He states his rights were violated by
libel, torture, deprivation of sleep, denial of the right to purchase postage and writing materials.1F
2
(Id. at 4). 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Reed, Payne and Culclager are in the position to
reprimand Warden Byer for these unethical practices and policy regarding inmates in isolation.
(Id. at 5). He alleges he suffered a loss of privileges and freedoms without due process. (Id.). He
alleges he was deprived of sleep, which worsened his hypertension and caused him mental anguish,
emotional distress, and loss of property. (Id.). Plaintiff does not describe the reason for his loss
of sleep in the individual capacity portion of his claim, but he refers to constant illumination in the
official capacity portion. In support of his official capacity portion of this claim, Plaintiff alleges
the constant illumination, libel by officers on disciplinary reports, denial of use of camera evidence
that could be used to exonerate inmates, and passive aggressive tactics used against inmates’ “use
of the grievance.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges the staff and administrative cover each others backs to
cover each other’s “indiscretions and unbecoming actions or inactions.” (Id.).
1 Plaintiff refers to both types of placement and does not specify which type for each claim.
2 Plaintiff does not state why he wanted writing materials in this claim, but in his second claim he
states he was unable to correspond with his family.
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
For his second claim, Plaintiff names Defendants Payne, Culclager, Reed and Byers. (Id.
at 6). Plaintiff alleges he spent “days in a constantly illuminated cell, deprived of sleep, suffered
physical and mental anguish because I was not allowed to communicate with my family though
mail.” (Id.). He alleges the lack of sleep caused a “massive spike” in his blood pressure, which
led to chest pain, headaches and dizziness. 	He alleges Defendants Payne, Culclager, Reed and
Byers refused to stop the “wanton infliction: of emotional distress” and failed to protect him. (Id.).
As his official capacity portion of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were made aware
of the constant illumination of isolation and administrative segregation cells and the denial of
writing materials, and they failed to stop such violations. (Id. at 7).
For his third claim, Plaintiff alleges that on January 28, 2024, Defendant Lee violated his
federal and state constitutional rights to be free from libel or slander. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Lee made false and libelous statements in a disciplinary knowing that a disciplinary
action is not grievable and inmates cannot use video to support our innocence. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Lee destroyed state property and blamed it on him. 	(Id.). 	As a result,
Plaintiff was placed in isolation, reduced to Class 4, and lost all privileges and good time credit.
(Id.). 	He alleges Defendant Lee’s actions caused him mental anguish, stress, outrage, and
contributed to spikes in his blood pressure. (Id.). As his official capacity portion of this claim,
Plaintiff alleges that his right to be free from libel was violated, as was his right to equal protection
and due process. (Id. at 8-9).
Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and other damages. 	(Id. at 9). 	He seeks a
declaratory judgment and a total monetary award of $340,000. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than
vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). The complaint must, however, still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff failed to state any plausible constitutional claims in his Second Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff has alleged that he was subject to libel and defamation. Slander, defamation,
and humiliation, while unprofessional and distasteful conduct, do not state a constitutional
violation. “[D]efamation, per se, is not actionable under section 1983. Underwood v. Pritchard,
638 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981). 	The Supreme Court has held that a person’s interest in his
reputation is not considered liberty or property protected by the due process clause. Paul v. Davis,
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). 	In other words, the “Supreme Court has made clear that federal
courts are not to view defamatory acts as constitutional violations.” 	Boyanowski v. Capital Area
Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2000). Similarly, the filing of a false disciplinary
charge against an inmate is not actionable under § 1983 unless it is filed in retaliation for the
inmate’s exercise of a constitutional right. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff does not allege that he was a victim of retaliation for exercising a constitutional right.
Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process concerning his disciplinary charge because he
was not permitted to use camera evidence to exonerate himself against a charge for destruction of
state property. He alleges his charge resulted in loss of good time credit, as well as privileges and
inmate class status. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and
the full panoply of rights due a defendant does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974). In general, when a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits:
the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2)
an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action.... [In addition,] the findings of the prison disciplinary board
[must be] supported by some evidence in the record.
Espinoza v. Peterson, 283 F.3d 949, 951–52 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 454 (1985). “The ‘some evidence’ standard is deferential to prison officials, and it does
not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. If there is any evidence in the record that could support
the finding of the disciplinary authority, then the sanctions comport with due process.” 	Heil v.
Eischen, No. 23-CV-3843 (JRT/TNL), 2025 WL 581549, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CV 23-3843 (JRT/TNL), 2025 WL 580938 (D. Minn. Feb. 21,
2025) (quoting Flowers v. Anderson, 661 F.3d 977, 980 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up)).
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied a disciplinary charge hearing, complete
with advance notice, a written evidentiary statement, and the opportunity to defend himself.
Instead, he alleges only that he was denied the use of camera evidence. He provides no further
details concerning an alleged due process violation concerning his disciplinary charge. 	His
allegations are insufficient to support a plausible claim for a violation of due process concerning
his disciplinary charge. 	See, Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (even a pro se Plaintiff must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim).
Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of conditions of confinement, Plaintiff has not identified
the period or periods of time for which he was housed in isolation (punitive or administrative) in
his Second Amended Complaint. Thus, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of
his conditions of confinement claims.
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied postage and writing materials to write to his family in
isolation. “The purpose of withholding personal mail is to make punitive isolation unpleasant, and
thereby discourage improper behavior and promote security within the prison.” Little v. Norris,
787 F.2d 1241, 1243 (8th Cir. 1986). Provided the amount of time for the denial of communication
is not excessive, such a denial is not a violation of constitutional rights. (Id.) A thirty-day denial
is not excessive. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to constant illumination in his cell, which deprived him
of sleep. 	Constant illumination of a cell can constitute a constitutional violation; however, the
focus of that analysis generally turns on the length of time that an inmate is exposed to that
illumination, as well as other factors. See, e.g., Onstad v. Hobbs, 607 Fed. App'x 595, 596 (8th
Cir. 2015) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation when cells were constantly illuminated for
four months). And as was aptly discussed in a recent case in this District:
In Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 88 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1996), for example,
the plaintiff, a detainee, was confined to a “5 ½ by 5 ½ foot cell without a toilet or
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
a sink and was forced to sleep on a mat on the floor under bright lights, which were
on twenty-four hours a day” for approximately fourteen days before he was moved
to a “regular cell.” Id. at 650. Noting that plaintiff “was observed sleeping ninety-
three hours of the fourteen days spent in the vestibule,” the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the “totality of the circumstances—which include the relative short
duration of the confinement, the necessity to keep the detainee under observation
for both his medical condition as well as general safety concerns, and the amount
of time that he spent out of the cell—supports the assertion of legitimate
governmental interest, and therefore, does not constitute a violation of [plaintiff's]
due process rights.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In Shepherd v. Ault, 982 F.Supp.
643 (N.D. Iowa 1997), however, the district court denied summary judgment,
concluding that plaintiffs’ claims that they were subject to constant illumination for
283 and 550 nights, respectively, gives rise to “[v]ery different inferences [ ]
concerning the effects of constant illumination when exposure to that condition is
long term,” including sleep deprivation. Shepherd, 982 F. Supp. at 648.
Scharnhorst v. Cantrell, No. 5:22-CV-05238-TLB-CDC, 2024 WL 3589755, at *20 (W.D. Ark.
July 11, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:22-CV-5238, 2024 WL 3584353
(W.D. Ark. July 30, 2024). Here, Plaintiff has failed to indicate the length of time for which he
was subjected to the alleged constant illumination, despite the opportunity to amend his Complaint
twice. Thus, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a conditions of confinement claim
based on the lighting. 	See, Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (even a pro se Plaintiff must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 9) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 13th day of February 2026.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 6:25-cv-06124-SOH Document 10 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>