6:24-cv-06052•Carter v. McCormick et al
Gesamter Gesetzestext
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HOT SPRINGS DIVISION JOHN PAUL CARTER PLAINTIFF v. Civil No. 6:24-cv-06052-SOH-CDC SHERIFF McCORMICK (Garland County, Arkansas); CHIEF DEPUTY ELROD (Garland County Detention Center) CAPTAIN COSGROVE (GCDC); FOOD DIRECTOR J HUNDHAUSEN (Summit Corp) DEFENDANTS MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation. Currently before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendants Cosgrove, McCormick and Elrod (Garland County Defendants) (ECF No. 46) and Defendant Hundhausen. (ECF No. 49). I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 12, 2024. (ECF No. 1). He was directed to file an Amended Complaint and did so on April 24, 2024. (ECF Nos. 3, 6). Plaintiff identifies himself as a pretrial detainee and characterizes his claim as one for his conditions of confinement. (ECF No. 6 at 2, 4). Plaintiff alleges that on March 14, 2024, he was eating his evening meal when he noticed something prickly and spit it out. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff identifies the prickly object as a castor bean. (Id.). Officer Rivers, a Garland County Detention Center employee, took a picture of the bean and downloaded it to a GCDC system. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges he is still in possession of the castor bean. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hundhausen served him a castor bean, knowing that castor beans had been found numerous times in the beans served at GCDC. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
2 that Defendant McCormick, Elrod, and Cosgrove were aware that other castor beans had been found. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he became “sick, at my stomach, it gave me diarrhea,0F 1 I went to medical and was treated for such symptoms seen on 3.16.2024 by nurse.” (Id.). Plaintiff names all Defendants for this claim. (Id. at 4-5). He proceeds against them in their official and individual capacities. (Id. at 5). He provides not facts for the official capacity claim. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of five million dollars for “physical and suffering caused by deprivation.” (Id. at 6). The Garland County Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on March 26, 2025. (ECF No. 46). Defendants correctly construe Plaintiff’s claims of exposure to a “castor bean” as a single claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement regarding adequate meals. (ECF No. 47 at 6 n. 1). They argue they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because: 1.) There is no proof of personal involvement by the Garland County Defendants; 2.). Plaintiff was not subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement; 3.) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and 4.) There is no basis for official capacity/county liability. (ECF No. 46 at 2). Defendants acknowledge that the castor bean has spiny seed capsules and can be fatal if only a few seeds are ingested, citing the North Carolina State Extension Service website. (ECF No. 47 at 8-9). They deny that the object in Plaintiff’s food was a castor bean. They also stress that he did not actually ingest the object. (Id. at 9). They further argue that, even if Plaintiff had ingested a single castor bean, he has a most alleged negligence, which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. (Id. at 10). They emphasize that:: Plaintiff does not allege, or even speculate, who placed the castor bean within the food on his dinner tray or how it may have gotten there. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the named Defendants within this lawsuit placed the castor bean within the food on his lunch tray. Plaintiff agreed that, because of the way trays are prepared and distributed, there was no way that someone could have intentionally placed the alleged castor bean in a tray specifically intended for the Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff does not 1 The actual spelling was diearra. The Court will infer that Plaintiff meant diarrhea. Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 2 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
3 allege that any of the Garland County Defendants would have been involved in the preparation or service of the tray on March 14, 2024. (Id. at 9). Defendants argue that the presence of the castor bean on a single occasion was not known to the County or “somehow, intentionally punitive.” (Id. at 9-10). They note that GCDC are not involved in the preparation of meals; this service is contracted with a third party. (Id. at 9-11). They note that Plaintiff also cannot prove that he suffered any actual physical harm from contact with the alleged castor bean. Plaintiff alleges stomach distress and diarrhea, but medical records indicate he refused anti-diarrheal medication when it was offered on March 16 and 17, 2024. (Id. at 11). They also note that Plaintiff did not provide any medical evidence or other proof that he was harmed by allegedly having an enclosed castor bean in his mouth for a short period of time. (Id.). Finally, they argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity and he has failed to provide any basis for official capacity liability. (Id. at 12-13). Defendant Hundhausen also filed her Motion for Summary Judgment on March 26, 2025. (ECF No. 49). Defendant Hundhausen adopts and incorporates all assertions of fact and arguments of law made by the Garland County Defendants in their Motion. (Id. at 2). She further incorporates the Garland County Defendants’ exhibits, including Plaintiff deposition testimony. (Id.). Defendant Hundhausen argues she is entitled to summary judgment because: 1.) Plaintiff did not allege and cannot prove that Defendant Hundhausen served contaminated food to him with the intent to punish; 2.) Plaintiff’s claims do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; 3.) Plaintiff cannot establish that any policy or custom of Summit led to a constitutional violation because the policies are constitutional on their face; 3.) Plaintiff has not established that he suffered any injury as a result of any actions of Defendant Hundhausen. (ECF No. 50). On March 31, 2025, the Court entered two Orders directing Plaintiff to submit his responses to each of the summary judgment motions. (ECF Nos. 53, 54). Both Orders provided explicit Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 3 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
4 instructions to Plaintiff to follow in submitting his Responses. He was advised that he must submit a Separate Statement of Disputed Facts. (Id.). He was also advised that he must cite to documents he intended to rely upon using the ECF Number and page. (Id.). He was clearly instructed that “[t]he Court will not look through the entire case file to locate a document supporting your factual statements.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s Responses were due April 21, 2025. (Id.). Plaintiff filed a Notice of Address change on May 1, 2025. (ECF No. 55). Although neither Order had been returned as undeliverable, the Court resent the Orders and set a new deadline of June 5, 2025. (ECF No. 56). Plaintiff filed a single Response on May 15, 2025. (ECF No. 57). Plaintiff filed no separate Statement of Disputed Facts. He raised no arguments in his Response, instead stating: I John Paul Carter am providing all the evidence I have with me Im currently am in ADC and can’t get other evidence from the County Jail. Im sending my writing responses/grievances/photo took by Officer Rivers of Garland County Detention Center/addresses of witnesses/sick calls. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff provides no citations or descriptions of documents, simply attaching 11 pages of exhibits. (Id. at 2-12). Plaintiff filed a Notice of Address Change on July 25, 2025, indicating that he had been released from incarceration. (ECF No. 61). The Court directed Plaintiff to submit a free-world IFP application, and Plaintiff was granted IFP status on October 15, 2025. (ECF Nos. 62-64). II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 4 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
5 party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999). The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). III. ANALYSIS A. Plaintiff’s Failure to Obey the Court’s Order and Local Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff failed to submit a separate Statement of Disputed Facts as directed by the Court. Local Rule 56.1(a) requires any party moving for summary judgment to submit a separate statement of undisputed material facts. Local Rule 56.1(b) requires the non-moving party opposing the summary judgment motion to file a separate statement of disputed facts. Pro se inmates are advised of this requirement in the Order directing them to file a summary judgment response. Pro se inmates are also advised of this requirement in the District’s Prisoner Litigation Guide, which contains an example to help them understand the concept of using the same paragraph numbering as that used by the moving party in their own statement of disputed facts. Due to Plaintiff’s failure, Defendants’ Statement of Facts is deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(c). In determining whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, however, the Court has also considered the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s verified Amended Complaint. A Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 5 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
6 verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. See, e.g., Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t., 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001). “[A] complaint signed and dated as true under penalty of perjury satisfies the requirements of a verified complaint . . . .” Id. As the Court in Roberson pointed out, “[a]lthough a party may not generally rest on his pleadings to create a fact issue sufficient to survive summary judgment, the facts alleged in a verified complaint need not be repeated in a responsive affidavit to survive the summary judgment motion. Id. The Court will, therefore, “piece[] together [Plaintiff’s] version of the facts from the verified complaint . . . .” McClanahan v. Young, No. 4:13-cv-04140, 2016 WL 520983, *1 (D.S.D. Feb. 5, 2016). B. Pretrial Detainee - Conditions of Confinement As a pretrial detainee, this Court analyzes Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Stearns v. Inmate Services Corporation, 957 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 525 n.16 (1979)). In articulating the standard governing pretrial detainees” claims related to conditions of confinement, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) held that the government may detain defendants prior to trial and “may subject them to the restrictions and conditions of a detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. There are two ways to determine whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of punishment. First, “a plaintiff could show that the conditions were intentionally punitive.” Id. at 538. Alternatively, “if there is no expressly demonstrated intent to punish, the plaintiff could also show that the conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose.” Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907 (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 538-39). Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). “There is a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Id. “In considering whether the conditions of pretrial Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 6 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
7 detention are unconstitutionally punitive, [courts] review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial detainee's confinement.” Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010). This case survived mandatory preservice screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because Plaintiff alleged that a poisonous object was found in his food, and he then suffered stomach issues and diarrhea shortly after exposure. After review of the summary judgment record it is clear that any imposition upon Plaintiff was de minimis at most. It has not been established that the object Plaintiff found in his meal was a castor bean. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that another inmate told him it was a castor bean, but he had no proof that it was a castor bean. (ECF No. 48-7 at 14, 30). Plaintiff’s allegations of stomach issues and diarrhea issues are internally inconsistent and contradicted by the summary judgment record. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he became “sick to his stomach” and had diarrhea after eating his meal. In his deposition, however, he denied that he had any stomach issues, stating he “never really felt sick. I just – all of a sudden got diarrhea real bad.” (ECF No. 48-7 at 16, 22). He repeated that “I never really felt sick.” (Id.). He testified that he was housed in an open pod that night and he could not recall if any other inmate got sick or used the bathroom frequently after eating the same meal. (Id. at 15-16). He testified the nurse offered him anti-diarrheal medication, which he called a “concrete pill,” he took it, and it helped his diarrhea to some extent. (Id. at 17). Plaintiff’s medical records, however, indicate that he refused anti-diarrheal medication when he saw the Nurse on March 16 and 17, 2024. (ECF No. 48 at 2; 48-4 at 1). He also testified that the nurse did not tell him that his diarrhea was related to the object in his food, even though he mentioned the event in his sick call request and told her about it in his sick call. (Id.). Plaintiff provides no additional medical evidence in his Response. To the extent Plaintiff may have experienced some form of diarrhea that was not severe enough to require medication, the Court also notes Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that Plaintiff took the antibiotic amoxicillin on March 13 Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 7 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
8 and 14, 2024. (ECF No. 48-4). Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he started taking the amoxicillin on March 9, 2024. (ECF No. 48-7 at 30). Diarrhea is a common side effect of antibiotics such as amoxicillin.1F 2 Further, the summary judgment record is silent as to any personal involvement by any named Defendant, let alone an intentional act to punish him with poison. "Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976)). In his deposition Plaintiff testified that he did not believe that Defendant Hundhausen “did anything on purpose.” (ECF No. 48-7 at 22). Plaintiff testified that other inmates eating with him that day did not find any foreign objects in their beans and that he did not expect Hundhausen to inspect each tray before it was served to each inmate. (Id. at 26-28). He further testified he does not know what they could have done differently. (Id. at 28). But he heard rumors that other inmates had found foreign objects in their beans, and he believed that if that was true, they should not continue serving the same things. (Id.). As to the Garland County Defendants, Plaintiff testified that he does not know if they are involved in preparing meal trays and none of them served him his meal on the night in question. (ECF No. 48-7 at 35). He testified that he named them as Defendants because “they’re over the jail”2F 3 and he believed Defendant Cosgrove had replied to his grievance.3F 4 (Id. at He did not believe anyone put the foreign object in his tray on purpose. (Id. at 38-39). He also did not believe they were accidentally 2 www.pdr.net (last accessed Oct. 23, 2025). 3 A supervisor cannot be held liable for an employee's unconstitutional actions based on a theory of respondeat superior. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. U. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 3d 960, 977 (S.D. Iowa 2019), aff'd, 5 F.4th 855 (8th Cir. 2021). 4 “Participation in the administrative grievance process alone is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983.” Lonix v. Lane, No. 2:25-CV-00012-JM-PSH, 2025 WL 1129012, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-CV-00012-JM-PSH, 2025 WL 1132320 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 16, 2025) (citing Rowe v. Norris, 198 Fed. App'x 579, 580 (8th Cir. 2006)). Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 8 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
9 involved in the placement of the foreign object. (Id. at 39). He does not believe any of them knew that there was a foreign object on his tray. (Id. at 42). Plaintiff testified again that other people had found castor beans in their food and the Garland County Defendant should have “stepped in” and ordered new beans. (Id. at 41). At the same time, he testified that the Summit was in charge of kitchen duties. (Id. at 39). He did not believe that any of the Garland County Defendants caused his illness or diarrhea. (Id. at 43). Plaintiff agreed that his problem “really is that there were previous allegations of castor beans in the beans,” and he believes that new beans should have been ordered. (ECF No. 48-7 at 44). He also testified, however, that he did not work in the kitchen and did not know if or when new beans had been ordered. (Id. at 44-45). When informed that there was no evidence of food contamination when earlier reports were investigated, Plaintiff emphasized that he still found something in his food. (Id. at 46). Plaintiff agreed, however, that this was the only time he found a foreign object in his food at GCDC. (Id. at 46). An isolated incident involving a foreign object in the food does not state a claim of constitutional dimension. See e.g., Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) (prisoners have a right to nutritionally adequate food, but Wishon presented no evidence that the food he was served was nutritionally inadequate or prepared in a manner presenting an immediate danger to his health, or that his health suffered as a result of the food); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects . . . does not amount to a constitutional deprivation”); Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F.Supp. 526, 527 (W.D. Va. 1974) (“The only contention concerning food which is detailed at all, is the inmates’ complaint that their food frequently contains insects. Nevertheless, occasional incidents of a foreign object contained in food, while regrettable, do not present a question of constitutional proportion”). Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 9 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
10 Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the summary judgment record such that no reasonable jury could believe them. There is no material question of fact, and all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is recommended that the Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendants Cosgrove, McCormick and Elrod (Garland County Defendants) (ECF No. 46) and Defendant Hundhausen (ECF No. 49) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation. The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court. DATED this 3rd day of November 2025. /s/ Christy Comstock HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Case 6:24-cv-06052-SOH Document 66 Filed 11/03/25 Page 10 of 10 PageID #: <pageID>
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