Abadi v. WalMart, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
AARON ABADI 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	CIVIL NO. 5:25-05259-TLB
WALMART, INC. & WALMART STORES EAST, LP 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF A MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Aaron Abadi (“Plaintiff”), a resident of New York, has filed a complaint against
Defendants Walmart, Inc. and Walmart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”), including allegations under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), (b); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a; discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (ECF No. 2, pp. 12-15, ¶¶ 40-55). 	Plaintiff further alleges
Walmart violated the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA); interfered with his constitutionally
protected right to interstate travel; and committed the torts of negligent training, negligent
supervision, 	negligent 	and 	intentional 	infliction 	of 	emotional 	distress, 	and 	wrongful
exclusion/constructive eviction. Id., pp. 16-20, ¶¶ 56-78.
Plaintiff made application to proceed pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and the
undersigned, finding that his application facially qualified him for IFP status (and erring on the
side of caution), previously granted the motion. (ECF Nos. 3, 7). 	Legal research reflects that
multiple federal courts have questioned Plaintiff’s representations in his various IFP applications
but typically granted IFP status.1 Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the
1 For a non-exclusive list, see Abadi v. City of N.Y., No. 21-CV-8071 at ECF No. 4; Abadi v. British
Airways PLC, No. 21-CV-10825 at ECF No. 4; Abadi v. NYU Langone Health System, No. 21-
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Honorable Judge Timothy L. Brooks, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the
undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation. The case is before the
Court for preservice screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).
I. 	PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s claims date back to the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging that, on April 30, 2021,
while traveling through Maine “camping and distancing from major cities,” he attempted to enter
Walmart store #1974 in Houlton, Maine but was denied entry without a mask (i.e., face covering).
(ECF No. 2, p.7, ¶¶ 17-18). Plaintiff says he tried to explain to Walmart’s employees that he could
not wear a mask due to his disabilities2, going as far as presenting a physician’s letter which
allegedly confirmed his condition and noted his prior COVID-19 infection. Id. Despite his
explanations, Plaintiff says he was barred from entering the Walmart store, leaving “humiliated,
distressed and fearful.” (ECF No. 2, p.7, ¶ 19). Although his Complaint (and declaration) lacks a
specific date, Plaintiff says he subsequently confirmed with Walmart’s corporate representatives
that Walmart’s policy was nationwide and not limited to Maine and/or Plaintiff, and thereafter
“immediately abandon[ed] his cross-country travel and return[ed] home.” Id., pp. 7-8, ¶¶ 20-23.
Plaintiff says travel during the pandemic was “one of the only stable, healthy and safe activities
available to him” and a “blanket exclusion” from Walmart stores during the mask “mandate period
CV-11073 at ECF No. 4; Abadi v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., No. 22-CV-1766 at
ECF No. 4; Abadi v. Lyft, Inc., No. 23-CV-3618 at ECF No. 3; Abadi v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 23-
CV-4033 at ECF No. 13; Abadi v. U.S., No. 23-CV-7413 at ECF No. 3; Abadi v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., No. 23-CV-7645 at ECF No. 4; Abadi v. Biden, No. 23-CV-8440 at ECF No. 4.
2 Plaintiff alleges he has a “documented sensory processing disorder that prevents him from
wearing items tightly around his face, including masks, glasses or other facial coverings. (ECF No.
2, p. 7, ¶16). Plaintiff says when he attempts to wear such items, “he experiences severe sensory
overload, intense discomfort, anxiety and a loss of ability to function.” Id.
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inflicted severe emotional distress and abruptly disrupted a critical part of [Plaintiff’s] ability to
function and cope during that time.” Id., pp. 8-9, ¶ 24. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial and recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and recovery of costs. Id.
at pp. 20-21.
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure meaningful
access to federal courts for people unable to pay the costs of bringing an action. See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). When a party proceeds in forma pauperis, however, a Court
must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous or
malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). Dismissals
under section 1915 are often made on the court’s own initiative “prior to the issuance of process,
so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expenses of answering” meritless
complaints. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324.
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or it
is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro se
plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
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Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)). “[I]f the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal
nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s
claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915
(8th Cir. 2004).
III. 	PLAINTIFF’S OTHER LITIGATION
Plaintiff filed a similar (but not identical) suit against Walmart in federal court in Maine
which was dismissed by U.S. District Judge Singal on October 31, 2022. Abadi v. Walmart, Inc,
Walmart Stores East, LP, Janet T, Mills, Barbara Marshall and Marie Hanson, 2022 WL 9822322
(Sept. 29, 2023). 	Other COVID-19 litigation filed by Plaintiff includes a suit against Target
Corporation in federal court in Pennsylvania, alleging Target unlawfully required mask wearing
by customers during the pandemic in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act; this
litigation was dismissed U.S. District Judge Kenney. See Abadi v. Target Corp., 2023 WL 6796558
(E. D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2023), affirmed 2024 WL 1715403 (April 22, 2024). 	In his decision, Judge
Kenney noted Plaintiff’s analogous matters in Florida, Abadi, 338 So. 3d 1101, and Nevada, Abadi,
2022 WL 4117087, with appeals in the Second, Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits3 and four petitions
for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court which were all denied. See Abadi et al. v. TSA, 2023
WL 6379048 (Mem) (2023); Abadi v. Dep't of Transp., 143 S. Ct. 220 (Mem) (2022); Abadi v.
Dep't of Transp., 142 S. Ct. 1694 (2022) (Mem); Abadi v. Dep't of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 893 (Mem)
(2022).
3 See Abadi v. City of New York, 2023 WL 3295949, at *1 (2d Cir. 2023); Abadi., 2023 WL
4045373, at *1; Abadi, 2022 WL 17550961, at *1; In re Abadi, 2022 WL 2541249, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); Abadi v. Dep't of Transportation, 2021 WL 7500325, at *1 (2d Cir. 2021).
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Other instances of Plaintiff litigating COVID-19’s mask mandates include a 2023
complaint against American Airlines in the Southern District of New York challenging the airline’s
compliance with 	Executive Order 	13998, 	Promoting 	COVID-19 	Safety in 	Domestic and
International Travel, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205 (Jan. 21, 2021), claiming “all of the studies[and] Dr.
Fauci’s public statements … confirm that masks are almost useless in the protection of COVID-
19.” 	The New York action which was dismissed. See Abadi v. America Airlines, 2024 WL
1346437 (March 29, 2024). Plaintiff similarly sued Quick Chek Corporation in the District Court
of New Jersey, challenging the Governor’s Executive Order 157 requiring face masks during the
pandemic. 	See Abadi v. Quick Chek Corp., 2023 WL3983879 (D. New Jersey, June 13, 2023).
Similar federal court litigation has been filed by Plaintiff against The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), Amtrak, Greyhound Lines, British Airways, Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa,
The Walt Disney Company, Caesars Entertainment, the NYU Langone Health System, Apple, Inc.,
all relating to face mask requirements/mandates. Since Judge Kenney authored his 2023 decision,
additional petitions for writ of certiorari have been denied by the Supreme Court. 	See Abadi v.
Biden, 2025 WL76710 (Mem) (2025); Abadi v. Adams, 2025 WL 889298 (Mem.) (2025); Abadi
v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., 2023 WL 6378910 (Mem.) (2023). And on March 24, 2025, due
to a described abuse of the privilege, Plaintiff lost his ability to file petitions in the United States
Supreme Court in noncriminal matters unless he pays the filing fee. See Abadi v. Adams, supra.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
Count 1 – Plaintiff’s ADA Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Walmart unlawfully retaliated against him in violation of
Section 503(a) Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). 	Section 503(a) prohibits retaliation
against an individual who, inter alia, asserts his or her rights under the ADA. 	EEOC v. CRST
International, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1181 (N.D. Iowa 2018). 	For Plaintiff to establish a
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claim of retaliation under Section 503(a), he must show that he was engaged in a statutorily
protected activity, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is a causal
connection between the two. EEOC v. CRST, supra, citing Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d
622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1218 (8th Cir. 2013). The
reference here to “statutorily protected activity” refers to the sort of activity covered by § 12203(a)
– in other words, “oppos[ing] [an] act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA]” or “ma[king] a
charge, testif[ying], assist[ing], or participat[ing] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under [the ADA].” Glover v. Tigani, 2023 WL 4604505, at *7 (D. Minn. July 13, 2023).
Only equitable relief is available. See EEOC v. CRST, supra.
“The ADA bars private employers from discriminating against a ‘qualified individual on
the 	basis 	of 	disability.’ 	Discrimination 	is 	defined 	to 	include 	‘not 	making 	reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified [employee]
with a disability.’” Christie v. Layton Constr. Co., LLC, 2025 WL 2921845, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Oct.
14, 2025), citing Faidley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 889 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A)). A claim under Section 503(a) necessarily arises in the
context of employment. 	Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 3d
1163, 1181 (N.D. Iowa 2018).
Plaintiff’s Title V claim fails because his Complaint contains no facts of employment, and
no facts related to seeking, applying, interviewing or otherwise gaining (or attempting to gain)
employment at Walmart. Rather, Plaintiff identifies a single incident of being denied entry into
Walmart in conjunction with a COVID-19 mask mandate that is no longer in effect. Read liberally,
Plaintiff also alleges that, on an unspecified date by an unidentified person, he learned that any
future attempt to enter a Walmart without a mask while the mask policy was in effect would be
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denied. These allegations are insufficient as Plaintiff does not allege he was employee of Walmart
on the date in question or that he was denied access while in the process of trying to become an
employee, vendor or contractor – to the contrary, he was denied entry as an unmasked customer.
It is recommended that Plaintiff’s Section 503(a) retaliation allegations be dismissed as failing to
state a claim under the ADA.
The undersigned declines to construe Plaintiff’s allegations under Title III of the ADA
which prescribes, as a general rule, that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Plaintiff
previously asserted a Title III claim against Walmart in federal court in Maine which was
dismissed because (1) only injunctive relief is available under Title III, and (2) Plaintiff’s
complaint was devoid of any allegation that Plaintiff is suffering from ongoing discrimination or
that he is likely to suffer any future discrimination under Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d
299, 304 (1st Cir. 2003). 	See Abadi v. Walmart, Inc, Walmart Stores East, LP, Janet T, Mills,
Barbara Marshall and Marie Hanson, No. 22-1901, 2022 WL 9822322 (Sept. 29, 2023).
Plaintiff did not re-plead his Title III claim here, and even if he had, the undersigned views
Plaintiff as lacking Article III standing, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), and
his Title III claim as collaterally estopped. See Ideker v. PPG Indus., Inc., 788 F.3d 849, 852 (8th
Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (collateral estoppel prevents relitigating issues “already decided in a
different cause of action.”). The Maine federal court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the undersigned finds no factual basis in Plaintiff’s
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Complaint to resurrect that claim here. See Abadi v. Walmart, Inc, Walmart Stores East, LP, Janet
T, Mills, Barbara Marshall and Marie Hanson, No. 22-1901, 2022 WL 9822322 (Sept. 29, 2023).
Count 2 – Plaintiff’s ADA Interference
Plaintiff next alleges unlawful interference by Walmart in violation of Section 503(b) of
Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b), which provides it is “unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or
her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other
individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.” 42
U.S.C. § 12203(b). Section 503(b) prohibits interference with an employee’s exercise of his or her
rights under the ADA. See EEOC v. CRST, supra.
An interference claim under Section 503(b) requires Plaintiff to show that (1) he engaged
in activity statutorily protected by the ADA; (2) he engaged in, or aided or encouraged others in,
the exercise or enjoyment of ADA protected rights; (3) the defendant interfered on account of
Plaintiff’s protected activity; and (4) the defendant was motivated by an intent to discriminate. See
Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations under Section 503(b) are entirely insufficient. First, as noted above,
Plaintiff’s Complaint is conspicuously void of any facts related to employment, including that he
is a “qualified individual” with a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Plaintiff says that “through
its corporate representatives and policies,” Walmart “engaged in acts of intimidation, coercion and
interference designed to discourage Plaintiff from asserting or exercising his rights under the
ADA” when advising him that “he was banned from all Walmart stores nationwide and that he
could expect the same refusal at every location,” creating a “coercive environment that deterred
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him from attempting to shop at Walmart during the mandate period.” (ECF No. 2, p. 13, ¶¶ 40-
41). 	These allegations relate to Plaintiff’s status as a consumer, not a current or prospective
employee. The undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 503(b) claim.
Count 3 – Public Accommodation Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §2000a
The ADA established “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). The ADA provides a
private right of action to individuals who are discriminated against based on their disability in the
enjoyment of public accommodations, however, the only remedy available to private plaintiffs is
injunctive relief. Id. §§ 12182(a), 12188(a), 2000a-3(a).
Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff contentions are too speculative to establish
Article III standing to seek injunctive relief. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992) (reasoning that injury required to establish standing must be “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical” (quotation marks omitted)); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) (“[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing at the time the
action commences, the fact that the dispute is capable of repetition, yet evading review will not
entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum.”). Plaintiff hinges his public accommodation
discrimination claims from a single incident on April 30, 2021; Walmart’s mask mandate ended
on May 14, 2021, with guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevent. See
https://www.npr.org/2021/05/14/997040195/walmart-drops-mask-mandate-following-new-cdc-
guidelines (Dec. 29, 2025).
Past injuries alone are insufficient for standing to seek injunctive relief for future
constitutional violations. Park v. Forest Service of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000);
Youngbear v. Bayens, 2023 WL 9475652, *3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 2023) (citing Frost, 920 F.3d
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at 1161). 	In Frost v. Sioux City, Iowa, the Eighth Circuit cautioned that a plaintiff who seeks
injunctive relief “against future conduct of defendants who caused injury in the past” must show
“a real and immediate threat that [he] would again suffer similar injury in the future.” 920 F.3d
1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2019). Other than allegations in Plaintiff’s declaration of ongoing “anxiety
and dread” while shopping in a Walmart, his pleadings do not identify any ongoing and/or future
harm that warrants injunctive relief. While Plaintiff’s pleadings are to be liberally construed, the
undersigned cannot simply infer any actual or imminent threat that Walmart will reinstitute its
long-expired COVID-19 customer mask policy. 	For these reasons, Plaintiff’s injunctive relief
claim for public accommodation discrimination should be dismissed for lack of standing.
Count 5 – Interference with Right to Contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code, upon which Plaintiff’s Count 5 is
premised, provides for equal rights under the law, as follows:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental
discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (emphasis added).
Section 1981 protects “identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional
discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” St. Francis Coll. v. Al–
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Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). Section 1981 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have “the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed
by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). First enacted in 1866, the statute was amended in 1991
to define “make and enforce contracts” to include “the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.” Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 468 (8th Cir. 2009). The statute
“does not provide a general cause of action for race discrimination if in fact it occurred.”
Youngblood v. Hy–Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1017 (2002). Rather, Section 1981’s purpose is to “prohibit discrimination in the ‘performance,
modification and termination of contracts’ and to protect ‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.’” See Williams v. Lindenwood Univ., 288 F.3d
349, 355 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting §1981(b)).
The Eighth Circuit has identified several elements to a claim under § 1981: (1) membership
in a protected class, (2) discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant, (3) engagement in a
protected activity, and (4) interference with that activity by the defendant. See Green v. Dillard's,
Inc., 483 F.3d 533, 538 (8th Cir.2007); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th
Cir.2004).
Plaintiff cannot proceed under § 1981 as he has not pled Walmart discriminated against
him (by refusing store entrance for commerce) based on his race or ethnicity; there are no
allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint that he is a member of a “protected class” for purposes of §
1981. 	Section 1981 protects “identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional
discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” St. Francis Coll. v. Al–
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). Plaintiff plead only that Walmart interfered with Plaintiff’s
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right to contract based on his “disability and in retaliation for his protected [ADA] activity.” (ECF
No. 2, p. 15, ¶ 54). Even though civil-rights pleadings are to be viewed liberally, “[s]uch pleadings
must nonetheless not be conclusory and must set forth the claim in a manner which, taking the
pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.” Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th
Cir. 	1976) 	(emphasis 	added). 	The 	undersigned 	finds 	Plaintiff’s 	allegation 	of 	disability
discrimination insufficient to state a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Count 6 – Maine Human Rights Act
The undersigned recommends that this district court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiff’s claims arising under the Maine Human Rights
Act as Plaintiff has not established a basis for the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Either the
diversity and amount in controversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 must be satisfied or the
claim must be based upon a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 	Mid-Am. Freight
Logistics, LLC v. Big Boy Freight, 2025 WL 3551197, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2025). Plaintiff
has established neither with respect to his claims under Maine law.
Counts 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 – Negligence
Plaintiff alleges that Walmart “failed to properly train its employees and corporate
representatives” on the ADA (Count 7); “failed to adequately supervise its employees and
corporate decision-makers to ensure compliance with disability-rights laws and proper handling
of customer accommodation requests” (Count 8); intentionally inflicted emotional distress on
Plaintiff (Count 9); negligently inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff (Count 10); and inflicted
intentional harm on Plaintiff without justification (Count 11).
Applying Arkansas law, each of Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Walmart must be
dismissed as the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint on
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December 10, 2025. Arkansas law requires that a cause of action for negligence be commenced
within three (3) years after the cause of action accrues. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105; Tate v. Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings, 102 Ark. App. 354, 356 (2008). Arkansas courts have long adhered to the
“occurrence rule” in determining when a cause of action for negligence accrues. See Howard W.
Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, § 13:4 (6th ed. 2014). 	This rule provides that “the statute [of
limitations] in negligence cases begins to run from the date the negligent act is committed.” Martin
v. Arthur, 339 Ark. 149 (1999). Stated another way, “the three-year-limitations period begins to
run, absent concealment of the wrong, on the date that the negligent act was committed, rather than
the date that it was discovered.” Calcagno v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ark. 802, 805 (1997); see
also Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat. Bank, 2012 Ark. 121 (2012) (citation omitted) (“The
statute begins to run when the negligent act occurred.”). The occurrence rule applies regardless of
when the full extent of a plaintiff's injuries is revealed and regardless of whether there is an interval
between the allegedly tortious act and the damage suffered by the plaintiff. El Dorado Chem. Co.
v. L&L Indus. Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 756490, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 25, 2016) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff identifies April 30, 2021, as the date on which he was denied entry into Walmart;
under Arkansas law, the statute of limitations period for any related negligence on Walmart’s part
expired on or before May 1, 2024.
Even if Maine’s longer six-year statute of limitations were applicable to Plaintiff’s
negligence claims, Plaintiff has not pled a basis for this Court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 which requires not only complete diversity of citizenship but that the
amount in controversy exceed $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Buckley v. Control Data
Corp., 923 F.2d 96, 97, n.6 (8th Cir. 1991). 	Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any allegations
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about the amount in controversy, and thus, this district court cannot properly exercise § 1332
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s negligence claims under either Arkansas or Maine law.
Count 12 – Constructive Eviction
Plaintiff alleges in Count 12 that he was wrongfully excluded and/or constructively evicted
from Walmart’s premises at Store 1974 in Houlton, Maine on April 30, 2021. 	This claim should
be dismissed as frivolous for Plaintiff’s allegations in Count 12 are entirely conclusory; Plaintiff
has not pled any factual basis for his right of entry onto Walmart’s private property which was
wrongfully denied in violation of either Arkansas or Maine law on the date in question.
Count 13 – Interference with Interstate Travel
Plaintiff’s claim that Walmart interfered with his right of interstate travel also fails. The
federal guarantee of interstate travel “protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: ‘the
erection of actual barriers to interstate movement’ and ‘being treated differently’ from intrastate
travelers.” Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993), citing Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982). See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869) (Art. IV, §
2Art. IV, § 2, “inhibits discriminating legislation against [citizens of other States and] gives them
the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them”); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948) ( Art. IV, § 2Art. IV, § 2, “insure[s] to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B
the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy”). The Supreme Court has recognized the
freedom to travel as an unenumerated yet basic constitutional right. See United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). 	More recently, the right to interstate travel has been described as
embracing at least three different components: “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to
leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien
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when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.” Doe v. Miller, 405
F.3d 700, 711 (8th Cir. 2005), quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
Plaintiff’s interstate travel interference claim cannot proceed. 	First, Walmart is a private
actor – not the government – and its store policies do not have the force of state or federal law.
Second, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Walmart, a private actor, engaged in a civil or
criminal conspiracy with any Maine state actors to deny Plaintiff’s interstate travel rights by
instituting a store mask policy in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Guest, supra.
Moreover, the undersigned cannot reasonably infer from Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that
Walmart’s mask policy on April 30, 2021 (or on any date up until May 14, 2021) constituted an
actual barrier to Plaintiff’s interstate movements during the COVID-19 pandemic. 	Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim that his right to interstate travel was unconstitutionally infringed
by Walmart.
Count 4 – Declaratory Judgment Act
Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claim for relief under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 	The Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declarations.” 28
U.S.C. § 2201. The Declaratory Judgment Act “does not create any new substantive right but rather
creates a procedure for adjudicating existing rights,” Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d
121, 124 (8th Cir. 1965). The court must therefore look to the other statutory grants of jurisdiction
relied on by Plaintiff. 	See Lickteig v. Bank OZK, 2020 WL 5995982, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 9,
2020), aff'd, 2021 WL 1618262 (8th Cir. Jan. 8, 2021).
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For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to state any
claim for relief. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to seek relief under the Declaratory Judgment
Act.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
It is recommended that all claims contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 2) be
DISMISSED as provided herein for failure to state a claim and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Status of Referral: 	Entry of this Report and Recommendation terminates the
referral.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
RECOMMENDED this 30th day of December 2025.
________________________________
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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