USA v. Carney, et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	PLAINTIFF
V. 	CASE NO. 5:25-CR-50005-001 & -002
JASON BOYD CARNEY and
LACEY CHRISTINA CARNEY 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Now before the Court is the Government’s First Motion in Limine (Doc. 96) seeking
to prohibit defense counsel from making certain arguments and/or attempting to introduce
certain evidence at trial. Separate Defendant Jason Boyd Carney filed a Response in
Opposition to the Motion (Doc. 131). In this motion the Government raises eight separate
liminal issues, which the Court will address in turn.1
I. Selective Prosecution, Prosecutorial Motives, Deficiency of Investigation
First, the Government asks the Court to prohibit suggestions to the jury that the
Government engaged in selective prosecution of the Defendants, for example, by
questioning the Government’s prosecutorial motives or charging decisions or by pointing
out the general prevalence of the same or similar wrongdoing in society at large. Mr.
Carney agrees and stipulates that he will not argue selective prosecution and will not
suggest to the jury that he is being unfairly singled out because of his political or religious
beliefs. Beyond that, though, Mr. Carney objects to the breadth of the request and
1 There is a ninth section in the Motion that requires no ruling. In it, the Government simply
places Defendants on notice that it intends to move to admit certain summary charts and
demonstrative exhibits under Rules 1006 and 611(a). The charts and exhibits are not
attached.
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contends 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	explore 	the 	personal 	biases 	and 	motives 	of 	the
Government’s witnesses and deficiencies in the Government’s investigation.
As to the types of remarks for which the parties find common ground, the Court will
prohibit arguments sounding in selective prosecution or improper prosecutorial motive.
However, the Court will need more context to define the bounds of a given individual
witness’s personal biases and motives, as well as their general and specific involvement
with law enforcement’s investigation. For example, questions that expose defects in law
enforcement’s investigation or the credibility of the Government’s evidence are generally
fair game. On the other hand, questioning a witness with a laundry list of investigative
tasks that hypothetically could have been performed (but were not) is generally not
appropriate. Such evidence is excludable where its relevance is minimal, where it tends
to confuse the proper issue (i.e., whether the government’s actual evidence is credible,
reliable, and sufficient to meet its burden of proof), and where it otherwise amounts to a
waste of time. See United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 594 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that “an exhaustive exploration of things not done in the investigation would be time-
consuming and of little relevance” and that the district court may properly impose
reasonable limits on testimony that confuses the issues or is repetitive). Here, without the
benefit of the proposed questions and surrounding factual context, the Court cannot
presently say how Rule 403’s considerations should be weighed. 	Accordingly, the
Government’s first liminal argument is GRANTED IN PART as to selective prosecution
and improper prosecutorial motive and DEFERRED IN PART with respect to deficiencies
in the investigation.
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II. Defendants’ Prior Statements
The Government’s second request is that the Court preclude Defendants from
eliciting their own prior out-of-court statements and/or those of the Defendants’ agents or
co-conspirators, as such statements would be hearsay. The Government offers no
specific examples, and Mr. Carney objects to a categorical ban on the presentation of
out-of-court statements, as they may be admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803. The Court will apply the Federal Rules of Evidence and
exclude improper hearsay from trial. Beyond that, the Court will not make any specific
rulings until confronted with the out-of-court statement and its surrounding context. A
ruling on this issue is therefore DEFERRED. With that said, defense counsel should not
refer to a defendant’s out-of-court statement during opening statements without the
Court’s specific permission. And where defense counsel believes it is appropriate to
introduce such statements during trial, they must first seek leave of court outside the
hearing of the jury.
III. Impeachment Methods
The third liminal issue asks the Court to bar improper methods of impeachment,
including counsel offering prior inconsistent statements without first confronting the
declarant or misusing Memoranda of Investigation and other investigative reports. The
Court will enforce Rule 613, but the request is presently too generic to permit a pre-trial
ruling and is therefore DEFERRED until trial.
IV. Evidence of Good Conduct Under Rule 405(b)
The fourth liminal argument seeks to prohibit Defendants from offering testimony
or evidence describing their specific instances of good conduct. The Government
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correctly notes that where character evidence is admissible, Rule 405 defines the
methods of proving character and limits the use of specific instances of a person’s
conduct to cross-examination of the character witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 405(a). Specific-
instance evidence may also be appropriate where character or a character trait is an
essential element of a charge or defense. See Fed. R. Evid. 405(b). According to the
Government’s 	reasoning, 	Defendants 	are 	charged 	with fraud, 	structuring 	financial
transactions to evade reporting requirements, and making false statements on tax
returns—none of which include character or a character trait as an essential element—
therefore the Carneys should be precluded from “attempting to show character through
good acts.” (Doc. 96, p. 9).
Mr. Carney agrees that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). But he points to the permissible uses of
character evidence and worries that the Government seeks to deny him the opportunity
to testify about his personal background, employment history, charitable work, and
involvement in religious organizations, which he believes is necessary for the jury to
assess his credibility.
The Court will prohibit Defendants from admitting evidence of their specific acts of
charity and good character because such evidence is not pertinent to an element of any
claim, charge, or defense in this case under Rule 405(b). With that said, however, if either
Defendant takes the stand, the Court will permit them to describe for the jury their
personal backgrounds, family members, and their work history (including, in general
terms, their involvement with non-profit companies and religious organizations). Doing so
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will, of course, expose them to cross-examination on those topics and others, as provided
under Rule 607. It will also open the door to an attack of their credibility as witnesses, as
provided under Rule 608.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART, AND DEFERS IN
PART the ruling on the fourth liminal issue, as described above. In the context of trial, if
defense counsel seeks to introduce potentially admissible charitable-acts or good-works
testimony as character evidence, they must first request a sidebar, reference this portion
of the Order, and make a proffer.
V. Absence of Witnesses
The fifth liminal argument asks that counsel not be permitted to comment on the
absence of any one witness at trial, much less invite the jury to draw a negative inference
from the witness’s absence. Mr. Carney is not opposed to this part of the Motion, and it
is GRANTED.
VI. Possible Punishments
The sixth liminal request seeks to prohibit defense counsel from mentioning to the
jury the possible range of punishment Defendants could face if convicted. The Court
agrees that federal juries are not tasked with imposing punishment—and are, in fact,
instructed not to consider punishment in any way when rendering a verdict. See 8th Cir.
Model Crim. Inst. 3.12. The sixth request is therefore GRANTED. Of course, this ruling
does not preclude counsel from emphasizing to the jury the gravity and importance of its
decision.
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VII. Jury Nullification
The seventh liminal argument seeks to preclude improper argument that could lead
to jury nullification, i.e., suggesting to the jury that it should base its decision on anything
other than the facts in evidence and the Court’s instructions as to the law. Defendants
agree, and this part of the Motion is GRANTED.
VIII. Government Misconduct
Finally, the eighth liminal argument asks that counsel be barred from alleging in
the jury’s presence that the Government committed misconduct or from mentioning
anything related to the volume, timing, or content of discovery. Defendants agree.
Therefore, this part of the Motion is GRANTED.
IT IS ORDERED that the Government’s First Motion in Limine (Doc. 96) is
GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, AND DEFERRED IN PART, as stated above.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 4 th day of May, 2026.
__________________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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