Luedtke v. Northwest Arkansas Community College

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
JOHN LUEDTKE 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-05188-TLB-CDC
NORTHWEST ARKANSAS
COMMUNITY COLLEGE 	DEFENDANT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by Plaintiff John Luedtke against
his former employer, Defendant Northwest Arkansas Community College (“NWACC”), under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act
(“ACRA”).
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L.
Brooks, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose
of making a Report and Recommendation. 	Before the Court for consideration is Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15). The undersigned has also reviewed Defendant’s
Brief in Support (ECF No. 16) and Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (ECF No. 17),
Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 20) in opposition, Response to Statement of Uncontested Material
Facts (ECF No. 21), and Brief in Support of Response (ECF No. 22), and Defendant’s Reply (ECF
No. 23). For the reasons given below, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s Motion be
GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
According to Mr. Luedtke’s Complaint, he worked for 45 years as a coach and scout in
major sports leagues and at various colleges and high schools. See ECF No. 2, ¶ 9. He says he
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“had personally coached hundreds of athletes and was referred to by most people who knew him
as ‘Coach.’” Id. Mr. Luedtke was employed at NWACC (a public community college in Benton
County, Arkansas) from 1996 through 2023. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 6. While at NWACC, he “was given
the responsibility to initiate and direct the health and wellness program . . ., the physical education
program, various club sports, the development and supervision of the fitness center, and – in 2020
– the initiation and management of the first intercollegiate athletic programs” at NWACC. Id. at
¶ 8. Mr. Luedtke was responsible for raising money for NWACC’s intercollegiate athletic
programs, and he recruited students to participate in those programs. See id. at ¶¶ 12–13, 15. He
also worked with the National Junior College Athletic Association (“NJCAA”) to certify these
programs for competition and membership in that association. Id. at ¶ 14.
After NWACC hired a new President, Dr. Dennis Rittle, in July 2022, Dr. Rittle and
NWACC’s Board of Trustees began searching for a full-time athletic director. 	Id. at ¶¶ 18–19.
Mr. Luedtke applied for that position and was given a 25-minute interview by Zoom on or about
May 19, 2023, but he was then told that he would not be given a second interview. Id. at ¶ 21.
Several finalists were considered for the position, but for various reasons, none of them was
ultimately hired. See id. at ¶ 22. On June 26, 2023, Mr. Luedtke was told that NWACC was re-
opening its search for a full-time athletic director. Id. at ¶ 25. The next day, Mr. Luedtke sent an
email to Dr. Rittle and to members of the Board of Trustees expressing his interest in the position.
Id. at ¶ 26. The day after that, he was informed by Dr. Diana Johnson (NWACC’s Vice President
for Learning) and Lisa Milam (NWACC’s Executive Director of Human Resources) that his
employment with NWACC would be ending immediately. 	See id. at ¶¶ 20, 27. 	Mr. Luedtke
ultimately was not hired as athletic director; instead, the re-opened hiring process culminated in
the hiring of a woman who was aged in her early thirties. See id. at ¶ 29.
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Mr. Luedtke filed his Complaint in this lawsuit on September 11, 2024, bringing three
counts against NWACC. Count I alleges that NWACC fired him because on June 12, 2023, he
had applied for FMLA leave to care for his mother, thus violating his rights under the FMLA. See
id. at ¶¶ 24, 31. 	Count II alleges that Mr. Luedtke’s male gender was a motivating factor in
NWACC’s decision not to hire him as athletic director, in violation of Title VII and the ACRA.
See id. at ¶ 33. 	And Count III alleges that Mr. Luedtke’s age (he was born in 1957) was the
deciding factor in NWACC’s decision not to hire him as athletic director, in violation of the
ADEA. See id. at ¶ 36. NWACC denies that Mr. Luedtke’s application for FMLA leave played
any role in his termination and likewise denies that his gender or age played any role in its decision
not to hire him as athletic director. See ECF No. 7, ¶¶ 27–34. NWACC has moved for summary
judgment, arguing that all of Mr. Luedtke’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice. 	That
motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165
F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
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v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 	“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. ANALYSIS
The undersigned turns its attention first to Mr. Luedtke’s FMLA claim, followed by a
discussion of his various hiring discrimination claims.
A. Mr. Luedtke’s FMLA Claim.
“The FMLA was designed to protect, in relevant part, the reasonable medical needs of
employees with serious health conditions within the limits set by the employer’s legitimate interest
in managing its business.” Scobey v. Nucor Steel-Arkansas, 580 F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir. 2009). It
“entitles employees to take twelve weeks of leave from work during any twelve-month period if
the employee meets certain statutory requirements.” Boston v. TrialCard, Inc., 75 F.4th 861, 868
(8th Cir. 2023) (citing U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)). The Eighth Circuit has explained that there are three
types of claims arising under the FMLA:
(1) where an employer refuses to authorize leave under the FMLA or takes other
action to avoid responsibilities under the Act (an entitlement or interference claim);
(2) where an employee opposes any practice made unlawful under the FMLA and
the employer retaliates against the employee (a retaliation claim); and (3) where an
employer takes adverse action against an employee because the employee exercises
rights to which she is entitled under the FMLA (a discrimination claim).
Id.
To establish an entitlement or interference claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was
eligible for FMLA leave; (2) his employer was on notice of his need for FMLA leave; and (3) his
employer denied him benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA. Id. at 869. By contrast,
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to establish a retaliation or discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in
activity that is protected under the FMLA (such as applying for FMLA leave); (2) he suffered a
materially adverse employment action (such as termination); and (3) a causal connection existed
between the protected activity and the adverse action. See id.; Wierman v. Casey’s General Stores,
638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011). The parties agree that the latter standard for FMLA retaliation
or discrimination applies here. Compare ECF No. 16, pp. 4–5 with ECF No. 22, p. 21.
In FMLA retaliation or discrimination cases, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
by satisfying all three of those elements, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, non-retaliatory or non-discriminatory reason for its challenged action. See Wierman,
638 F.3d at 999; Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 787 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2015). 	If the
defendant meets that burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to identify evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reason
is merely pretext for unlawful discrimination or retaliation. 	See Wierman, 638 F.3d at 999;
Hudson, 787 F.3d at 866. 	This burden-shifting analysis is known as “the McDonnell Douglas
framework,”1 see Wierman, 638 F.3d at 999; Hudson, 787 F.3d at 866, and (as will be seen in the
next subsection below) it also applies to other types of non-FMLA employment discrimination
claims.
Here, the undersigned is skeptical that Mr. Luedtke can establish a prima facie case. There
is no dispute that on June 12, 2023, he verbally requested FMLA leave from an NWACC human
resources employee named Robin Roitz, who emailed him FMLA paperwork two days later, and
that Mr. Luedtke’s employment was terminated on June 28, 2023, before he completed the FMLA
1 This framework is named after the seminal United States Supreme Court case of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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application process. 	See ECF No. 17, ¶¶ 94–97; ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 94–97. 	But Mr. Luedtke has
provided virtually no evidence that there was any causal connection between these two events.
Mr. Luedtke recorded the meeting at which he was informed of his termination, and had a
transcript prepared of that recording. 	See ECF No. 15-10. 	Because of this, there is no dispute
regarding what was said at that meeting. There were initially four, and then eventually five, people
present at this meeting: Mr. Luedtke, Dr. Johnson, Ms. Milam, Dierdre Slavik (Mr. Luedtke’s
direct supervisor), and Ms. Roitz (who was called in during the meeting to answer some questions
about possible retirement benefits). See generally id.
At the beginning of the meeting, Dr. Johnson informed Mr. Luedtke of the decision to end
his employment thusly: “I don’t want to be here at this point in time, but, you know, we’ve met
twice over the last semester, and we talked about your role as a special instructor and about your
role in cross country. You have consistently overstepped policies and procedures and not adhered
to some of the directions that you were given by me. And so, overall, we don’t feel like we can
trust you to change your behavior. And so this is—we’re terminating your position today.” Id. at
1 (internally numbered 2:8–2:15). Mr. Luedtke asked her what prompted this decision. See id.
(internally numbered 2:20). Dr. Johnson replied, “I was forwarded some communications from a
board member and to Dr. Rittle in which you referred to yourself as coach, and you were going
around the hiring policies and procedures of the college.” See id. (internally numbered 2:21–2:24).
She then elaborated that she was referring to the email Mr. Luedtke had sent Dr. Rittle expressing
his interest in the position of athletic director after he had already “been told that [he] did not get
to the next stage in the application process and [was] not going to be considered.” 	See id.
(internally numbered 3:2–3:21). Later, Dr. Johnson elaborated on her previously stated claim that
Mr. 	Luedtke 	had 	“consistently 	overstepped 	policies 	and 	procedures” 	with 	the 	following
explanation: “I’ve been called into two meetings outside of the meetings I had with you over
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actions that you took surrounding marketing, purchasing, recruiting, that you were asked not to
do.” See id. at 4 (internally numbered 13:11–13:14).
Dr. Slavik was apparently surprised by the purpose of the meeting and advocated for Mr.
Luedtke throughout the meeting’s duration. See generally id. Mr. Luedtke’s recent FMLA request
was mentioned only once during the meeting, very early, when Dr. Slavik asked “is there any way
that he could – I mean, he has his FMLA paperwork in process – could he use that up until his
birthday in September? Because if he reaches that milestone –I mean, he planned on retiring, he's
going to be off campus, he can go to Wisconsin, but he could stay employed until then?” See id.
at 1 (internally numbered 4:8–4:13). Ms. Milam immediately responded that “[t]he decision was
made today separate from any FMLA request. That’s not something that was a part of any
conversation.” See id. (internally numbered 4:14–4:16). Mr. Luedtke was then presented with the
option of either retiring immediately or having an at-will termination imposed upon him. See id.
at 2 (internally numbered 5:5–5:22). Most of the meeting was spent discussing the particulars of
these two scenarios with respect to benefits, payouts, etc. 	See generally id. 	Ultimately Mr.
Luedtke selected the option of retirement. See ECF No. 15-11.
NWACC has buttressed Dr. Johnson’s statements during that meeting by placing into the
record a paper trail documenting the issues she referenced. 	One example is an email that Vice
President for Student Services Justin White sent to Mr. Luedtke on December 15, 2022,
admonishing him for having over-promised scholarship funds to prospective students by $8,100
each, requiring Dr. Rittle to approve institutional tuition waivers to cover the overage. See ECF
No. 15-14, pp. 10–11. Two minutes after sending that email to Mr. Luedtke, Dr. White forwarded
it to NWACC human resources employees, with the instruction to “[p]lease place this email in
John’s personnel file as record of counseling and correction.” See id. at 10.
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Another example is an August 15, 2022, email in which an outside vendor notified
NWACC that Mr. Luedtke had sent her an NWACC logo that his nephew designed but which had
not been approved by NWACC’s marketing team. See id. at 6–7. Sixteen days later, Dr. White
emailed Mr. Luedtke and others, informing them that “the current spirit logo will serve as the only
approved logo for current Cross Country as well as future athletic programs. 	There will be no
updates, edits, changes or alterations made to the current logo. All athletic related purchases
must go through proper marketing approval before any item is purchased or ordered.” Id.
at 8 (emphasis in original). However, on May 5, 2023, Mr. Luedtke sent another email containing
an unapproved NWACC logo, generating frustrated discussion of the matter between Dr. Ritter,
Dr. White, and the Executive Director of Communications. See id. at 12–14.
Still another example is a May 22, 2023, memo that Dr. Johnson provided Mr. Luedtke,
instructing him that “[b]etween today and June 30, 2023, I need you to follow the following
guidelines in regards to intramural sports at the college.” 	See ECF No. 15-16. 	The first such
guideline she listed was “[p]lease do not assume the title of Coach. 	You are a Faculty
Advisor/Sponsor of intramural sports.” 	See id. 	This memo was drafted after Dr. Ritter had
expressed frustration to Dr. Johnson on May 5, 2023, about Mr. Luedtke having referred to himself
as “Coach John Luedtke” in an email he sent earlier that day about NWACC’s’ Esports team. See
ECF No. 15-14, pp. 12–15. 	This provides further context for Dr. Johnson’s statement to Mr.
Luedtke during their final June 28, 2023, meeting that what prompted the decision was his email
two days earlier to Dr. Ritter expressing interest in the position of athletic director, in which “you
referred to yourself as coach.” See ECF No. 15-10, p. 1 (internally numbered 2:21–2:24).
Mr. Luedtke does not dispute that any of these admonishments, instructions, or counseling
occurred, although he does offer explanations, justifications, or additional context for the actions
he took that led to them. See ECF No. 22, pp. 18–21. But none of these arguments makes any
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showing of a causal connection between his request for FMLA leave and his termination. 	“To
demonstrate a causal connection, [the plaintiff] must show the exercise of FMLA rights ‘played a
part’ in the adverse action. 	Generally, more than mere temporal proximity between protected
activity and adverse action is required.” Boston, 75 F.4th at 869 (internal citations omitted). But
temporal proximity – specifically, sixteen days between when he verbally requested FMLA leave
and when his employment ended – is all Mr. Luedtke can point to here. “In order for temporal
proximity alone to be sufficient, the temporal proximity must be very close.” Sisk v. Picture
People, Inc., 669 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
undersigned is aware of at least one case in which the Eighth Circuit held that on the facts before
it a gap of only 13 days between a protected activity and the adverse action at issue there was
“sufficient, but barely so,” to show causation for purposes of making a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir.
2002).
However, assuming for the sake of argument that the 16-day gap here is sufficiently close,
albeit barely so, to establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation or discrimination for Mr.
Luedtke, summary judgment on this claim is nevertheless proper. As described above, NWACC
has certainly articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory reasons for its decision
to terminate Mr. Luedtke’s employment. 	So, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
burden shifts back to Mr. Luedtke to identify evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons are mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination or retaliation. But when a plaintiff’s prima facie case is based entirely on temporal
proximity, that case is undermined for purposes of showing pretext “where the allegedly retaliatory
motive coincides temporally with the non-retaliatory motive.” See Wierman, 638 F.3d at 1001.
“Moreover, evidence that the employer had been concerned about a problem before the employee
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engaged in the protected activity undercuts the significance of the temporal proximity.” Id. Given
the timeline provided above, there is no dispute that was the case here. 	And given the well-
documented nature of that timeline and the fact that Mr. Luedtke does not dispute he engaged in
the activities which prompted the various admonishments described above, this is not a situation
where he could demonstrate pretext by showing that “the employer’s proffered explanation had no
basis in fact.” See Smith, 302 F.3d at 834.
Mr. Luedtke also points to favorable annual performance reviews that he received for the
three years immediately preceding his termination. See ECF Nos. 17, 19, 21. But all three of those
evaluations were made by Dr. Slavik who, the reader will recall, was surprised by the decision to
terminate Mr. Luedtke and who advocated for him during the meeting at which his termination
was announced. So while this is certainly evidence that Dr. Slavik valued Mr. Luedtke as an
employee and did not support his termination, it is not evidence that Dr. Johnson’s proffered
reasons were pretextual, and does not create any reasonable inference that Dr. Johnson – the
decisionmaker with respect to Mr. Luedtke’s termination, see ECF No. 15-2, p. 19 – acted with
discriminatory or retaliatory intent.
In conclusion, Mr. Luedtke has not created any material dispute of fact as to whether
NWACC’s stated reasons for ending his employment were pretext for some unlawful motive.
Accordingly, NWACC is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Luedtke’s FMLA claim.
B. Mr. Luedtke’s Hiring Discrimination Claims.
As mentioned in Section I above, Mr. Luedtke’s Complaint alleges three counts. Count 1
is the FMLA claim discussed above. Count II alleges that Mr. Luedtke’s male gender was a
motivating factor in NWACC’s decision not to hire him as athletic director, in violation of Title
VII and the ACRA. See id. at ¶ 33. And Count III alleges that Mr. Luedtke’s age was the deciding
factor in NWACC’s decision not to hire him as athletic director, in violation of the ADEA. See
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id. at ¶ 36. With respect to Count II, which is brought under both Title VII and ACRA, the Eighth
Circuit has made clear that the same legal framework applies to discrimination claims whether
brought under Title VII or ACRA. See Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782,
792 (8th Cir. 2011).
The McDonnell Douglas framework discussed in the context of Mr. Luedtke’s FMLA
claim also applies to both of his hiring-discrimination claims. Specifically, in the absence of direct
evidence of discrimination, Mr. Luedtke must first make a prima facie case; then NWACC must
show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision; then Mr. Luedtke must show
that this reason is pretext for discrimination. 	To make a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was
qualified for the position for which the employer was accepting applications; (3) he was denied
the position; and (4) the employer hired someone from outside the protected class. 	Arraleh v.
County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006). Similarly, to make a prima facie case of
age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was over forty years old;
(2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was not hired for the position; and (4) the employer
hired a younger person to fill the position. Tusing v. Des Moines Independent Community Sch.
Dist., 639 F.3d 507, 515 (8th Cir. 2011). The undersigned will assume for the sake of argument
that Mr. Luedtke was qualified for the position of athletic director and, accordingly, that he can
make a prima facie case on both of these counts as, obviously, he is a male over the age of forty
who was denied the position of athletic director, which was given instead to a 32-year-old woman.
Certain important facts about the athletic director hiring process are undisputed. The job
opening was originally posted on April 7, 2023, and the application process was closed on May
16, 2023. 	Compare ECF No. 17, ¶ 57, with ECF No. 21, ¶ 57. 	The job posting outlined the
following minimum qualifications for the position: three years of full-time coaching experience at
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any level; the ability to adequately budget; the ability to adhere to policies and procedures; and at
least a bachelor’s degree. 	Compare ECF No. 17, ¶ 58, with ECF No. 21, ¶ 58. 	Thirty-eight
candidates, including Mr. Luedtke, applied for the position during this open period. Compare ECF
No. 17, ¶ 64, with ECF No. 21, ¶ 64. The hiring committee concluded that sixteen of those
candidates, including Mr. Luedtke, met the minimum qualifications for the position, and extended
short virtual interviews to those candidates in which they were asked four screening questions.
Compare ECF No. 17, ¶ 69, with ECF No. 21, ¶ 69. Five of those sixteen candidates were selected
to move on to a second round of interviews; Mr. Luedtke was not among those five. 	Compare
ECF No. 17, ¶ 70, with ECF No. 21, ¶ 70.
Dr. White, who formed the search committee for this hiring process, see ECF No. 15-3, p.
20, testified at his deposition that the reason Mr. Luedtke was not selected to move forward to the
next round was “because other candidates were more qualified,” see id. at 62–63. When discussing
the superior qualifications possessed by the five candidates who moved forward, Dr. White
testified that three of them had experience as athletic directors at other institutions, and two of
them were head coaches at other institutions. See id. at 37–38. Dr. White testified that the
committee also discussed “that it was demonstrated that [Mr. Luedtke] could not follow college
policies and procedures.” See id. at 62–63. These are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
the decision not to advance Mr. Luedtke any further in that hiring process. See Wagner v. Gallup,
Inc., 788 F.3d 877, 886 (8th Cir. 2015).
At the conclusion of this process, on June 26, 2023, NWACC offered the athletic director
position to a man who Plaintiff estimates was around 58 years old. Compare ECF No. 17, ¶¶ 77–
78, with ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 77–78. However, that candidate declined the offer. Id. NWACC then
offered the position to another of the finalists, a woman, who also declined the offer. Compare
ECF No. 17, ¶¶ 79–80, with ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 79–80. 	Recall from the discussion above that, on
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June 27, 2023, Mr. Luedtke had sent the email to Dr. Ritter expressing his renewed interest in the
athletic director position, which led to his termination the following day. On June 29, 2023, the
search committee decided to re-post the position and open the process back up to a new group of
potential applicants. Compare ECF No. 17, ¶ 81, with ECF No. 21, ¶ 81. At the conclusion of the
re-opened process nearly a month later, on July 27, 2023, the position was offered to Brooke
Brewer (the aforementioned 32-year-old woman), who accepted the offer. Compare ECF No. 17,
¶¶ 86–87, with ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 86–87.
This timeline is important, and it is fatal to Mr. Luedtke’s claims. 	Interestingly, Mr.
Luedtke concedes that “this lawsuit likely would not have come about” if the 58-year-old male
sitting athletic director who was initially offered the position had accepted it. And for good reason:
it would be utterly absurd under such circumstances for Mr. Luedtke to contend he was denied this
position on account of his sex or his age. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Mr. Luedtke focuses his
arguments about pretext on what he contends are his superior qualifications for the position relative
to Ms. Brewer’s. But Ms. Brewer was not among the five candidates who advanced to the second
round of interviews during the first go-round; indeed, she did not apply for the position at all during
the first search process. See ECF No. 15-3, pp. 45–46. Rather, she only applied for the position
after the job search was re-opened – and that position’s re-posting occurred on June 29, 2023, one
day after Mr. Luedtke was terminated from his employment at NWACC for, among other things,
attempting to circumvent the formal hiring process for that very position before its re-opening had
even been posted. In other words, while NWACC’s proffered reason for not hiring him the first
time around was that other candidates were more qualified, NWACC’s proffered reason for not
hiring him the second time around was, as Dr. Johnson stated during the June 28, 2023 meeting
with 	Mr. 	Luedtke 	the 	day 	before 	the 	position 	was 	re-posted, 	“I 	was 	forwarded 	some
communications from a board member and to Dr. Rittle in which you referred to yourself as coach,
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and you were going around the hiring policies and procedures of the college,” see ECF No. 15-10,
p. 1 (internally numbered 2:21–2:24). 	This was the latest in a series of incidents over the last
several years in which NWACC maintained he had failed to adhere to their policies and
procedures.
This inevitably returns us to the central question: Has Mr. Luedtke created any material
dispute of fact as to whether NWACC’s stated reasons for ending his employment were pretext
for some unlawful motive? There is no need to rehash that discussion here; the answer is no and
for the same reasons discussed above. Accordingly, NWACC is entitled to summary judgment on
Mr. Luedtke’s Title VII, ACRA, and ADEA claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant Northwest Arkansas Community College’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff John Luedtke’s
Complaint (ECF No. 2) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
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15
DATED this 30th day of January 2026.
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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