Higgins v. Vinita Express, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
DENNIS HIGGINS 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Case No. 4:23-cv-04108
VINITA EXPRESS INC.; GSC
TRANSHOLDING LLC; CRT
EXPRESS INC.; STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY; and
JOHN DOES (1, 2, 3, etc.) 	DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Dennis
Higgins (“Plaintiff”). 	(ECF No. 30). 	Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (“Separate Defendant”) has responded. (ECF No. 40). Plaintiff replied. (ECF No. 44).
The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
From what the Court can ascertain from the record, it appears that on October 23, 2020,
Plaintiff was asleep in his semi-trailer truck while parked at a gas station for the night in Texarkana,
Arkansas. (ECF No. 42, at 2; ECF No. 40-3, at 7). Plaintiff was later jostled awake when a white
Volvo semi-trailer truck (“white Volvo”) backed into Plaintiff’s semi-trailer truck. (ECF No. 42,
at 2; ECF No. 42, at 9-10). Plaintiff then exited his vehicle and briefly talked to the driver of the
white Volvo. (ECF No. 40-3, at 10). After a short conversation, the driver returned to the white
Volvo, and Plaintiff approached the cabin in an attempt to get the driver’s contact information.
(ECF No. 40-3, at 19). Plaintiff grabbed a handle on the white Volvo’s door frame to “lean on” it.
(ECF No. 40-3, at 19). At this point, the driver “took off” and fled the scene without providing
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any contact information to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 40-3, at 19).
Plaintiff’s “Statement of No Genuine Issues of Material Fact in Support” are as follows:
(1) “On October 23, 2020, [Plaintiff] was insured by an automobile insurance policy with [Separate
Defendant], carrying uninsured motorist coverage”; (2) “On that same date, October 23, 2020, the
aforesaid insurance policy was in force and effect”; (3) “On the same date, October 23, 2020,
[Plaintiff’s] vehicle was struck by another vehicle, which he believed to be a white Volvo”; (4)
“The alleged white Volvo left the scene”; (5) “the alleged white Volvo was never found by law
enforcement”; (6) “The owner of the alleged white Volvo remains unknown”; and (7) “The driver
of the alleged white Volvo remains unknown.”1 (ECF No. 32, at 1-2).
On October 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Circuit Court of Miller County,
Arkansas alleging a claim of negligence against Defendants Vinita Express Inc., CRT Express Inc.,
and John Does (1, 2, 3, etc). and a claim for breach of contract against Separate Defendant. On
November 13, 2023, Separate Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to the Western District of
Arkansas on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 2). On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed the
instant motion requesting that the Court determine as a matter of law that the driver of the white
Volvo is unknown, that the owner of the white Volvo is unknown, and that the white Volvo is a
“phantom vehicle” for the purposes of Plaintiff’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage with Separate
Defendant.2 (ECF No. 30, at 2-3).
1The Court notes that Plaintiff’s “Statement of No Genuine Issues of Material Fact” contains no citation to the record
in support of his “undisputed facts” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Further, the Court notes
that Separate Defendant disputes or partially disputes every “undisputed fact” provided by Plaintiff and cites to the
record in support. (ECF No. 41).
2The Court also notes that Plaintiff only requests that the Court make specific legal determinations and does not ask
the Court to rule on his breach of contract claim against Separate Defendant.
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for summary judgment is well established. When a party moves for summary
judgment, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). This is a “threshold
inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they reasonably may be
resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A
fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. A dispute is
genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either
party. Id. at 252.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider all the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-Op, 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The moving
party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir.
1996). The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record
that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. However, a party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials . . . but must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256. “Mere allegations,
unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving part’s own conclusions, are
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-
27 (8th Cir. 2007).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
In the instant motion Plaintiff requests that the Court rule as a matter of law: (1) that the
driver of the white Volvo is unknown and cannot be reasonably identified; (2) that the owner of
the alleged white Volvo is unknown and cannot be reasonably identified; and (3) that the white
Volvo is a “phantom vehicle” for the purposes of Plaintiff’s claim for Uninsured Motorist Coverage
from Separate Defendant.
Plaintiff’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage with Separate Defendant states that in order for a
policy holder to recover compensatory damages for bodily injury, the owner or driver of the
adverse vehicle could not reasonably have been identified, remains unknown, and caused bodily
injury to the insured. (ECF No. 40-1, at 44; ECF No. 30-1, at 2). Plaintiff’s policy also contains
a choice of law provision stating that Florida state law applies when there is any disagreement as
to the interpretation and application of any provision in the policy. (ECF No. 40-1, at 65).
Federal district courts sitting in diversity, like the Court in this case, must apply the forum
state’s substantive law, including its conflict-of-law rules. Guardian Fiberglass, Inc. v. Whit Davis
Lumber Co., 509 F.3d 512, 515 (8th Cir. 2007). 	The Court will “look to the choice-of-law
principles of the forum state [in this case Arkansas] and then apply the same law to the case as the
forum state would.” Fuller v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 281 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted). 	The Supreme Court of Arkansas has generally held “that choice-of-forum clauses in
contracts are binding, unless it can be shown that the enforcement of the clause would be
unreasonable and unfair.” Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 362 Ark. 598,
603, 210 S.W.3d 101, 106 (2005) (citation omitted). There has been no claim that the relevant
choice of law clause is unreasonable or unfair, thus the Court will apply Florida law when
analyzing Plaintiff’s policy because there is an effective choice of law clause in contact.
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Under Florida law “Courts construe insurance contracts according to their plain language.”
Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017) (citing Fayad v. Clarendon Nat.
Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005)). 	However, “any ambiguity which remains after
reading each policy as a whole and endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and
operative effect must be liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the insurer.”
Id. (quoting Washington Nat. Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 949-50 (Fla. 2013)). 	“A
provision is ambiguous if it is ‘susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one providing
coverage and the other excluding coverage.’” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	“The ambiguity must be
genuine, and the lack of a definition for an operative term ‘does not, by itself, create an
ambiguity.’” Id. (quoting Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co., 162 So. 3d 183, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
“When a term in an insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a
meaning.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that the identity of the white Volvo’s driver and owner has not and cannot
be reasonably identified and thus his uninsured motor insurance should provide coverage. (ECF
No. 31, at 3). Plaintiff cites to Arkansas case law stating that when the “language of the policy is
unambiguous, courts should give effect to the plain language of the policy.” (ECF No. 31, at 3).
Further, Plaintiff states that “[i]f the language is ambiguous, the policy should be liberally
construed in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.” (ECF No. 31, at 3).
Separate Defendant contends that there are multiple issues of material fact in dispute. (ECF
No. 40, at 1). Separate Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s own testimony establishes that the driver
and owner of the white Volvo are not unknown. 	(ECF No. 40, at 2). 	Separate Defendant then
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opines that Florida law is controlling over the instant motion, not Arkansas law. (ECF No. 40, at
2).
In reply, Plaintiff argues that if the driver of the vehicle had remained, he would have been
identified by law enforcement. (ECF No. 44, at 1). Plaintiff presents a document purporting to
show that the tractor unit of the white Volvo was in a shop the same day of the accident. (ECF No.
44, at 2). Plaintiff states that his testimony purporting that “Vinita Express” was written on the
side of the white Volvo was uncertain and that he only “believed” he saw the name Vinita Express.
(ECF No. 44, at 2). 	Plaintiff then makes miscellaneous arguments attempting to support his
position that the owner of the white Volvo is unknown and cannot reasonably be identified. (ECF
No. 44, at 3-5). Plaintiff states in a footnote that under both Arkansas and Florida law, insurance
policies are interpreted in favor of coverage. (ECF No. 44, at 5).
Plaintiff is asking the Court to make certain legal determinations based on facts. However,
these facts are in dispute because Separate Defendant has disputed nearly every fact that Plaintiff
has put forward. Plaintiff’s own testimony establishes that he was in contact with the driver of the
white Volvo for a short amount of time and could roughly describe his appearance. (ECF No. 40-
3, at 14-18). Though he did not get the name or number of the driver before he left, Plaintiff was
still in contact with the driver. Further, Plaintiff believes that a decal located on the side of the
white Volvo said Vinita Express. When asked if he had reason to believe that the white Volvo had
a Vinita Express decal on it, he answered, “Yes. I had a reason to believe it was.” (ECF No. 40-
3, at 24). 	When asked if he knew it was a Vinita Express decal, Plaintiff replied, “Well, yes.”
(ECF No. 40-3, at 24). Plaintiff then found and called a number listed as Vinita Express to ask if
it had a truck in the area. (ECF No. 40-3, at 26). Plaintiff also attempts to differentiate between
an owner and the “motor carrier” language Separate Defendant uses. However, it appears to the
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Court that even if Vinita Express was not the owner of the white Volvo, it would be able to easily
identify who owned the white Volvo. 	Accordingly, when viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show material facts
are not in dispute.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 30) should be and hereby is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 31st day of March, 2025.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge
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