Wright v. Woods et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
GLENDA WRIGHT 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-517-DPM
LAFAYETTE WOODS, JR., in his
Individual and Official Capacities and
JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT
ORDER
DEFENDANTS
Glenda Wright worked for many years as a food supervisor for
the 	Jefferson 	County 	Sheriff's 	Department. 	She 	says 	she 	was
disciplined and fired due to retaliation and discrimination. Wright sues
under 	Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e. 	Doc. 	1 at 	1. 	She also brings
age-discrimination 	claims, 	though 	she 	doesn't 	cite 	the 	Age
Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 	Wright names
Sheriff Lafayette Woods in his individual and official capacities, as well
as the Jefferson County Sheriff Department.
First, the Sheriff's Department is part of Jefferson County, not a
separate entity subject to suit. 	Ketchum v. City ofWest Memphis, 974 F.2d
81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). 	Plus, Wright's claims against the Department
duplicate 	her 	claims 	against Sheriff Woods 	in 	his official capacity.
Wright 	is 	making 	a 	claim 	against 	Jefferson 	County. 	The 	Sheriff
Department can drop out as a named defendant.
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Second, Wright's claims against Title VII and ADEA claims against
Sheriff Woods in his individual capacity fail. 	Title VII doesn't provide
for individual liability. 	Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103,
1111 (8th Cir. 1998). The law on the ADEA is less clear. But several of
my colleagues have held that this statute doesn't provide for individual
liability. 	See, 	e.g., Morrow 	v. 	City 	of Jacksonville, 	941 	F. 	Supp. 816,
819-20 (E.D. Ark. 1996); 	Doc. 24 at 3 in Drye v. University of Arkansas for
Medical 	Sciences, 	No. 	4:09-cv-922-JLH 	(E.D. 	Ark. 	4 	January 	2011);
Doc. 	18 	at 	6 	in 	Zimmerman 	v. 	Arkansas 	Department 	of 	Finance
& Administration, 	No. 	5:17-cv-160-JM (E.D. 	Ark. 	2 	February 	2018),
affirmed, 745 F. App'x 666 (8th Cir. 2018). I agree.
Third, 	Wright's charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleged race and age discrimination and retaliation for
then 	unknown 	reasons. 	Doc. 	6-1 	at 	1. 	She 	can't 	pursue 	a 	sex
discrimination claim 	without 	having 	exhausted 	her 	administrative
remedies. 	Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847,851 (8th Cir.
2012). 	That claim fails.
Fourth, 	Wright filed her charge on 20 May 2024. 	Doc. 6-1 at 1.
With one exception, a timely charge of discrimination must be filed
with 	the 	EEOC 	within 	one 	hundred 	eighty 	days 	of 	each 	alleged
discriminatory act. 	42 U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e-5(e)(l); 	Richter, 	686 F.3d at
850-51. This is, in general, a strict deadline. Burkhart v. American Railcar
Industries, Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 475-76 (8th Cir. 2010). One hundred eighty
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days before her charge date is 22 November 2023. 	Wright alleges a
suspension and various discipline that occurred before that date.
While Wright doesn't use the words "continuing violation" in her
complaint, Sheriff 	Woods 	candidly 	acknowledged 	that 	law 	in 	his
briefing. 	E.g., Wilkie v. Department of Health & Human Services, 638 F.3d
944, 950-52 (8th Cir. 2011). 	Though she told the EEOC she didn't know
why 	she 	was 	being 	retaliated 	against, 	Wright 	now 	pleads 	an
explanation 	for 	this 	alleged 	retaliation: 	she 	got 	caught 	up 	as 	a
subpoenaed witness in the heated and long-running litigation between
Sheriff 	Woods 	and 	his 	predecessor, 	now-County 	Judge 	Gerald
Robinson. 	The Court notices this litigation. 	Woods v. Robinson, No.
35CV-22-199 	(Jefferson 	County). 	Wright 	worked 	for 	then-Sheriff
Robinson for fifteen years. Wright's retaliation claim for all the alleged
adverse 	actions 	in 	her 	work 	environment 	goes 	forward 	on 	a
"continuing violation" theory. 	Because her race and age claims are
intertwined with the alleged retaliation, they should go forward on that
basis, 	too. 	A 	retaliatory 	continuing 	violation 	may 	not 	pan 	out.
But Wright has pleaded enough facts to make one plausible. Discovery,
and later briefing on limitations, will bring clarity.
*
The motions to dismiss, Doc. 3 & 6, are partly granted and partly
denied. 	Wright's 	claims 	against 	the 	Jefferson 	County 	Sheriff
Department 	are 	dismissed 	without 	prejudice. 	Her 	claims against
-3-
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Sheriff 	Woods 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity 	are 	dismissed 	without
prejudice. 	And Wright's sex discrimination claim is dismissed without
prejudice, too. 	At this early point, the Court denies without prejudice
Sheriff Wood's request to limit the relevant timeframe.
So Ordered.
(/
D .P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge
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