Stallings v. Reed, et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JASON STALLINGS, as the Administrator )
of the Estate of Richard Lawrence Stallings, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIV. ACT. NO. 1:25-cv-47-TFM-N
)
HJALMAR ISAAC REED, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in Part Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 23, filed 7/17/25). In lieu of a formal
response, Plaintiff filed a Stipulation of Dismissal of Count Three of the Amended Complaint. See
Doc. 25.
The Rules of Civil Procedure permit a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action without an
order of the court “by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer
or a motion for summary judgment” or “a stipulation signed by all parties who have appeared.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A). A request to dismiss an action requires a court order and dismissal by
terms the court considers “proper” if Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) does not apply. FED. R. CIV. P.
41(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(c) applies the same standards of Rule 41(a) to the dismissal of
counterclaims, cross claims, and third-party claims.
The Court has the authority to dismiss all claims against a defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P.
41 even if there are other defendants in the case. Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092,
1106 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss all of his claims against
a particular defendant . . . .”); see also Plain Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-
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Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 1973) (“There is little merit in the argument
that the court could not dismiss the action as to less than all defendants upon motion [under (a)(2)]
. . . .”); Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting
all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to October 1, 1981, as binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit). In Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the point that
Rule 41(a) allows a district court to dismissal claims against a particular defendant because “an
‘action’ can refer to all claims against one party. 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing
Klay, 376 F.3d at 1106).
In City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hosp. Holdings, L.P., 82 F.4th 1031 (11th Cir. 2023),
the Eleventh Circuit determined that to be effective under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) a stipulation of
dismissal must include the signature of all parties who have appeared to include those parties who
may have also already been dismissed. Id. at 1038. However, the Eleventh Circuit also made it
clear that “Rule 41(a)(2) still provides parties with an avenue for securing dismissals through court
order” of an entire action against even when the parties are unable to acquire signatures from all
parties who have appeared in the litigation. Id. at 1039; see also id. at 1036 (“Rule 41(a) allows a
district court to dismiss all claims against a particular defendant.”) (quoting Roswell, 67 F.4th at
1144; In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664, 677 (11th Cir. 2023)).
In Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018), the Eleventh
Circuit held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) was not the appropriate mechanism for dismissal of fewer
than all claims asserted in a lawsuit. In doing so, it noted that the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1)
contemplates dismissing an “action.” Id. “There is no mention in the Rule of the option to stipulate
dismissal of a portion of plaintiff's lawsuit - e.g., a particular claim - while leaving a different part
of the lawsuit pending before the trial court.” Id. (emphasis in original). Rather, the Perry court
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emphasizes that Rule 41(a) is not the proper vehicle for dismissing individual claims but only an
entire action. To dismiss a single claim without dismissing an entire action against a defendant,
the Plaintiff should seek and obtain leave to amend the complaint to eliminate that claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Id. “Litigants who wish to dismiss, settle, or otherwise resolve less than an
entire action can ensure that they receive a final judgment on the remainder of their claims . . . by
seeking partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) from the district court, or by amending their
complaints under Rule 15.” Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144. However, the Court notes the latter option
would result in a determination on the merits while an amended complaint would simply dismiss
the claim.
Though the document is entitled Plaintiff’s Stipulation of Dismissal of Count Three of the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 25), there is no reference to a specific rule. Based on the caselaw
provided above, the Court cannot consider it a stipulation under Rule 41(a). But for all intents and
purposes, the parties agree that Count Three should be dismissed. Therefore, the Court finds there
are two ways to proceed. First, to grant the Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
and dismiss count three without prejudice or second, to require Plaintiff to further amend the
complaint under Rule 15.
Therefore, based on the above and the parties’ clear agreement that the dismissal of Count
Three is appropriate, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in Part Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 23) is GRANTED and Count Three is DISMISSED
without prejudice. Counts One and Two remain pending.
DONE and ORDERED this the 15th day of August 2025.
/s/ Terry F. Moorer
TERRY F. MOORER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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