Gray v. City of Evergreen, Alabama et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
IVAN KEITH GRAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF EVERGREEN, ALABAMA,
et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-00141-KD-B
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This 	action 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Defendants 	Stanley 	B.
Stallworth, 	Kenny 	Edwards, 	and 	Jerry 	Caylor’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss
Plaintiff 	Ivan 	Keith 	Gray’s 	amended 	complaint 	and 	memorandum 	in
support 	(Docs. 	3, 	4). 	The 	motion 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for consideration and recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S).
Upon 	consideration 	of 	all 	matters 	presented, 	the 	undersigned
recommends, for the reasons stated herein, that Defendants’ motion
to dismiss (Doc. 3) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff Ivan Keith Gray (“Gray”) commenced
this action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Conecuh
County, Alabama. 	(Doc. 1-2 at 2-13). 	On the same day, Gray filed
an 	amended 	complaint, 	which 	is 	now 	his 	operative 	pleading. 	(Id.
at 15-27).

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In 	his 	amended 	complaint, 	Gray 	names 	as 	Defendants 	the 	City
of Evergreen, Alabama (“City of Evergreen”), its mayor, Stanley B.
Stallworth 	(“Stallworth”), 	and 	two 	members 	of 	its 	city 	council,
Kenny 	Edwards 	(“Edwards”) 	and 	Jerry 	Caylor 	(“Caylor”). 	(Id. 	at
15). 	Gray sues Defendants Stallworth, Edwards, and Caylor in their
individual and official capacities. 	(Id. at 19).
Gray, who is “African-American,” alleges that he was hired as
chief 	of 	police 	for 	the 	City 	of 	Evergreen 	by 	a 	vote 	of 	the 	city
council on August 1, 2023. 	(Id. at 16, 20). 	However, Gray alleges
that Mayor Stallworth subsequently “unlawfully removed [Gray] from
his 	being 	hired 	as 	City 	of 	Evergreen 	Chief 	of 	Police 	and 	instead
at the City Council Meeting on August 15, 2023, the Mayor, acting
in concert with” Defendants Edwards and Caylor “over the objection
of other council members and without the actions of other council
members,” appointed “a less qualified white applicant” as the City
of Evergreen’s chief of police. 	(Id. at 16, 19-21).
Gray 	asserts 	that 	he 	was 	the 	victim 	of 	“employment
discrimination on the basis of race,” and that Defendants’ actions
violated 	federal 	and 	Alabama 	law 	and 	failed 	to 	comport 	with 	his
rights to due process and equal protection under the law. 	(Id. at
16, 21-27). 	Gray asserts the following four causes of action: (1)
“Employment 	Discrimination: 	Title 	VII, 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964,
as 	amended, 	42 	U.S.C. 	Section 	2000e, 	et 	seq.”; 	(2) 	“Employment
Discrimination, 	Title 	42 	U.S.C. 	Section 	1983 	Claim 	Equal

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Protection”; 	(3) 	“Employment 	Discrimination, 	Title 	42 	U.S.C.
Section 	1981 	Claim”; 	and 	(4) 	“Due 	Process 	Violation; 	Declaratory
Judgment Relief; Mandamus Relief.” 	(Id. at 22-27).
Defendants 	removed 	the 	action 	to 	this 	Court 	on 	May 	3, 	2024.
(Doc. 	1). 	On 	May 	8, 	2024, 	Defendants 	Stallworth, 	Edwards, 	and
Caylor 	(collectively, 	the 	“Individual 	Defendants”) 	filed 	the
instant 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Gray’s 	amended 	complaint 	pursuant 	to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), along with a memorandum
of 	law 	in 	support. 	(Docs. 	3, 	4).1 	Gray 	filed 	a 	response 	in
opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 12), and the Individual
Defendants 	filed 	a 	reply 	in 	support 	of 	their 	motion. 	(Doc. 	13).
Therefore, 	the 	Individual 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	has 	been
fully briefed and is ripe for resolution.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party
may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(6). 	“To
survive 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	a 	complaint 	must 	contain 	sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) 	(quoting 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	544, 	570
(2007)). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial 	plausibility 	when 	the 	plaintiff
1 	Defendant 	City 	of 	Evergreen 	filed 	an 	answer 	to 	Gray’s 	amended
complaint on May 8, 2024. 	(Doc. 5).

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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. 	This 	necessarily 	requires 	that 	a 	plaintiff 	include 	factual
allegations 	that 	plausibly 	support 	each 	essential 	element 	of 	his
claim. 	Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010).
“If the complaint contains a claim that is facially subject to an
affirmative 	defense, 	that 	claim 	may 	be 	dismissed 	under 	Rule
12(b)(6).” 	LeFrere 	v. 	Quezada, 	582 	F.3d 	1260, 	1263 	(11th 	Cir.
2009).
When 	evaluating 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6), 	a
court 	“must 	accept 	the 	factual 	allegations 	in 	the 	complaint 	as
true 	and 	construe 	them 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
plaintiff.” 	Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1066
(11th Cir. 2017). 	That said, “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual 	support 	are 	entitled 	to 	no 	assumption 	of 	truth.” 	Mamani
v. 	Berzain, 	654 	F.3d 	1148, 	1153 	(11th 	Cir. 	2011). 	A 	complaint
does not need detailed factual allegations, but it “requires more
than 	labels 	and 	conclusions, 	and 	a 	formulaic 	recitation 	of 	the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Title VII - Individual Capacity Claims
In his first cause of action, Gray asserts that the “City of
Evergreen, 	by 	and 	through 	its 	officials, 	specifically 	the 	named

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individual defendants, engaged in actions tantamount to employment
discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991.” 	(Doc. 	1-2 	at 	22). 	The 	Individual 	Defendants 	argue 	that
Gray’s Title VII claims against them as alleged in his first cause
of action are due to be dismissed “because there is no individual
liability under Title VII.” 	(Doc. 3 at 2; Doc. 4 at 3-4).
The 	Individual 	Defendants 	are 	correct 	that 	“as 	a 	matter 	of
law, 	there 	is 	no 	individual 	liability 	under 	Title 	VII.” 	Perkins
v. Kushla Water Dist., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1260 (S.D. Ala. 2014),
aff’d, 	598 	F. 	App’x 	899 	(11th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(per 	curiam); 	see 	Smith
v. 	Lomax, 	45 	F.3d 	402, 	403 	n.4 	(11th 	Cir. 	1995) 	(stating 	that
individuals 	“cannot 	be 	held 	liable 	under 	. 	. 	. 	Title 	VII”).
“Relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and
not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a
violation 	of 	the 	Act, 	regardless 	of 	whether 	the 	employer 	is 	a
public company or a private company.” 	Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d
931, 	933 	(11th 	Cir. 	2006). 	Accordingly, 	“[a] 	municipal 	officer
may not be sued in his individual capacity under Title VII.” 	Wiant
v. Mobile Cnty. Pers. Bd., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2833, at *8, 1992
WL 510313, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 1992) (citing Busby v. City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding
that 	Title 	VII 	claims 	against 	a 	municipal 	officer 	must 	be 	made
against 	that 	officer 	in 	his 	official 	capacity, 	and 	not 	in 	his

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individual capacity)); see Gomez v. City of Doral, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 	85, 	at 	*6 	n.2, 	2022 	WL 	19201, 	at 	*3 	n.2 	(11th 	Cir. 	Jan. 	3,
2022) 	(per 	curiam) 	(“To 	the 	extent 	Gomez 	seeks 	to 	hold 	Mayor
Bermudez 	liable 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity 	under 	Title 	VII, 	this
argument fails. 	Our court has held that relief under Title VII is
available 	against 	only 	the 	employer 	and 	not 	against 	individual
employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.”)
(quotations omitted); Perkins, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1260 (“Individual
employees 	and 	board 	members 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	liability 	under
Title VII.”). 	In his response to the present motion, Gray concedes
“there 	is 	no 	individual 	liability 	under 	Title 	VII.” 	(Doc. 	12 	at
1). 	Accordingly, 	to 	the 	extent 	Gray’s 	Title 	VII 	claims 	are
asserted 	against 	Defendants 	Stallworth, 	Edwards, 	and 	Caylor 	in
their individual capacities, they are due to be dismissed.
B. 	Official Capacity Claims
The 	Individual 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	Gray’s 	claims 	against
them in their official capacities are also due to be dismissed as
unnecessary 	and 	duplicative 	because 	“a 	suit 	against 	Individual
Defendants 	in 	their 	official 	capacity 	is 	essentially 	the 	same 	as
a suit against the City of Evergreen.” 	(Doc. 3 at 2; Doc. 4 at 4-
5). 	In his response, Gray states that “where the plaintiff alleges
claims 	and 	causes 	of 	action 	relative 	to 	constitutional 	law
violations 	in 	his 	Second, 	Third 	and 	Fourth 	Cause 	of 	Action, 	the
defendants 	in 	their 	individual 	capacity 	may 	be 	sued 	and 	to 	that

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extent 	the 	defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is 	due 	to 	be 	denied.”
(Doc. 	12 	at 	1). 	However, 	Gray 	does 	not 	contest 	the 	Individual
Defendants’ motion for dismissal of his official capacity claims.
(See id.).
When 	a 	plaintiff 	sues 	a 	local 	government 	officer 	in 	his 	or
her official capacity, “the suit is simply another way of pleading
an 	action 	against 	an 	entity 	of 	which 	an 	officer 	is 	an 	agent.”
Busby, 	931 	F.2d 	at 	776 	(quotations 	omitted). 	“Because 	suits
against 	a 	municipal 	officer 	sued 	in 	his 	official 	capacity 	and
direct 	suits 	against 	municipalities 	are 	functionally 	equivalent,
there 	no 	longer 	exists 	a 	need 	to 	bring 	official-capacity 	actions
against local government officials, because local government units
can 	be 	sued 	directly 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	Id. 	“In 	reliance 	on 	this 	notion,
courts 	in 	this 	Circuit 	routinely 	and 	overwhelmingly 	deem 	suits
against both a local government official in his official capacity
and 	the 	entity 	of 	which 	the 	officer 	is 	an 	agent 	to 	be 	redundant,
and 	dismiss 	the 	official-capacity 	claims 	against 	the 	individual
defendant 	on 	that 	basis.” 	M.R. 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Sch. 	Comm’rs 	of 	Mobile
Cty., 	2012 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	99535, 	at 	*9, 	2012 	WL 	2931263, 	at 	*2
(S.D. 	Ala. 	July 	18, 	2012); 	see, 	e.g., 	Btesh 	v. 	City 	of 	Maitland,
2010 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	19815, 	at 	*14, 	2010 	WL 	883642, 	at 	*5 	(M.D.
Fla. 	Mar. 	5, 	2010) 	(“When 	identical 	Section 	1983 	claims 	are 	made
against 	both 	a 	governmental 	entity 	and 	the 	entity’s 	officers,
employees, 	or 	agents 	in 	their 	official 	capacities, 	courts 	should

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dismiss the claim against the named individual defendants in their
official 	capacities 	as 	‘redundant 	and 	possibly 	confusing 	to 	the
jury.’”) (quoting Busby, 931 F.2d at 776); Irving v. Enter. Rent-
A-Car, 	2007 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	117055, 	at 	*22, 	2007 	WL 	9702315, 	at
*8 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	Feb. 	16, 	2007) 	(“[T]o 	the 	extent 	that 	Plaintiff
brought 	§ 	1981 	claims 	against 	the 	individual 	Defendants 	in 	their
official 	capacities, 	Plaintiff’s 	§ 	1981 	claims 	against 	the
individual 	Defendants 	in 	their 	official 	capacities 	are 	redundant
and 	due 	to 	be 	dismissed.”), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted,
2007 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	117041, 	2007 	WL 	9702295 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	May 	7,
2007).
The Court notes that a plaintiff “may bring a Title VII suit
against 	an 	individual 	in 	his 	official 	capacity.” 	Wheeles 	v.
Nelson’s Elec. Motor Servs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1267 (M.D. Ala.
2008); see Busby, 931 F.2d at 772. 	However, an official capacity
suit against an individual officer under Title VII “is the same as
a 	suit 	against 	the 	employer.” 	Wheeles, 	559 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	1267.
Thus, Title VII suits against municipal officers in their official
capacities may be dismissed as redundant where the municipality is
a 	properly 	named 	defendant 	in 	the 	lawsuit. 	See 	Moss 	v. 	W 	& 	A
Cleaners, 	111 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	1181, 	1187 	(M.D. 	Ala. 	2000) 	(“[W]hile
official-capacity 	suits 	against 	an 	employer’s 	agents 	are 	proper,
such 	suits 	are 	unnecessary 	where 	a 	plaintiff 	has 	also 	sued 	the
employer. 	In 	other 	words, 	if 	a 	Title 	VII 	plaintiff 	names 	his 	or

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her 	employer 	as 	a 	defendant, 	any 	of 	the 	employer’s 	agents 	also
named in the complaint may be dismissed from the action.”).
Accordingly, to the extent the claims in Gray’s first, second,
third, 	and 	fourth 	causes 	of 	action 	are 	asserted 	against 	the
Individual 	Defendants 	in 	their 	official 	capacities, 	they 	are 	due
to 	be 	dismissed 	as 	unnecessary 	and 	duplicative 	of 	Gray’s 	claims
against the City of Evergreen.
C. 	Legislative Immunity
Last, the Individual Defendants assert that Gray’s remaining
claims 	against 	them 	are 	due 	to 	be 	dismissed 	because 	they 	are
entitled 	to 	absolute 	legislative 	immunity. 	(Doc. 	3 	at 	2; 	Doc. 	4
at 5). 	Specifically, the Individual Defendants argue:
Eleventh 	Circuit 	case 	law 	establishes 	that
municipal officers sued in their individual capacity are
entitled 	to 	absolute 	immunity 	from 	suit 	if 	the
challenged 	conduct 	was 	in 	furtherance 	of 	their
legislative 	duties. 	Gray’s 	claims 	against 	Individual
Defendants 	concern 	Individual 	Defendants’ 	alleged
refusal to elect Gray as Chief of Police or their alleged
discharge of him through their voting process at a City
Council 	board 	meeting. 	The 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has
concluded that the vote of a city councilman constitutes
an 	exercise 	of 	legislative 	decision-making, 	which
entitles 	[a] 	city-council 	member 	to 	absolute 	immunity
since voting is a legislative function.
Because 	Individual 	Defendants’ 	alleged 	actions
furthered 	their 	legislative 	duties, 	the 	claims 	as
alleged 	in 	Gray’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	against 	Individual
Defendants 	in 	their 	individual 	capacity 	are 	due 	to 	be
dismissed.
(Doc. 4 at 5-6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
In response, Gray argues that “[i]t is the nature of the act which

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determines 	whether 	legislative 	immunity 	shields 	the 	individual
from 	suit,” 	and 	that 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has 	“distinguished
between acts that are legislative in nature and thus shielded (like
voting, 	speechmaking 	on 	the 	legislative 	floor, 	committee 	report,
committee investigations and proceedings), and those that are not
(like 	public 	distribution 	of 	press 	releases 	and 	newsletters,
administration 	of 	penal 	facilities, 	and 	personnel 	decisions).”
(Doc. 12 at 2 (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted)).
Local 	legislators 	“enjoy 	absolute 	immunity 	when 	exercising
functions 	‘in 	the 	sphere 	of 	legitimate 	legislative 	activity.’”
Macuba 	v. 	DeBoer, 	193 	F.3d 	1316, 	1320 	(11th 	Cir. 	1999) 	(quoting
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998)). 	“It is the nature
of 	the 	act 	which 	determines 	whether 	legislative 	immunity 	shields
the 	individual 	from 	suit.” 	Yeldell 	v. 	Cooper 	Green 	Hosp., 	Inc.,
956 F.2d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 1992). 	“Only those acts which are
‘necessary 	to 	preserve 	the 	integrity 	of 	the 	legislative 	process’
are 	protected” 	by 	the 	doctrine 	of 	legislative 	immunity. 	Id.
(quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972)).
“Legislative acts are those which involve policy-making
decision 	of 	a 	general 	scope 	or, 	to 	put 	it 	another 	way,
legislation 	involves 	line-drawing. 	Where 	the 	decision
affects 	a 	small 	number 	or 	a 	single 	individual, 	the
legislative 	power 	is 	not 	implicated, 	and 	the 	act 	takes
on the nature of administration.”
Id. at 1062-63 (quoting Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 889 F.2d
1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989)).

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The 	Individual 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to
legislative 	immunity 	for 	their 	“alleged 	refusal 	to 	elect 	Gray 	as
Chief 	of 	Police 	or 	their 	alleged 	discharge 	of 	him 	through 	their
voting 	process 	at 	a 	City 	Council 	board 	meeting” 	because 	“‘voting
is 	a 	legislative 	function.’” 	(Doc. 	4 	at 	6 	(quoting 	Arrington 	v.
Dickerson, 	915 	F. 	Supp. 	1503, 	1508 	(M.D. 	Ala. 	1995)). 	Eleventh
Circuit 	“cases 	have 	recognized 	that 	a 	legislator’s 	vote
constitutes 	the 	act 	of 	‘legislating,’ 	and 	thus 	cloaks 	the
legislator 	with 	immunity, 	if 	the 	vote 	is 	cast 	for 	or 	against 	the
enactment of a law.” 	Smith, 45 F.3d at 405 (emphasis in original)
(internal citations omitted). 	However, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of 	Appeals 	has 	“expressly 	rejected 	the 	argument 	that 	the 	act 	of
voting, 	in 	itself, 	constitutes 	legislative 	action 	giving 	rise 	to
immunity.” 	Smith, 45 F.3d at 406 (citing Crymes v. DeKalb County,
923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991)). 	Instead, it has recognized
that 	“[w]hether 	the 	act 	is 	one 	that 	affects 	a 	wide 	population 	or
sets a general policy, as distinct from an act affecting a single
person or a narrow group, generally is the key that differentiates
a 	legislative 	act 	from 	an 	administrative 	or 	executive 	act 	not
covered by the immunity.” 	Vestavia Plaza, LLC v. City of Vestavia
Hills, 	Ala., 	2013 	WL 	4804196, 	at 	*19 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Sept. 	9, 	2013)
(citing Yeldell, 956 F.2d at 1062). 	The Eleventh Circuit has noted
that, 	“[t]ypically, 	legislators’ 	employment 	decisions 	are 	deemed
administrative acts.” 	Smith, 45 F.3d at 405 (holding that county

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board’s 	vote 	not 	to 	reappoint 	plaintiff 	and 	to 	appoint 	another
person 	as 	its 	clerk 	was 	an 	administrative 	act 	not 	protected 	by
legislative immunity); see Yeldell, 956 F.2d at 1062 (finding that
county commissioner’s “decisions to hire, fire, and demote certain
individuals” 	were 	“administrative 	acts”); 	Bryant 	v. 	Nichols, 	712
F. Supp. 887, 893 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (“[T]he city council’s decision
was 	not 	a 	policy 	decision 	that 	focused 	on 	such 	traditional
legislative matters as the provision of city services, rather, it
was 	a 	personnel 	action 	directed 	toward 	affecting 	the 	employment
status of one individual. 	[Plaintiff’s] complaints against [city
officials] are better classified as challenging actions that were
performed in the course of fulfilling administrative or managerial
functions.”) 	(internal 	citations 	omitted); 	see 	also 	Bogan, 	523
U.S. 	at 	55 	(distinguishing 	between 	“the 	hiring 	or 	firing 	of 	a
particular 	employee” 	and 	the 	legislative 	act 	of 	terminating 	a
position, which “may have prospective implications that reach well
beyond the particular occupant of the office”).
The 	undersigned 	notes 	the 	similarities 	between 	the 	instant
case and Robinson v. Alexander City, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172002,
2021 WL 4134054 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2021), where an Alabama city’s
former 	police 	chief 	brought 	a 	civil 	rights 	racial 	discrimination

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lawsuit2 	against 	the 	city, 	its 	mayor, 	and 	certain 	city 	council
members in response to the city council’s decision not to reappoint
him as chief of police. 	2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172002, at *1, 2021
WL 4134054, at *1. 	In a motion for summary judgment, the defendant
city 	council 	members 	asserted 	that 	they 	were 	entitled 	to
legislative 	immunity 	because 	they 	were 	engaged 	in 	a 	legislative
act by voting on appointments. 	Id., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172002,
at *13, 2021 WL 4134054, at *5. 	The court noted:
The 	act 	of 	voting 	does 	not 	expressly 	give 	rise 	to
legislative 	immunity 	and 	voting 	on 	an 	appointment 	“is
not 	the 	sort 	of 	broad 	‘legislative’ 	activity 	that 	is
typically associated with grants of absolute immunity.”
[Smith, 	45 	F.3d 	at 	405]. 	In 	contrast, 	a 	budgetary
decision 	to 	eliminate 	an 	employment 	position 	is 	a
legislative act, not an administrative one that warrants
legislative 	immunity. 	See 	Bryant 	v. 	Jones, 	575 	F.3d
1281, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Unlike employee personnel
decisions, 	the 	elimination 	of 	a 	public 	employment
position does constitute a legislative act.”).
Id., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172002, at *14, 2021 WL 4134054, at *5.
The 	court 	concluded 	“that 	the 	decision 	to 	not 	reappoint 	the
Plaintiff was administrative in nature and is an employee personnel
decision, 	more 	like 	that 	found 	in 	Smith 	than 	in 	Bryant.” 	Id.,
2021 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	172002, 	at 	*15, 	2021 	WL 	4134054, 	at 	*5.
Because 	it 	found 	that 	the 	city 	council’s 	decision 	was
2 	Like 	Gray, 	the 	plaintiff 	in 	Robinson 	brought 	claims 	of 	race
discrimination pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well
as 	a 	claim 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	alleging 	that 	the 	Defendants
violated 	his 	constitutional 	right 	to 	equal 	protection 	under 	the
law. 	See 	Robinson, 	2021 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	172002, 	at 	*2, 	2021 	WL
4134054, at *1.

14
administrative 	rather 	than 	legislative 	in 	nature, 	it 	denied 	the
council members’ motion for summary judgment based on legislative
immunity. 	Id.
Here, the Individual Defendants ask the Court to focus on the
fact that Gray was either discharged or not hired through a voting
process at a city council meeting. 	However, they point to nothing
in 	Gray’s 	pleading 	which 	indicates 	that 	the 	decision 	to 	hire
another 	individual 	as 	police 	chief 	for 	the 	City 	of 	Evergreen 	was
“general in nature” rather than “simply a decision regarding whom
to 	hire.” 	See 	Smith, 	45 	F.3d 	at 	406. 	Nor 	do 	the 	Individual
Defendants 	offer 	any 	discussion 	of 	the 	relevant 	laws 	or 	rules
surrounding the hiring of a police chief for the City of Evergreen
that 	would 	support 	the 	inference 	that 	their 	decision 	regarding
Gray’s employment was a legislative rather than an administrative
function. 	See 	Bryant, 	712 	F. 	Supp. 	at 	890 	(stating 	that 	“under
[Alabama] state law, it appears that matters concerning employment
decisions 	. 	. 	. 	are 	managerial 	functions 	and 	not 	legislative”).
Thus, 	the 	Court 	cannot 	conclude 	at 	this 	juncture 	that 	the
Individual 	Defendants 	are 	entitled 	to 	absolute 	legislative
immunity 	for 	their 	decision 	not 	to 	hire 	or 	to 	discharge 	Gray 	as
the City of Evergreen’s police chief. 	Accordingly, the Individual
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them in
their 	individual 	capacities 	in 	Gray’s 	second, 	third, 	and 	fourth
causes of action is due to be denied.

15
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	recommends
that 	the 	Individual 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Gray’s 	amended
complaint 	(Doc. 	3) 	be 	GRANTED 	in 	part 	and 	DENIED 	in 	part, 	as
follows:
The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Gray’s 	Title 	VII 	claims 	against
Defendants 	Stallworth, 	Edwards, 	and 	Caylor 	in 	their 	individual
capacities 	as 	asserted 	in 	the 	first 	cause 	of 	action 	is 	due 	to 	be
GRANTED, 	and 	Gray’s 	Title 	VII 	claims 	against 	Defendants
Stallworth, Edwards, and Caylor in their individual capacities are
due to be DISMISSED with prejudice;
The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Gray’s 	claims 	against 	Defendants
Stallworth, 	Edwards, 	and 	Caylor 	in 	their 	official 	capacities 	as
asserted in his first, second, third, and fourth causes of action
is due to be GRANTED, and all of Gray’s claims against Defendants
Stallworth, 	Edwards, 	and 	Caylor 	in 	their 	official 	capacities 	are
due to be DISMISSED with prejudice;
The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Gray’s 	claims 	against 	Defendants
Stallworth, Edwards, and Caylor in their individuals capacities as
asserted 	in 	his 	second, 	third, 	and 	fourth 	causes 	of 	action 	based
on absolute legislative immunity is due to be DENIED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A 	copy 	of 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	shall 	be 	served 	on
all parties in the manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects

16
to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14)
days of the date of service of this document, file specific written
objections with the Clerk of this Court. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). 	The parties should
note 	that 	under 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 	3-1, 	“[a] 	party 	failing 	to
object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or 	recommendations
contained 	in 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	in 	accordance 	with 	the
provisions 	of 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	636(b)(1) 	waives 	the 	right to 	challenge
on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period
for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object.
In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review
on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
11th Cir. R. 3-1.
In 	order 	to 	be 	specific, 	an 	objection 	must 	identify 	the
specific place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation
where 	the 	disputed 	determination 	is 	found. 	An 	objection 	that
merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before
the Magistrate Judge is not specific.
DONE this 20th day of September, 2024.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE