CHATHAM COUNTY v. SMITH et al.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0699
Chatham County
v.
Damon L. Smith et al.
On Appeal from the Superior Court of Chatham County
No. SPCV2300211
Decided: October 14, 2026
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Chatham County imposed a fire protection service fee,
consisting of a flat per-parcel charge or a charge based on the
square footage of structures, on all parcels of real property in a
special district consisting of unincorporated areas of the county.
Appellees Damon L. and Sebrell E. Smith, owners of property
subject to the fee, sued for refunds, contending that the fee was
actually 	an 	illegal 	tax. 	The 	trial 	court 	granted 	Appellees
summary judgment, holding that the fee was a tax on real
property rather than a fee or assessment and that it was an illegal
tax because it was not based on the value of the property — an ad
valorem tax — as required under Georgia law. Because we agree
that the fire protection service fee was actually a tax and that it
was required to be ad valorem, we affirm.
“On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, legal
questions are reviewed de novo, and this Court also conducts a de
novo review of the evidence.” Barnett v. Caldwell, 302 Ga. 845,
845 	(2018) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Further, 	we 	must 	“view 	the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

2
light most favorable to the non-movant,” which is the County in
this case. State v. Federal Def. Program, Inc., 931 SE2d 123, 129
(Ga. 2026) (quotation marks omitted). So viewed, the evidence
shows as follows.
Before July 1, 2024, Chatham County had no county-
operated fire department. Beginning in 1988, the County was
divided into 12 special districts for fire protection services that
were provided by municipal fire departments, volunteer fire
departments, or private entities. Southside Communities Fire
Protection, Inc. d/b/a Chatham Emergency Services, Inc. (“CES”)
provided 	fire 	protection 	services 	to 	four 	districts 	in
unincorporated 	Chatham 	County 	in 	return 	for 	fees 	paid by
property owners in those districts. When about one third of the
property owners stopped paying and CES could not continue
providing the same services, the County contracted with CES to
provide fire protection services in the affected districts. At that
time, the County adopted a fire service protection tax and,
invoking the Special Districts Paragraph of the Home Rule
Article, Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. VI, it created a
special district encompassing the unincorporated portions of the
County that were not already paying other fire departments.
In 2022, the County repealed the fire service protection tax.
Once again invoking the Special Districts Paragraph, it enacted
the 	“Fire 	Protection 	Service 	Fee 	Ordinance” 	(“Fire 	Fee
Ordinance”), which implemented a “Fire Protection Service Fee”
(“Fire Fee”). It also created a “Fire Service Area,” which was a
special service district “within unincorporated Chatham County”
where a contractor, specifically CES, would provide fire protection
services. The Fire Fee would be annually assessed against all
parcels 	of 	real 	property 	in 	the 	Fire 	Service 	Area 	and 	was
structured as a combination of a $100 flat charge for the land and

3
a variable rate for the square footage of all structures, including
mobile 	homes 	and 	ancillary 	structures. 	The 	variable 	rate
increased over 11 bracketed increments, ranging from $75 for
square footage of 0.0001 to 499.99 square feet to $10,000 for
square footage of 50,000 or more. The annual Fire Fee was
collected on this basis for the fiscal year running from July 1,
2022, through June 30, 2023.
In 2023, the Fire Fee Ordinance was revised to impose a
flat $100 charge for “unimproved/vacant” parcels and a charge of
$0.14 per square foot with a minimum fee of $100 for all “burnable
structures,” including main and ancillary structures. The 2023
amendment also altered the definition of “Fire Service Area” to
exclude those parts of unincorporated Chatham County where
fire protection services are “billed by a separate fire service
provider 	by 	another 	municipality 	or 	a 	vendor 	selected 	by
Chatham County or a department of Chatham County, or a
volunteer fire department.” The Fire Fee was billed and collected
under the 2023 amendment for the fiscal year running from July
1, 2023, through June 30, 2024. In June of 2024, CES was not
financially 	able 	to 	continue, 	and 	the 	County 	took 	over 	fire
protection 	services 	for 	the 	unincorporated 	special 	services
district, changed the fee, and incorporated it into the millage rate
for that district.
At all relevant times, the Fire Fee Ordinance authorized
the County to assess a “late charge penalty of the greater of $25
or ten percent (10%) of the amount due” as well as “all costs of
collection, 	including 	attorney’s 	fees 	and 	court 	costs.” 	The
Ordinance also authorized the County to collect unpaid fees “by
any means allowed under law, including but not limited to filing
suit to collect on an unpaid account and by using all methods
allowed by Georgia law to collect on any judgment obtained

4
thereby, including enforcement of any lien resulting from any
such 	judgment.” 	The 	Ordinance 	further 	provided 	that 	its
violation “shall be punishable by a fine of up to $500 or up to 50
hours of community service per day of violation or both.”
Appellees, owners of real property in the Fire Service Area
subject to the Fire Fee, filed a verified class action complaint and
multiple amended complaints against the County in superior
court. Appellees alleged that, because the Fire Fee was actually a
tax but was not assessed ad valorem, it was “an illegal tax not
authorized by the Georgia Constitution or by Georgia law,”
entitling Appellees and the proposed class members to refunds
under OCGA § 48-5-380 of Fire Fees collected from July 1, 2022,
through 	June 	30, 	2024, 	as 	well 	as 	declaratory 	judgment,
injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. 	Appellees pursued class
certification in multiple motions. The County filed motions to
dismiss, 	for 	stay 	of 	discovery 	and 	protective 	order, 	and 	for
judgment on the pleadings. And the parties subsequently filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.
After a consolidated hearing, the trial court granted class
certification. In a separate order entered on the same day, the
trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and
denied the County’s motions to dismiss, for judgment on the
pleadings, and for summary judgment. 1 	In the latter order, the
1 In its final enumeration in this appeal, the County contends that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment before merits discovery was
conducted. However, the County has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. It
is true, as the County argues, that the trial court’s scheduling order, as
required by OCGA § 9-11-23(f)(2), stayed all merits discovery until a written
decision regarding certification of the class. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-23(f)(1),
however, the trial court established a schedule for discovery germane to the

5
trial court concluded that, using the criteria set forth in Bellsouth
Telecomm., LLC v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 146–47 (2019), “the
Fire Fee is a tax on real property” and “not a fee or assessment”;
that the Fire Fee is “an invalid and unlawful tax” because taxes
on real property, even those “levied in a Special District on real
property pursuant to the authority granted under the Special
Districts Paragraph,” must be ad valorem; and that Appellees and
all class members are entitled to recover refunds “of all such
illegally paid taxes” under Georgia’s refund statute, OCGA § 48-
5-380, in the total amount of $26,852,778.90 plus prejudgment
interest totaling $3,274,595.33.
As explained below, we conclude that the Fire Fee was an
issue of whether the requested class should be certified. As a result, substantial
discovery was conducted, including depositions under OCGA § 9-11-30(b)(6) of
County officials and the CES fire chief. After that discovery, Appellees filed
their motion for summary judgment, and the County filed both a response and
its own motion for summary judgment. In the County’s summary judgment
filings, it relied on the depositions and argued only the merits. The County
never requested a continuance, nor did it file an affidavit pursuant to OCGA §
9-11-56(f), which requires a showing that the respondent cannot, for reasons
stated, present facts essential to justify its opposition. Nor did the County ever
argue — not even in its post-hearing response — that a summary judgment
ruling would be premature or that merits discovery remained stayed. The
County makes such arguments for the first time in this appeal.
On summary judgment, a party has a duty to present its best case and
may not withhold meritorious legal arguments until appeal, absent special
circumstances. Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 828–29 (2002).
Prematurity because merits discovery was stayed does not fit within the list of
special circumstances in Pfeiffer, 275 Ga. at 829 n.10, and the County does not
argue otherwise. Furthermore, a respondent’s failure to invoke the remedy of
OCGA § 9-11-56(f) forfeits a claim that summary judgment is premature and
demonstrates that the trial court did not err by proceeding to rule on the
summary judgment motion. Bell v. Freeport Title & Guaranty, 355 Ga. App.
94, 96–97 (2020); Carr v. FedEx Ground Package System, 317 Ga. App. 733,
740 (2012).

6
illegal tax because it was not ad valorem as required by applicable
Georgia constitutional and statutory law.
1. 	The Fire Fee was a tax.
“The Georgia Constitution protects taxpayers by limiting
the methods and means by which Georgia governments can
impose taxes.” Homewood Assocs. v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-
Clarke County, 323 Ga. 62, 77 (2025) (Peterson, C. J., concurring).
“The distinction between a tax and a fee is not one of names but
of substance.” McLeod v. Columbia County, 278 Ga. 242, 244
(2004) (quotation marks omitted). While fees are “a charge for a
particular service provided, based on the payer’s contribution to
the problem,” a tax is “‘an enforced contribution exacted pursuant
to legislative authority for the purpose of raising revenue to be
used for public or governmental purposes, and not as payment for
a special privilege or a service rendered.’” Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at
146–47 (quoting Gunby v. Yates, 214 Ga. 17, 19 (1958)).
Drawing from McLeod, Bellsouth identified four factors
that Georgia courts should consider in determining whether a
governmental fee or charge is in substance a tax. The factors to
be considered are that a tax is “(1) a means for the government to
raise general revenue based on the payer’s ability to pay (i.e.,
income 	or 	ownership 	of 	property), 	without 	regard 	to 	direct
benefits that may inure to the payer or to the property taxed,”
that the tax is “(2) mandatory,” that it is “(3) not related to the
payer’s contribution to the burden on government,” and that the
tax does “(4) not result[ ] in a ‘special benefit’ to the payer
different from those to whom the charge does not apply.” 305 Ga.
at 146–47. While Bellsouth requires consideration of all four
factors, it does not require all four factors to be met in order to
hold that a governmental charge is in substance a tax. See 305
Ga. at 146 (“Generally, we have considered four criteria in

7
considering whether a charge is a tax.”); id. at 149 (concluding
that the charge at issue there was a tax “based on the relevant
factors”); McLeod, 278 Ga. at 245 (describing the “mandatory”
factor as “not dispositive” but “support[ing] the view” that the
charge at issue was a fee) 2; id. at 244 (describing the distinction
as one of “substance”). In applying those factors, we must keep in
mind their objective: to facilitate the determination of whether a
governmental charge was for a “special privilege” or “particular
service” or instead “for the purpose of raising revenue to be used
for public or governmental purposes.” Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 146–
47.
The County argues that the trial court erred by treating
the Fire Fee as an unconstitutional tax under Bellsouth rather
than applying the Special Districts Paragraph to conclude that it
was a fee. More specifically, the County says that applying
Bellsouth here is not appropriate because the Fire Fee was
adopted pursuant to the Special Districts Paragraph and was not
a countywide regulatory charge like that at issue in Bellsouth.
However, nothing in the Special Districts Paragraph indicates
that “tax” should be defined differently from its use in the rest of
the Georgia Constitution or from the understanding of the term
that we expressed in Bellsouth, nor does the Special Districts
Paragraph change the distinction between taxes on the one hand
and non-tax fees and assessments on the other. Instead, that
Paragraph simply provides that “special districts may be created
for 	the 	provision 	of 	local 	government 	services 	within 	such
districts; and fees, assessments, and taxes may be levied and
2 Note, however, that if a charge is wholly voluntary, “it cannot be a
tax.” McLeod, 278 Ga. at 245 (holding that an option for property owners to
reduce the charge, as well as a prohibition on the imposition of a lien directly
against the property, supported the view that it was a fee).

8
collected within such districts to pay, wholly or partially, the cost
of providing such services therein and to construct and maintain
facilities therefor.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. VI.
Indeed, we have already expressed our understanding that “fees,
assessments, and taxes” in the Special Districts Paragraph are
“separate” and “equal” “categories of funding sources for county
services” that are “different in kind” from each other. See City of
Winder 	v. 	Barrow 	County, 	318 	Ga. 	550, 	561–62 	(2024)
(“[O]therwise, 	there 	would 	have 	been 	no 	need 	to 	list 	‘fees,
assessments, and taxes’ separately and on equal terms.”). And
“where a word or phrase is used in one part of a constitution in a
plain and manifest sense, it is to receive the same interpretation
when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears, from the
context or otherwise, that a different meaning should be applied
to it.” State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 902 (2023) (“[W]e
presume that the same meaning attaches to a given word or
phrase wherever it occurs in a constitution.”).
The provision for “taxes” in the Special Districts Paragraph
was ratified in 1983 in a legal and historical context that included
this Court’s understanding of the term in other parts of the
Georgia 	Constitution, 	which 	was 	entirely 	consistent 	with
Bellsouth’s definition of the term. See Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 146–
47 (quoting Gunby for a definition of “tax” and drawing four
criteria from McLeod for determining whether a charge is a tax);
McLeod, 278 Ga. at 243–44 (defining “tax” in the context of Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III(a) (the Uniformity Clause),
and Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I); Gunby, 214 Ga. at 18–19 (defining
“tax” in the context of the provision of the 1945 Constitution that,
similar to Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. I(a), limited
the purposes for which the powers of taxation over the whole state
could be exercised, Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I).
See also Lovell v. Raffensperger, 318 Ga. 48, 51 (2024) (holding

9
that construction of a constitutional provision “requires careful
attention to not only the language of the clause in question, but
also its broader 	legal and historical 	context, 	which 	are the
primary determinants of a text’s meaning” (quotation marks
omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that Bellsouth sets forth the
controlling test, 3 and we now turn to application of its four factors
and hold that the Fire Fee was a tax as a matter of law.
First, the Fire Fee was imposed on property owners to fund
the general availability of fire protection without regard to their
use of the service or its direct benefit to them or their property.
The County argues that the Fire Fee was imposed in the special
district “for a particular service provided.” McLeod, 278 Ga. at 244
(quotation marks omitted). But McLeod itself explained more
fully that fees “are intended to be and should be clearly described
as a charge for a particular service provided,” in contrast to taxes,
which are “a means for the government to raise general revenue
and usually are based on ability to pay (such as property or
income), without regard to direct benefits which may inure to the
payor or to the property taxed.” Id. (citations and punctuation
omitted).
The text of the Fire Fee Ordinance shows that the Fire Fee
likewise generated general revenue without regard to any direct
benefits that property owners might receive from fire services.
The 	Ordinance 	stated that 	“[a]ll 	Properties 	within 	the Fire
3 The County contends that Bellsouth and McLeod established different
frameworks for determining whether a fee or charge is in substance a tax and
that the trial court should have applied the McLeod framework here, to the
exclusion of Bellsouth. However, McLeod established a framework for how to
assess whether a given charge or fee was in substance a tax, and Bellsouth
followed that framework in determining that the charge in Bellsouth was an
improper tax. See Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 146–47. Those cases establish one
framework for this determination, and we rely on it here.

10
Service Area are subject to” the Fire Fee 	and that the property
owner was “obligated to pay the applicable” Fire Fee and would
be “responsible for the fire fee.” The Ordinance “allocate[d] the
cost of maintaining a constant state of availability, readiness and
preparedness 	to 	provide 	fire 	protection 	services 	among 	the
owners of property [in] the Fire Service Area.” The purpose of the
Fire Fee was “to fund the cost of fire protection services, systems,
equipment 	and/or 	facilities 	needed 	to 	provide 	effective 	fire
protection,” which “may include the payment of debt obligations,
lease 	payments, 	operating 	expenses, 	contractual 	obligations,
capital outlays, non-operating expenses, provisions for prudent
reserves and other costs as deemed appropriate by the governing
body of Chatham County.” Accordingly, the Fire Fee was assessed
for a general-revenue purpose based on the extent to which a
person owns property in the Fire Service Area, “not the extent to
which a person can or in fact does summon emergency services.”
Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 147. And although the County argues that
the funds collected were placed in a dedicated enterprise fund
instead of a general revenue fund, “requiring a governmental
charge to be deposited in a special purpose fund does not make it
not a tax.” Id.
Second, the mandatory nature of the Fire Fee supports our
holding that it was a tax. As previously explained, the Fire Fee
Ordinance had strong enforcement provisions that authorized
penalties and fees, as well as collection of the Fire Fee “by any
means allowed under law, including but not limited to filing suit”
and 	enforcing 	any 	lien 	resulting 	from 	any 	judgment. 	In
considering whether a charge is mandatory for the purpose of
determining whether it is a tax, we have also considered “not
whether someone may theoretically continue to live a lawful
existence without using a particular service at all, but whether
someone may obtain that service by way of an alternate route that

11
avoids paying the charge.” Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 148. 4 In that
regard, the County argues 5 that property owners could opt out of
the Fire Fee, citing deposition testimony of County officials that
property owners “can prove they have fire coverage from another
city or company,” that the County had agreements with some of
its cities whose fire stations are closer to property owners in an
unincorporated area, that property could be removed from the
Fire Service Area if the County made that decision, and that
certain 	“neighborhoods” 	had 	successfully 	requested 	such 	a
change.
The 	Fire 	Fee 	Ordinance 	recognized 	that 	there 	were
unincorporated 	areas 	of 	the 	County 	serviced 	by 	the 	fire
department designated by the County to provide fire protection
services in the Fire Service Area, while there were “other areas of
the unincorporated County which [we]re serviced by municipal
fire departments and volunteer/nonprofit fire departments.” The
Fire Service Area was defined in 2022 as the unincorporated
areas of the County where fire protection services were provided
4 Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 148, cited two cases with alternative routes to
avoid paying part or all of the charge at issue. See McLeod, 278 Ga. at 245
(holding that this factor supported the view that a utility charge was not a tax
because property owners could reduce the amount of the charge by creating
and maintaining private stormwater management systems and because the
ordinance did not permit imposition of a lien directly against the property of
those who fail to pay the charge); Luke v. Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources, 270
Ga. 647, 648 (1999) (holding that a fee for participation in an underground
storage tank trust fund was not a tax when the storage tank owner may
demonstrate evidence of financial responsibility as required by statute by
means other than participation in the fund).
5 We note that, in its appellate reply brief, the County extensively
develops its argument that the Fire Fee is not a tax but, with respect to this
factor, argues only that “the mandatory nature of the charge does not convert
it into a tax,” as this factor is “not a dispositive rule.”

12
by CES. And that definition was amended in 2023 to instead
expressly 	exclude 	those 	unincorporated 	areas 	where 	fire
protection services were “billed by a separate fire service provider
by another municipality or a vendor selected by Chatham County
or 	a 	department 	of 	Chatham 	County, 	or 	a 	volunteer 	fire
department.” 	The Fire Fee Ordinance required “[a]ll properties
located in the unincorporated Fire Service Area” to have a current
valid fire protection service “with a provider who is recognized by
the County in the Service Delivery Strategy filed with the State
and an approved fire department with the State of Georgia.”
Although the record shows that it apparently was possible
for a group of property owners who were close enough to a
municipal fire station with the necessary capacity to request
removal from the Fire Service Area, that option was not available
to property owners who were not near a municipal fire station.
The County does not explain, and nothing in the record shows,
what would be required for property owners to establish a new
volunteer fire department, but we note that there are significant
legal requirements in that regard. See OCGA §§ 25-3-21 (defining
“fire department” to include “a fire department solely utilizing
volunteer 	firefighters”), 	25-3-22 	(requiring 	a 	certificate 	of
compliance with “the minimum requirements specified in Code
Section 25-3-23 and the rules and regulations of the Georgia
Firefighter Standards and Training Council”); 25-3-23 (setting
out the minimum requirements, including responsibility for a
defined 	area 	of 	operations 	that 	has 	“been 	approved 	and
designated by the governing authority of the applicable county”).
There is no evidence that any property owners availed themselves
of an alternative to paying the Fire Fee. Furthermore, if a
property owner were to succeed in avoiding the Fire Fee by
transfer to a municipal fire department or a volunteer fire
department, then the owner would be billed by that department

13
for the local government service of fire protection, and the Fire
Fee would remain mandatory for every property still located in
the Fire Service Area. Indeed, the Special Districts Paragraph
authorizes fees, assessments, and taxes for local governmental
services to be levied and collected only “within such districts.”
Accordingly, the combination of the enforcement provisions of the
Fire Fee Ordinance with the difficulty and ultimate result of
avoiding the Fire Fee supports the view that it was not actually a
fee.
Third, the Fire Fee did not track any payer’s burden on the
system and was not based on the payer’s use of the system, but
turned on ownership and square footage. The Fire Fee Ordinance
expressly excluded from its definition of the Fire Fee “special
charges to the owners of particular properties for services or
facilities related to fire protection, including, but not limited to,
charges for fire inspections for which a corresponding fee may be
collected for the service rendered.” County officials conceded that
the Fire Fee was “not based on the actual consumption or use of
fire services” and that the square footage brackets were based on
“common sense” and not “any sort of fire data.” Indeed, a property
owner who paid the Fire Fee each year might well not have
summoned fire protection services to the associated property. See
Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 149 (stating, when deciding that a charge
for 911 services was a tax, that “[a] person who pays the charge
year after year might well never make a 911 call on the associated
telephone line”).
Fourth, and closely related to the third factor, the Fire Fee
conferred no special benefit to property owners because CES was
required to respond to all calls within the Fire Service Area
regardless of payment. The Fire Fee Ordinance defined the Fire
Service Area simply as the special service district “where fire

14
protection 	services 	are 	provided.” 	Thus, 	the 	Ordinance
contemplated provision of such services throughout the special
service district; provision of fire protection services was based
merely on the location of the district rather than payment by
properties receiving such services. The deposition testimony of
the CES Fire Chief and the County Manager confirmed that the
County was obligated to respond to all calls for fire protection
service in the Fire Service Area, regardless of whether a property
owner had paid the Fire Fee; that no one who summoned fire
services without having paid the Fire Fee, including a passing
motorist or a tenant, was billed by CES; and that the benefits
received by one who paid the Fire Fee were the same for everyone
who 	did 	not 	pay 	the 	fee. 	See 	Bellsouth, 	305 	Ga. 	at 	149
(additionally stating as part of its analysis of whether the 911
charge was a tax that a “person may use a public phone or
borrowed phone to summon emergency services ... on a regular
basis” and that “emergency services are available to all within a
given emergency services area”).
The County argues that the availability of fire protection
services is a property-specific benefit because of enhanced value,
decreased risk, and lower insurance premiums. Again, however,
the purpose of a tax is “raising revenue to be used for public or
governmental 	purposes, 	and 	not 	as 	payment 	for 	a 	special
privilege 	or 	a 	service 	rendered.” 	Bellsouth, 	305 	Ga. 	at 	146
(quotation marks omitted). Cf. McLeod, 278 Ga. at 245 (holding
that 	the 	utility 	charge 	was 	a 	fee 	where 	it 	applied 	only 	to
“developed 	property, 	but 	not 	to 	undeveloped 	property,” 	and
therefore “the properties charged receive[d] a special benefit”
from the services). In this case, the property owners to whom the
Fire Fee applied “‘received no benefit not received by the general
public, 	because 	all members 	of 	the 	public 	may 	access 	the’”
governmental service. Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 149 (quoting Fulton

15
County v. T-Mobile South, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 466, 471 (2010)).
Bellsouth recognized that the argument that only those to whom
the 	911 	charge 	applied 	could 	“take 	advantage 	of 	certain
‘enhanced’ 	services 	... 	framed 	the 	benefit 	at 	issue 	wrongly”
because the charge applied irrespective of the level or type of
service provided. 305 Ga. at 150. Similarly, the fact that the
property owners to whom the Fire Fee applied might receive some
incidental benefits to their specific parcels of property also frames
the issue of “special benefits” wrongly because the Fire Fee was
only 	for 	the 	public 	purpose 	of 	governmental 	fire 	protection
services and did not depend on whether those incidental benefits
ever materialized. Moreover, those to whom the Fire Fee did not
apply could also receive incidental benefits: for example, tenants
could benefit from lower insurance premiums, and tenants and
motorists could benefit from decreased risk, that resulted from
the provision of fire protection services even though they were not
required to pay the Fire Fee. Indeed, the Fire Fee Ordinance
expressly recognized that “benefits” from fire protection services,
specifically including “reduced risk to life and property due to fire,
and reduced insurance premiums,” extend “to all properties in the
County and surrounding areas.” 	Consequently, the potential
property-specific incidental benefits on which the County relies
did not amount to “special benefits” to payers that differed from
the benefits received by those who were not required to pay the
charge.
Both the County and amici argue for deference to the
County’s legislative determination in its Fire Fee Ordinance that
the Fire Fee was “not a tax.” However, the cases they cite do not
support the proposition that this Court ought to defer to a
legislative determination that a charge is a fee when in substance
it is a tax. See, e.g., Turner County v. City of Ashburn, 293 Ga.
739, 744 (2013) (“This Court has previously held that the question

16
of the benefit of a tax is one that is exclusively left to legislative
discretion and is not a matter for inquiry by the courts unless
there is a manifest abuse of power.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Again, “[t]he distinction between a tax and a fee is not one of
names but of substance.” McLeod, 278 Ga. at 244 (quotation
marks omitted). A “legislature’s characterization of the amounts
collectible ... as being fees is not controlling on the question of
whether they constitute fees or taxes, if the burden imposed is
devoid of the essential nature of fees.” Gunby, 214 Ga. at 19
(holding that a charge for marriage licenses deposited in a
restricted purpose retirement fund was a tax). See also Sexton v.
City of Jonesboro, 267 Ga. 571, 572 (1997) (holding that an
ordinance’s statement that it was a “tax” levied “for revenue
purposes 	only 	and 	not 	for 	regulatory 	purposes” 	was 	“not
determinative” of whether it was effectively a regulatory fee).
While County and amicus briefs rely in part on our line of
three cases holding that stormwater utility charges are fees, those
cases are distinguishable. In McLeod, we held that the ordinance
there 	imposed 	a 	utility 	charge 	for 	stormwater 	management
services, applied only to property that actually contributed to the
absorption of stormwater runoff, provided a special benefit to the
properties charged through the control and treatment of polluted
stormwater contributed by those properties, allowed property
owners to maintain private systems, and did not permit the
imposition of a lien directly against a charged property. 278 Ga.
at 243–45. In the second case, we applied the same analysis to the
ordinance there, holding that the issue was “controlled by this
Court’s 	decision 	in 	the 	nearly 	identical 	case 	of 	McLeod.”
Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke County,
292 Ga. 514, 514–15 (2013). And the third case involved the same
stormwater ordinance and decided the same legal question at
issue in Homewood Village. Homewood Assocs., 323 Ga. at 69.

17
Despite the appellants’ contention in Homewood Assocs. that the
record was materially different, we held that Homewood Village
“determined as a matter of law that the payors ... receive[d] a
special benefit.”6 Indeed, the “special benefit” question in those
three cases, involving services to control and treat the repeated
occurrences of stormwater runoff on each developed property, is
fundamentally different from that question in this case, involving
fire protection services to deal with the possibility of a fire on any
property.
Because the Fire Fee was imposed on property owners to
fund the general availability of fire protection without regard to
their use of the services or any direct benefits they might receive,
was mandatory in nature, did not track their burden on the
system, and did not result in a special benefit to them, we
conclude, based on these relevant factors, that the Fire Fee was
enacted to raise revenue for public or governmental purposes
rather than to provide a particular service to the property owners
and was, therefore, a tax.7
6 We note that Homewood Assocs. adhered to the holding in Homewood
Village on stare decisis grounds and acknowledged “the doubts some of us may
have about the correctness of [our prior] analysis regarding whether [the]
stormwater utility charge is a fee.” Homewood Assocs., 323 Ga. at 71.
7 We note that persuasive authority from our own Court of Appeals
lends further support for characterizing the Fire Fee as a tax. See Lincoln
County v. Serenity Builders & Dev., LLC, 373 Ga. App. 395, 399–402 (2024)
(holding that a county’s water availability charge was a tax and not a fee under
the Bellsouth test because the charge covered the costs of maintaining
infrastructure, was based on property ownership, was imposed regardless of
the lack of direct benefit to the persons and properties against which it was
assessed, was mandatory because it could not be reduced and a lien could be
imposed directly against the property, was imposed regardless of the burden

18
2. 	The Fire Fee was an illegal tax because it was not ad
valorem.
Having concluded that the Fire Fee was actually a tax, we
now turn to the question of whether the tax was required to be ad
valorem under the Georgia Constitution and applicable statutes.
The term “ad valorem” means “according to value.” Griggs v.
Greene, 230 Ga. 257, 267 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). In
general, the tax laws of Georgia require that property taxes be
based on the value that would be realized from a normal cash sale.
See OCGA § 48-5-1 (“The intent and purpose of the tax laws of
this state are to have all property ... returned at the value which
would be realized from the cash sale, but not the forced sale, of
the property ... as such property ... [is] usually sold except as
otherwise provided in this chapter.”). See also City of Winder, 318
Ga. at 560 (looking to the definition of “property tax” in Black’s
Law Dictionary (Abridged) (6th ed. 1991) as “[a]n ad valorem tax,
usually levied by a city or county government, on the value of real
or personal property that the taxpayer owns on a specified date”).
The 	County 	and 	amici 	curiae 	argue 	that 	the 	Special
Districts Paragraph, as adopted in 1983, expanded flexibility in
funding services by conferring broad authority on counties to fund
services within special districts by means of fees, assessments, or
taxes without being limited by any ad valorem requirement. The
trial court decided that taxes on real and tangible personal
property, 	even 	those 	levied 	under 	the 	Special 	Districts
or lack thereof that owners placed on the county, and resulted in no special
benefit to the payer different from those to whom the charge did not apply); T-
Mobile, 305 Ga. App. at 469–73 (holding prior to Bellsouth that a 911 charge
was a tax because it was not voluntary, its purpose was to raise revenue and
not as compensation for a service, and the payers received no benefit not
received by the general public).

19
Paragraph, must be ad valorem. The trial court located the source
of the ad valorem requirement in the Georgia Constitution,
specifically the Uniformity Clause, Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII,
Sec. 	I, 	Par. 	III(a) 	(“Except 	as 	otherwise 	provided 	in
subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this Paragraph, all
taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.”). The trial
court relied on Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 830 (1955), to
support its understanding of the Georgia Constitution and also
cited Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I (“Except as
authorized in or pursuant to this Constitution, all laws exempting
property from ad valorem taxation are void.”) and Heron Lake II
Apts., L. P. v. Lowndes County Bd. of Assessors, 299 Ga. 598
(2016). After thoroughly reviewing the trial court’s order, the
appellate briefs, and all cited authority, some of us have doubts
about 	whether 	an 	ad 	valorem 	requirement 	can 	properly 	be
inferred from the text of Article VII of the Georgia Constitution of
1983 and whether Hutchins or any decision of this Court has so
held. See Homewood Assocs., 323 Ga. at 77 n.12 (Peterson, C. J.,
concurring) (“The 1945 Constitution removed the ‘ad valorem’
language (at least in its express form in this provision) but kept
the uniformity language. ... And the 1983 Constitution, which
now controls, contains materially identical language.”); id. at 81
n.15 (“Note that the current constitution does not contain a
general ad valorem requirement for taxation.”). However, we
need not resolve those issues here because, as explained below,
we conclude that former OCGA § 36-70-24(3)(B) (1997), the
version of that statute applicable in this case, did require the Fire
Fee to be ad valorem and that certain “home rule” and taxation
provisions in the Georgia Constitution — especially the Special
Districts Paragraph itself — required the County to comply with
that statutory provision.

20
“Basic canons of construction tell us to read our laws
(statutes and constitutional provisions alike) (1) together, and (2)
in harmony whenever possible.” Warbler Inv., LLC v. City of
Social Circle, 321 Ga. 125, 133 (2025) (quotation marks omitted).
“It is a basic rule of construction that a statute or constitutional
provision should be construed to make all its parts harmonize and
to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part, as it is not
presumed that the drafters intended that any part would be
without meaning.” Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509
(2023) (punctuation omitted).
“[T]he governing authority of any county ... may exercise
the power of taxation as authorized by this Constitution or by
general law.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Par. I (emphasis
added). The power granted to counties in home rule provisions of
the Georgia Constitution to adopt and to amend or repeal “clearly
reasonable ordinances ... relating to its property, affairs, and local
government,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I(a), “shall
not be construed to extend to ... [a]ction adopting any form of
taxation beyond that authorized by law or by this Constitution.”
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I(c)(4). The Special
Districts Paragraph (after initially providing for the creation of
special districts for the provision of local government services and
for the levy and collection of fees, assessments, and taxes to pay
for such services) provides the following:
Such 	special 	districts 	may 	be 	created 	and 	fees,
assessments, or taxes may be levied and collected
therein by any one or more of the following:
(a) By general law which directly creates the
districts.
(b) By general law which requires the creation

21
of 	districts 	under 	conditions 	specified 	by 	such
general law.
(c) By ... county ordinance ... , except that no
such ordinance ... may supersede a law enacted by
the General Assembly pursuant to subparagraphs (a)
or (b) of this Paragraph.
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. VI (emphasis added).
Assuming, without deciding, that the initial language of the
Special Districts Paragraph is broad enough to permit the levy of
non-ad-valorem taxes against real property, the latter portion of
that 	paragraph 	limits 	the 	funding 	allowed 	within 	a 	special
district.
Applying 	that 	latter 	portion 	of 	the 	Special 	Districts
Paragraph to this case, we first see that no general law expressly
authorized the County to impose a non-ad-valorem tax generally
on real property in the unincorporated areas of the County. See
OCGA § 48-5-6 (“All property shall be returned for taxation at its
fair market value except as otherwise provided in this chapter.”).
Instead, former OCGA § 36-70-24(3)(B) restricted the County’s
options for imposing a charge on real property in the Fire Service
Area. This statute was part of the Services Delivery Strategy Act,
former OCGA § 36-70-20 et seq. (1997). 8 The intent of that Act
was, among other things, “to provide a flexible framework within
which local governments in each county can develop a service
delivery system that is both efficient and responsive to citizens in
their 	county” 	and 	“to 	minimize 	inefficiencies 	resulting 	from
duplication 	of 	services 	and 	competition 	between 	local
8 The Act was amended effective January 1, 2026. See Ga. L. 2024 at
1044, 1052; Ga. L. 2025 at 667, 670.

22
governments.” OCGA § 36-70-20. And the Act mandated an
agreement for the implementation of a “service delivery strategy.”
OCGA § 36-70-21 (“Each county and municipality shall execute
an agreement for the implementation of a local government
service delivery strategy as set forth in this article by July 1,
1999.”). The Fire Fee Ordinance invoked the Act and referenced
the County’s “service delivery strategy” in several places. The
Ordinance stated that, “[i]n accordance with OCGA § 36-70-20,
there are areas of unincorporated Chatham County that are
serviced by a fire department defined in the Service Delivery
Strategy.” 	The Ordinance defined the Fire Service Area as “the
special service district within unincorporated Chatham County
where fire protection services are provided by [CES,] as defined
in the Service Delivery Strategy.” 	And the Ordinance required
“the Fire Protection Service” to be “with a provider who is
recognized by the County in the Service Delivery Strategy filed
with the State.” 	Moreover, County witnesses referred to the
County’s service delivery strategy a number of times. One County
witness explained that “the fire service districts were created
prior and then voted on and brought in as part of the service
delivery 	strategy.” 	Another 	County 	witness 	described 	the
County’s service delivery strategy agreement as “over 25, 30 years
old,” and still another County witness further explained that the
County “is restricted by the service delivery strategy in terms of
... where we provide service and ... how we pay for services.”
Accordingly, the Services Delivery Strategy Act as enacted in
1997 governed the Fire Fee Ordinance, and former OCGA § 36-
70-24(3)(B) applied to the Fire Fee Ordinance at all relevant
times.
Former OCGA § 36-70-24(3)(B) stated that funding of
services provided for the primary benefit of the unincorporated

23
area of the county 9 “shall be derived from special service districts
created 	by 	the 	county 	in 	which 	property 	taxes, 	insurance
premium taxes, assessments, or user fees are levied or imposed
or through such other mechanism agreed upon by the affected
parties which complies with the intent of subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph.” Although the Fire Fee was actually a tax and was
levied against real property, it was not a “property tax” as
contemplated by this statute unless it was ad valorem because we
have construed “property taxes” in former OCGA § 36-70-24(3)(B)
to “mean[ ] ad valorem property taxes” to the “exclusion” of “non-
ad valorem taxes on property.” City of Winder, 318 Ga. at 561–62.
Indeed, the Fire Fee was not ad valorem, and the County has not
argued — in the trial court or on appeal — that it was. Basing the
amount of the Fire Fee on square footage or a flat fee per parcel
made it the antithesis of an ad valorem tax because it was not
proportional to the value of the property: the charge was the same
for different parcels or different buildings with the same square
footage regardless of how widely their value differed. See Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that the term is from
the 	Latin 	“according 	to 	the 	value” 	and 	means 	“(Of 	a 	tax)
proportional to the value of the thing taxed”; and that an “ad
9 Former OCGA § 36-70-24(3)(A) (1997) provided that the service
delivery strategy “shall ensure that the cost of any service which a county
provides primarily for the benefit of the unincorporated area of the county shall
be borne by the unincorporated area residents, individuals, and property
owners who receive the service.” Thus, former “OCGA 36-70-24(3)(B) limit[ed]
the sources within a special district that can be used to fund services provided
for the primary benefit of the unincorporated area of the county.” City of
Winder, 318 Ga. at 562. And the fire protection services here fit that
description. See id. at 565 (Bethel, J., concurring) (“[S]ervices exist that are
easily identified as being provided for the primary (and perhaps even exclusive)
benefit of unincorporated area(s). These services might include ... a fire service
whose coverage area is exclusively outside the incorporated limits.”).

24
valorem tax” is “[a] tax imposed proportionally on the value of
something (esp. real property), rather than on its quantity or
some other measure”); 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 6 (Apr. 2026 update)
(“An ‘ad valorem tax’ is a tax levied on property or an article of
commerce in proportion to its value as determined by assessment
or appraisal.”); 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 19
(Aug. 2026 update) (explaining that, in contrast to “specific”
taxes, which “are of a fixed amount by the head or number, or by
some 	standard 	of 	weight 	or 	measurement, 	and 	require 	no
assessment other than a listing or classification of the subjects to
be taxed ... [t]he essential characteristic of an ad valorem tax is
that the tax is levied according to the value of property as
determined by an assessment or appraisal”). The Fire Fee also did
not constitute any “other mechanism” approved in OCGA § 36-70-
24(3)(B) (listing alternatives to “property taxes” as “insurance
premium 	taxes, 	assessments, 	or 	user 	fees” 	or 	“such 	other
mechanism agreed upon by the affected parties”). The Fire Fee
Ordinance therefore violated the mandate of that statute by using
a funding mechanism that it did not permit.
Because former OCGA § 36-70-24(3)(B) stated that the
funding of services in the circumstances of this case (i.e., where
the 	services 	were 	provided 	for 	the 	primary 	benefit 	of 	the
unincorporated area of the county) “shall be derived from special
service districts created by the county” (emphasis added) through
“property taxes” or other described mechanisms, the statute was
authorized 	by 	subparagraph 	(b) 	of 	the 	Special 	Districts
Paragraph because it was, in the language of that subparagraph,
a “general law which require[d] the creation of districts under
conditions specified by such general law.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.
IX, Sec. II, Par. VI(b). Subparagraph (c) of the Special Districts
Paragraph also authorizes the creation of special districts and the
funding of services therein by county ordinance, but expressly

25
prohibits any such ordinance from “supersed[ing] a law enacted
by the General Assembly pursuant to subparagraph[ ] ... (b).” Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. VI(c). Because former OCGA
§ 36-70-24(3)(B) was such a law, the Fire Fee Ordinance, though
generally authorized by the Special Districts Paragraph, could
not “supersede” that statute by imposing a tax on real property
that was not ad valorem.
Because the Fire Fee Ordinance imposed a tax on real
property that was not ad valorem, it violated the general law of
former 	OCGA 	§ 	36-70-24(3)(B) 	and 	the 	Special 	Districts
Paragraph, which authorized that statute and prohibited any
county ordinance from superseding it. The Fire Fee Ordinance
therefore was not an exercise of the County’s “power of taxation
as authorized by this Constitution or by general law,” Ga. Const.
of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Par. I, but adopted a “form of taxation
beyond that authorized by law or by this Constitution,” Ga. Const.
of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I(c)(4). Accordingly, the Fire Fee was
an illegal tax because it was imposed by the County on real
property but was not ad valorem as required by applicable
Georgia constitutional and statutory law. We therefore affirm the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
Judgment 	affirmed. 	All 	the 	Justices 	concur, 	except
Peterson, C.J., disqualified.