Jones v. State

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In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0077
Marlon Christopher Jones
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fayette County
No. 2022R-0136

Decided: June 2, 2026

BETHEL, Justice.
Marlon Christopher Jones was convicted of malice murder
and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Donnell
Hicks. 1 On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred in
admitting his statements to police and in denying his motion to
strike a juror for cause. For the reasons below, Jones’s claims fail.
1. The evidence admitted at trial showed the following.
Jones’s wife worked at a local pharmacy and was engaged in an

1 The crimes occurred on May 4, 2022. On May 10, 2022, a Fayette
County grand jury indicted Jones for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
(Count 2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
3). At a jury trial from October 30–November 3, 2023, Jones was found guilty
on all counts. The trial court sentenced Jones to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole on Count 1 and five years consecutive on Count 3. The
remaining count was vacated by operation of law.
Jones filed a timely motion for new trial on November 17, 2023, which
he later amended. Following a hearing in December 2024, the trial court
entered an order denying the motion, as amended, on April 3, 2025. Jones then
filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case was docketed to the term of this
Court beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
affair with Hicks, the general manager. On the day of the crimes,
Jones confronted Hicks in the pharmacy parking lot and shot him
repeatedly, killing him. A witness driving by the pharmacy at the
time saw a man in a purple shirt shoot a gun twice, walk around
in front of a car, and then repeatedly shoot a body on the ground.
After shooting Hicks, Jones called 911 and told the
dispatcher that he had “just killed a man in front of [the
pharmacy],” that he put the gun in the car, and that Hicks “was
f***ing [his] wife.” When police arrived at the scene, they arrested
Jones, who was wearing a purple shirt, was still in possession of
his gun, and had gunshot residue on his hands Text messages
recovered from Hicks’s phone established that Jones had recently
confronted Hicks with his suspicions about the affair.
2. Jones first argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress his custodial statements made at the crime
scene 2 because, he says, he invoked his right to remain silent and
the State failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights. His arguments fail. 3
Before trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress his
statements made to a police officer at the crime scene shortly after
his arrest, arguing in relevant part that police officers questioned

2 Jones’s vague, perfunctory argument references his custodial
statements made shortly after his arrest at the crime scene and during a
subsequent interview at the police station. But Jones’s pretrial motion to
suppress related only to the statements made at the crime scene, and those
were the only statements introduced into evidence at trial. So we interpret his
argument on appeal to concern only the statements made at the crime scene.
3 Jones argues for the first time in his reply brief that his statements
made at the scene were coerced and should have been suppressed on that
additional basis. But “an appellant who raises an argument for the first time
in a reply brief is not entitled to have that argument considered.” Williams v.
State, 323 Ga. 362, 369 n.7 (2026) (cleaned up).

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him after he invoked his right to remain silent and without first
obtaining from him a valid waiver of his rights under Miranda. 4
The trial court held a Jackson-Denno 5 hearing to consider Jones’s
motion to suppress. At the hearing, the State presented the
testimony of the officers who interacted with Jones at the crime
scene, as well as the officers’ body camera footage that recorded
those interactions. The officers testified in pertinent part, and
their body camera footage showed as follows.
At the scene, Jones was arrested, handcuffed, and read the
Miranda rights. The arresting officer asked Jones if he
understood the rights that were read to him, to which Jones
responded, “I do.” The officer asked Jones if he was willing to
waive his rights and submit to questioning, and Jones replied,
“Not right now.” The arresting officer then informed her sergeant
that she read Jones the Miranda rights, that Jones did not wish
to talk, but that they could try again later on. After some time,
the sergeant went to speak with Jones, who was seated in the
back of a patrol car, and she asked if he needed to use the
bathroom. Jones responded affirmatively. The sergeant indicated
that police would “make that happen,” and then asked Jones if he
wanted to tell her his “side of it, tell [her] what happened.” Jones
immediately responded, “Best I can say is, my wife was sleeping
with [Hicks]. He’s the manager of the store and whatnot.” Jones
then disclosed that, during a “confrontation” with his wife the
previous day, he discovered that his wife “was cheating on [him]
with [Hicks].” Jones claimed that he had talked with Hicks and
that Hicks wanted to fight him. Jones denied fighting with Hicks
and also denied that Hicks “came at [him]” in any way. Jones
asserted that he drew his gun to show Hicks “the severity of [the

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
5 Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368 (1964).

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situation],” though he also claimed that he only wanted to talk
with Hicks and sought “peace” and “understanding.” Jones said
that he was not sure how many times he fired his weapon and
was not sure he had hit Hicks until he “walked up on him.”
After considering this evidence and the argument of the
parties, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Jones was advised of the Miranda rights, that he understood
the Miranda rights, that he voluntarily waived those rights, and
that he thereafter gave his statement freely and voluntarily
without hope of benefit or fear of injury. The court rejected Jones’s
argument that he had invoked his right to remain silent by
responding, “Not right now,” after the arresting officer asked if he
would submit to questioning, reasoning that Jones’s response was
not an unequivocal invocation of that right. On that basis, the
trial court denied Jones’s motion to suppress, and his statement
was subsequently introduced into evidence at trial.
As we have said before, “[p]ursuant to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, a defendant who is in
custody must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
certain rights, including the right to remain silent and the right
to the presence of an attorney.” State v. Lee, __ Ga. __ (2026),
S25A1087, slip op. at 6 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (quotation marks
omitted). “Miranda outlines the procedures to be followed once
warnings have been given, making clear that once warnings are
given and one of the rights referenced therein is invoked, police
must honor that invocation.” Jenkins v. State, 317 Ga. 585, 594
(2023).
“To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-
chief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant was advised of [the Miranda] rights and that
he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived them.” State

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v. Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. 222, 226 (2024). When this Court
reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
generally “review a trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations for clear error and apply the law de novo.”
Sinkfield v. State, 318 Ga. 531, 540 (2024).
In cases where some or all of the material facts are
undisputed, we properly may take notice of the undisputed facts
– even if the trial court did not – without interfering with the
prerogative of the trial court to resolve disputes of material fact.
Such undisputed facts include, among other things, those which
definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to
evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of
credibility. Audio or video evidence may match that description.

Dickey v. State, ___ Ga. ____ (2026), S26A0046, slip op. at
*2 (Ga. May 5, 2026) (cleaned up).
In advancing this claim on appeal, Jones makes two
arguments that his custodial statements at the crime scene were
inadmissible, both focused on his initial response of “[n]ot right
now” to the arresting officer’s question about whether he would
submit to questioning. First, he asserts that his response of “[n]ot
right now” constituted an invocation of his right to remain silent.
And second, he argues that “his only words on the record about
his understanding of his rights” were “[n]ot right now” and, as
such, the State failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights before submitting to questioning. Neither
argument is persuasive.
(a) We turn first to Jones’s argument that his initial
response to the arresting officer constituted an invocation of the
right to remain silent. “We have explained that police must

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scrupulously honor a suspect’s right to remain silent if the person
clearly and unambiguously states that he wants to end a custodial
interrogation.” Locklear v. State, 317 Ga. 115, 120 (2023)
(quotation marks omitted).
[A] suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning
with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion
of the right to remain silent. If the statement is ambiguous or
equivocal, then the police have no duty to clarify the suspect’s
intent, and they may proceed with the interrogation.

Perez v. State, 283 Ga. 196, 198 (2008) (quotation marks
omitted). And “if a defendant equivocates in asserting the right,
a police officer is under no obligation to clarify or to stop
questioning.” Locklear, 317 Ga. at 120 (quotation marks omitted).
Viewed in context, the record here supports the trial court’s
finding that Jones’s response of “[n]ot right now” did not
articulate his desire to cut off questioning “with sufficient clarity”
such that a reasonable police officer would have understood the
statement “to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.” Perez,
283 Ga. at 200 (quotation marks omitted). Rather, a reasonable
police officer could have interpreted that statement to mean only
that Jones did not want to answer questions at that moment in
time, “not that he did not want to speak to police at all.” Locklear,
317 Ga. at 120 (appellant’s statement “that’s as far as I’m going
with it,” considered in context, was not an unambiguous and
unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent). Indeed,
under the circumstances in which Jones made the statement—
moments after his arrest and mere minutes after shooting and
killing Hicks—a reasonable officer could have understood Jones’s
conditional statement to be temporally qualified and to mean that

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he might speak with officers at a future time. See Young v. State,
309 Ga. 529, 536 (2020) (Although the first half of the statement
— “I’m done talking to you” — might appear unequivocal in
isolation, it was immediately followed by a conditional statement
that rendered the whole statement equivocal.); Cheley v. State,
299 Ga. 88, 91 (2016) (considered in context, a reasonable officer
would have understood appellant’s statement that he was
“completely finished” to mean “only that [appellant] had lost
patience with the repeated and continued questions” on a
particular subject); Weaver v. State, 288 Ga. 540, 544 (2011)
(appellant’s statement, “I can’t talk right now,” was reasonably
interpreted under the circumstances to mean that he was
temporarily overcome with emotion, not that he was
unequivocally invoking his right to remain silent, and statement
“I don’t want to say nothing” was reasonably understood as a part
of the “give-and-take” of interrogation, rather than an invocation
of the right to remain silent); Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 425
(2010) (appellant’s statement “‘if you’re not going to talk real talk,
then we shouldn’t talk’ was not an unequivocal and unambiguous
invocation of his right to remain silent” because “it was
conditional and ambiguous, and lacked sufficient clarity to lead a
reasonable police officer to understand that [appellant] was
exercising his right to remain silent”). Because Jones’s response
was not so clear as to lead a reasonable police officer to
understand that he was unequivocally and unambiguously
asserting his right to remain silent, the officers were under no
duty to cease questioning him.
(b) Jones’s argument that the State failed to prove that he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights is likewise
unavailing. In asserting this claim, Jones centers his argument
on the form of the waiver and emphasizes the absence of evidence
that he expressly waived his rights. But “it is well settled that a

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relinquishment of the rights pursuant to Miranda need not be
express.” Lopez-Cardona, 319 Ga. at 227. See also Berghuis v.
Thompson, 560 US 370, 384, 385 (2010) (noting that “[t]he
prosecution … does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda
rights was express” and that Miranda “does not impose a
formalistic waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to
relinquish those rights”). Instead, the waiver may be implicit, as
determined by looking to “all the circumstances,” including “the
defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights
and a course of conduct indicating waiver.” Lopez-Cardona, 319
Ga. at 227 (quotation marks omitted). In short, “[a]s a general
proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a
full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner
inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to
relinquish the protection those rights afford.” Berghuis, 560 US
at 385. Such is the case here.
The absence of an express waiver of the Miranda rights,
either verbally or in writing, does not preclude a finding that
Jones in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights. See
Huffman v. State, 311 Ga. 891, 895 (2021) (“a written waiver is
not necessary where a suspect is orally advised of his or her rights
and subsequently waives those rights through his or her
responses” (quotation marks omitted)). The trial court could
conclude from the officers’ testimony and its own assessment of
the body camera footage—which accords with ours—that Jones
acknowledged that he understood the Miranda rights and waived
them when he freely responded to subsequent questioning
without invoking those rights. See Huffman, 311 Ga. at 895
(affirming denial of motion to suppress where appellant did not
sign a waiver of rights under Miranda, the officer who read the
rights did not ask for a verbal waiver or verbal acknowledgment
that appellant understood the rights, the evidence authorized the

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trial court to conclude that appellant understood his rights, and
appellant implicitly waived his rights by responding to the
officer’s questions). See also Berghuis, 560 at 384 (“Where the
prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it
was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement
establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Jones’s motion
to suppress his custodial statements on these bases, and this
claim fails.
2. In his remaining claim of error, Jones argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to strike a juror for cause,
which was based on the juror’s indication that the evidence made
her squeamish and uncomfortable and that she would have a
difficult time viewing the evidence. 6 Following the denial of his
motion, Jones used a peremptory strike to remove the juror. On
appeal, Jones asserts that he was harmed because he was forced
to use “a valuable strike to get the ineligible juror out of the
panel.” Even assuming the trial court erred, however, Jones has
failed to show the requisite harm.
“In assessing harm arising from a trial court’s erroneous
refusal to excuse a prospective juror, at issue is whether any
unqualified juror was seated as the ultimate result of errors with
respect to jurors challenged for cause.” Carson v. State, 308 Ga.
761, 772 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). See also Willis v.
State, 304 Ga. 686, 707 (2018) (“[A] defendant is not
presumptively harmed by a trial court’s erroneous failure to
excuse a prospective juror for cause simply because the defendant

6 Jones argues in his reply brief that additional jurors also should have
been stricken for cause. But, as we stated in footnote 2 above, we do not
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Williams, 323
Ga. at 369 n.7.

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subsequently elected to remove that juror through the use of a
peremptory strike.”). Jones has not shown, or even alleged, that
an unqualified juror was seated, and thus he has failed to show
reversible error. See Carson, 308 Ga. at 772. Accordingly, his
claim of error fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P. J., not participating.

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