CourtListener 10846009

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 3, 2026

S25A1498. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

A DeKalb County jury found Quintavius Jackson guilty of

felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting

death of Sulaiman Jalloh. 1 Jackson contends that the evidence was

1 The crimes occurred on October 15, 2019. A DeKalb County grand jury

returned an indictment on January 23, 2020, charging Jackson and his co-
defendant, Cordarius Dorsey, with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
predicated on armed robbery and aggravated assault, respectively (Counts 2
and 3), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 6), and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8). (Dorsey was
separately indicted both for felony murder predicated on possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and for the underlying firearm offense (Counts 4
and 7). During a trial that began on December 5, 2022, the jury found Jackson
not guilty of malice murder but guilty on the remaining counts. (The jury found
Dorsey guilty on all counts.) The judge imposed concurrent life sentences
without the possibility of parole on both of Jackson’s felony murder convictions
(Counts 2 and 3) and a consecutive five-year prison term for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8). The court merged the
armed robbery and aggravated assault counts into their respective felony
murder counts. As explained more fully in Division 3 (b), infra, we must vacate
Jackson’s sentence and remand the case for resentencing because the trial
court erred in sentencing Jackson on both felony murder counts. Jackson filed
a timely motion for new trial on December 16, 2022, and he amended it on
September 13, 2024. Following a hearing held on March 3, 2025, the trial court
constitutionally insufficient, that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the

principles of justice and equity and is decidedly and strongly against

the weight of the evidence, that the trial court made evidentiary and

sentencing errors, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective. As explained more fully below, Jackson has not carried

his burden of showing reversible error. However, as explained in

Division 3 (b), we vacate Jackson’s sentence in part and remand the

case to the trial court to correct a sentencing error.

1. Jackson contends that the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a party

to the crimes he claims were committed solely by his co-defendant,

Cordairus Dorsey. He also argues that the jury’s verdict is contrary

to the weight of the evidence as well as the principles of justice and

equity. He insists that he was merely present when Dorsey

assaulted, robbed, and killed Jalloh. For the following reasons, both

denied Jackson’s motion for new trial on March 11, 2025. Jackson filed a timely
notice of appeal on March 28, 2025, and the case was docketed in this Court
to the August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2
claims fail.

(a) Jackson was charged individually and as a party to the

crimes of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

As a matter of Georgia statutory law, “[e]very person
concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto
and may be charged with and convicted of commission of
the crime.” OCGA § 16-2-20(a). Conviction as a party to a
crime requires proof of a common criminal intent, which
a trier of fact may infer from “presence, companionship,
and conduct before, during and after the offense.”
McGruder v. State, 303 Ga. 588, 591 (2018) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also Felts v. State, 311 Ga. 547,
552 (2021). And “all the participants in a plan to rob are
criminally responsible for the act of each committed in the
execution of the plan and which may be said to be a
probable consequence of the unlawful design,” Williams v.
State, 304 Ga. 658, 662 (2018) (citation and punctuation
omitted), a principle we have specifically held applies to
murders committed during the commission of “a crime
that foreseeably [leads] to murder”—such as armed
robbery—perpetrated by a group that shares a common
criminal intent. Felts, 311 Ga. at 552. See also Moore v.
State, 311 Ga. 506, 509 (2021).

Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 679 (2022) (cleaned up). When we

evaluate a “due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable

3
to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes

of which he was convicted.” Shellman v. State, 318 Ga. 71, 74 (2024)

(quotation marks omitted). And “[w]e defer to the jury’s resolution

of any conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the

drawing of reasonable inferences from the facts.” Hooks v. State, 318

Ga. 850, 852 (2024). See also Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 455 (2023)

(“In [assessing the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence], we do

not evaluate witness credibility, resolve inconsistencies in the

evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence; these tasks are left to

the sole discretion of the jury.”).

So viewed, the evidence admitted at trial shows the following.

On October 15, 2019, Jackson and Dorsey met at a gas station in

DeKalb County and were there together half an hour. After Jalloh

drove his car into the station’s parking lot and stopped near the door

to the station’s convenience store, Dorsey robbed and shot Jalloh

while Jackson, as the facts recounted below demonstrate, helped

Dorsey. The incident was recorded from various angles on the gas

4
station’s surveillance video cameras.

The surveillance videos show Jackson and Dorsey interacting

with each other for about 30 minutes prior to the shooting. A witness

also recounted seeing Dorsey at the gas station “all day” on the day

of the shooting. The video recordings show that, prior to the

shooting, the two men walked around together in the parking lot of

the gas station. Dorsey wore all black clothing, orange Nike shoes,

and a burgundy Polo-branded hat. Dorsey and Jackson spoke with

each other, gestured to each other, shook hands, and Jackson tried

on Dorsey’s burgundy hat. When Jackson entered the convenience

store, the surveillance camera recorded clear, color images of his face

and clothing.

At about 10:15 p.m., Jalloh drove his car into the gas station

parking lot. Dorsey, who was standing outside alone at the time,

tapped on the glass window to get Jackson, who was inside, to join

him. The video recording shows that Dorsey pulled a handgun from

his clothing as he walked to Jalloh’s car. As Jalloh opened his car

door, Jackson went to the rear of the car and glanced around the

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parking lot, as if looking for someone. Dorsey, pointing his gun, stood

beside Jalloh’s open car door. Upon seeing Dorsey, Jalloh tried to

close the car door, but Dorsey pulled it open. As Dorsey struggled

with Jalloh, Jackson ran to Dorsey’s side. Jackson took a blue bag

from Jalloh, and Dorsey shot Jalloh in the chest. Both Jackson and

Dorsey left the gas station on foot, with Jackson sprinting away and

Dorsey slowly walking away in a different direction, as Jalloh fell

from his car onto the pavement. Jalloh died from the gunshot wound

to his chest.

Acting on information gathered from eyewitnesses to the

shooting as well as anonymous tips, law enforcement officials

determined that an individual known as “Polo” or “Juicy Boy” was

involved in the shooting. One of the investigators, Detective Brown,

was familiar with “Juicy Boy,” and knew him as Dorsey. He testified

that Dorsey was also referred to as Polo or J. B. Detective Brown

identified Dorsey in court as the person he knew as Juicy Boy. He

also watched the surveillance video recording as it was played for

the jury and identified Dorsey as the person in the burgundy Polo

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hat and dark clothing.

The State also introduced in evidence images and video

recordings from a Facebook account for a person using the name

“Polo Rollack.” The account displayed several images of Dorsey. In a

video recording posted to the account on October 14, 2019, the day

before the shooting, Dorsey can be seen wearing orange shoes like

those worn by the shooter. Dorsey’s social media accounts contained

information that led the police to Jackson’s Instagram account.

Using data from Jackson’s social media, the police were able to

obtain Jackson’s email address and driver’s license information. The

police learned that Jackson got a driver’s license two days after the

shooting. The photograph of Jackson’s driver’s license showed the

same two-toned, “twists” hairstyle worn by the shooter’s accomplice

in the gas station surveillance video. Images from Jackson’s social

media page and Jackson’s driver’s license both show that he had a

“21” tattooed on his face.

The police went to Jackson’s home where they interviewed his

mother. They showed her a still image taken from the surveillance

7
video, and she positively identified the person in the still image as

Jackson. In the still image, Jackson wore a navy-blue Polo shirt and

had a two-toned, “twists” hairstyle. The police interviewed Jackson

shortly after his arrest. When shown the still image of Dorsey’s

accomplice from the surveillance video, Jackson identified it as an

image of himself.

During a subsequent search of Jackson’s home, the police saw

a pile of clothing that included a navy-blue shirt like that worn by

Jackson and a burgundy Polo hat matching that worn by Dorsey

during the shooting. The hat was swabbed for DNA. Subsequent

testing showed that the DNA on the hat matched DNA samples

taken from both Jackson and Dorsey. The police searched Jalloh’s

car and found blue bags beneath Jalloh’s passenger seat like the one

taken by Jackson. The bags contained more than $30,000 in cash.

Jackson argues that this evidence fails to establish that he was

a party to the crimes for which he was convicted because he did not

shoot Jalloh and was merely present when Dorsey decided to commit

the crimes. Jackson is correct that “a person’s mere presence at the

8
scene of the crime and mere approval of the criminal act are

insufficient to establish that [he] was a party to the crime,” Grant v.

State, 298 Ga. 835, 837 (2016), but here, there was evidence from

which the jury could infer that Jackson was not merely present, but

rather an active participant in the crime. Witness testimony and the

surveillance video showed that Jackson waited at the gas station

with Dorsey, left the convenience store when Dorsey tapped on the

glass, and moved to the rear of the car when Dorsey approached

Jalloh’s car—actions from which a jury could infer that he was

acting as a lookout. Then, when Dorsey pointed a gun at Jalloh and

then struggled to take Jalloh’s property, Jackson went to Dorsey’s

aid. And when Dorsey shot Jalloh, Jackson took a bag from Jalloh

and fled. This evidence authorized a jury to conclude that Jackson

was an active participant in the crimes. Thus, it “makes no

difference here” that the evidence showed that Dorsey was the one

who shot and killed Jalloh; Jackson’s “conduct supports the jury’s

conclusion that he shared an intent” to assault and rob Jalloh at

gunpoint. See Mohamed, 307 Ga. at 90. Jackson’s conduct before,

9
during, and after the crimes supported the jury’s conclusion that he

shared an intent to commit the aggravated assault and armed

robbery of Jalloh. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the jury

to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was a party to

the crimes of felony murder, OCGA § 16-5-1(c), and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, OCGA § 16-2-20(b). See

Butler, 313 Ga. at 679; Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450, 453–54 (2020).

(b) Jackson contends that the trial court should have granted

his motion for new trial on the “general grounds,” pursuant to OCGA

§§ 5-5-20, 5-5-21, “for the same reasons” he contends the evidence

was allegedly insufficient. Jackson argues that the record “does not

show that the trial court properly exercised its discretion[.]” We

disagree.

Although the evidence was legally sufficient in this case to

sustain a conviction as a matter of due process, the trial court had

the authority to grant a new trial if it found that the jury’s verdict

was “contrary to … the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-

5-20, or the verdict was “decidedly and strongly against the weight

10
of the evidence[.]” OCGA § 5-5-21.

When these so-called “general grounds” are properly
raised in a timely motion for new trial, the trial judge
must exercise a broad discretion to sit as a “thirteenth
juror.” … [T]he merits of the trial court’s decision on the
general grounds are not subject to our review, and the
decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds is
vested solely in the trial court.

King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2023) (cleaned up). Here, the trial

court, after reviewing the evidence presented at trial, found as

follows:

As a separate inquiry, the Court has also considered
its authority under OCGA §[§] 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. The
Court has considered the legal sufficiency of the evidence
when combined with any conflicts in the evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.
The Court has also considered the merits of
Defendant’s arguments. The Court, in an exercise of
discretion, finds that the verdict was neither “contrary to
evidence and the principles of justice and equity,” under
OCGA § 5-5-20 nor “decidedly and strongly against the
weight of the evidence” under OCGA § 5-5-21.

The record shows that the trial court weighed the evidence and

considered the credibility of the witnesses before it determined that

Jackson was not entitled to a new trial on the general grounds.

Because the trial court’s order reflects that it exercised its discretion

11
as the thirteenth juror, this claim presents nothing further for our

review. Id. Compare Holmes v. State, 306 Ga. 524, 528 (2019)

(“[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the motion

for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court

has failed to exercise” its discretion under the general grounds.

(emphasis added)).

2. Jackson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing a State’s witness to give his “opinions and comments on a

video of the actual murder.” Specifically, he argues that the court

should not have allowed, over objection, Detective Brown to testify

about his identification of Jackson from the gas station surveillance

video. He contends that the detective should not have been allowed

to testify that the video showed Jackson as he “snatched a bag” from

the victim and “fle[d] from the scene.”

As a threshold matter, although Jackson claims that he

objected to the detective’s testimony regarding Jackson’s activities

on the surveillance video, he identified in his brief an objection only

to the admission of screenshots of Jackson’s social media. The record

12
reflects that Jackson did not object to the testimony he now

complains was improperly admitted. Thus, the claimed error was

not preserved for ordinary review, and we review this claim for plain

error only. See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (2016); OCGA § 24-

1-103(d).

Jackson cannot satisfy the test for establishing plain error

because he has not shown the existence of an obvious error.2 In this

case, even if Jackson had objected, the trial court was not required

to exclude the detective’s statements.

“A witness ordinarily may identify a person in a photo or video

2 To establish plain error, an appellant must meet each prong of a four-

prong test:
[F]irst, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation
from a legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or
abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second,
the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means
he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are
satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the
error—discretion which ought to be exercised if only the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.
Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 664 (2021) (quotation marks and emphasis
omitted). As we have noted, affirmatively establishing all four prongs “is a
difficult standard to satisfy.” Id. at 665 (quotation marks omitted).
13
if the identification satisfies OCGA § 24-7-701 (a) (Rule 701 (a)).” Lee

v. State, 322 Ga. 44, 59 (2025). Rule 701(a) authorizes the admission

of lay witness testimony in the form of opinions or inferences that

are rationally based on the witness’s perception, helpful to a clear

understanding of the determination of a fact in issue, and not based

on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. OCGA § 24-

7-701(a). 3 The witness may make such an identification if there is

“some basis to conclude” that the witness is “more likely to correctly

identify” the person in the video than the jury is. Glenn v. State, 302

Ga. 276, 279 (2017). When a court is deciding whether “some basis”

exists, the court can consider many factors, but the most important

is the witness’s “level of familiarity” with the person in the video. Id.

So if the witness has prior knowledge of the person or has interacted

3 OCGA § 24-7-701(a) provides:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences shall be limited to
those opinions or inferences which are:
(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness;
(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and
(3) Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Code Section 24-7-702.
14
with him before, as the detective did here with Jackson, that could

be a basis to conclude the witness is “better equipped than the

jurors” to make a good identification. See id.; Bullard v. State, 307

Ga. 482, 493 (2019). In its order denying Jackson’s motion for a new

trial, the court found that “such was the case here, given the

[detective’s] familiarity with [Jackson’s] appearance due to his

investigation of the case.” Based on the record before us, even if

Jackson had objected, the trial court would not have abused its

discretion in admitting the detective’s testimony identifying Jackson

on the surveillance video recordings. See id. Therefore, the trial

court did not plainly err in allowing the detective’s testimony. See

Lewis v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 665 (2021) (explaining that the

appellant cannot prevail if he fails on “even one element of the plain-

error test” (citation omitted)).

3. Jackson argues that the “trial court erred in sentencing the

Defendant, as mandatory, to life without parole [for] felony murder

as the sentence here for felony murder was discretionary and not

mandatory.” The record does not support Jackson’s contention that

15
the trial court mistakenly believed it was required to impose a

mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

Because the court sentenced Jackson on the felony murder

counts as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(a)4, it had the

discretion to sentence him either to a life sentence or to a life

sentence without the possibility of parole. OCGA § 16-5-1(e)(1) (“A

person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death,

by imprisonment for life without parole, or by imprisonment for

life.”). The transcript shows that, at sentencing, the prosecutor

asked the court to sentence Jackson to life without parole based on

Jackson’s “lack of remorse” as well as his conduct during the trial,

4 Code Section § 17-10-7(a) provides:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (b.1) of this
Code section, any person who, after having been convicted of a
felony offense in this state or having been convicted under the laws
of any other state or of the United States of a crime which if
committed within this state would be a felony and sentenced to
confinement in a penal institution, commits a felony punishable by
confinement in a penal institution shall be sentenced to undergo
the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the
subsequent offense of which he or she stands convicted, provided
that, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may, in his
or her discretion, probate or suspend the maximum sentence
prescribed for the offense.
16
which counsel argued showed a disregard for “the seriousness of this

entire process.” The prosecutor did not state or suggest that such a

sentence was mandatory. Following the State’s argument, defense

counsel made no argument for leniency, asserting that the court was

“bound by the recidivist notice.” Although the trial court did not

expressly state at sentencing that it had exercised its discretion in

sentencing Jackson to life without the possibility of parole, it did not

state that it believed such a sentence was mandatory. And absent

record evidence to the contrary, this Court presumes that “the trial

court understood the nature of its discretion and exercised it.”

Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 108 (citation omitted). Here, the court

made its thought process clear at the motion for new trial hearing,

vigorously rejecting counsel’s assertion that the court imposed the

sentence based on defense counsel’s mistaken belief that the

sentence was mandatory.

THE COURT: So you’re thinking that I didn’t
exercise my discretion when I gave him –
TRIAL COUNSEL: It doesn’t show it on the record,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: So when I did it, I did it because?

17
TRIAL COUNSEL Because you were told it was
mandatory.
THE COURT: You thought I did it because they told
me I could? No, not in this building; not in these walls;
that’s not how it goes.

In its written order denying Jackson’s motion for new trial, the

trial court stated that it was “fully aware of the difference between

section (a) and (c) recidivist sentencing” and that it based its

sentence on the State’s argument at sentencing as well as the

evidence presented at trial, including all the facts and circumstances

of the crimes. Further, the trial court explained that “[t]he sentence

was entered solely as an act of discretion and not due to any

misapprehension of the law.” Because the record shows that the

trial court exercised its discretion when entering the sentence, the

trial court did not err in sentencing Jackson to life without the

possibility of parole. See Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 152–53

(2023); Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29, 31–32 (2019).

4. Jackson asserts that he was denied constitutionally effective

assistance of counsel when his attorney did not object to the State’s

recommended sentence of life without the possibility of parole for

18
felony murder and agreed that the court “must sentence”

accordingly.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient

and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong

of the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate that trial

counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way

considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (2022)

(quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial

would have been different.” Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025)

(quotation marks omitted). And, if a defendant fails to make a

sufficient showing on one prong of the Strickland test, we need not

address the other prong. Starks v. State, 320 Ga. 300, 304 (2024).

Assuming, without deciding, that counsel was deficient for

19
mistakenly believing that the trial court was required to sentence

Jackson to life without the possibility of parole for felony murder,

Jackson has not shown that, had he objected to the sentence and

argued for leniency, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome would have been different. In its order denying the motion

for new trial, the trial court expressly stated that it intended to

impose the sentence it did based on the State’s arguments and

Jackson’s apparent lack of remorse. Because Jackson failed to

satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Jackson

failed to meet his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of

counsel. See Starks, 320 Ga. at 304. Consequently, this claim of error

fails.

5. Although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Jackson to life in prison without the possibility of parole

for felony murder, see Division 3, supra, it did err in imposing that

sentence on both counts of felony murder. “When a defendant is

found guilty on multiple counts of murder for a single homicide, all

additional counts beyond one for which the defendant is sentenced

20
are surplusage and must be vacated.” Walton v. State, 303 Ga. 11,

17 (2018). Under the circumstances here, Jackson’s sentences for

felony murder and the sentences for predicate felonies underlying

the felony murder counts must be vacated and the case remanded

for resentencing, so that the trial court may properly sentence

Jackson “for felony murder on a single count and to reconsider

sentencing in light of the remaining predicate offense for the surplus

count of felony murder which must be vacated by operation of law.”

Id. Because the court erroneously sentenced Jackson on both felony

murder convictions instead of vacating one of them, it did not

consider whether the surplus predicate felony merges as a matter of

fact into the single felony murder conviction remaining. It may do so

on remand.5 See, e.g., Noel v. State, 297 Ga. 698, 700 (2015) (“[O]n

resentencing, a legal conviction may be entered on only one felony

murder verdict, the underlying felony charged in that count will

5 We note that, because the court ran Jackson’s sentence for his firearm

conviction consecutive to the felony murder sentences that have been vacated,
the trial court must also resentence Jackson on his firearm possession
conviction.
21
merge into the felony murder conviction as a matter of law, the

remaining felony murder verdicts will stand vacated by operation of

law, and a determination whether the remaining non-murder

felonies merge as a matter of fact into the felony murder conviction

will need to be made.”); Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 336 (2) (2013)

(holding that the decision regarding which felony murder verdicts

shall be deemed vacated, which may affect other sentencing

decisions, is left to the discretion of the trial court on remand).

Judgment affirmed; sentence vacated in part and case
remanded for resentencing. All the Justices concur.