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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 3, 2026

S26A0419. MITCHELL v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

Johnson Bell Mitchell appeals his convictions for malice

murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony

stemming from the stabbing death of his son, Shaun Mitchell. 1 On

1 Shaun died on December 15, 2011. In March 2012, a Fulton County

grand jury returned an indictment against Mitchell, charging him with malice
murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during
the commission of a felony. At a jury trial in January 2013, the jury found
Mitchell guilty on all counts. Mitchell was sentenced to serve life in prison on
malice murder and a consecutive five-year term for the possession count. The
remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. See Leeks v.
State, 296 Ga. 515, 523–24 (2015). Mitchell, through counsel, timely filed a
motion for new trial in February 2013, but it took 12 years for that motion to
be resolved.
The record does not clearly show the reason for the inordinate delay, but
Mitchell himself does not seem to be responsible. The record does not show that
trial counsel formally withdrew from the case, but in 2014, Mitchell filed pro
se motions asking for appointed appellate counsel and for a hearing on his
motion for new trial. After he filed those pro se motions, Mitchell was
appointed counsel. In January 2015, the trial court denied Mitchell’s request
for a hearing on the basis of precedent in effect at the time providing that
appeal, Mitchell argues that the trial court erred in refusing to

consider his motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA

§ 16-3-24.2, which he filed on the first day of his trial. He also argues

that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the

prosecutor’s statement in closing argument that Mitchell was a

“mean drunk.” We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to consider Mitchell’s OCGA § 16-3-24.2

Mitchell did not have the right to be represented by counsel and also file
motions on his own. But see Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876 (2023) (overturning
precedent that pro se filings from represented individuals were legal nullities
and holding that trial courts had the discretion to accept such filings). Several
different counsel substituted in at various times as Mitchell’s attorney; at least
some of them appeared for status conferences over the years, and one filed an
amended motion for new trial in 2019 that merely argued the general grounds
and an evidentiary error. Another attorney began representing Mitchell in
2020, but waited five years, until June 2025, to file an amended motion for new
trial that raised a sufficiency of the evidence claim. In August 2025, Mitchell’s
attorney waived an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, and the
court entered an order denying it. Mitchell timely appealed, and his appeal
was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
None of the claims raised in the motion for new trial or on appeal
required the development of a record or the appointment of new, post-
conviction counsel. Indeed, current counsel waived an evidentiary hearing on
the motion for new trial. In short, there was no good reason for the substantial
delay in resolving this post-conviction matter. We must say, yet again, that “it
is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system, including trial
courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and defendants, to ensure
that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided
without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (2018).
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motion under the circumstances. And because there was evidence to

support the prosecutor’s statements, the trial court also did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor’s statements.

Therefore, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the trial

evidence showed the following. Just after midnight on December 15,

2011, Mitchell and his adult son, Shaun, got into an argument in the

kitchen of Mitchell’s home. The argument began because Mitchell

woke up his then-11-year-old daughter to clean the kitchen late at

night and refused to permit Shaun’s girlfriend to do it for her. The

men began bumping into each other, and Mitchell pushed Shaun.

Shaun then pushed Mitchell against a counter, at which time

Mitchell grabbed a knife and repeatedly stabbed Shaun. One of the

family members called 911, and during the call, Mitchell got on the

phone and said, “I stabbed my son” because “he came at me and tried

to jump on me.” Shaun died as a result of a stab wound to his chest

that penetrated his heart.

Mitchell was arrested. When he was being processed into the

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jail, he reported that he had been drinking. Mitchell reported that

he had one beer. One of Mitchell’s children, who was present during

the incident and observed the stabbing, testified that she observed

several liquor bottles in Mitchell’s room, including an open bottle,

the morning after the fatal stabbing.

Mitchell’s trial began on January 28, 2013, when the jury was

selected and sworn. On the following morning, before any witnesses

were called, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Mitchell

had submitted a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA

§ 16-3-24.2. The prosecutor stated that if Mitchell wanted to have a

hearing, Mitchell could testify “today,” since he had the burden of

proof. In response to a question from the trial court about the time

limits for filing a motion, the prosecutor stated that the motion

should have been filed at least 10 days before trial. The trial court

ruled that the motion was not timely because the jury had already

been selected and sworn and stated that Mitchell was free to argue

self-defense during his trial. At trial, Mitchell called no witnesses

and argued that he acted in self-defense.

4
1. Mitchell argues that the trial court erred in refusing to

consider his OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion, because the statute contains

no deadline to file an immunity motion. He argues that the trial

court was wrong to rely on the deadlines imposed by the discovery

statute, OCGA § 17-16-4,2 because even if the deadlines under that

statute applied, the harsh remedy of exclusion of evidence is a

consequence for a discovery violation only upon a showing of bad

faith and prejudice,3 neither of which was shown here. But it is not

clear that the trial court relied on OCGA § 17-16-4 in refusing to

consider Mitchell’s OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion. The court merely said

that it would not consider the motion because the trial was

underway and did not reference the 10-day-before-trial argument

raised by the State. And Mitchell has not shown that the trial court

2 In criminal cases, when a defendant opts into reciprocal discovery,
OCGA § 17-16-4 generally requires the State to make available certain
evidence — among other things, relevant statements made by the defendant
and evidence the State intends to use as evidence at trial — to the defendant
no later than ten days prior to trial. That statute also requires the defendant
to provide materials the defendant intends to introduce as evidence at trial
within ten days of timely compliance by the State, but not later than five days
prior to trial. See OCGA § 17-16-4(a), (b).
3 See OCGA § 17-16-6.

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abused its discretion in refusing to consider the motion at that point.

The statute at issue, OCGA § 16-3-24.2, provides that “[a]

person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section 16-

3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24, or 17-4-20 shall be

immune from criminal prosecution,” subject to an exception not

raised here. Mitchell is correct that this statute does not say when

an OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion must be filed, including whether it

must be filed pretrial. See, e.g., Gude v. State, 313 Ga. 859, 871

(2022) (noting that “nothing in the language of OCGA § 16-3-24.2

requires an immunity motion to be filed pretrial”); State v. Remy,

308 Ga. 296, 297 (2020) (same). Indeed, OCGA § 16-3-24.2 provides

immunity beyond just the trial, as “prosecution” is defined as “all

legal proceedings by which a person’s liability for a crime is

determined, commencing with the return of the indictment or the

filing of the accusation, and including the final disposition of the case

upon appeal.” OCGA § 16-1-3(14) (emphasis added). Because the

immunity provided under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 extends beyond

protection from trial, the plain text of the statute does not preclude

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a defendant from filing a motion during or after the trial.

The State argues that we have held that OCGA § 16-3-24.2

motions must be decided prior to trial, citing to several cases in

which we have said as much. But those cases were in a different

posture and thus do not apply here. In our first case interpreting

OCGA § 16-3-24.2, we held that the trial court erred in refusing to

rule on the defendants’ immunity motions that were filed before

trial. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 166 (2008). We have often repeated

Fair’s language that OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motions must be determined

prior to trial. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 297 Ga. 222, 225 (2015); Hipp

v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 418 (2013); Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 412–

13 (2008). But each of those cases addressed only motions that were

filed before trial. We have never held that an OCGA § 16-3-24.2

motion is time-barred if it is filed after a trial starts. See Gude, 313

Ga. at 871 (declining to decide whether a motion filed near the end

of the defendant’s trial was untimely because the trial court

alternatively ruled on the merits). Thus, the cases cited by the State

only stand for the proposition that OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motions filed

7
before trial must be decided before trial, not that all OCGA § 16-3-

24.2 motions must be filed before trial. See Schoicket v. State, 312

Ga. 825, 832 (2021) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that a decision’s

holding is limited to the factual context of the case being decided and

the issues that context necessarily raises. Language that sounds like

a holding — but actually exceeds the scope of the case’s factual

context — is not a holding no matter how much it sounds like one.”).

That said, that the immunity statute does not itself impose a

deadline for OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motions does not mean that the

defendant’s right to file such a motion is unfettered. Under OCGA §

17-7-110, “[a]ll pretrial motions, including demurrers and special

pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment,

unless the time for filing is extended by the court.” The plain

language of the statute sets out the general rule to file a pretrial

motion — ten days after the date of arraignment — and provides

that a trial court has the discretion to extend that deadline. See

Scott v. State, 368 Ga. App. 310, 310–11 (2023) (under OCGA § 17-

7-110, the trial court has the discretion to consider a motion filed

8
beyond the ten-day statutory deadline, but it is not required to do

so). Cf. Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 500, 503 (2017) (refusing to consider

merits of defendant’s pretrial motion filed 21 months after ten-day

statutory deadline where there was no indication trial court granted

an extension). Nothing in the text of OCGA § 17-7-110 prevents its

application to motions filed under the immunity statute. And

Mitchell points to no other requirement, statutory or otherwise, that

would force a trial court to accept an OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion filed

after OCGA § 17-7-110’s ten-day period lapses.

As relevant here, Mitchell filed his motion after his trial

started, clearly outside of the ten-day period set out in OCGA § 17-

7-110, and the record shows no indication that he received an

extension. Mitchell suggests that the trial court was nevertheless

obligated to consider his immunity motion, regardless of when it was

filed. But the only requirement we have held that the law imposes

is for a trial court to decide before trial a motion that is filed before

trial. Mitchell has identified no requirement, statutory or otherwise,

that would force a trial court to consider before trial an OCGA § 16-

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3-24.2 motion filed after OCGA § 17-7-110’s ten-day period lapses.

Thus, the requirement for a trial court to consider a pretrial OCGA

§ 16-3-24.2 motion was not triggered.

For OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motions filed after the ten-day period

listed in OCGA § 17-7-110, a trial court has the discretion to

consider them, but it is not required to do so. See OCGA § 17-7-110

(giving trial courts discretion to extend the deadline). Cf. Gude, 313

Ga. at 870 (trial court denied on merits an OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion

filed near the end of trial, as well as alternatively finding that

motion was untimely); State v. Smith, 347 Ga. App. 289, 292 (2018)

(seeing no plain error in trial court considering OCGA § 16-3-24.2

motion filed after the trial started). And given a trial court’s wide

discretion in how to conduct the trial, 4 Mitchell cannot show that the

trial court abused its discretion in declining to delay the ongoing

trial in order to hold a hearing and consider the merits of his OCGA

4 See Watkins v. State, 278 Ga. 414, 415 (2004) (“No principle is better

settled than that in the conduct of trials, both civil and criminal, a broad
discretion is vested in the judge below, and that that discretion will not be
controlled by this court unless it is manifestly abused.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
10
§ 16-3-24.2 motion.

Moreover, nothing precluded Mitchell from asking the trial

court, after the conclusion of the trial, to revisit its prior ruling on

his OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion. In Hipp, 293 Ga. 415, we concluded

that trial courts “retain the authority in criminal cases to change

their interlocutory rulings prior to the entry of a final judgment.” Id.

at 417. This authority extends to rulings on an OCGA § 16-3-24.2

motion and allows a trial court to grant immunity before entry of a

final judgment, even after a jury has rejected a defendant’s claim of

self-defense at trial. Id. at 418. There is no indication that Mitchell

ever asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling on his OCGA § 16-

3-24.2 motion after the jury returned its verdict and prior to the trial

court’s final judgment.

Moreover, Mitchell has not argued the merits of his self-

defense claim, either to the trial court on his motion for new trial or

on appeal. Despite arguing in his motion for new trial, as part of his

general grounds claim, that his actions showed that he was guilty of

voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, he did not argue that

11
his actions were justified completely as a matter of self-defense, such

that he would be not guilty of any crime. See Demery v. State, 287

Ga. 805, 809 (2010) (“[I]f [a defendant] is justified in killing under

OCGA § 16-3-21 [self-defense], he is guilty of no crime at all.”

(cleaned up)). He also has not argued on appeal that the evidence

showed that he acted in self-defense, even under a lower standard

necessary to prevail on an OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion.5 In other

words, Mitchell has had opportunities to continue arguing the

merits of his self-defense claim before the trial court and before this

Court, and has chosen not to. Under these circumstances, and given

the lack of authority requiring it, Mitchell provides no compelling

argument that we should vacate and remand to the trial court to

5 We also note that the jury was fully instructed on self-defense,
including the State’s burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 7 (2023). This standard is far more stringent for the
State than the by-a-preponderance burden Mitchell would have had to carry if
the trial court had heard his motion. See Bunn, 284 Ga. at 413 (“to avoid trial,
a defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under
OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence”). As the Attorney
General points out, Mitchell has not shown what, if any, evidence he would
have offered in support of his immunity motion or how that evidence would
have been different than the evidence presented at trial.

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hold a hearing on his OCGA § 16-3-24.2 motion at this stage in the

proceedings.

2. Mitchell next argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s reference to

Mitchell as a “mean drunk” in closing argument, because there was

no evidence he was drunk at the time of the incident, let alone that

he was mean when he was drunk. He also argues that because the

trial court overruled his initial objection, the prosecutor was

emboldened to continue an unwarranted and unsupported attack by

repeatedly referring to him as a “mean drunk.” We disagree that the

court abused its discretion.

“A prosecutor has wide latitude in the conduct of closing

argument, the bounds of which are in the trial court’s discretion.”

Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 458 (2023) (cleaned up). Although a

prosecutor “is prohibited from injecting into … closing argument

extrinsic and prejudicial materials that have no basis in the

evidence,” Kyler v. State, 270 Ga. 81, 85 (1998), a prosecutor is

allowed to argue inferences that can reasonably be made from the

13
evidence presented at trial, Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505, 515

(2017).

Here, Mitchell admitted that he drank on the night of the

stabbing, and a witness said that there was an empty bottle of

alcohol in his room. In the prosecutor’s first “mean drunk” reference,

the prosecutor argued that Mitchell was not attempting to avoid any

serious bodily injury since he pushed Shaun first, and argued that

“maybe [Mitchell’s] just a mean drunk” given that his response to

the verbal altercation was excessive and unjustified and showed a

level of anger and malice. Given the evidence that Mitchell had been

drinking, and the wide latitude a prosecutor has in its closing

argument, we see no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in

overruling Mitchell’s objection.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.