Jester v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 16, 2025

S25A0917. JESTER v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Jquantae Jester was convicted of felony murder and

concealing the death of another in connection with the killing of

Myra Smith Parlier.1 Jester contends that the trial court erred by

admitting other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b), by failing

to instruct the jury on the statutory requirement of confession

corroboration, and by admitting certain testimony. Seeing no

1 Parlier’s body was found on January 16, 2022. In May 2022, a Fulton
County grand jury indicted Jester for malice murder, felony murder based on
aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another.
After a mistrial in March 2023, the jury at Jester’s second trial, which was held
from May 17 to 30, 2023, found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty of
the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole for felony murder and 10 consecutive years for
concealing the death of another; the court merged the aggravated-assault
count. Jester filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. After
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in November 2024. Jester filed a
timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2025
term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
reversible error, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at Jester’s trial showed the

following. On the afternoon of January 16, 2022, a man who was

driving southbound on I-75 near Lake Allatoona discovered a large,

black, plastic container wrapped with packing tape on the shoulder

of the interstate. The man, who sometimes collected items of value

from the roadway, pulled over, placed the container in his truck, and

drove to his home in Cartersville. Inside the container, the man

found a woman’s dead body. The woman’s body was covered with

clothing and several pillows and blankets; a white trash bag covered

her head; and a dog leash was around her neck. The man called 911.

Responding investigators transported the woman’s body to the

GBI, which later identified the woman as Parlier. The medical

examiner who performed Parlier’s autopsy concluded that there

were abrasions on her neck that were consistent with someone

pulling the dog leash around her neck. The examiner also testified

that there was moisture inside the trash bag covering Parlier’s head,

indicating that Parlier was still breathing when the bag was placed

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there. The examiner concluded that Parlier’s death was caused by

asphyxia.

Investigators determined Parlier’s address in East Point and

obtained a search warrant for her house. They found a pillow that

was similar to a pillow found in the container; white trash bags and

a dog leash that were similar to the trash bag and dog leash on

Parlier’s body; a large, empty space in a closet in a back room,

indicating that the container had once been stored there; and an

empty roll of packing tape on the dining room table.

In February 2022, a friend of Parlier’s told investigators that

Jester and his girlfriend Rashad Boone had spent time with Parlier

in the fall and winter of 2021 and had sometimes slept in their car

in Parlier’s driveway because they were experiencing homelessness.

Investigators obtained information from Parlier’s EBT account

showing that her EBT card was used several times after her body

was found. Surveillance videos from the stores where the EBT card

was used showed Jester and Boone making purchases around the

times when the EBT card was used. Investigators arrested Jester

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and Boone on unrelated charges on February 25, 2022.

Investigators searched a moving truck that Jester and Boone

had been staying in and found several items that belonged to

Parlier, including her identification cards, debit and credit cards,

banking documents, social-security benefits documents, blank

checks, and jewelry. Investigators also determined that after

Parlier was killed, Jester (using a false name) used her debit card to

pay for a motel room; the PIN number for Parlier’s bank account and

the limits on her ATM debit card were changed; someone attempted

to deposit checks purportedly signed by Parlier; and $850 in cash

was withdrawn from her account.

Jester was interviewed shortly after he was arrested on

February 25; the interview was video-recorded and played for the

jury at trial. He claimed that in early January 2022, he paid Parlier

to use her EBT card and that when he later went to Parlier’s house

to return the card, she was not there, but a suitcase belonging to her

was on her front porch. The suitcase contained several of Parlier’s

credit cards, and Jester and Boone put it in their moving truck so

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they could return it to Parlier. Jester maintained that he did not

use Parlier’s credit cards.

On March 7, investigators interviewed Jester in the morning

and again in the afternoon; those interviews were also video-

recorded and played for the jury. During the morning interview,

Jester repeated his story about finding Parlier’s suitcase. Later that

afternoon, however, Jester asked to speak to investigators again,

saying that he would give “a full confession.” 2 Jester stated that at

some point, he learned that Parlier had sold a shotgun that he stored

in her house. He went to Parlier’s house to confront Parlier about

it, and when she refused to tell him where the shotgun was, he “got

angry.” He grabbed a “rope from one of her ... robes” and “wrapped

it around her throat and strangled her” and “took a bag and covered

it over her head and [he] suffocated her.” Jester held the bag there

“until she stopped breathing,” which “took a while.” He then took a

2 Jester said that he would confess if Boone was not charged with any

crimes. Investigators responded that they could not “make any deals” before
determining whether Boone was involved.

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“black,” “hard plastic” container from the back room; wrapped

Parlier in blankets; placed her in the container; and covered her with

“pillows and stuff like that.” He drove the moving truck to “the

expressway” and disposed of the container. Jester then went back

to Parlier’s house, took her credit cards and financial documents,

and put them in the moving truck. He later attempted to “pass”

checks at Parlier’s bank and paid a woman to withdraw $850 from

Parlier’s bank account for him.

Cell phone records for Parlier’s phone showed that the last

communication before her body was found on January 16, 2022, was

sent at 7:45 p.m. on January 14. Cell-site location information

(“CSLI”) for a cell phone associated with Jester showed that on

January 14, 2022, the phone was in the area of Parlier’s house in the

evening; on January 15, the phone was near Parlier’s house

throughout the evening and was moving north, consistent with

traveling north on I-75, at 11:41 p.m. At 1:36 a.m., the phone was

near Parlier’s house again. And phone records for that phone

showed that on the evening of January 15, the phone called a

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number used to access EBT account information and that in the

early morning hours of January 16, the phone called a customer

service number and a technical support number for Parlier’s bank.

In addition, an expert in latent fingerprint analysis determined that

Jester’s fingerprints were on the container in which Parlier’s body

was found, on the packing tape securing the container, and on the

trash bag covering Parlier’s head.

At trial, Parlier’s friend testified that when Jester learned that

Parlier sold his shotgun, he was “upset” and he and Boone said that

“they were good to her, and they couldn’t believe that she would sell

... their things.” Boone also testified that Jester was “upset” that

Parlier sold his gun. Finally, the State presented other-acts

evidence showing that in September 2015, Jester strangled another

woman and threatened to kill her; he later pled guilty to false

imprisonment in connection with that incident.

Jester testified in his own defense as follows. He and Boone

often stayed in Parlier’s driveway; they helped her around the

house; and they sometimes paid her for the use of her EBT card.

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Jester last saw Parlier around January 8, 2022, when he took her

shopping, and Parlier said that he and Boone could “hold on to” her

EBT card. Parlier gave Boone “a lot of jewelry,” and Jester found

Parlier’s credit cards and financial information in the suitcase on

her porch. He falsely confessed to investigators because he was

“confused” and because he felt “obligated” to “sacrifice” himself so

that Boone would not be charged. He denied any involvement in

Parlier’s murder.

2. Jester contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b), which

says that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action

in conformity therewith,” but that such evidence may be admissible

for other purposes, including to prove “motive” and “intent.” As

explained below, we conclude that any error in the admission of this

evidence was harmless.

(a) At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor proffered that the

other-acts evidence would show that about six years before Parlier’s

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murder, Jester held another woman, Octavia Everett, captive,

strangled her, and threatened to kill her; he was arrested and tried

on charges related to that conduct; and after the trial ended in a

mistrial, he pled guilty to false imprisonment. Over Jester’s

objection, the trial court ruled that the other-acts evidence would be

admitted for the purposes of showing Jester’s motive and intent.

At trial, the State presented the other-acts evidence by reading

into the record a transcript of Everett’s testimony during Jester’s

trial on the charges in that case, which showed as follows. 3 Around

2:00 a.m. on September 18, 2015, Everett met Jester at a friend’s

house, and they eventually walked toward Jester’s house together.

When they arrived, Jester grabbed Everett and dragged her into the

house, where he hit her, slapped her, and threatened to kill her. She

took her clothes off, and Jester slammed her on the ground and

slapped her while she kicked and screamed. Jester then “repeatedly

choked” Everett “until [she] almost stopped breathing.” Jester

3 The prosecutor represented that Everett had since died and was
therefore unavailable to testify in this case.
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eventually walked with Everett to her house, and she later reported

the incident to law enforcement officials. After Everett’s testimony

was read into the record, the prosecutor introduced into evidence

Jester’s 2018 guilty plea to false imprisonment, for which he was

sentenced as a first offender to serve five years in prison and five

years on probation.

(b) Assuming (without deciding) that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence for the purposes of

showing Jester’s motive and intent, any such error was harmless.

The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is

“whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to

the verdict.” Boone v. State, 321 Ga. 820, 827 (2025) (quotation

marks omitted). In making this determination, “we review the

record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have done.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

To begin, we acknowledge that Jester’s attack on Everett was

a serious and violent act. But the risk of potential unfair prejudice

from the jury hearing evidence of that act was offset by the other,

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properly admitted evidence of Jester’s guilt, which was

overwhelming. Two witnesses testified that Jester was “upset” with

Parlier because she sold his shotgun. And Jester confessed to

investigators that when he confronted Parlier about the gun, he

became angry, strangled her, held a bag over her head until she

stopped breathing, and put her body in a container. Jester’s

fingerprints were on the container, the tape securing it, and the bag

covering Parlier’s head. CSLI showed that on the evening before

Parlier’s body was found, Jester’s phone was near Parlier’s house

and then traveled toward the location where the body was dumped.

Later that night and early the next morning, Jester’s phone called

phone numbers dedicated to EBT information and banking

information for Parlier’s bank. Parlier’s EBT card, credit cards,

checks, and other financial information were found in Jester’s

moving truck, and Jester used Parlier’s EBT card and credit card

and withdrew money from her bank account after she was

murdered. And Jester’s claim at trial that he falsely confessed was

not plausible, given that the detailed account of the murder he

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provided to investigators was amply corroborated by other

inculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Boone, 321 Ga. at 827–28

(pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting other-acts evidence and concluding that any error was

harmless, “in light of the overwhelming evidence of [the appellant’s]

guilt,” which included his own admission to investigators that he

killed the victim); Thomas v. State, 314 Ga. 681, 688 (2022)

(explaining that the improper admission of other-acts evidence

showing that the appellant committed a prior shooting created a

“risk of prejudice and confusion of the issues,” but that such a risk

was offset by the strong evidence of his guilt of the charged crimes).

In addition, the trial court instructed the jury before opening

statements, before the other-acts evidence was presented, and again

during the final charge about the limited purposes for which the

evidence was admitted. Specifically, the court instructed that the

other-acts evidence was admitted for the purposes of showing motive

and intent; the jury could consider the other-acts evidence only for

those purposes; Jester was on trial only for the offenses charged in

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the indictment and not for the other act; and the jury could not infer

from the other-acts evidence that Jester was of a character that

would commit the charged crimes. We ordinarily presume that

jurors follow such instructions. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 307 Ga.

865, 875 (2020) (explaining that the trial court’s extensive

instructions about the limited use of other-acts evidence, which the

jury presumably followed, reduced the harmful effect of the

evidence).

Moreover, the purposes for which the jury was instructed to

use the other-acts evidence had little bearing on the crucial issues

at trial. The State was not required to prove motive to establish

Jester’s guilt. See Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 779 (2022). And

intent was not a significant issue in the case: Jester’s defense was

that someone else killed Parlier, not that he did so without the

requisite intent. See Howell, 307 Ga. at 876 (explaining that even if

other-acts evidence was wrongly admitted for the purpose of

showing intent, the evidence “was of lesser importance to the jury’s

decision” because “the crucial issue in th[e] case was the murderer’s

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identity, not his intent”).

In sum, even if the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the other-acts evidence, it is highly probable that any

such error did not contribute to the verdicts. Accordingly, this claim

fails. See, e.g., Thomas, 314 Ga. at 688 (holding that the erroneous

admission of other-acts evidence to prove motive and intent was

harmless, because the evidence of the appellant’s guilt was strong

and the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the

other-acts evidence only for certain limited purposes and could not

consider it as evidence of the appellant’s criminal propensity); Ash

v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 781–83 (2021) (concluding that any error in

the admission of other-acts evidence to prove intent was harmless

because the evidence of the appellant’s guilt was strong, the trial

court charged the jury about the limited use of the other-acts

evidence, and intent was not a central issue in the case). 4

4 Although the parties do not mention it in their appellate briefs, we note

that the prosecutor made several statements during his opening statement and
closing argument suggesting to the jury that the other-acts evidence showed
Jester’s propensity to strangle women. Jester did not object to these

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3. Jester also contends that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury on the statutory requirement of confession

corroboration. See OCGA § 24-8-823 (providing, in pertinent part,

that “[a] confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence,

shall not justify a conviction”). As Jester acknowledges, his trial

statements at trial, and he does not raise any claims about them in this appeal.
But in assessing whether the admission of other-acts evidence was harmless,
we often consider, among other things, the arguments the State made about
the other-acts evidence. Compare Harris v. State, 321 Ga. 87, 105 (2025)
(concluding that the erroneous admission of “powerful and highly prejudicial”
other-acts evidence was not harmless, in part because the State emphasized
that the evidence showed the appellant’s criminal propensity) with Lee v. State,
917 SE2d 683, 692 (2025) (holding that any error in the admission of other-
acts evidence was harmless and noting that the State did not “use the kind of
propensity-based language or arguments that we have considered especially
damaging when assessing harmless error”).
While the prosecutor’s propensity-based arguments about the other-acts
evidence in this case were improper, we note that the trial court charged the
jury that opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence, that the
trial court instructed the jury on the law, and that the jury was required to
apply the law that the court provided. And in light of the overwhelming
evidence of Jester’s guilt, the trial court’s instructions about the jury’s use of
the other-acts evidence, and the limited role that the issues of motive and
intent played in the case, the inappropriate way in which the prosecutor used
the other-acts evidence does not alter our conclusion that any error in the
admission of the evidence was harmless. See Howell, 307 Ga. at 876
(explaining that even if the prosecutor made some comments during his closing
argument suggesting that the other-acts evidence showed the appellant’s
criminal propensity, the trial court charged the jury that closing arguments
are not evidence and that the court instructed the jury on the law; and
ultimately holding that any error in the admission of the other-acts evidence
was harmless).
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counsel did not request such an instruction and did not object to its

omission, so we review this claim for plain error only. See OCGA §

17-8-58(b); Hart v. State, 917 SE2d 631, 645 (2025).

To succeed on his claim of plain error, Jester must show that

the alleged error was not affirmatively waived; was clear and

obvious beyond reasonable dispute; likely affected the outcome of

the trial; and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. See Hart, 917 SE2d at 645.

Because an appellant must establish all four elements of this test,

demonstrating plain error “is difficult, as it should be.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

Here, Jester has not met his burden of showing that the

omission of an instruction on the requirement of confession

corroboration likely affected the outcome of his trial. “Although a

confession alone cannot sustain a conviction, no specific manner of

corroboration of the confession is required, and corroboration in any

particular is sufficient.” Hooper v. State, 313 Ga. 451, 455–56 (2022)

(quotation marks omitted). The State presented ample evidence

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corroborating many particular aspects of Jester’s confession. Two

witnesses testified that Jester was upset with Parlier about the sale

of his shotgun, which corroborated Jester’s statement to

investigators that he “got angry” when he confronted Parlier about

the gun sale. The State also presented substantial forensic evidence

corroborating Jester’s account of the murder, including the medical

examiner’s conclusions about the manner of Parlier’s death and

evidence that Jester’s fingerprints were on the bag he told

investigators he held over Parlier’s head and on the “black,” “hard

plastic” container he admitted he used to conceal Parlier’s body.

Evidence indicating that the container had been stored in a closet in

a back room in Parlier’s house aligned with Jester’s statement that

he took the container from the back room, and evidence that

Parlier’s body was covered with clothing, pillows, and blankets

corresponded with Jester’s statement that he wrapped Parlier in

blankets and covered her with “pillows and stuff like that.” In

addition, CSLI showing that Jester’s phone traveled toward the

location where Parlier’s body was found on the shoulder of the

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interstate supported Jester’s statement that he dumped the body

near the “expressway.” And evidence indicating that after Parlier’s

murder, Jester used Parlier’s EBT and credit cards, attempted to

deposit checks purportedly signed by Parlier, and withdrew $850 in

cash from her bank account corroborated Jester’s statements that

he stole Parlier’s credit cards and financial documents, attempted to

“pass” checks at Parlier’s bank, and paid a woman to withdraw $850

from Parlier’s bank account.

Although Jester made a few statements to investigators that

were not supported by independent evidence (such as Jester’s

statement that he used a “rope” from Parlier’s “robe[]” to strangle

her), the extensive evidence corroborating numerous key aspects of

his confession was more than sufficient to satisfy OCGA § 24-8-823.

See McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 175 (2016) (rejecting the

appellant’s argument that the State was required to introduce

evidence corroborating his statement that he used his handgun to

shoot the victim because “no specific manner of corroboration is

required, and corroboration in any particular is sufficient”).

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Accordingly, Jester has not shown that the trial court’s omission of

a jury instruction on the requirement of confession corroboration

likely affected the outcome of his trial, and he cannot succeed on his

claim of plain error. See Hart, 917 SE2d at 645 (concluding that the

appellant could not show that the omission of an instruction on

confession corroboration likely affected the outcome of her trial

because “there was sufficient corroboration of [the appellant’s]

statements”); Davis v. State, 316 Ga. 418, 423 (2023) (holding that

the appellant could not show that the trial court’s failure to instruct

on confession corroboration likely affected the outcome of his trial

because “there was ample, strongly inculpatory corroborating

evidence”); Hooper, 313 Ga. at 456–57 (explaining that the appellant

did not establish that the failure to charge the jury on confession

corroboration likely affected the outcome of the trial because

“several particulars of [the appellant’s] statements were

corroborated,” such that “there was ample corroborating evidence”).

4. Finally, Jester claims that the trial court erred by admitting

testimony from an expert witness in latent print examination

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because the State allegedly failed to include her on its witness list,

see OCGA § 17-16-8(a), and failed to permit the defense to inspect

and copy her scientific report, see OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(4). Although

Jester raised an objection at trial to testimony from a different

witness on the ground that the witness was not included on the

State’s witness list (and the trial court sustained that objection and

excluded the witness’s testimony), Jester did not mention to the trial

court the alleged discovery violations with respect to the expert

witness he now complains about. Because Jester did not object to

the admission of this witness’s testimony on the ground that the

State committed the discovery violations Jester alleges, we review

this claim, too, for plain error only. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d); Arnold

v. State, 321 Ga. 434, 446 (2025). See also Jennings v. State, 318 Ga.

579, 587 (2024) (reviewing the appellant’s claim of evidentiary error

for plain error because the appellant failed to make a specific

objection at trial to the admission of the evidence on the grounds

asserted on appeal).

Even assuming that the State failed to comply with OCGA §§

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17-16-8(a) and 17-16-4(a)(4), Jester has not established that the trial

court clearly and obviously erred by not excluding the expert’s

testimony. OCGA § 17-16-6 provides that if the State does not follow

the discovery procedures in OCGA §§ 17-16-8(a) and 17-16-4(a)(4),

the trial court may elect to impose various remedies, including

ordering the State to permit the discovery, allowing the defense to

interview the witness who was not disclosed, granting a

continuance, or “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith,

prohibit[ing] the state from ... presenting the witness not disclosed.”

The exclusion of evidence is not required under OCGA § 17-16-6, and

of the available remedies “is a particularly harsh sanction that

should be imposed only where there is a showing of bad faith by the

party that has failed to comply with its discovery obligation and

prejudice to the other party.” State v. Bryant, 307 Ga. 850, 853

(2020) (quotation marks omitted).

Although Jester asserts in his appellate brief that the State’s

alleged failure to comply with its discovery obligations was “blatant

and intentional,” he did not bring to the court’s attention any alleged

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discovery violations with respect to the expert witness during the

trial, and there is no indication in the record that the court was (or

should have been) aware of any such alleged violations. See

Knighton v. State, 310 Ga. 586, 594 (2020) (explaining that under

the plain-error test, the error must be so obvious that “‘the trial

judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent

the defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it’” (quoting United

States v. Frady, 456 US 152, 163 (1982))). Moreover, Jester has

offered no evidence showing that the State acted in bad faith, and

nothing in the record indicates as much. Thus, even if the trial court

had been made aware of the discovery violations Jester now alleges,

Jester has not met his burden of showing that the court should have

imposed the sanction of excluding the expert witness’s testimony.5

Because Jester has not established that the trial court

committed a clear and obvious error by not excluding the expert’s

testimony under OCGA § 17-16-6, he has not shown plain error, and

5 Jester does not contend in his appellate brief that the trial court (had

it been aware of the alleged discovery violations) should have imposed a
remedy other than the exclusion of the expert witness’s testimony.
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this claim fails. See Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639, 661 (2023) (holding

that the appellants did not establish, under the plain-error test, that

the trial court clearly and obviously erred by failing to exclude

certain evidence on the ground that the State committed a discovery

violation, because the appellants did not offer any evidence showing

that the State acted in bad faith, such that they had not shown that

the trial court would have excluded the evidence under OCGA § 17-

16-6); Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 242 (2022) (concluding under

plain-error review that the appellant had not shown that the trial

court clearly and obviously erred by failing to exclude testimony on

the ground that the State did not provide proper notice, because the

trial court would not have excluded the testimony absent a showing

of bad faith and prejudice).6

6 Jester does not argue that the errors he alleges, when considered
cumulatively, resulted in prejudice sufficient to order a new trial. Even
assuming that the evidentiary error and the instructional error that we
assumed above can be aggregated for cumulative-error review, we discern no
cumulative prejudice. See Guyton v. State, 321 Ga. 57, 64 n.7 (2025)
(explaining that “[a] defendant who wishes to take advantage of the
[cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court just how he was
prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors” (quotation marks
omitted)).
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Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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