CHAPMAN v. THE STATE (Two Cases)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 1, 2025

S25A0710. CHAPMAN v. THE STATE.
S25A0711. WATSON v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

Yaquan Chapman and Jordan Watson appeal their convictions

related to the shooting death of William Trawick and the assault of

Aubrey Stansill and Griffin Cleveland. 1 On appeal, Watson argues

1 The shootings occurred on February 16, 2021. On October 12, 2022, a

Butts County grand jury indicted Chapman, Watson, Calvin Rozier, and Carey
Williams individually, and as parties to a crime, with the malice murder and
felony murder of Trawick (Counts 1 and 2), aggravated assault of Cleveland
(Count 3), aggravated assault of Stansill (Count 4), and aggravated assault of
Trawick (Count 5). Williams’s case was severed from his co-indictees, and he
testified as a witness for the State. Following a jury trial held from November
13 to 16, 2023, Chapman and Watson were found guilty on all counts.
On November 16, 2023, Chapman and Watson were both sentenced to
life in prison without parole for malice murder (Count 1), 20 years in prison for
the aggravated assault of Cleveland (Count 3), and 20 years in prison for the
aggravated assault of Stansill (Count 4). The other counts merged or were
vacated by operation of law.
Chapman timely moved for a new trial, which was amended on June 10,
2024. After a hearing, the trial court denied Chapman’s motion on December
9, 2024. Chapman timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to
the April 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
Watson timely moved for a new trial, which was amended on July 26,
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of malice murder

and aggravated assault and that trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance in various respects. Chapman also claims that trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance and raises multiple alleged

trial court errors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The evidence at trial showed the following. On February 16,

2021, the four co-indictees — Chapman, Watson, Calvin Rozier, and

Carey Williams — devised a plan to purchase marijuana from

Trawick and then rob him. The group recruited Christian Miles to

drive them to Trawick’s home in Jackson. On the drive, the group

decided to use the phrase “Go time” to signal when to move forward

with the robbery. In the car, Watson was carrying a firearm

described as an “AR,” and Rozier and Chapman carried handguns.

When the group arrived at Trawick’s home, Chapman, Rozier,

and Williams went inside, while Watson and Miles stayed in the car.

Trawick, his girlfriend Stansill, and his friend Cleveland were all

2024. After a hearing, the trial court denied Watson’s motion on January 6,
2025. Watson timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the
April 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
sitting in the living room. For about an hour, the group played video

games and smoked marijuana. At 9:05 p.m., Chapman texted Rozier

“Draw down on Diego”2 and “Wait in Carey[.]”

At 9:36 p.m., Rozier texted Williams from his Apple Watch, “Go

time[.]”In response, Williams went outside to retrieve Watson from

the car. After Williams and Watson entered the house, Chapman,

Rozier, and Watson pulled their guns out and began firing. Trawick

was shot in the upper chest, hip, buttocks, and arm, and Stansill

was shot in the knee.

A few moments later, Watson, Chapman, Rozier, and Williams

ran back to the car. Once Cleveland heard them leave, he ran out of

the back door of the house. At this point, Watson, Chapman, Rozier,

and Williams realized that they had left behind multiple personal

items, including Rozier’s ID and Apple Watch, and Chapman’s

phone. They returned to retrieve those items, and a second round of

shooting began. Chapman was shot in the arm, and Cleveland was

shot in the back of the leg. After the second round of shooting, the

2 Cleveland testified that Trawick also went by “Diego.”

3
group retreated to the car. Miles drove them to a hospital in

Stockbridge where Watson escorted Chapman inside. Once Watson

and Chapman entered the hospital, the remaining group members

dispersed.

After the shootings, Stansill dialed 911. Emergency medical

personnel and police officers arrived on the scene. As police

conducted a protective sweep of the home, an officer asked Trawick

who shot him; Trawick responded, “Quan Carey.”3 Trawick later

died at the scene.

Officers collected four 9mm cartridge casings and four .223

cartridge casings from Trawick’s home. Based on the recovered

casings, a firearms expert testified at trial that three firearms were

used during the shooting: two 9mm pistols and one AR-15. The shot

that killed Trawick came from a 9mm pistol. Officers also collected

DNA samples from blood found on the exterior of Trawick’s home.

The State’s DNA expert testified at trial that this blood “matched”

Chapman’s DNA profile.

3 Miles testified that Chapman’s nickname is Quan.

4
At trial, Stansill testified that when the shooting began,

Trawick said, “[S]o it’s like that, Quan?” She also testified that one

of the shooters had a dreadlock hairstyle. Video footage of Watson

entering the hospital in Stockbridge confirmed that Watson had

dreadlocks the night of the shooting. After the shooting, Cleveland

told police that one of the shooters had a stutter. At trial, the lead

investigator who interviewed Chapman testified that Chapman had

a stutter.

Chapman v. The State, Case No. S25A0710

On appeal, Chapman argues that (1) the jury was unfairly

prejudiced by hearing trial counsel’s motion to continue before trial

began; (2) the trial court erred by (a) improperly admitting evidence

of a gun barrel, (b) improperly admitting a cell phone download, and

(c) overruling trial counsel’s objection to statements made by the

prosecutor during closing arguments; and (3) trial counsel was

ineffective for (a) failing to file a motion to sever Chapman’s trial

from his co-defendants and (b) failing to adequately prepare for trial.

As discussed below, each of these claims fails.

5
(1) Chapman contends that the trial judge impermissibly

commented on trial counsel’s preparedness in violation of OCGA §

17-8-57 (a) when the judge denied trial counsel’s motion for a

continuance. OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) provides that “[i]t is error for

any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or

intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue

has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” We need

not decide whether this claim was preserved for ordinary appellate

review;4 even if it was, the claim fails because the trial judge’s

comments were not comments about Chapman’s guilt or whether a

fact at issue had been proved.

After the jury pool was sworn in but before jury selection

began, Chapman’s trial counsel moved for a continuance. Trial

counsel explained that he was participating in a different trial

shortly before Chapman’s trial, and without additional time to

4 Before jury selection began, Chapman’s trial counsel moved for a
continuance, which the trial court denied. Then after voir dire began,
Chapman’s trial counsel objected to the comments the trial judge made when
ruling on his motion to continue. The State argues that Chapman waived this
claim by waiting to object until after voir dire began.
6
prepare for Chapman’s trial, he “would be ineffective per se.” The

trial judge responded,

[W]hat I did about five months ago, when y’all told me
this case was going to be tried, I called all the attorneys.
I said I want every attorney here for every court day that
I have non-jury to be ready for this trial. I don’t recall ever
seeing you one time come down here. I don’t know your
schedule. You took the case. You took it knowing what
was going to happen. Your motion is denied.

Chapman complains that the trial judge’s comment expressed the

judge’s opinion that trial counsel was “inept.” But we have held that

a trial judge’s “brief musing about defense counsel’s strategy” is not

“the type of direct comment on the substance or weight of the

evidence” that violates OCGA § 17-8-57. Dailey v. State, 297 Ga. 442,

443 (2) (774 SE2d 672) (2015). Here, the trial judge merely discussed

whether he would grant trial counsel’s motion and noted that

Chapman’s trial counsel took the case knowing that the trial was

quickly approaching. Even if the judge was critical of trial counsel’s

time management, that is not the type of comment that violates

OCGA §17-8-57 (a). See Dailey, 297 Ga. at 443 (2). Accordingly, this

claim fails.

7
(2) Chapman claims that the trial erred in three respects.

(a) First, Chapman argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting into evidence a gun barrel used during the

shooting that he claims was improperly authenticated. Specifically,

Williams testified that the assault rifle Watson used during the

shooting belonged to Chapman. The State then showed Williams the

barrel of an assault rifle and asked Williams to identify the item.

Williams testified that it was “the barrel to the AR[,]” and the State

sought to admit the item into evidence. Chapman’s trial counsel

objected, arguing, “That could be any gun. We don’t know where it

came from.” The trial court asked Williams, “[I]s that gun you saw

— you had that day — you saw it that day?” Williams responded,

“Yes[,]” and the trial court admitted the gun barrel over Chapman’s

counsel’s objection.

Chapman argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the gun barrel because Williams did not provide any

additional information about how he could identify the evidence

other than his assertion that he had seen Chapman with the gun

8
before. “The admission of evidence is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether to

admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an

abuse of discretion.” Collins v. State, 321 Ga. 215, 220 (3) (913 SE2d

644) (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gun barrel. Williams

testified that he was familiar with Chapman’s gun barrel and had

seen it before. This is sufficient evidence to authenticate the gun

barrel. See OCGA § 24-9-901 (a)-(b) (1) (“[t]estimony of a witness

with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be” is sufficient

to satisfy the requirements of authentication or identification); cf.

Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 86-87 (8) (891 SE2d 884) (2023)

(photos were properly authenticated and admitted because the

witness testified he was familiar with the photos and the people in

them). Accordingly, this claim fails.

(b) Second, Chapman argues that the trial court abused its

9
discretion by admitting Watson’s cell phone download. 5 Because

Chapman’s objection to the admission of the cell phone download

was untimely, we review this enumeration for plain error only.6 To

show plain error, an appellant must show that the alleged error “(1)

was not affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious beyond

reasonable dispute, (3) likely affected the outcome of the

proceedings, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. State, 319 Ga.

562, 567 (1) (905 SE2d 570) (2024). “[I]f an appellant fails to satisfy

any one prong of the plain error test, we need not consider the other

prongs.” Id. Because any alleged error in admitting the cell phone

download did not affect the outcome of Chapman’s trial, this claim

5 In his brief, Chapman argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting a “phone dump,” which appears to be a thumb drive containing
information taken from Watson’s cell phone, such as Watson’s photos.
6 Trial counsel for Rozier and Watson — but not Chapman — timely

objected to the admission of the cell phone download. Chapman’s trial counsel
objected only after the State admitted a video taken from the cell phone
download and that video was played for the jury. See Everett v. State, 318 Ga.
697, 703 (3) (899 SE2d 699) (2024) (“[S]tandard practice in Georgia has long
required a party to make and obtain a ruling on an objection to evidence in the
trial court, before or as the evidence is admitted, in order to preserve the
objection for appeal.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

10
fails.

The only evidence published from the cell phone download was

a video of Chapman holding an AR-15. This evidence was

cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, namely Williams’s

testimony that Chapman owned an AR-15. More importantly, the

State presented other strong, unchallenged evidence of Chapman’s

guilt, including evidence that Chapman’s blood was found at the

scene, Miles’s testimony that he drove Chapman to Trawick’s home

on the day of the shooting, Trawick’s statement that “Quan” shot

him, Cleveland’s statement that one of the shooters had a stutter,

and the lead investigator’s testimony that Chapman had a stutter.

“Given the other, compelling evidence of [Chapman’s] guilt in

comparison to the weakly incriminating evidence derived from” the

cell phone download, Chapman “has not shown that any error in the

admission of the . . . evidence likely affected the outcome of his trial.”

Goins v. State, 310 Ga. 199, 205 (4) (850 SE2d 68) (2020); see also

Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593, 596-597 (2) (899 SE2d 132) (2024)

(rejecting plain error claim where defendant argued that evidence

11
should have been excluded as cumulative of other unchallenged

evidence, and the evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong).

Accordingly, this claim fails.

(c) Finally, Chapman claims the trial court erred by overruling

his objection to statements made by the prosecutor during closing

arguments. Specifically, Chapman contends that the prosecutor

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto the defense when he

stated

[t]he burden lies entirely with the State. The defense has
no burden to present any evidence or call any witnesses
at all, but they can, if they have them. If they want to call
a witness to the stand, they can. If they want to present a
piece of evidence, they can and they did. . . . If they want
to talk to [Trawick’s] mom, put a subpoena in her hand,
put her on the stand. (emphasis added).

We review a trial court’s ruling on an objection during closing

arguments for abuse of discretion. See Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452,

456-457 (4) (883 SE2d 542) (2023). We have held that similar

statements by prosecutors that “comment[ ] on the defense’s failure

to present evidence, made with express reference to the fact that the

burden of proof rests ‘completely’ with the State[,]” are not improper.

12
See id. at 457-458 (4) (a) (holding that it was not improper for the

prosecutor to repeatedly note that the defense had the same power

to subpoena witnesses as the State during closing arguments); see

also Kimbro v. State, 317 Ga. 442, 452 (7) (893 SE2d 678) (2023)

(trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling objection to the

prosecutor’s comment that “[t]here is no defense raised by this

evidence” as it “merely emphasized to the jury that [the defendant]

had not successfully rebutted or explained the State’s evidence”).

Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were within the bounds of proper

closing argument, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

overruling Chapman’s objection to them. Accordingly, this claim

fails.

(3) Chapman contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in

two respects. We disagree.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must prove both that his counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d

13
674) (1984). “Deficient performance means that no reasonable

lawyer would have done what trial counsel did, while prejudice

means there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial

would have been different but for the deficient performance.” Parker

v. State, 320 Ga. 572, 579 (4) (910 SE2d 580) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted). If Chapman fails to show either prong of the

Strickland test, we need not examine the other prong. See Terrell v.

State, 313 Ga. 120, 130 (5) (868 SE2d 764) (2022).

(a) Chapman contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion to sever his trial from his co-defendants.7 But

even if trial counsel had filed a motion to sever, the trial court would

not have abused its discretion by denying the motion. See Green v.

State, 302 Ga. 816, 819-820 (2) (b) (809 SE2d 738) (holding that the

7 Chapman also claims that the trial court erred by denying his co-
defendant’s counsel’s motion to sever. But Chapman’s trial counsel did not join
the motion to sever, so this error has not been preserved for our ordinary
appellate review. See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 146 (3) (800 SE2d 353)
(2017) (failure to file or join a motion to sever waives the claim for appellate
review). And plain error review is not available for this type of alleged error.
See Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 497 (2) (a) (842 SE2d 22) (2020) (listing limited
categories of alleged errors for which plain error review is available).
Accordingly, our review is limited to Chapman’s claim that his trial counsel
performed deficiently by failing to file a motion to sever.
14
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because

“[e]ven if counsel had filed a motion to sever, the court would not

have abused its discretion in denying the motion as [the defendant]

would not have been able to show prejudice from the joint trial”).

Accordingly, this claim fails because, even assuming counsel was

deficient, Chapman has failed to prove prejudice.

“When ruling on [a motion to sever], a court should consider:

(1) the likelihood of confusion of the evidence and law; (2) the

possibility that evidence against one defendant may be considered

against the other defendant; and (3) the presence or absence of

antagonistic defenses.” Saylor v. State, 316 Ga. 225, 230-231 (2) (887

SE2d 329) (2023) (punctuation and citation omitted). Chapman has

failed to make this showing.

This case involved only three defendants who were tried for the

same offenses relating to the same incident. The law and the

evidence were substantially the same for all of them, and the State

argued that the defendants acted together to commit the crimes. See

Saylor, 316 Ga. at 230-231 (2) (holding that trial court did not abuse

15
its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever when the case

“involved only three defendants who were tried for almost all the

same offenses relating to the same incidents,” “[t]he law and

evidence were substantially the same for all of them, and the State

argued that the defendants acted in concert in committing the

crimes”). The only evidence Chapman points to that may have

created confusion was the admission of Rozier’s, Chapman’s, and

Williams’s text messages. But the trial court instructed the jury to

consider the text messages only as related to the defendants who

made them. Finally, Chapman argues that severance was required

because his co-defendant’s defenses were antagonistic. But “a

defendant must do more than raise the existence of antagonistic

defenses” to demonstrate that the trial court would have abused its

discretion in denying a motion to sever. Id. And Chapman has failed

to point to specific prejudice from antagonistic defenses that would

have required the trial court to grant his motion to sever. See Lupoe

v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 242 (2) (c) (794 SE2d 67) (2016); see also Walter

v. State, 304 Ga. 760, 763-764 (2) (822 SE2d 266) (2018) (where the

16
evidence showed the co-defendants acted in concert, severance was

not required where the co-defendants blamed the defendant for the

shooting and claimed that they were not present during or did not

participate in the murder).

Because the trial court would not have abused its discretion by

denying a motion to sever had Chapman’s trial counsel filed such a

motion, Chapman has failed to demonstrate prejudice and this claim

fails. See Lupoe, 300 Ga. at 242 (2) (c) (concluding that trial counsel’s

failure to file a motion to sever could not support an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim because “the trial court would not have

abused its discretion in denying it”).

(b) In Chapman’s final enumeration, he claims that “[t]rial

counsel was ineffective in assisting [him] at trial” because counsel

was “unprepared and ineffective . . . due to not reviewing the

discovery materials or investigating possible defenses.” Even

assuming that Chapman could demonstrate deficient performance,

he cannot demonstrate prejudice. At the motion for new trial

hearing, Chapman failed to introduce any evidence to support his

17
assertion that further investigation and preparation by trial counsel

would have changed the outcome of his trial. A defendant claiming

that his counsel was underprepared must show that more

preparation “might have produced [something] that would have

made a difference in the outcome of his trial.” Roberts v. State, 305

Ga. 257, 266 (5) (c) (824 SE2d 326) (2019). Because Chapman

“presents no evidence, or even assertion, as to what further

investigation or preparation might have produced that would have

made a difference in the outcome of his trial[,]” he has failed to

demonstrate prejudice, and his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim fails. Lane v. State, 299 Ga. 791, 795-796 (3) (792 SE2d 378)

(2016).8

Watson v. The State, Case No. S25A0711

8 We have assumed two trial counsel deficiencies in failing to file a
motion to sever and failing adequately to prepare for trial and one trial court
error in admitting Watson’s cell phone download. Chapman does not argue that
we should conduct a cumulative error review. Even if the assumed trial counsel
deficiencies and assumed evidentiary error are errors that could be examined
cumulatively, see State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17-18 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020),
we conclude that any such cumulative error does not demand a new trial. See
Williams v. State, 318 Ga. 83, 97 (5) (f) (896 SE2d 109) (2024); Robbins v. State,
320 Ga. 19, 28 (3) (b) n.3 (907 SE2d 615) (2024).
18
On appeal, Watson argues that there was insufficient evidence

to convict him of malice murder and aggravated assault; and trial

counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to move for a mistrial based on

the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument, (b) failing to

file a motion to sever Watson’s trial from his co-defendants, and (c)

failing to object to comments Chapman’s counsel made during

opening statements. As discussed below, each of these claims fail.

(4) Watson argues that there was not sufficient evidence to

convict him of malice murder and aggravated assault. When

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and inquire whether a rational trier of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d

560) (1979). “In conducting that evaluation, it is not the job of this

Court to weigh the evidence on appeal or resolve conflicts in trial

testimony[.]” Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 (854 SE2d 742) (2021)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

19
We conclude that the evidence here was sufficient as a matter

of constitutional due process to authorize the jury to find Watson

guilty, at a minimum, as a party to the crimes of murder and

aggravated assault. A jury may find a defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt if the evidence shows either that he directly

committed the crime or that he was a “party thereto.” OCGA § 16-2-

20 (a). A person is a party to the crime if he aids or abets in its

commission or if he “advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or

procures another” to commit it. OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3), (4). “And

although the defendant’s mere presence at the scene is not enough

to convict him as a party to the crime, the jury may infer his criminal

intent from his presence, companionship, and conduct before,

during, and after the offense.” Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 24 (2) (880

SE2d 158) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, Williams and Miles testified that Watson was with them

on the day of the shooting, and on the car ride over to Trawick’s home

Watson was carrying an AR-15. During this car ride, the group

planned the robbery and agreed on a signal they would use to start

20
the robbery. After receiving the signal from Rozier, Williams went

outside to retrieve Watson. Williams testified that Watson was one

of the people shooting at Trawick and Stansill in the living room and

that Watson went with the group back toward the house to retrieve

their personal items when Cleveland was shot. Finally, Stansill also

testified that Watson was one of the shooters, and this testimony

was supported by spent cartridges recovered at the scene.

This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude

that Watson was involved in planning the crimes and was an active

participant during the shooting. See Mathews v. State, 314 Ga. 360,

365 (1) (877 SE2d 188) (2022) (“[E]ven assuming that [the

defendant] did not fire the shot that killed [the victim] or shoot at

[the second victim], the trial evidence shows that [the defendant]

shared [the co-defendant’s] criminal intent to shoot at the victims

because [the defendant] committed the same acts.”); Harris v. State,

312 Ga. 602, 604-605 (2) (864 SE2d 31) (2021) (“[E]ven if someone

else fired the fatal shot, it is clear that Appellant and that individual

joined in the attack on the victim[,]” and thus the jury was

21
authorized to conclude that he was at least a party to the crime.

(citation and punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, this claim fails.

(5) Watson also contends that trial counsel was ineffective in

three respects. We disagree.

(a) During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated,

[S]ome day these good-looking young men are . . . going
to have to think about the thing that they did. Carey
Williams has thought about that and that’s why he’s
talking to you. Why is Carey Williams – what’s he getting
out of this? He’s getting the morning when he’s fifty years
old and he wakes up and say, damn it, I’m glad that I did
that. I am so glad I did that.

Watson claims that the prosecutor’s remark implied that Williams

was taking responsibility by testifying for the State, while Watson

was avoiding accountability by not testifying. Thus, Watson

contends, the prosecutor’s remark impermissibly commented on

Watson’s right to remain silent and his trial counsel should have

objected. We disagree.

The prosecutor’s comment fell within the wide range of

permissible arguments the State can make during closing. See, e.g.,

Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 88 (22) (d) (709 SE2d 239) (2011)

22
(holding that the prosecutor’s comment that the jury had not “heard

any evidence of [the defendant] taking responsibility” was not an

improper comment on the defendant’s failure to testify), disapproved

of on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 706-707 (11) (a)

n.3 (820 SE2d 640) (2018); Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 48, 49 (2) (610

SE2d 26) (2005) (prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s lack of

remorse not an improper comment on the defendant’s failure to

testify). Thus, any objection to this comment would have been

meritless, and this claim fails. See Lopez v. State, 318 Ga. 664, 672

(3) (b) (898 SE2d 441) (2024) (explaining that trial counsel does not

perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection).

(b) Next, Watson argues that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion to sever. Because the trial court would not

have abused its discretion by denying a motion to sever if trial

counsel had filed one, Watson has failed to show prejudice and this

claim fails. See McCabe v. State, 319 Ga. 275, 288-289 (4) (a) (903

SE2d 78) (2024); see also Green, 302 Ga. at 819-820 (2) (b).

As discussed in Division (3) (a), the first two factors in the

23
severance analysis — the potential for jury confusion and the

possibility that evidence against one defendant would be considered

against the other defendant — do not support Watson’s contention

that severance was required any more than they supported

Chapman’s contention. See McCabe, 319 Ga. at 288-289 (4) (a). The

law and the evidence were substantially the same for all three

defendants. And the only evidence Watson argues may have created

confusion was the admission of Rozier’s, Chapman’s, and Williams’s

text messages. But the trial court instructed the jury to consider the

text messages only as related to the defendants who made them. See

Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 290-291 (4) (824 SE2d 346) (2019)

(holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

defendants’ motion to sever when the law and the evidence for each

co-defendant was largely the same and the trial court provided

proper limiting instructions when evidence against one of the co-

defendants was inadmissible against the other).

Watson also argues that severance was required because his

co-defendant’s defenses were antagonistic. “That alone, however, is

24
insufficient to require severance, because unless there is a showing

of resulting prejudice, antagonistic defenses do not automatically

require a severance.” Virger, 305 Ga. at 291 (4). In his brief, Watson

points to the statements of his co-defendants during opening and

closing arguments (where the co-defendants attempted to shift the

blame for the shooting onto Watson) as evidence of prejudice. “But

any prejudice from those comments was limited by the trial court’s

instructions to the jury” that opening and closing statements are not

evidence. Hurston v. State, 310 Ga. 818, 827 (3) (a) (854 SE2d 745)

(2021). Accordingly, the trial court would not have abused its

discretion by denying a motion to sever if Watson’s trial counsel had

filed one, and this claim fails because Watson has failed to show

prejudice.

(c) During opening statements, Chapman’s counsel argued that

there was reasonable doubt that Chapman was guilty because

Chapman “never shot that assault rifle” and “according to the

State’s evidence, it was [Watson].” Watson claims his counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to this comment. But Chapman’s

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counsel’s comment fell within the wide range of permissible

statements parties can make during opening statements. See

Harvey v. State, 296 Ga. 823, 833 (2) (c) (770 SE2d 840) (2015) (“The

trial court has [the] sound discretion to control the content of the

opening statement of either party[.]” (citation and punctuation

omitted)); Newman v. State, 309 Ga. 171, 176 (2) (b) (844 SE2d 775)

(2020) (noting that the purpose of opening statements is to elaborate

on what the parties expect the evidence will show). Chapman’s

counsel was discussing what he believed the State’s evidence would

show, and the State did admit evidence that Watson shot the AR-15.

Thus, any objection to this comment would have been meritless and

this claim fails. See Lopez, 318 Ga. at 672 (3) (b).

Judgments affirmed. Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

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