State of Florida v. Johnny Wesley

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 6D2024-1651
Lower Tribunal No. 2022-CF-003086-O/B
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STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

JOHNNY WESLEY,

Appellee.
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Appeals from the Circuit Court for Orange County.
Kevin B. Weiss, Judge.

June 12, 2026

PER CURIAM.

The State of Florida challenges the order granting in part the motion to dismiss

filed by Johnny Wesley, 1 in which the trial court dismissed the charges of accessory

after the fact to a capital felony and false report to law enforcement authorities

concerning a capital felony under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(3)

1
The State filed a separate appeal of a substantially similar order regarding
the case against Wesley’s co-defendant, Lashawn Triplett. See State v. Triplett, No.
6D2024-1574 (Fla. 6th DCA June 12, 2026). This Court granted the State’s motion
to have these two cases travel together because Wesley and Triplett are co-
defendants, the orders on appeal are substantially similar, and the arguments
presented in each case are identical.
(“The defendant is charged with an offense for which the defendant previously has

been granted immunity.”).2 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.;

Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A).

We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the charge of accessory after the

fact to a capital felony because the plain language of section 777.03(1)(c), Florida

Statutes (2022), requires the commission of a capital felony. Wesley’s immunity for

lawfully killing someone in self-defense thus precludes the State’s prosecution for

this offense because no capital felony occurred. We reverse, though, the trial court’s

order dismissing the charge of false report to law enforcement authorities concerning

a capital felony. This charge relates to conduct directed toward law enforcement,

and Wesley’s immunity does not preclude the State’s subsequent prosecution for this

offense. We remand for further proceedings.

Background

In March 2022, Melvin Wilcox went to the county fair and ran into his friend,

Wesley, who was with Lashawn Triplett, the mother of Wilcox’s child. Wilcox and

Wesley got into a verbal altercation because Wesley never told Wilcox that he was

dating Triplett. The next night, Wilcox went to Wesley’s home, where Triplett was

also present. During this time, Wesley shot and killed Wilcox. Wesley and Triplett

then placed Wilcox’s body in the trunk of his car. The couple left their cell phones

2
The trial court declined to dismiss a third charge for tampering with physical
evidence that Wesley did not challenge and is not a subject of this appeal.

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at Wesley’s house and drove around in Wilcox’s car before leaving Wilcox’s body

and car at a Walgreens parking lot. The couple disposed of evidence in black trash

bags and removed those bags from the home. They then made false statements to

law enforcement about what happened, some of which video evidence rebutted.

Law enforcement arrested Wesley for first-degree murder with a firearm. In

a separate proceeding, the trial court granted Wesley’s Stand Your Ground motion,

concluding that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he

was not entitled to immunity. Although the State did not charge Triplett with first-

degree murder, the trial court later granted Triplett’s motion to adopt Wesley’s

immunity order without objection, thus recognizing that she was also immune from

prosecution for Wilcox’s murder.

Later, and relevant here, the State filed an amended information charging

Wesley and Triplett with accessory after the fact to a capital felony and false report

to law enforcement authorities concerning a capital felony. Wesley moved to dismiss

the amended information. He challenged the accessory after the fact to a capital

felony charge under rule 3.190(c)(4) (“There are no material disputed facts and the

undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.”).

He claimed that under any set of facts, the State could not charge him for this offense

because it required him to commit a crime, and his immunity for Wilcox’s death

made this factual showing impossible. He contested the false report to law

enforcement authorities concerning a capital felony charge under rule 3.190(c)(3).

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He argued that his immunity necessarily precluded the State’s prosecution for this

crime. In response to Wesley’s rule 3.190(c)(4) argument, the State filed a traverse

that outlined Wesley’s and Triplett’s behavior after Wilcox’s death. The State

separately argued that Wesley’s and Triplett’s immunity did not apply to any of the

charges that arose after Wilcox’s death. It insisted that these charges did not involve

using force in a situation that would justify self-defense. Finally, it observed that

while Wesley and Triplett received immunity for justifiably killing Wilcox following

their assertion of the affirmative defense of self-defense, this did not mean that they

had not committed a homicide.

Following a hearing at which the parties’ arguments mirrored their written

submissions, the trial court found that the disputed facts as alleged in the State’s

traverse were not material to determine whether Wesley’s grant of immunity

prevented the State from proving the two charges at issue. Citing section

777.03(1)(c), the trial court noted that to prove accessory after the fact to a capital

felony, the State must establish that a defendant: (1) maintained, assisted, or gave

any aid to the principal or an accessory before the fact; (2) knew that the offender

had committed a crime; (3) such crime was a capital, life, first-degree, or second-

degree felony; and (4) had done so with the intent that the offender avoids or escapes

detection, arrest, trial, or punishment. Citing section 837.05(2), Florida Statutes

(2022), the trial court also determined that to prove the charge of false report to law

enforcement authorities concerning a capital felony, the State must establish that a

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defendant gave false information to a law enforcement officer concerning the

commission of a capital felony. Thus, the trial court found that both newly charged

offenses required the State “to establish that a capital felony occurred.”

While the trial court agreed with the State that the grant of immunity for the

force used in the first-degree murder charge did not immunize Wesley from criminal

behavior that occurred later, it explained that the State still had to establish that a

capital felony occurred. The trial court found that when it granted Wesley and

Triplett immunity, a finding was made that they were lawful in their use of deadly

force against Wilcox. And because the force used against Wilcox was lawful, a first-

degree murder could not have occurred. Thus, the trial court determined that the

State could not establish a capital felony occurred, and both charges failed as a matter

of law.

Analysis

This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. See

State v. Washington, 403 So. 3d 465, 470 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (quoting State v.

Tacher, 84 So. 3d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“We review a trial court’s order

on a motion to dismiss de novo where, as here, it concerns a question of law.”)).

The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a defendant to move to

dismiss an information. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190. Under rule 3.190(c), a defendant

may move to dismiss at any time if the defendant is charged with an offense for

which the defendant has been granted immunity or if “[t]here are no material

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disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt

against the defendant.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(3), (4). But because the trial court

did not consider dismissal of either charge under rule 3.190(c)(4), neither do we.

A. Accessory After the Fact to a Capital Felony

To prove Wesley committed the crime of accessory after the fact to a capital

felony, the State must establish that: (1) he gave Triplett any other aid after the

shooting; (2) he knew that Triplett had committed a crime; (3) such crime was a

capital felony; and (4) he had done so with the intent that Triplett avoids or escapes

detection, arrest, trial, or punishment. See § 777.03(1)(c). In Florida, courts “follow

the supremacy-of-text principle—namely, the principle that the words of a governing

text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the

text means.” Washington, 403 So. 3d at 470 (citing Ham v. Portfolio Recovery

Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020)). Thus, this Court will interpret

Florida’s statutes according to the plain meaning of their text. See id.

“Crime” is defined as “a felony or misdemeanor.” § 775.08(4), Fla. Stat.

(2022). Both felonies and misdemeanors are defined to include “any criminal

offense that is punishable under the laws of this state, or that would be punishable if

committed in this state.” Id. § 775.08(1), (2); see Crime, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019) (“an act that the law makes punishable”); Crime, Merriam-

Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crime (last visited May

29, 2026) (“an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the government”).

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Before a conviction for accessory after the fact to a capital felony, the State must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying capital felony was committed.

See Brown v. State, 672 So. 2d 861, 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (citing Staten v. State,

519 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1988)).

The State failed to establish a prima facie case against Wesley for accessory

after the fact to a capital felony. Such a charge requires the State to present sufficient

evidence establishing the element that a capital felony crime occurred. It cannot

prove that Wesley or Triplett committed a crime—“an act that the law makes

punishable”—because they were granted immunity for their use of deadly force

against Wilcox. See Crime, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In other words,

the trial court found that they were justified in their use of deadly force against

Wilcox and thus acted lawfully. See Kumar v. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557, 559 (Fla. 2017)

(noting that section 776.032, Florida Statutes, “provides immunity for a person who

lawfully uses force in self-defense” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, because an

underlying crime was not “committed” here, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of

this count in the amended information.

B. False Report to Law Enforcement Authorities Concerning a Capital Felony

By contrast, we find that Wesley’s and Triplett’s immunity for killing Wilcox

does not necessarily preclude the State’s prosecution for the crime of false report to

law enforcement authorities concerning a capital felony. To prove this offense, the

State must establish that Wesley gave false information “to a law enforcement officer

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concerning the alleged commission of a capital felony.” See § 837.05(2), Fla. Stat.

(2022). We also interpret this statute according to its plain meaning. See

Washington, 403 So. 3d at 470. The statute’s plain language does not require us to

determine whether a capital felony occurred, or if Wesley or Triplett committed it.

See § 837.05(2). Indeed, the charge targets a defendant’s actions directed toward

law enforcement, and not the commission of the underlying crime.3 Accordingly,

Wesley’s and Triplett’s immunity for their use of force against Wilcox does not

resolve this charge, and the trial court erred in dismissing it under rule 9.130(c)(3).

For these reasons, we affirm in part the final order of dismissal as to the charge

of accessory after the fact to a capital felony. We reverse the final order of dismissal

in part as to the charge of false report to law enforcement authorities concerning a

capital felony and remand to the trial court with directions to reinstate that count in

the amended information.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for further

proceedings.

TRAVER, C.J., and STARGEL and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.

3
Because we do not analyze this matter under rule 3.190(c)(4), we also offer
no opinion on whether Wesley’s behavior violated the statute.

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James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow,
for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

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