Matias Sergio Quiroga v. State of Florida

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida

Opinion filed June 10, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0766
Lower Tribunal No. M24-22790
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Matias Sergio Quiroga,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida,
Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lizzet
Martinez, Judge.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Amy Lynn Weber, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and GOODEN, JJ.

GOODEN, J.
Subject matter jurisdiction is not a mere technicality. It is the court’s

fundamental authority to act. That authority was absent from the inception

of this case. The prosecution of Appellant Matias Sergio Quiroga under

phantom municipal ordinances for actions on tribal land exceeded the trial

court’s reach. Without a jurisdictional basis to adjudicate these claims, the

conviction and sentence cannot stand. We reverse.

I.

Quiroga was a guest at the Miccosukee Casino and Resort, located on

the Miccosukee Indian Reservation in Miami-Dade County. He went to the

lobby to lodge a complaint. During the interaction with staff, Quiroga became

animated.

Officer Manuel Lopez, an officer with the Miccosukee Tribe Police

Department, told Quiroga to return to his room. Quiroga refused. Officer

Lopez ordered Quiroga to turn around and place his hands behind his back.

Quiroga again refused. Officer Lopez then forced Quiroga to the ground and

placed him in handcuffs.

Officer Lopez completed an arrest affidavit, which was filed in the

county court. The arrest affidavit listed two charges: disorderly intoxication

in violation of municipal ordinance 18-18 and resisting arrest without violence

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in violation of municipal ordinance 10-10. But the affidavit failed to specify

which jurisdiction’s ordinances Quiroga violated.

Without filing an indictment or information, the State proceeded to

prosecute Quiroga on the purported ordinance violations. But neither the

trial court nor the parties ever discussed which government enacted the

ordinances Quiroga allegedly violated. Instead, the court and parties

apparently assumed that the elements of these purported ordinances

paralleled the elements of sections 856.011 and 843.02, Florida Statutes.

Ultimately, the jury found Quiroga guilty of disorderly intoxication, and not

guilty of resisting an officer without violence.

On appeal, Quiroga asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction since section 285.16, Florida Statutes, does not confer

jurisdiction for violations of local ordinances on tribal lands. Nor are there

any corresponding ordinances from any local jurisdiction matching what he

was purportedly charged with. In other words, the listed ordinances do not

exist.

Citing section 34.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the State adamantly

disputed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It maintained

this was a mere technical deficiency in the charging document and it

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prosecuted Quiroga with a violation of section 856.011, Florida Statutes. 1

Lastly, it asserted that Quiroga’s argument was not preserved for appeal

since it was not raised below and requested us to affirm.

We set this matter for oral argument. But days before the scheduled

argument, the State partially confessed error. 2 So we removed the case

from the calendar.

II.

We review the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo.

Jacobsen v. Ross Stores, 882 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

III.

Subject matter jurisdiction defines a court’s power to hear and decide

a case. In re Adoption of D.P.P., 158 So. 3d 633, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

1
We reject this argument. If the State charged Quiroga with a statutory
violation, it was required to proceed by indictment or information—which was
not filed here. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(a)(2) (“In circuit courts and county
courts, prosecution shall be solely by indictment or information, except that
prosecution in county courts for violations of municipal ordinances and
metropolitan county ordinances may be by affidavit or docket entries and
prosecutions for misdemeanors, municipal ordinances, and county
ordinances may be by notice to appear issued and served pursuant to rule
3.125.”); see also McKinnon v. State, 430 So. 3d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA
2026).
2
While the State conceded that there was no subject matter jurisdiction, it
urged us to review the conviction for sufficiency of the evidence. We decline
that invitation.

4
This power is bestowed by the Florida Constitution and state statutes. Bell

v. Kornblatt, 705 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “[I]t is a power that

arises solely by virtue of law.” Fla. Exp. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of

Revenue, 510 So. 2d 936, 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

“Subject matter jurisdiction is vital to the court’s ability to adjudicate.

For this reason, an objection to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at

any time.” FQS Enter., LLC v. B & K Factor, Inc., 407 So. 3d 585, 587 (Fla.

3d DCA 2025) (Gooden, J., specially concurring). See also Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.140(h)(2). It is “uniquely unwaivable” and “the parties cannot confer such

authority on a court.” JJJTB, Inc. v. Schmidt, 415 So. 3d 129, 132 (Fla.

2025). See also id. at 134 (Couriel, J., concurring) (“Because subject matter

jurisdiction concerns the scope of judicial power, it isn’t a matter for the

parties to waive, although they may contest whether the court, in any case,

has it.”); Seven Hills, Inc. v. Bentley, 848 So. 2d 345, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)

(“Subject matter jurisdiction, which arises only as a matter of law, cannot be

created by waiver, acquiescence or agreement of the parties, by error or

inadvertence of the parties or their counsel, or by the exercise of the power

of the court.”). “Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject

matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are absolutely void in

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the strictest sense of the term. . . .” Roberts v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 29 So. 2d

743, 748 (Fla. 1947).

To determine subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases, we examine

the charging document in view of the Florida Constitution and applicable

statutes. See State v. Vazquez, 450 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1984); L.L.H. v.

State, 873 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). The State proceeded on

an arrest affidavit—citing municipal code 10-10 and 18-18 from an unknown

jurisdiction—for actions on tribal land. The threshold question is whether the

State has the authority to charge individuals with ordinance violations

committed on tribal land.

A.

“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate

in respect to Indian tribes” and these powers are “plenary and exclusive.”

United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). To that end, state law

seldom applies to actions on tribal lands unless Congress so provides. Fla.

House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 613 (Fla. 2008). See

also Worcester v. State of Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.). In

1953, Congress did so and allowed certain states to decide whether it would

assume civil and criminal jurisdiction within its borders. Public Law 280, Act

of August 15, 1953, § 6, 67 Stat. 590. Congress provided:

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The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other
State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or
civil causes of actions, or with respect to both, as provided for in
this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner
as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action,
obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.

Id. at § 7.

Florida first consulted with the Seminole Tribe and obtained its

consent. 3 See David Getches, et al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian

Law 491 (4th ed. 1998). Then, beginning in 1961, Florida assumed such

jurisdiction. 4 See ch. 61–252, §§ 1–2, at 452–53, Laws of Fla. Codified in

section 285.16, Florida Statutes, this assumption provides:

(1) The State of Florida hereby assumes jurisdiction over criminal
offenses committed by or against Indians or other persons
within Indian reservations and over civil causes of actions
between Indians or other persons or to which Indians or other
persons are parties rising within Indian reservations.

(2) The civil and criminal laws of Florida shall obtain on all Indian
reservations in this state and shall be enforced in the same
manner as elsewhere throughout the state.

3
The federal government did not recognize the Miccosukee Tribe until 1962.
4
See generally Art. V, § 6(b), Fla. Const. (“The county courts shall exercise
the jurisdiction prescribed by general law. Such jurisdiction shall be uniform
throughout the state.”).

7
§ 285.16, Fla. Stat. Thus, Florida’s civil and criminals laws are enforceable

on tribal lands. 5

But this section does not reference local municipal ordinances. See

Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts 93 (2012) (“Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably

implies . . . . That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”);

State v. Demons, 351 So. 3d 10, 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (“This canon is

another way of stating the longstanding principle that courts are not at liberty

to add words to a statute that the legislature has not expressly provided.”).

Turning to other contextual clues, there is no evidence that ordinances

would fall within the original public meaning of “criminal laws of Florida . . .

enforced in the same manner as elsewhere throughout the state.” Indeed,

ordinances are not applicable throughout the state. By their very definition,

ordinances only apply locally within a certain jurisdiction. See Ordinance,

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 896 (3d ed. 1969) (“The act of the legislative

body of a municipal corporation. A local law of a municipal corporation, of a

general and permanent nature.”); Ordinance, Black’s Law Dictionary 1248

(rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“the term is used to designate the enactments of the

5
For an explanation of how other states addressed Public Law 280, see Felix
S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 544–45 (2005 ed.).

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legislative body of a municipal corporation.”); Ordinance, Webster’s New

World Dictionary of the American Language 1032 (1960) (“in law, a statute

enacted by the legislative department of a city government.”). 6 They are

inferior to the laws of Florida. City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

114 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2013).

To this end, this section does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over

violations of local ordinances committed on tribal land. See Op. Att’y Gen.

Fla. 77-29, at 2 (1977); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 94-45, at 2 n.6 (1994). And it

certainly does not confer jurisdiction for phantom ordinances that do not

exist. A trial court may not act beyond the power given to it by the people

through the Constitution and state statute. The trial court did so here.

IV.

Above all, the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction over this

criminal prosecution of Quiroga. The State cannot prosecute a criminal

defendant for a violation of a municipal ordinance that occurred on tribal land.

And it cannot prosecute phantom ordinances. The conviction and sentence

6
A municipal corporation is an “incorporation of persons, inhabitants of a
particular place, or connected with a particular district, enabling them to
conduct its local civil government.” Municipal corporation, Black’s Law
Dictionary 1168 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). It only has “subordinate and local
powers of legislation.” Id.

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are vacated. See, e.g., Andujar-Ruiz v. State, 320 So. 3d 228, 230 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2021); Barlow v. State, 171 So. 3d 777, 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015);

Wesley v. State, 375 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

Reversed; Conviction and sentence vacated.

LINDSEY, J., concurs.

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Case No. 3D25-0766
Quiroga v. State of Florida

LOGUE, J., concurring.

I concur in the result based upon the following broad and

commendable confession of error by the State:

The State concedes that there were two independent
defects – each individually sufficient to negate
jurisdiction which combine to render the prosecution
void: (1) prosecution under a municipal ordinance for
conduct occurring on Indian land is impermissible
because Florida’s assumption of criminal jurisdiction
over Indian reservations under Fla. Stat. § 285.16 is
limited to state laws of statewide application, which
expressly excludes local ordinances; and (2) the
complete absence of a filed information or a Notice
to Appear with the correct Florida Statute or
municipal ordinance violation or any other valid
charging document deprives the county court of the
jurisdictional predicate required by Florida case law
and the 1977 Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 61. See Vasquez v.
State, 450 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1984) (holding that
“[j]urisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the
charge made in the indictment or information.”).
Specifically, because the arrest affidavit did not
reference Florida Statute § 856.011 and only
referenced a municipal ordinance, even though there
was no objection below to the arrest affidavit serving
as a Notice to Appear which would have been
permissible, the court did not have jurisdiction over
this case.

I note the trial court did not have the benefit of this confession of error.

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