Scott Hale v. Sleiman Enterprises, Inc.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-2944
LT Case No. 16-2023-CA-1892
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SCOTT HALE,

Appellant,

v.

SLEIMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Bruce R. Anderson, Jr., Judge.

Benjamin James Stevenson, of Stevenson Legal, PLLC,
Pensacola Beach, for Appellant.

Jack R. Reiter and Eric Yesner, of Gray Robinson, P.A., Miami,
for Appellee.

June 5, 2026

EISNAUGLE, J.

In this slip and fall premises liability case, Scott Hale (“Hale”)
appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sleiman
Enterprises, Inc. (“Sleiman”). In rendering judgment, the trial
court concluded that Sleiman owed no legal duty to Hale. We
reverse.
I

Hale managed a Domino’s Pizza restaurant operating on
premises leased from Sleiman. At some point, water started
leaking from the roof into the kitchen. Hale managed the condition
by strategically placing garbage cans to catch and contain the
water.

The lease provided that only Sleiman, or its “designated
roofing contractor,” could “enter upon” the roof. As such, Domino’s
did not inspect the roof to determine the source of the leak.
Instead, it reported the leak to Sleiman.

About seven days later, Hale observed no active leak and
noted that the floor where he placed the garbage cans appeared
dry. Believing the leak had been resolved, he removed the garbage
cans. Shortly thereafter, Hale slipped and fell in a wet area while
walking past the oven toward the refrigerator. He testified that
he did not see the wet spot before he fell.

Hale sued Sleiman, alleging that Sleiman owed a duty to
timely investigate and address the leak. Sleiman moved for
summary judgment arguing that the leak originated from a
defective hood vent and that the lease required Domino’s to
maintain the vent. Based on those lease provisions, Sleiman
argued that it owed no duty to Hale.

In response, Hale argued that Sleiman breached a duty of care
because Sleiman had exclusive control over access to the roof. As
a result, argued Hale, Domino’s could not discern the cause of the
leak or repair the hood vent without Sleiman’s involvement and
approval.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Sleiman, reasoning that Sleiman did not owe a duty to Hale. This
appeal follows.

II

On appeal, Hale argues that Sleiman owed a duty to timely
investigate the cause of the leak because Sleiman retained

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exclusive authority to access the roof and investigate the source of
the leak. According to Hale, Domino’s could not discover that the
leak originated from the hood vent until Sleiman entered onto the
roof to investigate. We agree.

The existence of a duty of care in a negligence action is a
question of law. See Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 899 So.
2d 1105, 1110 (Fla. 2005). A duty can arise in several ways.
Relevant here, a duty arises where the “defendant’s conduct
foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a general
threat of harm to others.” McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d
500, 502 (Fla. 1992). The terms of the lease between Domino’s and
Sleiman in this case are “one facet of the general facts” relevant to
our duty analysis. Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d
1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003).

We conclude that Sleiman owed Hale a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances presented here. Importantly, the lease
prohibited Domino’s from accessing the roof to investigate the
source of the leak. Only Sleiman was authorized to do so. While
the lease provision requiring Domino’s to maintain the hood vent
may be relevant to other issues in the case, that fact does not
relieve Sleiman of its duty.1

We therefore reverse the summary judgment and remand for
further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MAKAR and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.

1 We likewise reject, without further discussion, the argument

that the danger in this case was open and obvious. Cf. Williams v.
Weaver, 381 So. 3d 1260, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (“While the fact
that a danger is obvious discharges a landowner’s duty to warn, it
does not discharge the landowner’s duty to maintain his property
in a reasonably safe condition.”).

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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