Artemis Pascalides v. Gabriela Artico

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 31, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D24-1052
Lower Tribunal No. 20-1176-CP-02
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Artemis Pascalides ,
Appellant,
vs.
Gabriela Artico,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jorge E.
Cueto, Judge.
Chepenik 	Trushin LLP, 	and Daniel F. 	Bachman, 	and Joshua R.
Williams, for appellant.
Rodolfo Nuñez, P.A., and Rodolfo Nuñez, for appellee.
Before EMAS, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.

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Appellant, Petitioner (the “Estate”) appeals the trial court’s Omnibus
Order on Petitioner’s and Respondent’s respective motions for summary
judgment. For the reasons below, we affirm.
Theodoros Pascalides passed away leaving significant assets in both
the United States and Venezuela. A dispute arose over approximately $2.3
million held in a bank account at J.P. Morgan (the “Account”) between his
three daughters, the Estate,1 and Gabriela Artico, the Appellee, Respondent.
This bank account was opened in May 1990 and was titled: “Theodoros
Pascalides 	and/or Gabriela Artico.” 	In 2004, Theodoros and Gabriela
updated this account to designate Theodoros and Gabriela as “joint tenants
with a right of survivorship.”
It is undisputed that Theodoros remained legally married to the mother
of the Executrix and her two sisters until the time of his death. 	It is also
undisputed that he separated from their mother and began an intimate
relationship with Gabriela in the 1980s which continued until his death. And
it is undisputed that his daughters did not know about the Account until after
his death.
1 Artemis Pascalides, one of Theodoros’ three daughters, was the Executrix
of the Estate.

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The 	operative 	complaint 	is 	the 	Estate’s 	Amended 	Petition 	(the
“Amended Petition”). The Amended Petition contains three counts:
- 	Count I for Declaratory Judgment seeks “(1) a declaration that the
Convenience Accounts 	[including 	the Account] 	were 	assets 	of
[Theodoros’] 	estate 	and 	the 	funds 	therein 	do 	not 	belong 	to
[Gabriela],(b) [the Executrix] as an heir of [Theodoros], has an
ownership interest in the funds contained in the Convenience
Accounts; (2) an award of costs, attorney’s fees and interest to the
maximum extent such are awardable by law, and (3) any such relief
this honorable court deems just and proper.”
- 	Count II for Conversion which contains no wherefore clause and no
other prayer for relief.
- 	Count III for Lack of Capacity which asks the court to “enter a
judgement in the amount of the funds improperly removed from the
Convenience Account 	against Gabriela; award costs, attorney’s
fees to the maximum extent such awardable by law; provide such
further 	relief 	this 	Honorable 	Court 	deems 	just 	and 	proper.”
(emphasis added).
After discovery, the Estate voluntarily dismissed “subsection [b], Count
I, Declaration, the declaration part of the amended petition, and that part was
to have [the Executrix] be declared an heir who had an interest in the funds
alleged to have been mere convenience accounts. 	Those have been
dismissed.”2 The 	Amended 	Petition’s 	Conversion 	claim 	contains 	no
2 See hearing transcript dated May 14, 2024, wherein the trial court took up
the competing summary judgment motions. 	See also the trial court “case
summary” docket at index 96, part of the record before us.

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wherefore clause and, thus, requests no relief.3 The Estate also voluntary
dismissed its Lack of Capacity claim “which relates to lack of capacity and
intent in March of 2016 [the time Theodoros was in the hospital].”
The trial court only had to decide a portion of Count I, requesting “(1)
a declaration that (a) the Convenience Accounts were assets of [Theodoros’]
estate and the funds thereon do not belong to [Gabriela].”
The Estate filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
[Gabriela’s] Wrongful Transfer of Funds Prior to [Theodoros’] Death seeking
an order granting partial summary judgement in its favor as to Count II
(Conversion) in the amount of $1,015,000.00, or 50% of the funds Gabriela
withdrew from the Account.
Gabriela moved for summary judgment seeking entitlement to all the
funds in the Account. 	At the hearing on these motions, Gabriela’s counsel
objected to the Estate’s claim for 50% of the Account because the Estate did
not plead for that relief.4
3 See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(3) (“A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief . . . must state a cause of action and must contain . . . a demand for
judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems the pleader entitled.”).
4 Gabriela’s counsel stated: “which I believe for purposes of an objection, I
don’t think that their complaint lays out that claim for this 50% issues in the
monies that were withdrawn. So I think there is a pleading issue there . . . .”

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The trial court, in an omnibus order, granted Gabriela’s motion and
denied the Estate’s motion relying on two sections of the Florida Statutes:
(1) section 655.79, Florida Statutes (2025) entitled “Deposits and accounts
in two or more names; presumption as to vesting on death” and (2) section
655.80, Florida Statutes (2025) entitled, “Convenience accounts.” 	This
timely appeal follows.
We review de novo orders on motion for summary judgment. 	Ibarra v.
Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 350 So. 3d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).
“Summary judgment is appropriate where the ‘movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)). “Genuine disputes
are those in which ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting In re Amendments to Fla. R.
of Civ. P. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 2020)).
“For an issue to be preserved for appeal . . . it ‘must be presented to
the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on
appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.’”
Reed v. State, 287 So. 3d 606, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting Archer v.
State, 613 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993)).

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“Courts generally are unauthorized to award relief not requested in the
parties’ pleadings.” 	Pure Powersports, LLC v. 7529 Salisbury Rd. Assocs.,
LLC, 415 So. 3d 815, 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (citations omitted); BAC Home
Loans Servicing, Inc. v. Headley, 130 So. 3d 703, 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)
(“[A] trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine matters that were not
the subject of proper pleadings and notice.”). 	And our party presentation
principle “restrains [courts] . . . from considering anything that the parties
have not presented.” 	Williams v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1636, D1637
(Fla. 5th DCA July 25, 2025) (citations omitted). As such “an appellate court
is not at liberty to grant a remedy not sought in the trial court.” Combs v. St.
Joe Papermakers Fed. Credit Union, 383 So. 2d 298, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980); Butler v. Brown, 338 So. 3d 392, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“[C]ourts
are not authorized to award relief not requested in the pleadings . . . [t]o grant
unrequested relief is an abuse of discretion . . . and reversible error.”).
Thus, the only issue properly before the trial court, and now this Court,
is what remains of Count I of the Amended Petition: a declaration designating
the Account as a convenience account.
“A convenience account is a deposit account . . . in the name of one
individual (principal), in which one or more individuals have been designated
as agents with the right to make deposits to and to withdraw funds from or

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draw checks on such account . . . .” § 655.80(1), Fla. Stat. (2025). “All rights,
interests, and claims in, to, and in respect of, such deposits and convenience
account and the additions thereto shall be those of the principal only.” 	§
655.80(2), Fla. Stat. (2025). So the stakes are clear: holding that the Account
is a convenience account would designate Theodoros as principal of that
account, making all the funds in the Account an asset of Theodoros’ estate
only. 	See Larkins v. Mendez, 363 So. 3d 140, 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); 5
Fla. Jur. 2d Banks and Lending Institutions § 207 (2025).
Reviewing the record, the Estate has failed to show there is a genuine
dispute that Theodoros created the Account to serve as a convenience
account. 	Nothing in the record shows that the Account was intentionally
created to serve as a convenience account where Theodoros is the principal
owner and Gabriela is merely Theodoros’s agent who may not withdraw
funds herself. 	Larkins, 363 So. 3d at 146. 	In fact, the record here shows
there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute that Theodoros 	created the Account 	with
Gabriela, so that she may use the funds for her personal needs.
Additionally, Theodoros and Gabriela’s designation as joint tenants
with a right of survivorship is a fatal blow to the Estate’s assertion that the
Account fits under section 655.80(1)’s, Florida Statutes, definition of a
convenience account. 	Unlike a convenience account, which is under the

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name of one individual and designates others as agents of the individual to
withdraw funds, Theodoros and Gabriela, as joint tenants, own an equal and
undivided interest in the Account. 	Compare § 655.80(1) (“A convenience
account is a deposit account . . . in the name of one individual (principal), in
which one or more individuals have been designated as agents . . . .”) with
12 Fla. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Partition § 1 (2025) (“In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, cotenants are presumed to own equal undivided
interests.”); see generally Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand and Assocs., 780 So.
2d 45 (Fla. 2001) (requiring joint tenancies be created with a unity of interest
among cotenants).
As a result, we agree with the trial court in granting summary judgment
in Gabriela’s favor. There is no dispute that the Account is a joint account,
solely funded by Theodoros. “When a joint bank account is established with
the funds of one person, a gift of the funds is presumed.” 	See Varela v.
Bernachea, 917 So. 2d 295, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Hagopian v. Zimmer,
653 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); 28 Fla. Jur. 2d Gifts § 37 (2025) (“Where
a joint bank account is established with the funds of one person, or funds are
contributed to a joint bank account by one of the holders of the account, the
funds in question are presumed to be a gift to the account holders.”). Further,
section 655.79, Florida Statutes, provides:

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(1) 	Unless 	otherwise 	expressly 	provided 	in 	a
contract, agreement, or signature card executed in
connection with the opening or maintenance of an
account, including a certificate of deposit, a deposit
account in the names of two or more persons shall
be presumed to have been intended by such persons
to provide that, upon the death of any one of them,
all rights, title, interest, and claim in, to, and in respect
of such deposit account, less all proper setoffs and
charges in favor of the institution, vest in the surviving
person or persons. Any deposit or account made in
the name of two persons who are husband and wife
shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless
otherwise specified in writing.
(2) The presumption created in this section may be
overcome only by proof of fraud or undue influence
or clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent. In
the absence of such proof, all rights, title, interest,
and claims in, to, and in respect of such deposits and
account and the additions thereto, and the obligation
of the institution created thereby, less all proper
setoffs and charges in favor of the institution against
any one or more of such persons, upon the death of
any such person, vest in the surviving person or
persons, notwithstanding the absence of proof of any
donative intent or delivery, possession, dominion,
control, or acceptance on the part of any person and
notwithstanding 	that 	the 	provisions 	hereof 	may
constitute 	or 	cause 	a 	vesting 	or 	disposition 	of
property or rights or interests therein, testamentary in
nature, 	which, 	except 	for 	the 	provisions 	of 	this
section, 	would 	or 	might 	otherwise 	be 	void 	or
voidable.
Considering these two presumptions, we agree with the trial court’s
decision. First, there is no genuine dispute challenging the presumption that
Theodoros intended to gift the funds to Gabriela by being the sole contributor

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to the Account. 	Second, nothing in the record overcomes the presumption
that the ownership of the Account was intended to be a joint tenancy with a
right of survivorship. This is to say, there is no genuine dispute on whether
Gabriela is entitled to the funds in the Account. 	She is. 	Thus, the Estate
failed to bring forth a disputed issue of material fact that the Account is a
convenience account. For this reason, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
Affirmed.