Calvin Roundtree v. State of Florida

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed January 14, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-1906
Lower Tribunal No. F07-32233
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Calvin Roundtree,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle Delancy, Judge.
Calvin Roundtree, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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Affirmed. 	See Ford v. 	State, 	402 So. 	3d 973, 981 (Fla. 	2025)
(“Erlinger1 was a direct-appeal case—not a postconviction case like Ford’s—
and it involved required jury findings regarding an element. Based on these
fundamental distinctions, it is clear that Erlinger provides no support for
vacating Ford’s death sentences.”); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 394–95
(Fla. 2025) (finding postconviction review of defendant’s sentence based on
Erlinger improper); Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576, 577 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA
2003) (“Apprendi2 was characterized as a procedural rule by the Supreme
Court. 	Since announcing Teague,3 the Supreme Court has not given
retroactive effect to any decisions announcing new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure.” (citation omitted)); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
358 (2004) (“Ring4 announced a new procedural rule that does not apply
retroactively to cases already final on direct review.”); Witt v. State, 387 So.
2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980) (“[T]he essential considerations in determining
whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively are essentially
three: (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance
1 Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024).
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
4 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

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on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new rule.”); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837,
848 (Fla. 2005) (concluding Apprendi does not apply retroactively); Luton v.
State, 934 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (concluding issue was not
preserved because defendant did not object and jury, not judge, must
determine his HVFO qualifications); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1) (“A court
may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect
calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively
alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to
that relief. . . .”); Jackson v. State, 803 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
(“To raise an illegal sentence claim under Rule 3.800(a), 1) the error must
have resulted in an illegal sentence, 2) the error must appear on the face of
the record, and 3) the motion must affirmatively allege that the court records
demonstrate 	on 	their 	face 	an 	entitlement 	to 	relief.” 	(quotations 	and
alterations omitted)); see also Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 94 (Fla. 2014)
(“A claim of error under Apprendi and Blakely5 is subject to a harmless error
analysis.”); see, e.g., Theophile v. State, 967 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA
2007) 	(“Relief 	under 	rule 	3.800(a) 	is 	precluded 	where 	an 	evidentiary
determination is required. For this reason, Appellant could not demonstrate
5 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

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entitlement to relief under rule 3.800(a) without citing to facts established in
the trial transcript or otherwise apparent on the face of the record.” (citation
omitted)).