Kathleen M. Bonczyk v. Richard C. Wolfe

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed January 14, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-2173
Lower Tribunal No. 22-663-CA-01
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Kathleen M. Bonczyk,
Petitioner,
vs.
Richard C. Wolfe,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Writ of Prohibition.
Kathleen M. Bonczyk, in proper person.
Wolfe Law Miami, P.A., and Richard C. Wolfe, for respondent.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent her fourth assigned trial
judge from further presiding over her civil dispute. 	Because at least one of
her myriad of previous disqualification efforts proved successful, the lower
tribunal correctly applied the successive motion provision contained within
Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330(i). 	See
Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(i) (“If a judge has been previously
disqualified on motion for alleged prejudice or partiality under subdivision (e),
a successor judge cannot be disqualified based on a successive motion by
the same party unless the successor judge rules that he or she is in fact not
fair or impartial in the case. Such a successor judge may rule on the truth of
the facts alleged in support of the motion.”). Given this provision, our review
is more deferential than that employed in evaluating the denial of an initial
disqualification motion. 	We are limited to determining “‘whether the record
clearly refutes the successor judge’s decision to deny the motion.’” Ardis v.
Ardis, 130 So. 3d 791, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Kokal v. State, 901
So. 2d 766, 774 (Fla. 2005)). 	And here, the record discloses no basis for
disturbing the ruling below. See Universal X Rays, Corp. v. Infinity Auto Ins.
Co., 399 So. 3d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“[T]he fact that a judge has
ruled adversely to the party in the past does not constitute a legally sufficient

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ground for a motion to disqualify.” (quoting Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d
650, 659 (Fla. 2000))). Accordingly, we deny the petition.
Petition denied.