Terry Hare v. Tania Decooman McLaughlin, et al

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
TERRY HARE,
Appellant,
v.
TANIA DECOOMAN MCLAUGHLIN, individually and as
personal representative of the ESTATE OF JACQUES DECOOMAN,
and TINA D. DECOOMAN-INGALSBE,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-2001
[March 25, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Okeechobee 	County; 	Laurie 	E. 	Buchanan, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
472023000216CAAXMX.
William 	F. 	Gallese 	of 	William 	F. 	Gallese, 	P.A., 	Jensen 	Beach, 	for
appellant.
Alan B. Rose, Scott Konopka, and Carly M. Weiss of Taft Stettinius &
Hollister, LLP, Stuart, for appellees.
S HEPHERD, J.
Terry Hare seeks review of a partial final judgment entered in favor of
Tania Decooman McLaughlin, individually and as personal representative
of the Estate of Jacques Decooman, and Tina Decooman-Ingalsbe, on two
counts of a five-count complaint. 	Hare also requests a stay of execution
of the judgment and collection efforts. 	For the reasons discussed below,
we 	dismiss 	Hare’s 	appeal 	of 	the 	partial 	final 	judgment 	for 	lack 	of
jurisdiction, treat the request to stay execution of the judgment as a
petition for writ of certiorari, grant the petition, quash the portions of the
final judgment that authorize execution, quash the writ of garnishment
and quash the order compelling Hare to complete a fact information sheet.
A 	partial 	final 	judgment 	is 	not 	appealable 	under 	Florida 	Rule 	of
Appellate 	Procedure 	9.110(k) 	where 	interdependent 	claims 	remain
unresolved. 	See Fla R. App. P. 9.110(k); see also Altair Maint. Servs. Inc.
v. GBS Excavating, Inc., 655 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)

2
(dismissing 	without 	prejudice 	appeal 	of 	a 	non-final 	order 	granting
summary judgment on one count of a multi-count complaint where the
undisposed counts involved the same transaction and parties). 	Although
Hare’s appeal of the judgment on counts II and V is premature, “certiorari
is available to review the form of an order, if not its underlying merits,
insofar as it permits execution prior to rendition of an appealable final
judgment.” 	E. Ave., LLC v. Insignia Bank, 136 So. 3d 659, 664 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2014); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks an improper
remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the property remedy had been
sought. . . .”). Accordingly, to the extent that the appeal requests a stay of
all post-judgment collection endeavors, we treat the appeal as a petition
for writ of certiorari.
Certiorari relief is proper where the petitioner shows: “(1) a departure
from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury
for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment
appeal.” Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla.
2004) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Snyder, 826 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA
2002) (internal quotations omitted)). 	Hare has met the requirements for
certiorari relief. See Team Richco, LLC v. Rapid Sec. Sols., LLC, 290 So. 3d
629, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (holding that a trial court order allowing
discovery 	in 	aid 	of 	execution 	of 	a 	non-final, 	non-appealable 	partial
summary judgment order satisfied all three prongs for certiorari relief).
Because the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the
law when it allowed discovery in aid of execution of a non-final, non-
appealable partial summary judgment, and irreparable harm would result,
we grant certiorari, quash the portions of the final judgment that authorize
execution, quash the writ of garnishment, and quash the order compelling
Hare to complete a fact information sheet.
Appeal dismissed, certiorari granted, orders quashed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
K UNTZ , C.J., and MAY , J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.