Scott Joseph Ranne v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
SCOTT JOSEPH RANNE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-2951
[April 15, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie 	County; 	Lawrence 	M. 	Mirman, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
562021CF001034AXXXXX.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	Tallahassee, 	and 	Heidi 	L.
Bettendorf, 	Senior Assistant 	Attorney General, 	West 	Palm Beach, 	for
appellee.
MAY , J.
The 	defendant 	appeals 	his 	conviction 	and 	sentence 	for 	attempted
second-degree murder with a firearm. He raises five points of error in: (1)
the admission of the medical examiner’s opinion; (2) the life sentence
imposed; (3) the jury instruction on attempted second-degree murder; (4)
the $200 prosecution cost imposed; and (5) failing to provide a twelve-
person jury. 	We agree with the defendant on points two and four. 	We
therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case to the trial
court for resentencing.
• 	The Facts
The State charged the defendant with attempted first-degree murder
with a firearm. 	The victim testified that she lived with the defendant and
that he is the father of her child. 	She was trying to break up with the
defendant, told him to leave, and an argument followed. 	During the

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argument, the defendant shot her. 	Fortunately, the victim survived the
shooting.
The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense of attempted
second-degree murder with a firearm. 	The trial court adjudicated the
defendant guilty and sentenced him to life in prison with a twenty-five-
year mandatory minimum.
From his conviction and sentence, the defendant now appeals.
• 	The Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison with a twenty-
five-year mandatory minimum. 	The defendant argues that while the
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence was authorized pursuant
to the 10-20-life statute, the life sentence exceeds the statutory maximum
for the offense, which is thirty years. See §§ 775.087(2)(a)3., 775.082(3)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2021). 	The State responds that the 10-20-life statute itself
provides 	for 	a 	maximum 	sentence 	of 	life 	in 	prison, 	rendering 	the
defendant’s sentence lawful. 	Alternatively, the State requests that if we
agree with the defendant and reverse, we should permit the trial court to
resentence the defendant to life.
We have de novo review of the defendant’s sentence as it “involves a
pure issue of law.” 	Garnes v. State, 382 So. 3d 701, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA
2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A sentence is ‘illegal’ if it imposes a kind of punishment that no judge
under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under
any set of factual circumstances.” 	Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1181
(Fla. 2001) (citation modified). Section 775.087(2)(a)(3), known as “the 10-
20-life statute,” gives the trial court discretion to choose a mandatory
minimum from twenty-five years up to life, even if that chosen mandatory
minimum exceeds the normal statutory maximum. 	Hatten v. State, 203
So. 3d 142, 145 (Fla. 2016).
If the trial court selects a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years, it
lacks authority under the 10-20-life statute for an additional term beyond
the selected minimum. 	Id. at 145–46. 	If the court wants to impose a
sentence longer than the selected mandatory minimum, it must have
“additional 	statutory 	authority” 	other 	than 	section 	775.087. 	Id.
(emphasis added); see also Garnes, 382 So. 3d at 706 (holding that to
exceed the statutory maximum based on 10-20-life, “the entire sentence
must be a mandatory minimum”).

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Here, the jury found the defendant guilty of attempted second-degree
murder, which is a first-degree felony punishable by a term of years not
exceeding life. 	§ 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). 	Under the attempt statute,
a felony of the first degree is re-classified as a second-degree felony. 	§
777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2021). 	Thus, attempted second-degree murder—
standing alone—is a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years’
imprisonment. 	§ 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2021).
If a firearm is used, that second-degree felony is again reclassified to a
first-degree felony. § 775.087(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021). A first-degree felony
is 	generally 	punishable 	by 	up 	to 	thirty 	years’ 	imprisonment. 	§
775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021). 	If the jury also finds the defendant
discharged a firearm and caused great bodily harm, 10-20-life applies and
gives the court discretion to impose a mandatory minimum between
twenty-five years and life. 	§ 775.087(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis
added).
Here, the jury found the defendant guilty of attempted second-degree
murder. 	The jury also found the defendant discharged a firearm and
caused great bodily harm. 	Those findings reclassified the offense from a
second-degree felony to a first-degree felony, carrying a general statutory
maximum 	of 	thirty 	years. 	See 	§§ 	777.04(4)(c), 	775.087(1)(b),
775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021). 	The jury’s findings also triggered the 10-
20-life statute, giving the trial court discretion to impose a mandatory
minimum between twenty-five years and life. 	See § 775.087(2)(a)3., Fla.
Stat. (2021).
The trial court, however, did not select “life” as the 10-20-life mandatory
minimum. Instead, the trial court imposed a total sentence of life, with “a
mandatory twenty-five years as part of that sentence.”1 	Therein lies the
error.
The trial court selected “twenty-five years” as the 10-20-life component
and 	then 	added 	life 	incarceration 	thereby 	exceeding 	the 	statutory
maximum. 	This 	is 	impermissible 	unless 	some 	other 	statute
1 The written sentence does not reflect that a 25-year mandatory minimum
sentence was orally imposed. The defense notes the unchecked box in the written
order is a scrivener’s error, and the order must be corrected to comport with the
actual sentence orally pronounced. 	See Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603
(Fla. 2007) (“[A] court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the
written sentencing document.” (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.
2003); Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996))). The State agrees.

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independently authorizes the longer total sentence. 	See Hatten, 203 So.
3d at 145–46; see also Wynn v. State, 277 So. 3d 281, 283 (Fla. 5th DCA
2019) (once the court imposed the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum
under section 775.087(2)(a)3., it could not exceed the statutory maximum
for the offense).
Accordingly, 	because 	the 	trial 	court 	selected 	a 	twenty-five-year
mandatory minimum but imposed a life total sentence without separate
statutory authority, the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum and is
thus illegal.
The defendant requests that we remand with instructions to resentence
at or below the statutory maximum of thirty years in prison with the
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum remaining in effect. 	The State
requests that we remand and allow the trial court to resentence the
defendant to life in prison. We agree with the defendant. See Garnes, 382
So. 3d at 707.
In 	his 	fourth 	issue, 	the 	defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	written 	order
assessing fines, fees, costs, and other charges contains a scrivener’s error
that should be corrected because it does not match the trial court’s oral
pronouncement. 	The written order lists a $200 prosecution fee, but the
court orally pronounced only $100. The State agrees this scrivener’s error
should be corrected pursuant to Croissy v. State, 404 So. 3d 419, 420 (Fla.
4th DCA 2025).2
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the sentence on issues two and four
and affirm the remaining issues without further discussion. 	We remand
the case to the trial court for resentencing at or below the statutory
maximum of thirty years in prison with the twenty-five-year mandatory
minimum remaining in effect.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
KUNTZ , C.J., and GERBER , J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
2 In his fifth issue, the defendant argues that he was entitled to a twelve-person
jury. This issue is unpreserved. See Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 940 (Fla.
2005). Regardless, the outcome is controlled by Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72,
73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).