Heather Sawyer Carvajal v. Danielle Santos Ferretti

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
HEATHER SAWYER CARVAJAL,
Appellant,
v.
DANIELLE SANTOS FERRETTI,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-3293
[April 29, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Stefanie 	C. 	Moon, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
062024DR019428AXDVCE.
Heather Sawyer Carvajal, Pompano Beach, pro se.
Hollis Elizabeth Mandell, of The Law Offices of Hollis E. Mandell, Davie,
for appellee.
KLINGENSMITH, J.
Appellant (“Girlfriend”) seeks review of a final judgment of injunction
for protection against stalking entered for Appellee (“Wife”). 	Because the
record does not contain competent, substantial evidence establishing the
statutorily required two separate instances of harassment, we reverse.
I. Background
The parties’ dispute arises from a contentious domestic situation. Wife
and her husband separated in 2021 and initiated divorce proceedings in
2022. 	Girlfriend began a relationship with the husband in 2019, prior to
the dissolution proceedings.
In October 2024, Wife filed a petition for an injunction for protection
against stalking, alleging four categories of conduct occurring between
August 2023 and October 2024:

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1. August 	2023 	social 	media 	post: 	Girlfriend 	accused 	Wife 	of
manipulating others, using her child to spy, and included language
Wife perceived as threatening.
2. February 2024 social media post: Girlfriend again accused Wife of
stalking behavior, tagged Wife’s workplace, and warned others about
her. 	Wife testified this led to a meeting with her employer.
3. October 	16, 	2024 	text 	message: 	Girlfriend 	contacted 	Wife
regarding 	a 	child 	support 	payment 	being 	sent 	via 	Zelle 	and
requested identifying information. 	Wife provided the information
and confirmed receipt through a court-approved communication
application.
4. October 	23, 	2024 	communications: 	Following 	an 	incident
involving Wife’s cousin, Girlfriend sent Wife a series of messages
calling her derogatory names, accusing her of stalking, and telling
her to stay away. When Wife blocked her number, Girlfriend resent
the same messages via WhatsApp and email within minutes and
referenced possibly appearing at Wife’s workplace.
At the hearing, both parties appeared pro se. The trial court found the
statutory 	requirements 	satisfied 	and 	entered 	a 	three-year 	injunction
prohibiting Girlfriend from contacting Wife.
II. Standard of Review
“Trial courts have broad discretion in granting . . . injunctions, and
unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, appellate courts will
not disturb the trial court’s decision.” Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355, 359
(Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (quoting DiTanna v. Edwards, 323 So. 3d 194, 200
(Fla. 4th DCA 2021)).
However, “the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to
justify imposing an injunction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” 	Id.
at 359-60 (citation modified). 	Likewise, “legal sufficiency . . . as opposed
to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal.”
Rosaly v. Konecny, 346 So. 3d 630, 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citation
modified).
III. Governing Law
Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2024), authorizes injunctions for
protection against stalking. 	“Stalking” occurs when a person “willfully,
maliciously, 	and 	repeatedly 	follows, 	harasses, 	or 	cyberstalks 	another
person.” 	§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024).

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“Harass” means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person that:
1. Causes substantial emotional distress; and
2. Serves no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2024).
A “course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose. 	§ 784.048(1)(b), Fla.
Stat. (2024).
Thus, to obtain an injunction against “stalking” based on allegations of
“harassment,” 	the 	petitioner 	must 	prove 	“willful[], 	malicious[], 	and
repeated[] . . . harass[ment].” 	§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). 	Each
instance of “harassment” must be comprised of a “course of conduct” (that
is, a pattern of a series of acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose)
that both causes substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate
purpose. § 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2024). Because the “harassment” must
be 	“repeated[]” 	for 	an 	injunction 	to 	issue, 	at 	least 	two 	instances 	of
“harassment” are required. §§ 784.048(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2024); see Carter
v. Malken, 207 So. 3d 891, 893-94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citation modified)
(“Stalking requires proof of repeated acts . . . . A minimum of two incidents
of harassment are required to establish stalking.”). 	Critically, “[t]wo or
more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally
insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment.” 	Garcia, 337
So. 3d at 360 (quoting Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020)). A qualifying course of conduct requires acts “separated by time or
distance.” 	Id.; see also Eichelberger v. State, 949 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007).
IV. Analysis
A. The 	Record 	Does 	Not 	Establish 	Two 	Separate 	Instances 	of
Harassment
1. The October 23 communications constitute a single incident
The 	October 	23, 	2024 	communications—sent 	via 	text 	message,
WhatsApp, 	and 	email—were 	transmitted 	within 	minutes, 	contained
substantially identical content, and arose from a single triggering event.
Under Florida law, this constitutes a single “course of conduct.” See
Garcia, 337 So. 3d at 360 (multiple approaches during a single encounter

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constitute one act); Cash, 306 So. 3d at 111; Eichelberger, 949 So. 2d at
361 (different forms of contact within a short time frame may constitute
one 	continuous 	episode). 	Accordingly, 	even 	if 	any 	of 	these
communications equated to qualifying incidents, these communications
would be considered only one “course of conduct” giving rise to, at most,
one instance of “harassment,” and not multiple.
2. The remaining incidents lack continuity of purpose
The remaining alleged acts do not combine to form a second qualifying
instance of “harassment.”
The August 2023 and February 2024 social media posts were separated
by months and were reactive in nature. The posts do not demonstrate the
continuity of purpose required to establish a course of conduct. 	See §
784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024).
The October 16, 2024 communication concerned child support and was
unrelated in purpose to the earlier posts. Communications about financial
support for a child constitute conduct with a legitimate purpose and are
analytically distinct from alleged harassment. 	See Reid v. Saunders, 282
So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Thus, these incidents are discrete and disconnected, not part of a
unified course of conduct.
3. No legally sufficient second instance exists
The difficulty in this case is not the absence of conflict, but the absence
of the kind of repeated, legally distinct conduct which section 784.048
requires. 	The 	record 	reflects 	a 	relationship 	marked 	by 	hostility,
accusation, and reactive communication. 	But when the allegations are
carefully examined through the lens of the governing law, the allegations
collapse into either a single continuous episode or isolated, unrelated
events—neither 	of 	which 	satisfies 	the 	requirement 	of 	two 	separate
instances of 	“harassment.”
The October 23 communications illustrate the point most clearly. 	On
that date, Girlfriend sent a rapid succession of messages to Wife, first by
text 	and 	then, 	after 	being 	blocked, 	through 	WhatsApp, 	and 	shortly
thereafter, by email. 	The messages were substantively identical, sent
within minutes of each other, and prompted by the same triggering event
involving Wife’s cousin. Although transmitted through multiple platforms,

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the messages were part of a single, uninterrupted effort to convey the same
message.
Florida courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that such conduct
can be artificially divided into multiple acts. 	In Garcia, we held that
multiple encounters during a single evening constituted only one act of
harassment, emphasizing that conduct must be meaningfully distinct—
not merely repeated in quick succession—to qualify as separate instances.
337 	So. 	3d 	at 	361. 	Likewise, 	in 	Cash, 	we 	explained 	that 	multiple
communications forming one continuous episode cannot be parsed into
separate acts to meet the statutory threshold. 	306 So. 3d at 111. 	And in
Eichelberger, the court recognized that different forms of contact occurring
within a short period and reflecting a single purpose constitute one course
of conduct, not multiple qualifying incidents. 	949 So. 2d at 361. 	Under
these principles, the October 23 barrage of messages, however offensive
the Wife may deem the messages to be, amounts to only one incident as a
matter of law to be considered under section 784.048.
That leaves the remaining allegations: two social media posts made
months apart and a single communication regarding child support. 	But
these events, which also lack the necessary continuity of purpose, likewise
do not combine to form a second qualifying instance of harassment for our
consideration. Section 784.048 requires a “course of conduct,” meaning a
pattern of behavior evidencing a sustained objective. § 784.048(1)(b), Fla.
Stat. (2024). 	Here, the August 2023 and February 2024 posts were
temporally remote and reactive, each tied to discrete grievances. 	The
October 16 communication, by contrast, concerned the transmission of
child support and was wholly unrelated in purpose. 	Such disconnected
acts cannot be stitched together to create a qualifying course of conduct.
As 	Garcia 	explains, 	section 	784.048 	requires 	acts 	that 	are 	not 	only
multiple, but meaningfully related and separated by time or circumstance
in a way that demonstrates repetition and not randomness. 337 So. 3d at
360.
What 	remains, 	then, 	is 	a 	record 	showing 	one 	short 	episode 	of
continuous communication, and several isolated incidents spread over
more than a year. 	That is not enough. 	Section 784.048 demands two
separate, legally sufficient instances of 	“harassment,” not one incident
supplemented by unrelated or non-qualifying conduct. 	To hold otherwise
would be to dilute the statutory requirement and permit injunctions based
on the very type of intermittent, emotionally charged exchanges that
Florida courts have repeatedly held fall outside the scope of stalking.
Because Wife failed to prove two separate instances of harassment, the
injunction cannot stand. See Garcia, 337 So. 3d at 360-61.

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B. The 	Nature 	of 	the 	Conduct 	Does 	Not 	Satisfy 	the 	Statutory
Definition of Harassment
Although our conclusion regarding the lack of two qualifying instances
of harassment is dispositive for resolving this matter, the communications’
nature 	and 	alleged 	effect 	similarly 	reinforce 	the 	insufficiency 	of 	the
evidence to satisfy section 784.048’s definition of stalking or harassment.
1. No substantial emotional distress under an objective standard
“Whether 	a 	communication 	causes 	substantial 	emotional 	distress
should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person
standard.” Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633 (quoting David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d
871, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).
“A reasonable person does not suffer substantial emotional distress
easily.” Kaye v. Wilson, 363 So. 3d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citation
modified). 	Rather, 	the 	conduct 	must 	be 	“extreme 	and 	outrageous.”
Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633.
Even accepting Wife’s testimony that she felt frightened, lost sleep, and
experienced anxiety as a result of Girlfriend’s conduct, the law requires
more than a subjective reaction. 	Section 784.048 demands proof of
“substantial 	emotional 	distress” 	measured 	by 	an 	objective,
reasonable 	person 	standard, 	and 	Florida 	courts 	have 	consistently
emphasized that threshold is high. § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024). This
objective standard does not elevate generalized concern or unease into
legally sufficient distress. As explained in Rosaly, the inquiry is “narrowly
construed” and turns not on how this particular petitioner subjectively
felt, but on whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances
objectively would suffer distress of a truly significant magnitude. 	346 So.
3d at 633. 	In other words, section 784.048 does not protect against all
emotional discomfort, but instead targets only conduct so extreme that it
would overwhelm an ordinary person. 	See Kaye, 363 So. 3d at 1159
(‘“[S]ubstantial emotional distress’ connotes an unjustifiable infliction of
stress of great proportion, in the nature of fear and concern.”) (quoting
Washington v. Brown, 300 So. 3d 338, 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)).
Measured against that standard, the conduct here does not qualify.
The record reflects insults, accusations, and disparaging social media
posts, namely being called a “psychopath,” a “stalker,” or an “abuser,” and
being criticized publicly. While such statements are undoubtedly offensive
and may be embarrassing or upsetting, Florida courts have repeatedly
held, as stated above, that this type of speech does not rise to the level of

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causing substantial emotional distress. 	Similarly, in Shannon, the court
held that even conduct causing embarrassment in a professional setting
does not meet the statutory threshold. 	278 So. 3d 173, 175-76 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2019).
Nor do the communications here approach the type of “extreme and
outrageous” conduct required to satisfy the standard. 	Florida courts
reserve that label for behavior far more severe—such as repeated, intrusive
surveillance or conduct that invades a person’s physical sense of security.
See Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633. 	By contrast, the communications here
were electronic, intermittent, and easily avoidable—demonstrated by the
fact that Wife blocked Girlfriend’s number and did not respond to further
messages. 	Courts have recognized that a reasonable person is expected
to possess a degree of resilience in the face of unpleasant communications,
particularly where 	those communications can be ignored 	or avoided.
“Unpleasant, uncivil, and distasteful communications do not rise to the
level required to support a permanent injunction against stalking.” 	Id.
(citation modified).
As noted in Kaye, a reasonable person does not suffer substantial
emotional distress easily; the law requires a showing of something more
than worry or discomfort arising from a contentious relationship. 363 So.
3d at 1159. 	Section 784.048 is not triggered simply because a party feels
uneasy 	or 	wishes 	to 	prevent 	further 	unpleasant 	interactions. 	Mere
irritation, 	annoyance, 	embarrassment, 	exasperation, 	aggravation, 	and
frustration, 	without 	more, 	does 	not 	equate 	to 	‘substantial 	emotional
distress.’ 	See Shannon, 278 So. 3d at 175-76.
In sum, the record reflects a series of emotionally charged exchanges,
but not conduct that would cause a reasonable person to experience the
level of distress which section 784.048 requires. 	Thus, even accepting
Wife’s testimony that she felt threatened or lost sleep, the conduct does
not meet the objective threshold which section 784.048 requires as a
matter of law. 	See Johnstone v. State, 298 So. 3d 660, 665 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020); Rosaly, 346 So. 3d at 633. Because the alleged behavior amounts,
at most, to embarrassment, frustration, and interpersonal conflict, it does
not satisfy the objective standard for substantial emotional distress and,
therefore, cannot support the issuance of a stalking injunction.
2. The conduct served legitimate purposes
Conduct cannot constitute harassment if it serves a legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat (2024). 	“Conduct is legitimate when there is a

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reason for the conduct other than to harass the victim.” 	Gonzalez v.
Funes, 300 So. 3d 679, 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (citation modified).
Here, the record demonstrates that the communications at issue, even
if contentious or poorly worded, were not undertaken without purpose.
Rather, 	the 	communications 	were 	rooted 	in 	identifiable, 	legitimate
objectives falling outside of section 784.048’s definition of “harassment.”
Section 784.048 requires proof that the conduct “serves no legitimate
purpose,” and Florida courts have consistently interpreted that limitation
broadly, recognizing that human interactions, particularly those arising
out of domestic disputes, often carry mixed motives without becoming
unlawful. 	§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024).
The October 16 communication regarding child support is the clearest
example. 	Girlfriend contacted Wife to facilitate payment of child support
on the husband’s behalf, requesting the information necessary to complete
the transaction. 	Even if Girlfriend herself had no independent legal
obligation to make the payment, the communication plainly related to the
financial support of the husband’s and Wife’s minor child where Girlfriend
was involved in paying those financial obligations. 	Florida courts have
held that such communications are inherently legitimate. 	In Reid, for
example, the court concluded that messages concerning child support,
“although worded harshly,” served an underlying legitimate purpose and
therefore could not support an injunction. 	282 So. 3d at 152. 	Similarly,
in Gonzalez, the court recognized that a third party may have a legitimate
reason to involve herself in communications where the subject matter
concerns a shared financial or relational interest. 300 So. 3d at 683. Here,
Girlfriend’s involvement in transmitting child support on husband’s behalf
places her squarely within that principle.
The remaining communications likewise reflect purposes that courts
have 	deemed 	legitimate, 	even 	when 	expressed 	in 	an 	accusatory 	or
emotional 	manner. 	Much 	of 	Girlfriend’s 	messaging—particularly 	the
October 23 communications—was directed at telling Wife to cease contact
and to stay away following an incident involving Wife’s cousin. 	Florida
courts have expressly recognized that such communications serve a lawful
function. 	In Leach, the court held that contacting another person to
demand 	that 	they 	leave 	one’s 	relationship 	or 	personal 	affairs 	alone
constitutes a legitimate purpose. 	162 So. 3d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA
2015). This is notwithstanding the communication’s confrontational tone.
See Gonzalez, 300 So. 3d at 683. 	The same reasoning applies here. 	A
demand for distance, even if delivered with hostility, is not the kind of
purposeless harassment which section 784.048 contemplates.

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Importantly, the presence of anger, insult, or even an ulterior motive
does not negate legitimacy. 	As explained in Gonzalez, conduct remains
legitimate 	so 	long 	as 	it 	is 	driven 	by 	some 	reason 	other 	than 	pure
harassment, even if that reason is accompanied by personal animus. 300
So. 3d at 683. 	Human communications, especially those in strained
relationships, are rarely devoid of emotion. 	The law does not require
civility. 	Rather, the law requires only that the conduct not be wholly
without legitimate purpose.
Viewed in this light, the communications at issue—addressing child
support, responding to perceived interference, and demanding cessation
of 	contact—fall 	within 	the 	realm 	of 	legitimate, 	even 	if 	contentious,
interpersonal 	interaction. 	Because 	the 	communications 	were 	not
undertaken 	solely 	to 	harass, 	the 	communications 	cannot 	satisfy 	the
statutory requirement that the conduct serve “no legitimate purpose,” and
thus cannot support the issuance of an injunction for stalking.
C. Injunctions Are Not a Remedy for Interpersonal Conflict
The trial court’s ruling focused on the parties’ contentious relationship
and the perceived impropriety of Girlfriend’s communications stemming
from her involvement with husband and his personal affairs with Wife.
Though Florida courts have repeatedly cautioned against this practice in
other cases, the message bears repeating: stalking injunctions are not
designed to regulate contentious personal disputes.
The law draws a firm—but still misunderstood—line between conduct
that is unlawful and conduct that is simply unpleasant, offensive, or
emotionally charged. 	That distinction becomes especially important in
cases involving requests for injunctions against stalking, where courts are
frequently asked to intervene in deeply personal disputes.
At 	first 	glance, 	it 	is 	easy 	to 	see 	why 	someone 	embroiled 	in 	an
acrimonious relationship might turn to the courts for relief. 	Words are
exchanged, 	accusations 	are 	made, 	reputations 	feel 	threatened, 	and
emotions run high. The concern can be real. But the legal question is not
whether the conflict is intense, it is whether the conduct meets section
784.048’s definition of “stalking.” 	And that definition is intentionally
narrow.
Florida courts have long recognized that injunctions are extraordinary
remedies, not tools for refereeing personal disputes. 	In Logue, we made
this point plainly: injunctions are not available “to stop someone from
uttering insults or falsehoods.” 297 So. 3d 605, 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

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That principle reflects a broader judicial reluctance to transform everyday
conflict into legally actionable wrongdoing. Similarly, in Klemple, the court
cautioned that injunctions are not meant “to keep the peace between
parties who, for whatever reason, are unable to get along.” 	197 So. 3d
1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation modified). 	In other words, the
law does not—and cannot—guarantee harmonious relationships.
This restraint is rooted first in section 784.048 itself. 	Section 784.048
does not prohibit rude behavior, social media arguments, or even harsh
personal attacks. 	Instead, section 784.048 targets a specific kind of
conduct: repeated, directed actions that cause 1) substantial emotional
distress, and 2) serve no legitimate purpose. 	That standard excludes
much of what occurs in interpersonal disputes. 	Arguments between
neighbors, former romantic or business partners, disputes involving family
members, 	and 	emotionally 	charged 	communications 	often 	arise 	from
recognizable—if imperfect—human motives. 	Such communications may
be regrettable, but are not necessarily unlawful.
Section 	784.048’s 	requirement 	of 	“substantial 	emotional 	distress”
further underscores this limitation. 	Courts evaluate distress using an
objective standard, asking how a reasonable person would respond and
not how the affected individual before the court subjectively felt. 	As
explained in Rosaly, this standard is “narrowly construed.” 346 So. 3d at
633. 	The law assumes that reasonable people can withstand a certain
level 	of 	friction, 	insult, 	and 	discomfort 	without 	requiring 	judicial
intervention. 	Everyday emotions like embarrassment, anger, and anxiety
are part of the human condition. 	Section 784.048 is concerned only with
conduct that is so extreme it would overwhelm an ordinary person, not
merely upset them.
Another important limitation is the concept of “legitimate purpose.”
Human 	interactions, 	even 	contentious 	ones, 	often 	have 	underlying
reasons. 	A message about child support, a demand to cease contact, or
even a heated response to perceived wrongdoing may all serve legitimate
ends. As Gonzalez recognized, conduct does not lose its legitimacy simply
because the conduct is accompanied by anger or hostility. 	300 So. 3d at
683. 	This principle prevents section 784.048 from sweeping too broadly
and 	ensures 	that 	courts 	do 	not 	penalize 	individuals 	for 	engaging 	in
ordinary though less-than-perfect communication.
Overlaying all of this is a constitutional concern. 	Many interpersonal
disputes are carried out through speech: texts, emails, social media posts.
When a court issues an injunction restricting communication, the court is
not merely resolving a dispute—it is limiting expression. 	As noted in

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DiTanna, such orders can function as prior restraints on speech, which
are viewed with deep skepticism under the First Amendment. 	323 So. 3d
at 204. If courts were to issue injunctions whenever speech was offensive
or 	upsetting, 	they 	would 	risk 	suppressing 	protected 	expression 	and
overstepping constitutional boundaries.
A practical dimension also exists. 	Courts are institutions designed to
resolve legal disputes, not to manage ongoing personal relationships. 	If
injunctions 	were 	available 	whenever 	a 	relationship 	deteriorated 	into
hostility, the judicial system would become a forum for supervising human
behavior at its most personal level. 	Courts are not in the business of
monitoring arguments, policing tone, and adjudicating grievances that,
while real, are not legal violations. 	The law resists this role. 	Instead, the
law 	intervenes 	only 	when 	conduct 	crosses 	a 	defined 	threshold 	into
repeated, harmful, and unjustified behavior.
Ultimately, the limitation serves an important purpose. 	By reserving
injunctions for true stalking or harassment—by conduct that is repeated,
malicious, and seriously distressing—the law preserves the remedy for
those 	who 	genuinely 	need 	protection. 	At 	the 	same 	time, 	the 	law
acknowledges a difficult truth: not all harmful interactions are legally
remediable. 	Some conflicts must be managed outside the courtroom,
through personal boundaries, social consequences, or other legal avenues
better suited to address the dispute.
While a trial judge may understandably feel compelled to resolve the
full scope of a bitter and emotionally charged dispute brought into court,
the judge’s authority is not guided by sympathy or a desire to restore
harmony, but by the limits of the law itself. 	The judiciary’s role is not to
mediate every personal conflict or to impose civility where relationships
have broken down, but to determine whether the specific legal standards
established by the Legislature have been met. 	Again, as Florida courts
have cautioned, injunctions are not a means “to keep the peace between
parties who, for whatever reason, are unable to get along,” Klemple, 197
So. 3d at 1286, nor are injunctions available simply to restrain offensive
speech or interpersonal friction. 	Logue, 297 So. 3d at 614 (“[I]njunctions
are not available to stop someone from uttering insults or falsehoods.”).
However compelling the circumstances may appear, a judge must resist
the temptation to act beyond those bounds and instead apply the law as
written, granting relief only where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
The record here reflects precisely that type of acrimonious dispute.
Seciton 784.048, however, imposes a higher threshold that was not met.

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Section 784.048 exists to address specific, defined harms and where those
harms are not present, an injunction is not the appropriate remedy.
V. Conclusion
The record reflects a highly acrimonious dispute involving overlapping
personal 	relationships, 	accusations, 	and 	emotionally 	charged
communications. 	But 	section 	784.048 	requires 	more 	than 	hostility,
offensiveness, or discomfort. And, because the evidence does not establish
two 	separate 	instances 	of 	“harassment” 	supported 	by 	competent,
substantial evidence, the injunction was improperly entered and is hereby
reversed.
Reversed.
SHAW and L OTT , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.